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This study is an examination of how English courts have approached, or are likely to approach 
– and therefore, the effectiveness of – attempts by the parties to oil and gas contracts to allocate 
risks arising from the activities which form the subject matter of their respective contracts inter 
se.  The study utilises petroleum industry standard form offshore drilling contracts in the United 
Kingdom, Canada and the United States of America as the context for this analysis, and examines 
the risks associated with drilling and other incidental operations, in the light of catastrophic 
events such as the Macondo disaster in the Gulf of Mexico and the Montara disaster in the Timor 
Sea. y  
  
Drawing from the Economic Theory of Law espoused by Richard Posner, which correlates 
market behaviour, resource allocation and the legal system, and so conceptualises risk from a 
cost and utility perspective, the study will show that it is actually the economic consequences of 
the occurrence of an event that are being allocated, and that the entire notion of risk allocation 
is a determination of how the economic cost of the occurrence of the particular consequence will 
be borne by the parties to the contract.   
 
The study will conclude with a comparative analysis of risk allocation in the different model 
contracts, and an opinion on the success/effectiveness of the model contracts, as tools used by 
parties for risk allocation inter se, in response to the challenges created by legislative and judicial 
intervention.  Justification for this opinion will be given, with reference to relevant case law and 
statutes in the different jurisdictions. 
 
Recommendations will be made on how the risk allocation structure can be improved, either by 






approach (where applicable), and proposing a balance in the instances in which, from the study’s 
perspective, the allocation formula is skewed, either due to the imbalance of power between the 









That extractive activities in upstream oil and gas are fraught with a lot of risks is no longer news; 
this awareness has existed from the very beginnings of endeavours in this regard.  Progressively, 
the industry has continued to improve on the methods of conquering Mother Nature, going where 
the geology leads, and developing technology to meet the challenges encountered on this voyage.  
But the expected push-back from Mother Nature is not all that practitioners have to contend with; 
other risks are recognised, and attempts have been made to manage them as well. 
There is no denying the fact that the risks faced by parties to oil and gas contracts have increased 
in tandem with the complexities of doing business in general, as there are now more regulatory, 
compliance, operational and social requirements to fulfil.  This is especially true for drilling 
contracts.  Indeed, the nature of contracting at the inception of the petroleum industry, which 
gives an insight into the state of the industry as a whole, was so rudimentary, that Moomjian1 
indicated that a ‘state of naiveté’ prevailed, to such an extent that there were several instances 
where the drilling is under way, and sometimes completed before the contract is signed2 
(emphasis added). 
With increased complexities and risks in drilling contracts, parties have had to focus on 
mechanisms for allocating risks in a manner that achieves their individual contract objectives, 
while ensuring that specific risks are assumed by the parties best suited to manage them, all 
relevant factors considered.     
As straightforward as the above sounds, contractual risk allocation is no mean task.  The 
negotiation process through which risk allocation is achieved can sometimes be long drawn out, 
                                                 
1 Moomjian, C. A.  “Drilling Contract Historical Development and Future Trends Post-Macondo: Reflections on a 
35-year Industry History”, Paper presented at the IADC/SPE Drilling Conference in San Diego, on March 7, 2012, 
at p.2.  He was citing another publication: ‘Insurance – A Necessity for Drilling Contractors’, The Drilling 
Contractor Magazine, May 1945 Edition.  






rancorous and one-sided, with an outcome that leaves at least one party feeling that it has just 
been left with the rough end of the stick.  This is dependent on factors such as the balance of 
power between the parties, prevailing market/economic conditions, and affiliation of parties to 
drilling associations.  
The scenario is further complicated by the influence of external factors outside the parties’ 
control, such as the applicable law in the jurisdiction of choice of the parties, or the jurisdiction 
to which the contract is subject, as a matter of law.  Add to this the role of the courts, which is 
evident in pronouncements made on the subject matter, which have sometimes resulted in 
situations in which parties have been left picking up pieces of their contracts, bearing the full 
brunt of risks previously thought to be properly allocated to the other party. 
 
At the heart of every contract is the expectation that its contents will be enforced in line with the 
‘intention’ of the parties.  The principle of freedom of contract is recognised in common law, 
and as Atiyah3 argues, this arose from equating free market economy with contract law 
principles, which then provided the platform upon which individuals could trade among 
themselves based on their preferred terms and conditions.4  However, this freedom has been 
curtailed by judicial intervention and relevant principles of law, which for instance, subject 
contract terms and conditions to the reasonable man’s test of interpretation,5 as well as to the 
principles of substantive justice.6   
 
As internal and external factors continually interfere with the way in which parties have allocated 
risk in the contract, parties have responded by resorting to petroleum industry model contracts 
                                                 
3 Atiyah, P. S. (1979) The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract. Oxford University Press. 
4 Ibid, at p. 402. 
5 Per Lord Hoffmann in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 898. 
See also Arnold v Britton (2015) UKSC 36; (2015) AC 1619, at 5- 6 (with Lord Carnwath dissenting); and Lord 
Hoffmann in Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom (2009) UKPC 10. 






for the drilling of offshore wells to allocate the risks associated with drilling and incidental 
operations, in the light of catastrophic events such as the Macondo disaster in the Gulf of Mexico 
and the Montara disaster in the Timor Sea.  Parties have sought to utilise the model contracts to 
overcome legislative and judicial hurdles, while preserving their – the parties – core intent and 
contract objectives. 
 
Given the global nature of the oil and gas business, it is inevitable that different model contracts 
are utilised, depending on the prevailing law in the jurisdiction in which the work is sought to be 
performed, the balance of power between the parties, prevailing market/economic conditions, 
and the affiliation of parties to drilling associations.   
 
Model contracts have been proposed by regional drilling associations to guide contract 
negotiations between parties. These model contracts are, at best, guidelines that can be adopted 
and/or adapted by the parties in line with the realities of their contracting circumstances.   
 
Thus, in the United Kingdom, Oil & Gas UK,7 the representative body of the UK offshore oil 
and gas industry, has, through LOGIC,8 its not-for-profit wholly owned subsidiary, developed 
model contracts,9 including the Mobile Drilling Rigs Contract, Edition 1, primarily intended to 
guide parties in their negotiations with respect to offshore drilling operations proposed to be 
carried on within the United Kingdom Continental Shelf.  The document can also be utilised 
outside the United Kingdom, subject to such amendments as may be necessary to give effect to 
the contract in a manner that complies with the laws of the governing jurisdiction of the contract. 
 
                                                 
7 http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/about-us.cfm   
8 Leading Oil and Gas Industry Competitiveness (UK), operates as the custodian for cross-industry projects that aim 
to increase the efficiency of working practice in the United Kingdom Continental Shelf (known as the UKCS): 
http://www.logic-oil.com/ 
9 https://www.logic-oil.com/content/standard-contracts-0 Standardisation of contracts is an objective initially 
introduced in the 1990s by the CRINE (Cost Reduction in New Era) initiative, with the aim of reducing costs by 






In United States of America, the International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) has 
developed model contracts for onshore and offshore drilling campaigns, and further distinguishes 
between model contracts for domestic use within the United States of America and international 
use.10  Different model contracts have also been developed for offshore drilling, depending on 
whether the activity is to be undertaken as a daywork contract,11 a footage contract12 or a turnkey 
contract.13 
 
In Canada, the Canadian Association of Oilwell Drilling Contractors (CAODC) and the 
Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) have developed model contracts that are 
mostly utilised within Canada.  The CAODC/CAPP Master Daywork Contract,14 for instance, 
which applies to offshore drilling, was negotiated and agreed between both associations, and 
came into existence in May 2001.  This was further updated in 2004, and is generally utilised as 
the baseline for offshore drilling operations in Canada. 
 
In addition to these, some operators and drilling contractors have also designed their own model 
contracts, and the ability of parties to amend them during negotiation (and the extent thereof) is 
also dependent on the balance of power between them, as the well as the prevailing 
market/economic conditions at the time at which the work is sought to be executed. 
 




11 A ‘day-rate’ or ‘daywork’ contract provides that the drilling contractor be paid a stipulated price (rate) for work 
performed at the direction of the operator over a 24-hour period, with the contractor assuming only specified risks: 
Calkins, ‘The Drilling Contract – Legal and Practical Considerations’, 21 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 285, 288 (1975), 
cited by Anderson, O. L. (1989) ‘The Anatomy of an Oil and Gas Drilling Contract’, Tulsa LJ, 25, pp. 359-533, at 
p.16. 
12 A ‘footage’ contract provides that the drilling contractor be paid a stipulated price per foot of hole drilled from 
the surface through the total: ibid. at p.18. 
13 A ‘turnkey’ contract provides for the drilling contractor to be paid a stipulated price for drilling a well to a specified 








Risk factors are potential areas of conflict in a contract, and the complexities inherent therein 
can escalate, especially when adversity strikes. As the boundaries of global business disintegrate, 
and commerce is carried on between parties in different parts of the world, the complexities in 
risk, and the allocation of risk, become even more apparent and present.  Add to this the fact that 
the parties may be utilising model contracts with which they are not familiar, ostensibly designed 
for a different jurisdiction, and which may admittedly be subject to different regulatory 
regimes/jurisdictions, and by extension, different legal interpretations. 
   
A review of the case law and literature on this subject shows that different model contracts 
contain provisions that embody differing approaches to risk allocation. Risk managers are 
inevitably forced to assess risks under many different drilling contract forms,15 and can 
sometimes misunderstand the scope and reach of the relevant risks, as well as the party to whom 
particular risks have been allocated.   Determining the party who is better able to bear and 
manage allocated risks, and issues of risk sharing, as well as the judicial treatment and approach 
of courts to risk allocation, have proved to be problematic, especially regarding the enforcement 
of indemnities, insurance, exclusions and limitation of liability. 
  
This study will examine whether the attempt by the parties to allocate risks between themselves, 
through the instrumentality of model contracts, in response to the challenges created by 
legislative and judicial intervention, has been successful and/or effective.  This examination is 
from an English law perspective, and would inevitably be made by reference to the very same 
institutions – legislature and judiciary – in the English courts, and their response and attitude to 
the model contracts. 
                                                 
15 Foster, S. J., Gibbie, K. W., Mason, D. C. and Baron, S. L. ‘Risks Assumed In Drilling Contracts: Global 








The central objective of this study is to examine whether the attempt by the parties to oil and gas 
contracts, and in particular, offshore drilling model contracts in the United Kingdom, Canada 
and the United States of America to allocate risks between themselves, has been successful 
and/or effective in the light of the challenges created by legislative and judicial intervention.   In 
this regard, this study will: 
1. Investigate the correlation, similarities and differences that exist among the model contracts, 
with a view to understanding how risks are allocated therein. 
 
2. Discuss perspectives of risk allocation from the standpoints of the parties. 
 
3. Examine the different contractual tools that are utilised in the different model contracts to 
allocate risk, such as indemnities, insurance, exclusions, and limitation of liability. 
 
4. Develop a matrix of the risks to be allocated.  
 
5. Examine potential areas of confusion in the allocation of such risks, and propose measures 
that infuse clarity. 
 
6. Examine potential problems arising from the way in which such risks have been allocated, 
discuss how the courts and legislature might address these problems, and identify possible 
solutions thereto.  
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 






How effectively have parties to oil and gas contracts, and in particular, offshore drilling model 
contracts in the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States of America allocated risks 
inter se, considering legislative and judicial approaches thereto? 
In the context of this study, ‘effectiveness’ would be assessed by the success of the parties in 
allocating risk inter se, in a manner that stands up to judicial and legislative scrutiny, from an 
English law perspective, while taking into consideration the party best able to bear a given risk.  
Flowing from this, the following sub-questions will also be addressed: 
1. What similarities and differences exist in the perspectives of risk allocation between the 
operator and contractor under the different offshore drilling model contracts? 
 
2. What risks are inherent in the selected regional offshore drilling model contracts, and how 
are these risks allocated between the operator and the contractor? 
 
3. How might the English courts and legislature respond to the attempt by parties to the offshore 
drilling model contracts to allocate risks among themselves? 
 
4. How can risk allocation be harmonised under the different model contracts, especially 
regarding the treatment of indemnities, insurance, exclusions, and limitation of liability? 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study is an analysis of the contractual allocation of risk under petroleum industry offshore 
drilling model contracts, and is essentially an examination of how English courts and legislature 
have approached, or are likely to approach (and therefore, the success and/or effectiveness of) 
attempts by the parties to petroleum industry model form contracts for the drilling of offshore 






catastrophic events such as the Macondo disaster in the Gulf of Mexico and the Montara disaster 
in the Timor Sea. 
This study is a doctrinal research (with certain non-doctrinal elements) that utilises the 
comparative case study methodology.  Kaarbo and Beasley16 define comparative analysis as ‘the 
systematic comparison of two or more data points (‘cases’) obtained through use of the case 
study method’.17  They also confirm that case studies can be both qualitative as well as narrative, 
and do not necessarily need to rely on multiple sources of evidence in order to function.18 
    
Pickvance,19 validating the usefulness of comparative analysis as a research method, opines that 
its purpose is to obtain an informed understanding of events and their cause.20  He identifies two 
conventional types of comparative analysis (the first explains the rationale for similarities and 
differences between phenomena, and the other emphasises data collection), and proposes two 
additional types that reveal a pluralist approach and focus on emergent phenomena in different 
societies.21  This built on an earlier version of his work22 in which he argued that the focus on 
underlying causes expands the scope and use of comparative analysis as a research methodology. 
 
The choice of methodology is justified by the aim of this thesis, which is to undertake an analysis 
of the contractual allocation of risk under petroleum industry offshore drilling model contracts 
in the United Kingdom, United States of America and Canada.  From the available literature, 
                                                 
16 Kaarbo, J. and Beasley, R. K. (1999) ‘A Practical Guide to the Comparative Case Study Method in Political 
Psychology’, Political Psychology, 20(2), at pp. 369–391; also available online at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/0162-895X.00149/abstract  
17 Ibid, at p. 372 
18 Ibid, at p. 373 
19 Pickvance, C. ‘The Four Varieties of Comparative Analysis: The Case of Environmental Regulation’, Conference 
on Small and Large-N Comparative Solutions, University of Sussex, U.K., 22–23 September 2005 University of 
Sussex, U.K. 
20 Ibid, at p. 2. 
21 Ibid, at p. 6. 
22 Pickvance, C. G. (2001) ‘Four Varieties of Comparative Analysis’, Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 






this type of study is best undertaken utilising the chosen methodology, based on the objective of 
exploring similar and dissimilar phenomena in the different model contracts by using similar 
parameters.   
The research approach will be qualitative, with theoretical and descriptive components that 
highlight perspectives of operators and contractors to the contractual allocation of risk under 
petroleum industry offshore drilling model contracts, while examining specific subjects that aid 
in answering the research questions. 
To undertake this research, a comparison framework has been developed, which is made up of: 
 The outline of the model contracts, particularly with respect to certain provisions23 that were 
selected based on their criticality in examining risk allocation regimes; 
 
 Judgements of the courts in the countries in which the model contracts that are the subject 
of this research have been developed; 
 
 Selected legislation in the countries in which the model contracts that are the subject of this 
research have been developed, and that address allocation of risk in commercial contracts, 
and especially those that impact offshore drilling contracts;  
 
 Doctrines of law (such as conscionability, freedom of contract and public policy) which 
guide the courts in reaching decisions; and 
 
                                                 
23 Loss of Life and Injury to Personnel; Loss of/Damage to Surface and Sub-Surface Equipment; Consequential 
Losses; Depreciation of In-Hole Equipment; Pollution (Arising Below and Above Surface of Ground); Liability for 
Third Parties; Formation Damage; Loss of Hole and Wild Well Liability; Patent Infringement; Debris Removal; 






 Principles of industry practice (for instance, the doctrine of Tradition24), which, though not 
law, have been ‘accepted’ by the oil and gas industry and evidenced by long and sustained 
practice, as being applicable to offshore drilling contracts. 
The research draws on three discrete economic theories: 
(a) The theory of risk and reward25 which posits that parties, as rational people, will accept 
higher risk as long as this translates into higher profits that surpass the cost of capital 
attendant upon the increased risk.  
 
(b) The neoclassical26 theory of incentives27 that parties, as rational people, will act in a manner 
that maximises utility, and will keep doing this so long as there is an incentive to do so. 
 
(c) The transactional efficiency28 theory, which measures risks in terms of transactional costs, 
as well as the utility or disutility resulting from a given event.  The objective here is to 
achieve transactional efficiency, and a crucial way of doing this is to determine which party 
is best situated to bear a given risk. 
                                                 
24 Cited in Rankin, M. D. and Richardson, D. R. ‘The Offshore Drilling Contract-Operator and Contractor 
Perspectives’, IADC/SPE 1983 Drilling Conference, New Orleans, Louisiana, February 20–23, 1983. Texas, USA: 
Society of Petroleum Engineers, 1–8.  The doctrine of tradition operates on the premise that risk for designated 
personnel, equipment and procedure is usually assigned to the contractor, leaving the other obligations/risks to be 
allocated between the parties, in the absence of which any unallocated risk will default to the operator. 
25 See, for example, Burke, M., Nicholas P., (2010) Risk versus Reward Capital Markets: Indonesia Dispute 
Resolution. 29 Int'l Fin. L. Rev. 25 2010–2011, p. 25; Millage, A. (2007) ‘Risk and Reward’, The Internal Auditor, 
64(5), p. 6; Albion, M. S. (2008) More Than Money: Questions Every MBA Needs to Answer: Redefining Risk and 
Reward for a Life of Purpose. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers; Quartz, S. R. (2009) ‘Reason, Emotion 
and Decision-Making: Risk and Reward Computation with Feeling’, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(5), at pp. 
209–215. 
26 Neoclassical theory is based on three fundamental assumptions: (i) people have rational preferences among 
outcomes; (ii) individuals maximise utility and firms maximize profits; and (iii) people act independently on the 
basis of full and relevant information.  See, for example, Weintraub, E. R. (1993). ‘Neoclassical Economics’ in 
Henderson, D.R. (ed.) The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. Library of Economics and Liberty: 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/NeoclassicalEconomics.html; accessed 14 June 2016. 
27 See, for example, Althaus, C. E. (2005) ‘A Disciplinary Perspective on the Epistemological Status of Risk’, Risk 
Analysis, 25(3), pp. 567–588, at p. 573. 
28 See, for example, Diamond, P. A. (1974) ‘Posner's Economic Analysis of Law’, The Bell Journal of Economics 






Drawing from these theories, which correlate market behaviour, risk shifting, resource allocation 
and the legal system, and so conceptualise risk from cost and utility perspectives, the study will 
show that it is actually the economic consequences of the occurrence of an event that are being 
allocated, and that the entire notion of risk allocation is a determination of how the economic 
cost of the occurrence of the particular consequence will be borne by the parties to the contract.  
The focus on economic consequences recognises that other consequences may be triggered by 
the occurrence of an event – legal, factual, reputational – which could have different 
implications and effect in contrast from the economic consequences of the occurrence of a given 
event. 
 
Secondary data will be utilised for this research, and will be sourced from case law, academic 
journals, previous research, legal textbooks, contract documents, legal opinions and legislation.   
 
The research methodology will answer the research questions relating to effectiveness of the risk 
allocation between the parties, as the comparison framework draws on the relevant parameters 
that address judicial and legislative responses to the allocation, while the theories will address 
the question as to whether risk has been allocated to the party that is best able to bear a given 
risk. 
SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This study will focus on the different types of drilling contracts29 already identified.30  Given the 
fact that these types of contracts can be utilised, either offshore, on land or in seasonally swampy 
terrain, this study will concentrate on offshore drilling contracts. 
   
                                                 
29 Daywork, Turnkey and Footage contracts, supra. 






Furthermore, the geographical regions to be examined are the United Kingdom, Canada and the 
United States of America. These regions have been chosen because the model forms that have 
been developed by the regional associations31 are most commonly utilised in practice globally.  
Thus, these forms, inclusive of a model developed by a major international oil company, are 
reflective of the global spread of the types of contracts utilised for offshore drilling.  
Although experiences and parallels may be drawn from other regions in the course of this study, 
the focus will remain on the primary areas of the comparative analysis.  
ORIGINALITY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
There is no literature that compares offshore drilling model contracts developed by drilling 
associations in the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States of America, and from the 
perspectives, or based on the theories that are the subject of the current research.  Furthermore, 
this research contains detailed analysis of the subject-matter, especially on the relevant sub-
elements (such as the compendium of risks in the drilling contracts).  
 
In particular, this study will contribute to the current state of knowledge in the following ways: 
1. Enriching the understanding of risk allocation in the offshore drilling model contracts from 
the perspectives of parties. 
 
2. Providing detailed insight into similarities and differences in the model contracts, in the 
geographical regions under consideration. 
 
3. Enhancing the model contract selection process by parties, through the detailed analysis of 
the pros and cons of each model contract vis-à-vis the objectives sought to be achieved vide 
the contract. 
                                                 
31 Mobile Drilling Rigs Contract, Edition 1, developed by Oil & Gas UK, through LOGIC; daywork, footage and 
turnkey contract models developed by the International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) in the USA; 
and the CAODC/CAPP Master Daywork Contract developed by the Canadian Association of Oilwell Drilling 







4. Generating improved discourse between parties on the different regimes of indemnities, 
insurance, exclusions, and limitation of liability in the different model contracts, helping 
them refine and define their common intention, aligning this with extant legal jurisprudence 
on the subject area. 
 
5. Proposing possible judicial and legislative approaches to problems arising from the way in 
which risk has been allocated by parties to the model offshore drilling contracts, and possible 
solutions thereto. 
 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Although this study is meant to provide a theoretical framework for contractual risk allocation 
in offshore drilling contracts, it recognises that actual drilling activities will take place pursuant 
to the clauses under consideration.  Thus, the study will be approached with a practical flavour, 
which makes it relevant to industry as well as researchers who are interested in this field of study. 
 
In this regard, this study is divided into seven chapters.  Chapter 1 sets the stage for the study by 
examining the theoretical and jurisprudential understanding of risk as a concept.  Like other 
similar concepts, risk does not admit of a single or commonly accepted definition, but can be 
approached from different perspectives, depending on whose world view is being considered. 
However, before starting the definitive journey, it is worthwhile to distinguish ‘risk’ from other 
related concepts that could, in certain instances, be construed as being the same thing, and have 
been used interchangeably in different contexts. 
 
Thus, ‘risk’ is contrasted with concepts such as ‘uncertainty’, ‘hazard’ and ‘probability’. An 
early understanding of what is considered as ‘risk’ properly so called, is germane to the overall 






judicial, epistemological, economic – highlighting the preferred approach, which also serves as 
the basis of consideration of the subject.  An overview of risks in general is also presented.  While 
acknowledging that risks can be categorised in different ways, the ‘PESTLEO’32 approach is 
preferred as it enables detailed focus to be given to each head of risk, together with how they 
interface, one with the other. 
 
Thereafter, the study examines different strategies for managing risks in general, not from any 
particular perspective. Examples are drawn from different sources, the aim being to establish 
risk allocation as one, and not the only, strategy for managing risk, between parties to a contract.  
The study shows that risk allocation usually occurs in conjunction with other strategies and, 
though largely a formal process, can also occur by default. 
 
This part of the study is wrapped up by considering insurance as a risk management strategy, 
and considers the different aspects of insurance that impact on contractual risk allocation, even 
though it occurs outside, but may be required by, the subject drilling contract, focusing on the 
‘additional insured’ status and benefits of being conferred with this status, as well as the crucial 
role it plays in ensuring the efficacy of indemnification provisions in the contract.  
 
Having established what risk is in general and, by extension, what it is not, Chapter 2 introduces 
the drilling process and drilling contract, situating these within the petroleum oilfield lifecycle, 
and highlighting the specific risks that arise from the drilling process.  This chapter lays the 
foundation for further discourse on the risks that contract parties allocate inter se in the drilling 
contract, and focuses on the offshore drilling contract after the discussions on risk allocation in 
contracts in general.  The point must be made that the offshore drilling contract is, first and 
foremost, a contract, and so subject to the normal rules, interpretations and limitations to which 
                                                 






contracts ordinarily defer.  This chapter also deals with the dynamics of the relationships between 
the operator, non-operator and contractor.  Although the non-operator may not be a party to the 
drilling contract, their role and status as co-venturers with the operator in the Joint Operating 
Agreement (JOA) means that they have an interest in the drilling contract.  The nature of this 
interest, as well as the implications for their relationship with the contractor will be discussed in 
detail.  
 
Chapter 3 analyses the legal framework for risk allocation, starting with the bedrock positions 
that existed prior to the current contractual and legislative intervention.  Essentially, it will 
examine how the courts allocated risk between contract parties in the absence of contractual 
and/or legislative provisions. 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on the contractual response to the way in which the courts allocated risk, 
highlighting the different mechanisms for the actual allocation of risks between parties.  This 
chapter builds on the preceding chapters that set the conceptual foundation for understanding 
risk and the legal framework for allocating it.  This section commences by taking a detailed look 
at the various ways by which the parties negotiate their contractual risk portfolio.  In this vein, 
detailed examination of indemnities, insurance, exclusions and limitation of liability, which 
define the risk structure in the contract, is undertaken.  Reference is made to case law and the 
different perspectives and arguments that parties make to buttress their preferred outcomes when 
the mechanisms are utilised. 
 
Chapter 5 deals with legislative intervention in the way in which the parties allocate risk 
contractually.  The underlying bases for the intervention are discussed, together with the impact 
that each intervention sought to make.  This chapter undertakes an analysis of the interventions 
made by the legislature in the risk allocation process, taking into consideration the higher calling 






including the State and third parties, who may be impacted by the contract.  The role of the 
legislature in walking a fine line between preserving the ‘intention’ of the parties, as expressed 
in their contract, and ensuring that the outcomes cohere with extant law and practice will be 
examined in detail. 
 
Having established the different risk perspectives of the parties, Chapter 6 dissects the different 
model contracts, and then proceeds to consider the risk allocation formula adopted in each of 
them in seriatim.  As part of this section, the model contract from a major international oil 
company, which has been utilised in practice, is also considered and analysed with reference to 
the risk allocation structure for the identified risks.  The study will propose a matrix of the risks 
and how they are allocated in the different model contracts, highlighting areas in which 
confusion exists, and proffers positions and outcomes that will aid the state of knowledge in this 
regard. 
 
Chapter 7 undertakes a comparative analysis of model offshore drilling contracts.  In this chapter, 
the study compares the model contracts with reference to the risk allocation methods, noting 
similarities and differences, and referring to case law where relevant.  A discussion on how the 
English courts have responded to the risk allocation structures in the different model contracts is 
a highlight of this section, also leveraging the discussions in the previous chapters, where 
necessary.  This chapter culminates with the outcome of the comparative analysis, and an opinion 
on the success or effectiveness of the model contracts, as tools used by contract parties for risk 
allocation, in response to the challenges created by legislative and judicial intervention.  
Justification for this opinion is given, with reference to relevant case law and statutes in the 







The CONCLUSION summarises the discussions in the study, and highlights the contributions 
that this study makes to the existing body of knowledge on the subject matter that it covers.  It 
also suggests the area in which future research is possible.      
 







UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPTS OF RISK AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the study focuses on the theoretical approaches to risk and risk management.  
This focus is based on the premise that a sound understanding of the underlying concept of risk 
is necessary in instituting a theoretical baseline in the approach adopted in this study.  This step 
is made more crucial by the fact that there are different disciplinary approaches to the concept 
of risk, given its pervasive nature and occurrence in various aspects of human affairs. 
 
The literature reveals that even within the same schools of thought, different writers have 
categorised risk in diverse ways, although it is sometimes possible to deduce the common theme 
that connects them theoretically. 
 
The approach of the courts and legislature to risk is also examined.  Their respective roles as 
adjudicators and legislators make it imperative to understand their perspectives, as the whole 
essence of the contractual arrangements between the parties to offshore drilling contracts, is that 
efficacy will be given to the commitments that they have ‘freely’ undertaken.  A divergence in 
approach and/or understanding between the parties to the offshore drilling contract and the court 
and/or legislature could result in interventions, interpretations and/or decisions that are 
unintended and unwanted. 
 
Risk has been distinguished from other concepts such as ‘uncertainty’, ‘hazard’, and 
‘probability’,33 the common thread running through the distinctions being the somewhat 
                                                 
33 Knight, Frank H. (1921), ‘Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit’. Boston, MA: Hart, Schaffner & Marx; Houghton Mifflin 
Co. Library of Economics and Liberty [Online] available from 






measurable or calculable nature of risk, which is conflated with the ability to manage this by 
accepting, transferring, allocating and/or mitigating it. These concepts are examined in this 
section to enhance the understanding of ‘risk’, avoiding the ideological divides that still exist as 
far as definitional approaches to the different concepts are concerned. 
 
Risk allocation is a method of risk management, and to situate this strategy properly within the 
risk management portfolio, an examination of other strategies is undertaken.  The aim is to show 
that risk allocation is one – and not the only – risk management strategy that parties could adopt 
to give effect to their contract, and that ‘allocation’ could sometimes be a shorthand way of 
describing the rest of the risk management strategies that are actually being executed by the 
parties, deliberately or otherwise. 
 
Given the focus of this study on contractual risk allocation, this section shows that, 
notwithstanding the theoretical approaches by the different writers, risk is context-dependent, 
and can only be truly understood, and given application, within specific event-driven contexts.  
The study posits that this context is an economic outcome, as the real essence of risk allocation 
is contractually to determine who will bear the economic consequences of the occurrence of the 
specific event.   
 
Furthermore, this chapter of the study demonstrates that the term ‘risk allocation’ is a misnomer, 
when considered from a contractual risk allocation perspective, as, from the literature it assumes 
that a risk event is being allocated,34 when, in actual fact, it is the economic consequences of the 
occurrence of an event that are being allocated.  Given the fact that several consequences could 
emanate from a certain event, this section shows that it is actually the economic consequences 
                                                 
34 See, for instance, the discussion by Moomjian, C. A. (2012), Op Cit, at p. 10, on the impact of Macondo on 






of the occurrence of an event that are being allocated, and that the entire notion of risk allocation 
is a determination of how the economic cost of the occurrence of the particular consequence will 
be borne by the parties to the contract. 
  
  
1.1 ‘Risk’ Contrasted with ‘Uncertainty’, ‘Hazard’ and ‘Probability’  
 
1.1.1 Risk and Uncertainty 
In spite of the definitional diversity of ‘risk’, there seems to be unanimity among the different 
writers about the nexus between risk and uncertainty.  Indeed, Hillson and Simon35 assert that 
‘everyone agrees that risk arises from uncertainty, and that risk is about the impact that uncertain 
events or circumstances could have on the achievement of goals’.36  Knight37 captures this 
relationship succinctly in his definition of risk:  
‘But uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar notion of risk, from 
which it has never been properly separated. The term ‘risk’, as loosely used in everyday speech 
and in economic discussion, really covers two things which, functionally at least, in their causal 
relations to the phenomena of economic organization, are categorically different … The essential 
fact is that ‘risk’ means in some cases a quantity susceptible of measurement, while at other times 
it is something distinctly not of this character; and there are far-reaching and crucial differences 
in the bearings of the phenomenon depending on which of the two is really present and operating 
… It will appear that a measurable uncertainty, or ‘risk’ proper, as we shall use the term, is so far 
different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in effect an uncertainty at all.’38 
                                                 
35 Hillson, D. and Simon, P. (2012), ‘Practical Project Risk Management: The ATOM Methodology’ (2nd ed); 
Management Concepts (http://www.atom-risk.com/books.html). 
36 Ibid, at p.3. 
37 Knight, Frank H. (1921), op cit. 






Other writers who establish the link between risk and uncertainty include Anderson et al,39 
Harrison40 and Holmes.41 
Knight’s construct draws a distinction between ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’, which he holds is the 
quantum of measurability of both concepts. Writers on the subject confirm the relationship 
between risk and uncertainty as stated by Hillson and Simon, but admit that the concepts are not 
theoretically identical.  Althaus42 captures this difference in these words: 
‘The idea is that risk and uncertainty both relate to the unknown, but that risk is an attempt to 
“control” the unknown by applying knowledge based on the orderliness of the world. 
Uncertainty, on the other hand, represents the totally random unknown and thus cannot be 
controlled or predicted’.43 
Indeed, some writers – Brown et al44 and Pasternack45 – have drawn a parallel between this 
representation of the ‘unknown’ with the now-famous statement credited to Donald Rumsfeld:46 
‘Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we 
know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are 
                                                 
39 Anderson, B.F.; Deane, D.H.; Hammond, K.R.; and McClelland, G.H., (1981), Concepts in Judgement in 
Decision Research, Praeger, New York defined risk and uncertainty as ‘A situation in which one knows only the 
probability of which of several possible states of nature has occurred or will occur’; cited in Maldonato, M. and 
Dell'Orco, S. (2011) Natural Logic: Exploring Decision and Intuition. Sussex Academic Press, p. 46. 
40 Harrison, E. F., 1995, The Managerial Decision-Making Process; Houghton-Mifflin, USA defined ‘risk’ as ‘A 
common state or condition in decision making characterised by the possession of incomplete information regarding 
a probabilistic outcome’, and ‘uncertainty’ as ‘An uncommon state of nature characterised by the absence of any 
information related to a desired outcome’; cited in Macmillan, F. (2000) Risk, Uncertainty and Investment Decision-
Making in the Upstream Oil and Gas Industry. Aberdeen University, p. 12.  
41 Holmes, P., 1998, Investment Appraisal, International Thomson Business Press, London defines risk as ‘A 
situation which refers to a state where the decision-maker has sufficient information to determine the probability of 
each outcome occurring’ and uncertainty as ‘A situation where the decision-maker can identify each possible 
outcome, but does not have the information necessary to determine the probabilities of each of the possibilities.’ 
cited in Macmillan, F. (2000) Risk, Uncertainty and Investment Decision-Making in the Upstream Oil and Gas 
Industry. Aberdeen University, p. 12. 
42 Althaus, C. E. (2005) ‘A Disciplinary Perspective on the Epistemological Status of Risk’, Risk Analysis, 25(3), at 
pp. 567– 588. 
43 Ibid, at p. 569. 
44 Brown, T., and Innocent, T (2013), ‘Making Sense of Uncertainty – Why Uncertainty is Part of Science’, Sense 
About Science at p.7. 
45 Pasternack, A. (2013), ‘The Rumsfeld Uncertainty Principle’, published online by Motherboard; 
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-epistomologist-from-hell accessed 24 February 2016. 
46 Donald Henry Rumsfeld is an American politician and businessman. He served as the 13th Secretary of Defense 
from 1975 to 1977, under President Gerald Ford, and as the 21st Secretary of Defense from 2001 to 2006 under 






known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are 
also unknown unknowns – the ones we don't know we don't know.’47 
This concept of ‘unknown unknowns’ is equivalent to the Black Swan concept postulated by 
Taleb.48  Taleb’s ‘Black Swan’ event is one that is impossible to predict, which nevertheless has 
a high impact upon occurrence.  He disputes the theory that uncertainty can be measured, stating 
that the attempt to use mathematics to achieve this amounts to an ‘intellectual fraud’.49  His view 
is that the better way to approach ‘Black Swans’, given their unpredictability, is to adjust to, and 
accept their existence, instead of attempting to predict or measure them. 
1.1.2 Risk and Hazard 
 
‘Risk’ has also been contrasted from ‘hazard’, even though these terms have been used inter-
changeably in some literature.  For instance, the Compact Oxford English Dictionary for 
Students defines ‘hazard’ as ‘danger or risk of danger …’50  Ferguson et al51 define ‘hazard’ as 
‘an agent of harm (e.g. HIV) and perceived risk is the subjective estimate that exposure to the 
hazard will be harmful’.  This perception of hazard as a potential source of harm is also accepted 
by the Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety, an agency of the Government of 
Canada. It defines ‘hazard’ as ‘any source of potential damage, harm or adverse health effects 
on something or someone under certain conditions at work’.52  Again, the Trades Union Congress 
                                                 
47 Seely, H. (2010) Pieces of intelligence: The Existential Poetry of Donald H. Rumsfeld. Simon and Schuster, p.2.  
This statement was made in response to a question at a U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) news briefing on 12 
February 2002 about the lack of evidence linking the government of Iraq with the supply of weapons of mass 
destruction to terrorist groups.  Although Rumsfeld is credited with this statement, there are suggestions that this 
may not be original to him; William Robert Graham is thought to be the author of this phrase, and Rumsfeld himself 
admits as much in his memoir, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (2011), at p. xiv, where he states that he first heard 
a variant of the phrase ‘known unknowns’ from Graham. 
48 Taleb, N. N. (2007), The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. Random House. 
49 Ibid, at p. 2. 
50 Supra, at p. 465. 
51 Ferguson, E., Farrell, K., Lowe, K. C. and James, V. (2001), ‘Perception of Risk of Blood Transfusion: 
Knowledge, Group Membership and Perceived Control’; Transfusion Medicine, Volume 11, Issue 2, pp 129–
135, April 2001; http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1046/j.1365-3148.2001.00295-4.x/full; accessed 24 
February 2016. 
52 Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety, published online at 






(TUC) of the United Kingdom approaches the distinction between risk and hazard by stating that 
‘A hazard is something that can cause harm, e.g. electricity, chemicals, working up a ladder, 
noise, a keyboard, a bully at work, stress, etc. A risk is the chance, high or low, that any hazard 
will actually cause somebody harm’.53 
Flowing from the above, the New Health Advisor54 ties it all together in its statement: 
‘In essence, a hazard will not be risky unless you are exposed to enough of it that it actually 
causes harm; the risk itself may actually be zero or it may be greatly reduced when precautions 
are taken around that hazard.  The simple relationship between the two is that you have to have 
exposure to a hazard to experience a risk. Thus, it is vital that you know the level of exposure 
you are going to have to the hazard to better understand how much risk is actually involved.55 
From the definitions above, certain conclusions can be deduced.  First, the distinction between 
risk and hazard that is self-evident from these definitions is the fact that hazard has a negative 
connotation, while risk could be either positive or negative.  Secondly, it also seems fair to 
suggest that every risk that eventuates into a negative outcome is probably due to a hazard, but 
that not every hazard will eventuate into a risk properly so called, and especially if the right risk 
management measures are taken. 
1.1.3 Risk and Probability 
 
‘Risk’ has also been distinguished from ‘probability’.  Although many definitions of risk are 
made with reference to probabilities – such as those of Anderson et al,56 Harrison,57 Holmes58 
                                                 
53 ‘What Is The Difference Between A Hazard and A Risk?’, WorkSMART, online publication by the , accessed at 
https://worksmart.org.uk/health-advice/health-and-safety/hazards-and-risks/what-difference-between-hazard-and-
risk on 25 February 2016. 
54 ‘Difference Between Hazard and Risk’, online publication by the New Health Advisor, 
http://www.newhealthadvisor.com/Difference-Between-Hazard-and-Risk.html accessed 25 February 2016. 
55 Ibid, at http://www.newhealthadvisor.com/Difference-Between-Hazard-and-Risk.html  
56 Anderson, B.F.; Deane, D.H.; Hammond, K.R.; and McClelland, G.H., (1981), Concepts in Judgement in 
Decision Research, supra. 
57 Harrison, E. F., 1995, The Managerial Decision-Making Process, supra. 






and The Royal Society59 – the two concepts can be distinguished theoretically.  The Compact 
Oxford English Dictionary for Students defines ‘probability’ as ‘the extent to which something 
is likely to happen, or be the case …’60  One of the earliest attempts to define probability was 
made by Bernoulli,61 who suggested that probability is ‘a “degree of confidence” that an 
individual attaches to an uncertain event, and that this degree depends on the individual’s 
knowledge and can vary from individual to individual’.  This approach takes the view of the 
subjectivity of probability, and is supported by Eisenberg,62 who states:  
‘By probability …, I mean the personal or subjective probability that a given actor assigns to the 
occurrence of a state, as opposed to the objective probability that the state will occur.’63 
However, writers such as Crovelli64 have also approached the concept from an objective 
perspective, defining ‘probability’ as: 
‘A measure of an objective, real, physical property of the world. According to this objective 
definition, we would conceive of probability as being something ‘out there’ in the world to be 
measured, recorded and analyzed in the same manner as we do with, for example, the hardness 
of different metals. Just as aluminium and cobalt have real physical differences that we can 
observe and measure, so too do things and events have different and real physical probabilities 
that we can observe and measure.’65 
 
A few deductions can be made.  First, the ‘unknown’, which can be neither predicted, measured 
nor managed, is deemed to represent ‘uncertainty’.  Secondly, ‘probability’ is the calculable 
                                                 
59 The Royal Society (1992), ‘Risk: Analysis, Perception and Management’, supra. 
60 Compact Oxford English Dictionary for Students, 3rd ed (2006), supra., at p. 810. 
61 Bernoulli, J., 1713, Ars conjectandi tractatus de seribus infinitis, Basel. 
62 Eisenberg, M. A., ‘Probability and Chance in Contract Law’ (1998) 45 UCLA Law Review 1005. 
63 Ibid, at p. 1007. 
64 Crovelli, Mark R., ‘Why the Definition of Probability Matters’ (Mises Institute, January 26, 2011), 
https://mises.org/library/why-definition-probability-matters accessed 26 February 2016. 






likelihood that a certain risk event will occur, and the parameter for calculation could be 
‘subjective’ or ‘objective’.   
From a contractual risk allocation perspective, this study has already taken the position that risk 
is context-specific and context-dependent.  Thus, any ‘uncertainty’ associated with ‘risk’ can be 
understood only within a specific context as well, and would relate more to the consequences 
rather than the event that precipitates them.  For instance, a drilling contract contemplates that a 
blowout could occur.  The factors that could cause a blowout, and the facts required to prove that 
it has indeed occurred, are known to the parties.  However, the element of a blowout, howsoever 
caused, that is uncertain is the extent of damage and, importantly, the amount of money required 
to remedy this occurrence, which would be borne by the party to whom this risk has been 
contractually allocated.   
Even in respect of the so-called ‘Black Swan’ events, the occurrence of the event is certain; the 
uncertainty is as to the economic consequence of the occurrence of the event.  If, by their nature, 
these events are uncontrollable, unintended, unforeseen and unforeseeable, it follows that the 
real worry is as to consequences and, specifically, economic consequences, as someone will still 
ultimately bear the economic burden of the occurrence of the event.    
Again, the probability factor is better conceptualised as the likelihood that a named party would 
be required to bear the economic burden of the consequences of an event, the focus being on the 
economic consequences rather than the event.  This viewpoint is supported by the recent 
introduction of the financial assurance regulations relating to the offshore petroleum and gas 
industry by the Australian government66 in response to the blowout at the Montara Wellhead 
                                                 
66 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) (‘OPGGSA’) is the foremost legislation that 
regulates Australia’s offshore petroleum and gas industry.  The financial assurance provisions of the OPGGSA were 
amended and came into effect in November 2013. By these amendments, a titleholder is required to maintain 
sufficient financial assurance, which empowers it to meet the costs, expenses and liabilities arising in connection 






Platform on 21 August 2009.67  That legislation allocates the financial responsibility of a 
catastrophe to the titleholder and, in this way, risk is equated to the probability of an economic 
outcome, which is seen from the focus of the regulations on the requirement for the titleholder 
to maintain monies sufficient to pay for any damage arising from any event related to its 
petroleum authorisation.  Thus, from the titleholder’s or contract party’s perspective, the real 
probability relates to the likelihood that he would be expected to make a payment for the 
consequences arising in the aftermath of an event, and this could be further granulated into the 
estimation of the sum of money likely to be expended.   
This is also why parties take out insurance, which addresses the real focus of risk in this regard 
as it provides the guarantee that the named party responsible for the economic consequence can 
actually make the requisite payments if and when the event occurs. 
1.2 Classification of Risk  
 
In this section, the different ways in which risk can be classified are examined, starting with the 
overview of risks in general.  These classifications highlight the risk factors that underpin the 
risk allocation mechanisms utilised in the drilling contracts which form the context of this study.  
For instance, pollution is an environmental risk that could arise in the course of drilling, and the 
parties would need to allocate this risk in a structured manner, utilising the risk allocation 
mechanisms discussed in this study.  Similarly, the discussion of the views of the different 
schools of thought provide the foundation for examining the manner in which the courts 
                                                 
to ensure that a titleholder has sufficient funds to pay for any damage arising from any event related to its petroleum 
authorisation. 
67 The Montara oil spill occurred after a blowout and fire at the H1 well on the Montara wellhead platform (WHP) 
on 21 August 2009.  The WHP is located in a remote area of the Timor Sea, approximately 250 km northwest of 
the Western Australian coast.  Although no lives were lost, the oil leak continued for 74 days, until mud was pumped 






approached risk allocation in cases where the contract parties or legislation failed to make this 
stipulation.  The perspectives of the Economic school of thought provide the background for the 
discussion on the efficiency of the manner of risk allocation adopted by contract parties which 
is fully examined in Chapter 4.              
1.2.1  Overview of Risks 
  
The attempt to classify risks would necessarily commence with an overview of the broad 
categorisation into the different types of risks possible.  Although in-depth analysis of this 
categorisation is outside the scope or interest of this study, it is helpful to discuss the types of 
risks for completeness and to give context to the discussions that follow hereafter. 
 
In this vein, this study will highlight the different types of risk following the PESTLEO68 
approach.  This approach recognises that there are other broad categorisations of risk,69 but the 
PESTLEO categorisation is preferred because of its wide coverage of all the risks arising from 
the drilling contract, especially the operational risks that are at the heart of this study. 
 
Thus, political risk has been defined as arising from interference by government with the 
operations of an organisation, which leads to a conflict between that organisation’s profit motive 
and the public interest.70  It is the type of risk to which investors, governments and corporations 
are exposed, and is engendered by political decisions, conditions or events that impact the 
profitability or the anticipated return on investment.  This interference is usually whimsical or 
                                                 
68 PESTLEO stands for ‘political, economic, social, technology, legal, environmental and operational’ risks. 
69 Some commentators prefer to discuss risk based on different approaches such as ETPS (‘economic, technical, 
political, and social’): Aguilar, F. J. (1967) Scanning the Business Environment. Macmillan.  Other approaches 
include: SEPE analysis (‘social, economic, political, and ecological’ risks); and STEEPLED (‘social, technology 
economic, environmental, political, legal, education and demographic’ risks). 
70 Faruque, A. A. (2011) Petroleum Contracts: Stability and Risk Management in Developing Countries. Dhaka, 






arbitrary, has the effect of jeopardising foreign investments71 and can occur at the macro or micro 
level of society.   
 
At the macro level, the risk affects the entire spectrum of society and does not target any specific 
project or business.72  It usually manifests as government instability, currency volatility, war or 
insurrection, regulatory and fiscal amendment, and systemic corruption.73  It is different from the 
micro-level political risk which is more project- or business-specific and would typically 
manifest as expropriation, nationalisation, contracts cancellation reneging on agreements.74   
 
Although some of these risks and actions arise in the ordinary course of government business, 
they may have profound implications on profitability, and sometimes affect the very essence of 
the contract.  In recognition of this fact, most drilling contracts contain provisions that protect 
the parties from the undesired effects of political risks, and these would include change-in-law 
provisions that typically allocate the risk of any such change to the operator. 
 
Economic risk arises when there are major changes in the economy that could impact the 
expected return on investment. This can be the result of changes in the goals of the country’s 
economic policy or their comparative advantage.75  Such changes occur at the macroeconomic 
level and manifest in conditions such as exchange rates and other government regulations.  
Sometimes, it also arises from political stability which can affect economic growth and 
confidence in the investment climate in the country.   
                                                 
71 Kinna, J. C. (1983) ‘Investing in Developing Countries: Minimisation of Political Risk’, Journal of Energy & 
Natural Resources Law, 1(2), at pp. 89– 99. 
72 Alon, I. and McKee, D. (1999) ‘Towards a Macro Environmental Model of International Franchising’, 
Multinational Business Review, 7(1), at p. 76. 
73 See, generally, Lambrechts, D. and Blomquist, L. B. (2017) ‘Political–Security Risk in the Oil and Gas Industry: 
The Impact of Terrorism on Risk Management and Mitigation’, Journal of Risk Research, 20(10), at pp. 1320– 
1337. 
74 Faruque, A. A. (2011) Petroleum Contracts: Stability and Risk Management in Developing Countries, supra, at 
p. 65. 
75 UKESSAYS 2013. Political and Economic Risk Analysis Case Study Macedonia Economics Essay. November 







At the micro-level, this risk relates to concerns that a project will not be commercially viable at 
a price that will offset its operating costs and service any debt obligations.  It also relates to the 
organisation’s ability to source for foreign exchange within a foreign country, and repatriate 
profits to the home country without undue restriction.   
 
The potential impact to the drilling contract would also be in terms of the fiscal regime applicable 
to the contract.  Parties would ordinarily take steps to allocate the risk of any changes in the fiscal 
regime, typically to the operator.  Contract parties can also utilise the force majeure clause to 
mitigate any extended effect that an unforeseen change in economic policy can have on the 
contract.76  Detailed discussion of force majeure is outside the scope of this study.  
 
Social risks are the potential negative effects to an organisation arising from its operations as 
well as interaction with its stakeholders.  These risks arise from the tension created by the 
organisation’s value chain, and tend to be more prevalent and inevitable in extractive industries.77  
In their quest to achieve corporate objectives, organisations may impact local community and 
other stakeholders negatively, leading to reactions that may be disruptive to the organisation’s 
activities or cause reputational repercussions.    
 
The organisation responds to this risk by undertaking its activities in a socially responsible 
manner, which attempts to strike a balance between sustainability and profitability.  The local 
communities and other stakeholders, including the relevant non-governmental organisations, 
must be engaged in a transparent and inclusive manner to address whatever concerns they have 
that fuel those tensions.  Failure to manage this risk and the engagement process effectively may 
                                                 
76 Lebeaupin v Richard Crispin & Co. (1920) 2 K.B. 714, at 719–720. 







lead to blockades, riots, negative publicity and, in extreme cases, threat to life and property.  
These conditions may give rise to the need to shut out stakeholders and protect the business and 
its people by utilising security services, which could lead to human rights abuses, further 
compounding the organisation’s problems, and denying it the licence to operate.78   
 
Within the context of the drilling contract, it is the operator’s responsibility to ensure that 
engagement with the host communities is carried on as detailed above.  In addition, the contract 
parties would typically embark on community-nominated projects as part of their corporate 
social responsibility – activities that demonstrate their commitment to improving the lot of the 
local community while minimising the impact of their activities thereto.79 
 
Technology risk is any potential for technology challenges to affect business, usually through 
service outages, regulatory non-compliance or breach of data integrity.80  Technology is crucial 
to supporting business activities in every sector of the economy, is an enabler for growth, 
innovation and market penetration, and can significantly reduce cost if deployed correctly.  
Reducing risk in this regard is a priority for businesses that depend on technology for different 
aspects of their value chain. 
 
These risks arise from different sources, and can be categorised as general risks, criminal risks 
or risks emanating from natural disasters.81  General risks manifest as viruses, spams, hardware 
or software malfunctions, or plain human error.  Criminal risks emanate from hackers, fraudulent 
                                                 
78 Also known as ‘LTO’, it represents the acknowledgment that an organisation has satisfied the requirements and 
conditions of the host community that entitles it to commence its extractive or manufacturing activities.   
79 See, generally, Jamali, D. and Mirshak, R. (2007) ‘Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Theory and Practice 
in a Developing Country Context’, Journal of business ethics, 72(3), at pp. 243–262. 
80 PwC (2017) Technology Risk. Online: PwC Network. Available at: https://www.pwc.co.uk/careers/student-
jobs/work-for-us/graduateopportunities/technology/digital-trust.html, accessed 6 December 2017. 
81 Queensland Government. (2016) What is an Information Technology Risk? Business Queensland Online: 
Queensland Government. Available at: https://www.business.qld.gov.au/running-business/protecting-






acts including stealing technology, dishonest or disgruntled staff or from password thefts.  
Natural disasters such as floods, fire and excessive heat can destroy or corrupt data or even the 
entire information technology architecture.  These risks have a negative impact on the 
organisation, and can cause varying levels of disruption to its activities. 
 
Organisations can address these risks by ensuring that they have business continuity plans in 
place.  These plans would typically include risk management plans which include measures to 
mitigate the effect of any of the risk events occurring.  They would also detail the nature of 
systems, firewalls and other protective measures to be implemented to safeguard the 
organisation.  The drilling contract would typically contain clauses requiring confidentiality of 
its contents, as well as prohibition from unlawful access.  Both parties would be in breach of 
their obligations under the contract if they failed to implement information technology systems 
which preserved the confidentiality of the contract and impugns the integrity of its contents. 
 
Legal risk arises from financial or reputational exposure to legal rules and regulation that impact 
the organisation, its procedures, relationships and market offerings, through either a 
misunderstanding or lack of awareness of the applicable rules and regulation, or by not taking 
due care to obtain the requisite knowledge and information.82  This exposure can relate to any of 
the organisation’s processes, but goes beyond these, as the conduct of individuals within the 
organisation can also trigger legal risk.  It can also arise from a failed transaction, a claim or 
counterclaim, negligence in protecting company assets or from a change in law.83  
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A significant legal risk that has emerged in recent times is the possibility of litigation in the home 
countries of transnational corporations by aggrieved members of the local population who feel 
that they are unable to get justice in their local courts.  These actions usually border on alleged 
human rights abuses or environmental pollution or degradation, and litigants can bring these 
actions based on the universal jurisdiction conferred by international law in certain 
circumstances relating to the contentious matters.84  Even though transnational organisations can 
sometimes defeat the claims in the courts of their home countries based on jurisdiction or 
procedural defects, the real cost of this exposure lies in the significant cost of defending these 
actions, the negative publicity, potential impact on their stock prices and the possibility of an 
out-of-court settlement with the aggrieved local community with which they still need to deal on 
an on-going basis. 
 
Within the context of the drilling contract, an additional risk exposure stems from the litigation 
that could be brought by either party, perhaps based on a disagreement arising from the method 
of risk allocation or any other matter encountered during drilling operations.  For instance, if 
parties have stated that liability would attach if wilful misconduct of supervisory personnel is 
established in certain circumstances, it becomes a contentious exercise to determine whether 
indeed the subject conduct fell short of the expectations of the contract, for which liability would 
attach. 
 
Environmental risk is the potential or actual threat of negative consequences on the environment, 
and living organisms, engendered by the activities of any entity, including an organisation, 
through wastes, resource utilisation and depletion, effluents, and emissions.  These activities 
expose plants and animals – including humans – to chemical, biological or physical harm, and 
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may impact air, water, or soil quality, sometimes affecting entire ecosystems.85  Environmental 
laws and regulations impact the entire value chain of the extractive industry, with a plethora of 
compliance requirements.  Given the vast number of conditions and legislation to be satisfied, 
there is a possibility that organisations may fail to comply with some of them, making 
environmental risk an exposure that most organisations face and would have to develop systems, 
processes and procedures to deal with. 
 
Compliance with the environmental regulatory requirements is not cheap.  Neither is non-
compliance.  Indeed, in recent times, this regulatory regime has attracted global attention, arising 
from greater awareness of the general populace as to what compliance standards are, and 
increased interest in ensuring that organisations undertake their activities in a way that is not 
harmful to the planet.  Businesses now have to factor in environmental compliance costs as an 
integral part of doing business, particularly in the extractive industries.86  Where they have failed 
to comply, there are stiff penalties and sanctions that attach to a finding of liability.87 
 
Within the context of the drilling contract, parties would typically allocate the risk of 
environmental pollution and non-compliance inter se, and the responsibility for bearing the 
economic consequences of pollution would depend on the causal factor, and from where it 
occurs.88  Furthermore, there are other compliance requirements – for instance the responsibility 
to obtain appropriate permits and licences for the drilling operations – which are allocated 
                                                 
85 Crawford Global Technical Services (2017) Environmental Risk: Defined. Online: Crawford Global Technical 
Services. Available at: https://crawfordgts.com/services/environmental-risk/environmental-risk-defined.aspx 
accessed 7 December 2017. 
86 Faruque, A. A. (2011) Petroleum Contracts: Stability and Risk Management in Developing Countries, supra, at 
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88 See, for instance, BP agreed to settle all the claims arising pursuant to the Macondo blowout for $21 billion – 
Gilblom, K. and Jordan, A. (2018) ‘BP’s $60 Billion Gulf Spill Tab Rises as Lawsuits Wind Down’, Bloomberg 
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between the parties.  Environmental responsibilities and compliance requirements are discussed 
in the study. 
 
Operational risk arises from the potential of loss due to people and/or systems error, inadequate 
and/or failed internal processes, or from external events.89  This exposure manifests as tax 
evasion, corruption, insider trading, harassment and discrimination, accounting errors, data entry 
and processing mistakes, vandalism and terrorism, among others.  Indeed, since operations cuts 
across the entire value chain of an organisation’s activities, the potential for risk is present in 
each transaction.   
 
Unlike other types of risk, operational risk can never really be eliminated because it arises from 
human beings, systems and processes that are inherently imperfect.  Thus, it is fair to say that it 
is inevitable that operational risk events will occur, and so an organisation must put measures in 
place to reduce the scope, extent, frequency and impact of their occurrence.  For instance, an 
organisation can set the level of exposure it is willing to absorb or tolerate from operational risks, 
and this is derived by balancing the costs of implementing additional controls that mitigate the 
exposure against the expected benefits of doing this, on one hand, and the potential cost of 
consequences if no additional measure is implemented, on the other hand.90 
 
Operational risks are rife within the context of the drilling contract.  The exposure to the risk can 
be attributed to the acts or omissions of the contract parties – the operator and contractor – or 
their respective contractors and/or employees.  Thus, the drilling contract anticipates this and 
allocates the economic consequences of the occurrence of the risk events inter se accordingly.  
For instance, human errors during drilling operations can arise due to incompetence of 
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employees, negligence, or wilful misconduct.  These causal factors, together with how they are 
dealt with in the drilling contract, are fully discussed in this study. 
 
1.2.2  Positivist and Constructionist Schools 
 
The overview in the foregoing section lays the foundation for the discourse on the theoretical 
foundations of risk.  As might be expected, there are several approaches to risk, with different 
writers proposing diverse risk classifications. In this regard, Renn91 classifies risk approaches 
into two schools of thought – positivist and social constructionist.  The positivist classification 
sees risk as ‘an objective property of an event or activity, and measured as the probability of 
well-defined adverse effects’.92  This classification aggregates approaches that view risk as 
objective measures of probability and magnitude of harm, and ranks them accordingly, enabling 
resources to be allocated to address greater risks first.  The views of writers such as Knight93 and 
Anderson et al94 would fit into this class. 
The social constructionist view sees risk as ‘a cultural or social construction, to be dealt with 
according to different criteria’.95  In this construct, and unlike the positivist class in which risk 
prioritisation is based on objective criteria, the social constructionist view consists of approaches 
in which risk priorities are determined by reference to subjective phenomena such as values and 
lifestyle preferences.  The views of writers such as Clark et al96 and Short97 belong to this class. 
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Lupton98 proposes another classification into three epistemological groups: The first of these is 
‘realists’, who view risk as ‘an objective hazard, threat or danger that exists, and can be measured 
independently of social and cultural processes’.99  This grouping is conceptually similar to the 
positivist school discussed earlier and, by extension, the writers already identified.  
The second class identified is the ‘weak constructionist’ group who conceptualise risk as ‘an 
objective hazard, threat or danger, that is inevitably mediated through social and cultural 
processes, and can never be known in isolation from these processes’.100  Closely related to the 
second group is the third group which Lupton calls the ‘strong constructionist’ class and which 
states that ‘nothing is a risk in itself, but what is understood as hazard, threat or danger is a 
product of historically, socially and politically contingent “ways of seeing”’.101 
The constructionists essentially argue that everything that is known about risk is inevitably 
bound up with our everyday experiences, and that the notion of risk being objective is a 
misnomer. Even the so-called expert opinions and studies are ultimately the product of social 
and cultural processes, and must be understood from that perspective.  The difference between 
the weak and strong positions espoused above is essentially in the extent to which cultural and 
social processes view the ‘hazard’ or harm element objectively.  So, while the ‘weak’ position 
accepts that risk could in itself be based on objective phenomena, it is only given expression, 
understanding and application within the socio-cultural context.  The ‘strong’ position maintains 
the socio-cultural influence but challenges the objective nature of risk. 
Althaus102 approached her classification from an epistemological perspective, exploring how 
different disciplines view risk.  Althaus postulates that ‘each discipline applies a particular form 
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of knowledge to uncertainty so as to order its randomness, and convert it into a risk 
proposition’.103  In this regard, she presented the world view from several disciplines, as well as 
what form of knowledge each applied to uncertainty to discern their construct of risk.  Although 
she does not classify the disciplines104 into broad categories based on their approaches to risk, it 
is possible to align individual approaches with already discussed classifications.  For instance, 
science and medicine apply principles and calculations to uncertainty and thus view risk as an 
objective reality, just like logic and mathematics.105  
In this regard, it can be safely deduced that these two disciplines would belong to Renn’s 
positivist school or Lupton’s realist school, and would include writers such as Burke,106 Cole,107 
and Adams,108 among many others.  Anthropology and sociology which respectively apply 
‘culture’ and ‘social constructs’ to uncertainty and view risk as a cultural phenomenon, would 
conceptually belong to the constructionist school.   
1.2.3  Economics School 
 
It is important to examine one of the disciplines proposed – economics – in more detail because 
of the important nexus that it has with this study, and the implications this worldview has on the 
approach adopted in this study. Accordingly, Althaus109 states that the economics discipline 
views risk as just another resource to be allocated and distributed. The proponents of this view 
contend that this perspective of risk focuses on reward and incentive, and is tied to monetary 
                                                 
103 Ibid, at p. 569. 
104 The disciplines are: Logic and Mathematics; Science and Medicine; Social Sciences (Anthropology, Sociology, 
Economics); Law; Psychology; Linguistics; History and the Humanities; the Arts; Religion and Philosophy. 
105 Ibid, at p. 569. 
106 Burke, J. (1991). Chances: The Probability Factors of Life, London: Virgin Books. 
107 Cole, L.A. (1993). Element of Risk: The Politics of Radon. Washington: AAAS Press. 
108 Adams, J. (1995), Risk; London: UCL Press. Accessed online at https://www.questia.com/read/103322786/risk  






value and utility.  Importantly, risk is deemed to be voluntarily taken, while any involuntary risk 
that threatens security should be insured.  Renn110 agrees, and posits that: 
‘Economic theory perceives risk analysis as part of a larger cost-benefit consideration, in which 
risks are the expected utility losses resulting from an event or an activity. The ultimate goal is to 
allocate resources so as to maximise their utility for society’.111 
Extending the cost–benefit argument, Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, et al112 make the connection 
between this (cost–benefit analysis) and probabilities, decision-analysis and uncertainty.  In this 
vein, they state that ‘probabilities’ are actually uncertainties about the present and future state of 
affairs, and that both cost–benefit analysis and decision analysis are based on probabilities.113  
The difference, however, is that while decision analysts view probabilities as expressions of 
individual beliefs, and are therefore judgements of the decision maker, cost–benefit analysis is 
based on more objective criteria.114 
This study views some elements of the constructionist perspective of risk as being closely aligned 
with the position already adopted herein.  The constructionists agree that risk is context-specific 
and derives meaning from socio-political processes.  However, their focus is still on events rather 
than on consequences; this is where their view contrasts with this study which views the real 
focus as being on economic consequences of the occurrence of the event. 
The economic view presents the most realistic picture of what is actually happening as far as 
contractual risk allocation is concerned.  The concept of risk as losses/resources capable of being 
                                                 
110 Op.Cit, at p. 62, citing Smith, V. K. 1986, “A Conceptual Overview of the Foundations of Benefit–Cost Analysis” 
In J. D. Bentkover, V. T. Covello, and J. Mumpower, eds. Benefits Assessment: The State of The Art. Dordrecht: 
Reidel, 13–34. 
111 Ortwin Renn (1992), Op.Cit at p. 62. 
112 Fischhoff, B.; S. Lichtenstein; P. Slovic; S. L. Derby; and R. L. Keeney. 1981. Acceptable Risk. Cambridge, Eng. 
Cambridge University Press, 106 – 109. Accessed online at 
https://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?q=Fischhoff%2C+%27Accepting+Risk%27&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5
&as_vis=1 on 29 February 2016. 
113 Ibid, at p. 106. 






allocated is evidence of the focus on the economic consequences of the occurrence of the event, 
rather than events, as events cannot be conceived as resources.  Indeed, the occurrence of the 
event is the trigger actually to allocate the resources.  From this perspective, the focus is on 
implications of risk which can be measured in economic terms.   
Indeed, when parties estimate, on average, how much they could potentially be expected to pay 
if a risk event occurs, they are, by extension, calculating the expected value115 of the consequence 
of the event occurring, and this is one of the tools that insurers also utilise in order to arrive at 
the right premium to cover the relevant risk. 
As this study has discussed, risk allocation in a drilling contract proceeds on certain assumptions, 
among which is the fact that risk is allocated to the party best able to manage it.  In reaching a 
determination of ability to bear the risk, risk appetite116 of the parties is one of the factors taken 
into consideration.  Since risk appetite is a product of qualitative and quantitative parameters, 
parties could actually arrive at their preferred level of risk appetite leveraging the economic 
approach.  Importantly, since this approach contemplates risk as a resource that can be allocated, 
parties are inevitably engaged in this process when they are negotiating their drilling contract, 
and seeking to confer advantages upon themselves, and taking on risks with the hope that their 
strategies will yield the expected dividend. 
1.3 Judicial and Legislative Approaches to Risk  
                                                 
115 The expected value of a situation with financial risk is the measure of how much you would expect to win (or 
lose) on average, if the situation were to be replayed many times. See, generally, Mian, M. A. (2011) Project 
Economics and Decision Analysis: Deterministic Models. Pennwell Books, at p. 181. 
116 KPMG Australia has defined this concept in these terms ‘the amount of risk, on a broad level, that an organisation is 
willing to take on, in pursuit of value. They also confirm that qualitative factors (such as defining risk categories and 
setting target levels around these), as well as quantitative models could be utilised in arriving at the risk appetite an 
organisation is comfortable with.  KPMG Australia, Understanding and Articulating Risk Appetite, (Advisory Paper, 
2008); accessed online at https://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/Risk-









1.3.1  Judicial Approach 
 
Given the differing approaches to risk, this study will be guided by the approach of the courts to 
risk in general.  Since the courts reach decisions based on their interpretation of the law, this 
discussion is inevitably tied to the legislative approach to risk as well.  In this regard, Ewald117 
opines that law conceptualises risk as ‘an event—potential or actual—that creates disorder, of a 
detrimental and often serious kind, and where there is an identifiable victim and perpetrator’.118 
This view of risk is fault based, which leads the courts to focus on accountability and 
responsibility for the errant conduct, leading to imposition of fines, other sanctions or damages, 
depending on the nature of the infraction and the status of the perpetrator. 
 
Huber119 suggests that these risks can be categorised into public120 and private121 categories. 
Following this categorisation, the courts have been accused of being too controlling and deterring 
of public risk, and being unduly biased in favour of tightening the process around cases involving 
perceived public risk.122. In support of this position, the courts have been accused of whittling 
down the onus on the claimant to prove injury,123 thereby enabling more claimants to succeed in 
their actions, with the potential of further constraining or eliminating risk taking, which 
compromises the upside of risks in general. 
                                                 
117 Ewald, F. (1991). ‘Insurance and Risk’. Accessed online  http://lchc.ucsd.edu/cogn_150/Readings/ewald/ewald.pdf  on 3 
March 2016. 
118 Cited by Althaus, C. E. (2005) ‘A Disciplinary Perspective on the Epistemological Status of Risk’, Risk Analysis, 
25(3), at pp. 567–588. 
119 Huber, P. (1985) ‘Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts’, Columbia 
Law Review, 85(2), p. 277. 
120 Public risks have been defined as manmade threats to human health or safety that are centrally or mass-produced, 
broadly distributed, and largely outside the individual risk bearer's direct understanding and control, ibid, at p. 277. 
121 ‘Private risks’ in contrast, are either of natural origin or, if man made, produced in relatively discrete units, with 
local impacts more or less subject to personal control: ibid, at p. 278. 
122 Gillette, C. P. and Krier, J. E. (1990) ‘Risk, Courts, and Agencies’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 
138(4), pp. 1027–1109, at 1043. 
123 See, e.g., In re ‘Agent Orange’ Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 758-59 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (involving the 







Vig and Bruer124 agree that the focus of the courts is on public risks, and opine that, even when 
they focus on private risks, the aim is to determine circumstances in which private actions might 
warrant injunctive intervention to safeguard public health and welfare. They argue that the courts 
previously adopted an ex post facto approach (after actual injury has occurred) to assessing 
damages and establishing culpability.  However, this is changing, as courts no longer restrict 
themselves to past and present risks, but also consider future risks, and balance conflicting 
interests between present benefits and anticipated risks.125  As far as interpreting legislation is 
concerned, the task of the courts is to discern legislative intent and adjudicate in risk-related 
matters, making a judgment call on risk/benefit trade-offs, using the law as a tool of social 
engineering to safeguard the public in respect of potential risk-laden circumstances.   
 
Other writers126 on regulation agree with the notion of public risk, view risk in adverse terms, 
confirm its probabilistic nature, which is not always calculable, and posit that regulatory 
‘interference’ in market dynamics is with the aim of safeguarding public health.127   
 
1.3.2  Legislative Approach 
 
The legislative approach to risk is, perhaps, the precursor of the judicial attitude to same.  Shapiro 
and Glicksman128 argue that legislative intervention is primarily for the purpose of harm 
prevention to the populace, and that a school of thought finds that this is underpinned by a 
utilitarian philosophy supported by cost–benefit analyses.  From this perspective, the objective 
                                                 
124 Vig, N. J. and Bruer, P. J. (1982) ‘The Courts And Risk Assessment’, Review of Policy Research, 1(4), at pp. 
716–727. 
125 Ibid, at p. 716. 
126 These other writers include Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein, Robert Baldwin (2001); Robert Baldwin, 
Christopher Hood, Colin Scott (1998). 
127 Hood, C., Rothstein, H. and Baldwin, R. (2001), The Government of Risk: Understanding Risk Regulation 
Regimes. Oxford University Press. 







of legislation is essentially to identify and reduce the potential causes of harm before they 
eventuate.129 They acknowledge another school of thought that rejects utilitarianism as the 
philosophical basis for this approach to risk, preferring instead pragmatism as the motive that 
drives risk regulation.130  Farber131 is a proponent of the latter approach, insisting that pragmatism 
is a better rationale, as it combines creativity with respect for extant legal tradition.132 
1.3.3  Economic Approach 
 
Unlike other judicial and legislative approaches to risk that focus on harm and undesirable 
consequences, Posner133 has attempted to correlate market behaviour, resource allocation and the 
legal system, and so conceptualises risk from a cost and utility perspective.  In his view, risks 
are measured in terms of transactional costs, as well as the utility or disutility resulting from a 
given event.  The objective is to achieve transactional efficiency, and this can be done by 
determining which party is best situated to bear the risk.134  In order to minimise transactional 
cost (and by extension, risk), parties must be adequately incentivised, transactions must be 
simplified and information sharing must occur to guarantee an informed exchange.135   
According to Posner, the notion of determining the party that is best able to bear a given risk is 
shorthand for placing risk on the party who can bear it cheapest.136  In this study’s construct, this 
would mean placing the obligation to bear the economic consequences of the occurrence of a 
given event on the party who can deal with this more cost-effectively.  Loosemore and 
                                                 
129 Ibid, at p. 1. 
130 Ibid, at p. 1. 
131 Farber, D. A. (1987) ‘Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution’, Minn. L. Rev., 72, p. 1331. 
132 Ibid, at p. 1337. 
133 Posner, R. A. (1986) Economic Analysis of Law. Little, Brown and Co. 
134 Diamond, P. A. (1974) ‘Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law’, The Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science, 5(1), at pp. 294–300. 
135 Ibid, at p. 298. 






McCarthy137 agree, and focus on the capacity of a party to bear a given risk.  From their 
perspective, capacity is determined by access or ownership of resources with which to deal with 
the risk, if the event occurs.  This would entail having the right level of expertise and authority, 
and the resources with which to implement other risk management strategies that ensure that 
contract objectives are met.138  Atiyah views this as the party who is able to take action to avoid 
the risk event from occurring.139  The exercise of determining the party best able to bear a given 
risk is not merely theoretical, as optimal transactional costs lead to better terms for the consumer. 
The focus on cost-effectiveness of risk allocation is self-evident, not just in respect of 
transactional costs, but also in terms of information exchange between parties. Thus, Posner 
considers what efficient disclosure of information between parties would be, and concludes that 
the party who is best able to give or obtain information more efficiently should do so.  His 
position, however, recognises that parties might have a disincentive to disclose information 
adverse to their interests, and so informational inefficiencies might inevitably be created because 
of this.140  He also focuses on information exchange between parties utilising standard term 
contracts, and surmises that optimality is attained when good exchange engenders competition 
that leads to the inclusion of terms that maximise transaction benefits for the consumer.141 
The essence of this approach can be seen in a drilling contract, as risk allocation should 
ultimately be about parties allocating the economic consequences of the occurrence of events 
between themselves in a manner that ensures allocation to the party who is best able to bear the 
risk – that is, best able to manage the likelihood of the occurrence of the event and, if it occurs, 
the economic consequences of the event occurring.  The manner of determining this then 
                                                 
137 Loosemore, M. and McCarthy, C. (2008) ‘Perceptions of Contractual Risk Allocation in Construction Supply 
Chains’, Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering Education and Practice, 134(1), at pp. 95–105. 
138 Ibid, at p.95. 
139 Atiyah, P. S. (1990) Essays on Contract. Oxford University Press, at p. 36. 
140 Posner, R. A. (1986), supra at pp. 48–49. 






becomes crucial, and parties would need to co-operate and share information transparently about 
risk profile, risk appetite and insurance to aid this process.  If this is not done, it is doubtful that 
transactional efficiency contemplated by Posner would be achieved, leaving both parties in a 
sub-optimal risk allocation situation. 
1.3.4  Commentary 
 
Based on the above, one can summarise that the judicial and legislative attitude to risk would 
depend on the character of the risk in question and, in particular, as to whether it affects the wider 
populace or only parties to a contract.  As it relates to the so-called ‘private’ risks (which is more 
the focus of this study), it is also fair to state that the attitude of the courts and the legislature in 
apportioning blame and determining culpability, which entitles the non-defaulting party to a 
remedy, is consistent with the stance of law encapsulated in the maxim ‘ubi jus ibi remedium’.142  
Justice Marshall143 captured the essence of this maxim in an opinion expressed in Marbury v 
Madison144 to the effect that there must be a remedy to every legal right.   
Irrespective of the philosophical leaning of the different commentators145 on the judicial and 
legislative approaches to risk, this study finds that the right to remedy in the face of injury or 
fault (whether this fault is occasioned by commission, omission or operation of law), underlies 
the attitude of the courts and legislature in this regard.   
                                                 
142 ‘Where there is a right, there is a remedy’.  For further reading on the maxim, see Thomas, T. (2004) in ‘Ubi Jus, 
Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy Under Due Process’, accessed online from the Social Science 
Research Network Electronic Library at http://ssrn.com/abstract=564302 on 6 March 2016. 
143 Thurgood Marshall was an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, serving from October 
1967 until October 1991. Marshall was the Court's 96th justice and its first African–American justice. 
144 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163–66 (1803). 
145 Posner, from an economic perspective, states that if ‘law fails to provide a remedy if a breach occurs, it will have 
induced a misallocation of resources by discouraging an exchange in which the performance of one party is deferred.  
He also opines that the function of contract law is to deter people from behaving opportunistically towards their 






As far as risk allocation is concerned, this study takes the view that the journey begins when the 
courts are called upon to interpret a contract, to reach a determination on the allocation of 
economic consequences of the occurrence of an event between the parties.  Rising to this 
occasion, the courts have several tools available to them, including, but not limited to: rules of 
interpretation and recourse to the default legal position and common law.  The outcome is a 
method of risk allocation in the specific instance between specific contract parties.  However, 
the decision also indicates the path that the courts may take in future if similar circumstances 
and/or events occur, and by which other parties may be bound, in keeping with the principle of 
stare decisis, and especially if the decision is handed down by a superior court of the jurisdiction. 
These tools are discussed in detail in the course of this study. 
 
The parties may seek a different outcome and/or interpretation on future occasions, and take 
steps to reflect this intent in their contract.  This may sometimes entail the specific exclusion of 
the application of a rule or principle that the courts would otherwise have applied.  There are 
also tools available to parties in their risk allocation function.  Thus, indemnities, mutual hold 
harmless and exemption clauses are some strategies that could be utilised to achieve this intent.  
These tools are also discussed in detail in a different section of this study. 
 
Public policy considerations or the need to use the law as a tool of social engineering may 
necessitate the intervention of the legislature to make laws that address risk allocation, and that 
effectively remove parties’ discretion in this regard.  There is legislation that targets contractual 
risk allocation, and this is discussed in detail, with emphasis on the behaviour of the parties that 
the legislation intervened to truncate. 
 
As previously discussed, where the manner in which the economic consequences of the 






otherwise threaten societal cohesion, legislative intervention is seen as necessary to safeguard 
the public space from perceived negative private interests and opportunistic behaviour. 
 
1.4 Risk Allocation as a Risk Management Strategy  
 
1.4.1  Definition of ‘Risk Management’ 
 
Although there is no generally accepted definition of ‘risk management’, different approaches 
have been propounded in literature on the subject.  Masham146  sees it as a mechanism for 
identifying, evaluating, treating and administering risks that threaten the survival of a business 
by eliminating benefits derived from assets.147  This approach recognises that preventive 
measures are required to be implemented to ensure that risk events do not occur and/or escalate. 
From a public policy perspective, the Royal Society postulates that risk management is the 
strategy for quantifying risks inherent in an event, and evaluating the possible benefits 
therefrom.148  In project management, risk management is viewed as planning, identifying, 
analysing and controlling risk in a given project.149  Its stated aim is to increase the chances of 
occurrence of positive outcomes, while simultaneously seeking to reduce negative outcomes.150
  
The following inferences can be drawn from the foregoing approaches: risk management is a 
process; it is systematic – involving a series of specified steps; it aims to engender desirable 
outcomes from events and/or actions; and it is also context-specific.  It is instructive to note that 
all the approaches state that the risk management process aims at resulting in desirable 
                                                 
146 Masham, D. (1992) ‘What Are Risk Management and Insurance?’ in Managing Risks of Investments in 
Developing Countries; Industry and Energy Department Working Paper (Energy Series Paper No. 55), at pp. 9–12. 
147 Ibid, at p. 10. 
148 The Royal Society (1992), Op.Cit.  
149 ‘A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK© Guide)’, Op.Cit, at p. 309. 






consequences.  This study posits that the ultimate objective of risk management is to ensure that 
a desirable economic consequence is achieved, given the occurrence of certain events; in effect, 
the risk management process attempts to reduce the likelihood of the occurrence of an event of 
which a party would be obliged to bear the economic consequence, by making payment in respect 
of a liability that has been allocated to him or, where this is inevitable, to procure that the amount 
of money to be paid is reduced to the lowest possible in the specific circumstance.  
1.4.2  Risk Management Process 
 
The constituent steps of the risk management process have also been expressed in different 
terms.  For instance, Valipour et al151 state that risk management has four main steps: risk 
identification, assessment, allocation and reduction.152  Their position is that risk allocation, 
which essentially means that the party best able to bear the risk should assume that responsibility, 
is a crucial step in the risk management process, given the fact that it optimises risk sharing.153  
In this context, this study infers that the party best able to bear a given risk is the one who is 
better able to reduce the likelihood of the occurrence of the risk event, and/or who is better able 
to deal with the economic consequences if it does occur.  Valipour et al also view risk allocation 
as a strategy of risk management to the extent that it can be de-coupled into different criteria154 
that, together with other strategies, constitute the means (as against the process) by which risk 
can be managed in projects. 
Gillette and Krier155 also find that risk management is a four-step process, consisting of: 
delineating the parameters of the exposure; determining the potential adverse consequences; 
                                                 
151 Valipour, A., Mohammadi, F., Yahaya, N., Sarvari, H. and Noor, N. M. (2014) ‘Identification and Evaluation of 
Risk Allocation Criteria and Barriers: A Malaysian Public Private Partnership Project Case Study’, Journal of 
Applied Sciences, 14(18), at p. 2023. 
152 Ibid, at p. 2023. 
153 Ibid, at p. 2024. 
154 They find that ‘Bear the risk at the lowest price’, ‘Control the chance of risk’, and ‘Risk attitude’ are three major 
optimal risk allocation criteria.  






defining the correlation between the exposure and the consequences; and estimating total risk 
involved.  They opine that the smooth running of this process is predicated on availability of 
dependable information and the exercise of good judgment in discerning boundaries of the 
inquiry.  
Woodcock156 takes a different approach in a two-step process, and categorises the risk 
management process into risk auditing and risk reduction.  The former entails the investigation 
of the potential exposure that the organisation or business has, while the latter proposes remedial 
steps that could be undertaken to lower the exposure.  He also makes reference to establishment 
of a risk profile, which is essentially the aggregation of the risk exposure, correlated with the 
frequency of occurrence and the severity of impact if it does.157 
A connection can be made between all the differing approaches.  All the steps inevitably seek to 
understand the correlation between events and risks inherent in an organisation, and recognise 
the need for strategies in mitigation.  Therefore, the risk management steps are a necessary 
precursor to the risk management strategies, the latter being the actual courses of action that need 
to be undertaken, or the tools that need to be utilised to ensure that a given event does not occur, 
the chances of its occurrence are reduced, or its impact is minimal if it inevitably does. 
1.4.3  Risk Aversion 
 
As far as risk management strategies are concerned, March and Shapira158 have stated that human 
beings tend to be naturally risk averse,159 and that decision makers tend to prefer low-risk 
                                                 
156 Woodcock, J. (1992), ‘Risk Auditing and Risk Reduction’ in Managing Risks of Investments in Developing 
Countries; Op.Cit, at p. 14. 
157 Ibid, at p. 14. 
158 March, J. G. and Shapira, Z. (1987) ‘Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking’, Management Science, 
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transactions, even though they are able to make sacrifices that have a positive effect on possible 
outcomes.160  Cooper and John161 agree that people would typically avoid risk as much as 
possible, and draw a distinction between risk aversion and risk-neutrality162.  They draw a 
parallel between risk aversion and an outright gamble, and people who are risk averse would 
typically agree to part with some value if they believe that it would safeguard them from an even 
greater risk of loss if the undesirable event occurs.  To them, this is a preferred option to a gamble, 
which portends greater losses if the risk event occurs. Risk-neutral individuals are neither risk 
averse nor averse to a gamble.163  
One way of managing risk is by diversifying or sharing one’s risk, which is the principle upon 
which insurance is based.  The concept of pooling of risks, known as diversification, ensures that 
the full incidence of a risk is not borne by a party upon the occurrence of an undesirable event. 
Insurance, as a risk management strategy, is more fully discussed below. 
Risk aversion is not a static phenomenon.  Danielsson et al164 suggest that market players respond 
to changing market conditions by embracing or avoiding risk. They are quick to clarify that this 
is not necessarily a reflection of risk appetite, as risk aversion can increase even though risk 
appetite remains the same.165  
1.4.4  Risk Allocation 
 
When one contract party is either unwilling or unable to bear all the risks associated with a given 
transaction, parties are wont to negotiate modalities for bearing the economic consequences of 
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the occurrence of adverse events. This is risk allocation, and the difference between this concept 
and diversification (which is also a form of risk sharing), which was discussed above, is the fact 
that the latter relies on the insurance structure in which risk is pooled, with several people 
participating, while the former occurs only as between parties in a commercial arrangement.  It 
is worth stating at this time that risk allocation may be done by parties themselves, but could also 
happen by judicial or legislative intervention, or indeed by operation of law. 
Risk allocation can occur due to several reasons. Cibinic et al166 have stated that this could be 
caused when contract cost is increased, or other factors that alter the conditions of contract, and 
make performance onerous and/or impossible if not addressed and redressed.167  Cole,168 in 
similar terms, suggests that misleading or inaccurate information provided by the client (in this 
case, the government) should suffice to trigger risk allocation discussions.169  
Loosemore and McCarthy have stated that risk allocation must be viewed within a particular 
socio-behavioural context if it is to hold any meaning.170  From this view, risk allocation is not 
homogenous, but could apply differently in different circumstances, and the rationale for any 
risk allocation would also be circumstance dependent. Even though they disclaim a uniform 
rationale for risk allocation, they also advise that risk should be allocated to the party with 
capacity171 to take it,172 and who should also be fully apprised of the risks being allocated.173  
                                                 
166 Cibinic, J., Nash, R. C. and Nagle, J. F. (2006) Administration of Government Contracts. Washington, DC; 
Chicago, IL: George Washington University, National Law Center, Government Contracts Program; Wolters 
Kluwer/CCH. 
167 Ibid, at p. 245 
168 Cole, Brian M. (l970). ‘Misrepresentation in Public Contracts: Allocating the Risk of Loss’ 21 Syracuse L. 
Rev. 1004.  
169 Ibid, at p. 1005. 
170 Loosemore, M. and McCarthy, C. (2008), supra, at p. 95. 
171 In terms of resources with which to ride out the risk, if the event occurs.  This would include the right level of 
expertise and authority, and the wherewithal to implement other risk management strategies that ensure that contract 
objectives are met. 
172 See Diamond, P. A. (1974) ‘Posner's Economic Analysis of Law’; supra, at p. 298. 






In order to ensure that they meet their allocated share of the economic consequences should the 
event occur, parties are sometimes contractually mandated to maintain insurance.174  Insurance 
as a risk management strategy is more fully discussed below, but suffice it to say that this is 
required to support the risk-bearer in discharging the financial obligation (economic 
consequences) of the occurrence of the event contemplated by the contract.   
The issue then turns on the consequences (on risk allocation) of not taking out insurance even 
when this is mandated by contract.  As Thornsjo points out, there is no guarantee that the 
indemnitor would actually obtain the requisite insurance just because there is a contractual 
requirement for this175.  This study posits that the indemnitor would be in breach of contract for 
not obtaining and maintaining the requisite insurance, and remains obliged to the indemnitee in 
respect of the indemnities which were supposed to be covered by insurance.  Although the 
indemnitee remains liable for the legal consequences of the occurrence of the event giving rise 
to the liability, it is doubtful that the indemnitor is able to pursue a claim against the indemnitee 
to recover any losses, as he (the indemnitor) is responsible for the economic consequences of the 
occurrence of the event.  The indemnity structure allocates the risk to the indemnitor, preventing 
him from recovering against the indemnitee in this situation, and ipso facto confers on the 
indemnitee the right to pursue a claim in breach of contract against the indemnitor for failing to 
take out insurance as contractually required.  Furthermore, it is also arguable that the principle 
of estoppel may bar any action by the indemnitor even in the face of loss purportedly suffered 
by him as a result of the occurrence of the event.176 
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1.4.5  Risk Acceptance 
 
A party can also choose to accept the risk allocation outcome, even if he thinks it is sub-optimal, 
and especially if the balance of power is against him.  In the literature considered earlier, there 
were approaches to risk that highlighted the upside of this concept.  Since risk can be beneficial 
in certain circumstances from this perspective, it follows that accepting it would be a strategy 
that is sometimes pursued to enable the party to reap its potential benefits.   
Carlsson177 agrees, and asserts that risk acceptance is necessary as a risk management strategy, 
as it enables parties to focus on risks that are not accepted so they can plan accordingly.  He, 
however, admonishes that accepting all risks is not a good idea and is certainly not a good risk 
management strategy.178 
Rammerstorger179 finds a correlation between risk acceptance and profits.  She posits that 
companies will accept higher risk as long as this translates into higher profits which surpass the 
cost of capital attendant upon the increased risk.180  Loosemore and McCarthy state that the party 
that accepts this increased risk should be entitled to charge a premium in consequence of this.181  
This position supports the correlation between risk and reward – a relationship that is the subject 
of vast literature182.   
                                                 
deny the existence of the facts and matters upon which they have agreed, at least so far as concerns those aspects of 
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accessed 11 March 2016. 
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There is no doubt that a relationship exists between risk and reward, even though this could be 
positive, negative or neutral.  Parties would prefer a positive relationship, but this is not always 
the case.  To hedge against the impact and implications of a negative relationship, parties may 
resort to insurance, which would serve as a buffer upon the occurrence of the event, as it would 
help in coping with the economic consequences of that occurrence.183  
The European Union (EU) Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA)184 has 
advised that risk acceptance does not remain static, but could change, even as new conditions 
emerge.185  This may be generally true but, within a contractual arrangement, parties are bound 
by the terms of their contract and any changes must be in accordance with their agreement, each 
emergent condition being the subject of negotiation before implementation. 
1.4.6  Risk Transfer 
 
Closely related to the strategy of risk allocation, is the strategy of risk transfer.  CNA Risk 
Control views this as the risk management strategy that entails the shifting of risk, in its entirety, 
by one contractual party to another.186  According to them, this is the strategy that underpins an 
insurance contract (wherein the insured transfers his risk to the insurance company), as well as 
the basis for a party’s assumption of the financial liability of another party, pursuant to indemnity 
provisions in a contract. 
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Lam187 defines risk transfer as the ‘deliberate exchange of probabilistically different cash flows’ 
– essentially, the process by which risk is moved from one entity to the other.  He opines that 
this transfer is not necessarily between two independent entities, but can also occur between two 
parts of the same entity.188  He confirms the role of insurance in this transfer process, as well as 
the fact that derivative products189 could be the medium of the exchange.  Indeed, Koopmans 
elevates the status of risk transfer as being the vehicle through which economic risk is reduced, 
holding that this is the very motivation for contractual parties. 190  
1.4.7  Risk Mitigation 
 
When risk has been accepted, the accepting party still needs to institute measures that ensure that 
the event does not occur, reduces the chance that it will occur or, if it does, that the impact is not 
as serious as it could possibly be.  This is known as risk mitigation, and has been defined as the 
‘process of developing options and actions to enhance opportunities and reduce threats to project 
objectives’.191  MITRE also identifies ‘options’ in risk mitigation – shorthand for several 
alternatives that can be utilised to reduce the probability that a risk event will occur, and/or the 
harshness of its consequences if it does.192  Instructively, they list the following measures: risk 
assumption/acceptance, avoidance, control, transfer, watch/monitoring. 
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The Committee for Oversight and Assessment193 defines risk mitigation as reduction of the 
possibility that a risk event will occur and/or reduction of the consequences if it occurs,194 while 
Herrera195 sees it as steps to limit adverse consequences. Herrera also lists strategies in risk 
mitigation as being ‘risk acceptance’, ‘avoidance’, ‘limitation’ and ‘transference’.   
Chopra et al196 have stated that, in implementing risk mitigation strategies, a common 
understanding of risks must exist, and then the preferred strategy tailored to the peculiar 
circumstances of the organisation or other endeavour.197  They also advocate a robust 
implementation of the strategies, including ‘insurance’ as a part of this mix, and this is discussed 
below. 
 
1.4.8  Insurance as a Risk Management Strategy 
 
As previously noted, insurance is crucial as a risk management strategy.  Indeed, Ewald 
proclaims that the entire notion of insurance is hinged on risk, and goes on to define it as ‘the 
application of probability calculus to statistics’.198  van der Merwe199 approaches insurance as a 
contract in which one party (insurer), in return for monies paid, will, upon the occurrence of a 
specific event, recompense the other party (insured) in a manner that seeks to restore the latter 
to the status quo ante.  It works on the principle of pooling of risks by a collectivity of people 
who are exposed to the same specific risk,200 each of whom is willing to make a payment 
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(premium) to avoid bearing the incidence of the economic consequences of an event if and when 
it occurs. The insurer arrives at this premium by estimating the frequency of the risk events, and 
applying this outcome to a ‘calculus of probabilities’,201 in order to predict the chance of the risk 
materialising. 
Insurance can be voluntarily undertaken by an entity, arise pursuant to a contractual obligation, 
or be mandated by legislation.  Given the focus of this study on contractual risk allocation, a 
more detailed discourse on the role of insurance in risk allocation will be undertaken in the course 
of this study.  Suffice it to state here that the contractual obligation to take out insurance is usually 
pursuant to indemnity provisions that offer protection to parties.  Thus, where a party 
(indemnitor) undertakes to indemnify another party (indemnitee) for any loss suffered upon the 
happening of a specified event, the indemnitor is actually saying that he (the indemnitor) will 
bear the economic consequences of the occurrence of that event. However, to make good this 
promise, the indemnitor needs to have the financial capacity to bear this economic burden if and 
when the event occurs.  This is one reason why the indemnitor is sometimes contractually 
required to take out insurance that ensures that the indemnitee will actually get the benefit of the 
indemnity clause, as the insurers will step in to effectuate the clause.  This is consistent with the 
advice by Thornsjo and Hasan202 that indemnification protections are only ‘as good as the 
indemnitor’s balance sheet’;203 thus, insurance comes in to either supplement the balance sheet 
or assume the liability to give effect to the indemnity clause in its entirety.   
To give efficacy to the insurance requirement arising from the contractual indemnity obligations, 
the contract would usually state that the insured be regarded as an ‘additional insured’, and an 
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endorsement made on the policy holder (indemnitor’s) insurance policy in this regard.  
Anderson204 states that an additional insured is usually a business partner to a policy holder, and 
their business relationship makes it sensible to endorse that individual onto the policy holder’s 
insurance policy.  He opines that this is usually done to ensure that the indemnity obligation is 
duly funded, as well as to procure a waiver of the right of subrogation in respect of the policy 
holder’s insurer.205 
Crucial to the notion of insurance is the concept of insurable interest.  In some jurisdictions, 
there is a legal requirement to prove that the loss of the utility of something would expose that 
individual to hardship that can be expressed in financial terms.206  Consequently, that individual 
has an incentive in preserving the existence of that thing, or at least the utility to be derived from 
the use of that thing, to the extent of taking out insurance to guarantee this objective.   
In the United Kingdom, there is a statutory requirement to establish an insurable interest, without 
which the contract for insurance would be void. Thus, the Marine Insurance Act 1906,207 which 
codifies three earlier statutes,208 provides the legal basis for this concept in English and Scottish 
law.  Reinecke,209 in a recent treatise on a case in South Africa,210 finds that there are two key 
principles to be established in cases involving insurable interest, essentially whether the insured 
has an interest that merits protection, and the quantification of that interest in monetary terms in 
the event of loss.211   
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In offshore drilling contracts where insurance is contractually required, the requirement for 
insurable interest is satisfied by the parties.  The indemnitor who is the primary policy holder 
has an interest in the subject matter by virtue of the financial loss that he would incur if the res 
of the contract is damaged or destroyed, or if the contract activities cause damage or destruction, 
while the indemnitee’s interest arises pursuant to the indemnity given by the indemnitor. 
If insurance is required, the obligor party can request the other party (beneficiary) to confirm 
whether self-insurance is acceptable.  This happens when the obligor has the financial capacity 
to give efficacy to the indemnity clause, either because he has created a fund for this purpose, or 
has other insurance arrangements, which may not necessarily be insurance available in the open 
market.  If financially capable, they can choose to cover all their risks, or they can cover this pro 
tanto, sourcing market insurance for the remainder of the risk portfolio.  However, this is all 
subject to the other party (usually the indemnitee for the specific risk/liability sought to be 
covered by the insurance) accepting the self-insurance measures in place to cover for the subject 
risk. 
A few conclusions can be drawn from the discussion on risk strategies so far.  First, a common 
denominator for the strategies is the requirement for insurance as the basis for ensuring efficacy 
of the plans for managing risk. The indemnity provisions as well as other risk allocation 
provisions need to be backed by funding, either by open-market insurance or the self-insurance 
mechanism of the relevant party. 
Secondly, strategies are not static.  Parties in a commercial arrangement typically utilise different 
strategies in line with the risks and/or exigencies being addressed. 
Thirdly, strategies straddle each other. For instance, risk allocation is in effect risk transfer even 
though allocation suggests that it is not only one party that takes all the risk, but connotes a sort 






Fourthly, strategy is fact- and circumstance-dependent.  The strategy adopted would depend on 
the specificities of the parties’ contractual situation.   
Fifthly, none of the strategies talks about eliminating risk in its entirety.  Indeed, the notion of 
‘management’ is coterminous with the fact that the existence and prevalence of risk are ever-
present dimensions of humanity. 
1.5 Risk Allocation in Offshore Drilling Contracts – Current State 
 
1.5.1  Methods of Risk Allocation 
 
The method and parameters for allocating risk in contracts, and offshore drilling contracts in 
particular, have always been at the heart of negotiations between the parties.  Coates has observed 
that most of the provisions of contracts allocate risk.  However, certain provisions are designed 
to do this in a deliberate manner, and aim to achieve certain objectives.212  Gordon213 organises 
these provisions into three broad groups: indemnities, exclusions/exemptions and limitation of 
liability.    
 
These groups (methods) are more fully discussed in subsequent parts of this study.  However, 
suffice it to say that indemnities represent an obligation of compensation for, or protection 
against, consequences of loss occurrence;214 exclusions operate to preclude the right of action or 
recovery by a party,215 and limitations of liability limits a party’s financial exposure in the event 
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that certain heads of loss occur.216  Many writers in this area of law seem to agree with this 
categorisation.217 
 
The use of indemnities has not been without controversy, as some jurisdictions have enacted 
legislation that prohibits their enforcement in circumstances in which public policy concerns 
may be impacted.  In the UK, the Unfair Contracts Terms Act 1977 establishes an anti-indemnity 
regime by prohibiting the limitation or exclusion of liability for death or personal injury arising 
from negligence,218 and subjects a limitation or exemption clause for any other type of 
loss/damage arising from negligence to the reasonableness test.219 
 
With respect to the USA in which four states220 have enacted anti-indemnity statutes,221 
Anderson222 posits that these statutes preclude indemnification against death, injury or damage, 
if it was caused by the indemnitee’s negligence; they expressly nullify and void any provision in 
any agreement which purports to circumvent and/or defeat the prohibitive aim of the 
legislation.223  Redfearn224 has pointed out the difference in approach between the Louisiana 
statute and the other anti-indemnity statutes, as far as sole or contributory negligence is 
concerned.  Thus, while the anti-indemnity statutes of the other states will not preclude a party 
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from being indemnified in respect of the other party’s contributory negligence, the Louisiana 
statute prohibits any sort of recovery in this instance.225 
 
The perspectives of the parties to the drilling contract differ in respect of these risk allocation 
methods.  Foster et al226 conducted research into the similarities and differences in the way in 
which risk was allocated in some drilling contracts (land and offshore),227 and presented their 
findings on the profile of risks usually allocated between both parties.  They found a lot of 
variations in the way in which this was done in respect of different heads of risk in the different 
contracts,228 and, among other recommendations, suggest that improved clarity of contract 
language as well as better collaboration between the parties as ways of ensuring the efficacy of 
the risk allocation strategies in drilling contracts.229     
 
1.5.2  Parameters of Risk Allocation 
 
Given the necessity to co-operate, different parameters for determining the optimum risk 
allocation formula have been proposed.  Triantis230 states that foreseeability is a factor that 
determines risk allocation patterns in contracts.  He draws this conclusion from the rule in Hadley 
v Baxendale231 that a promisor can be relieved from the consequences of his breach if the 
promisee’s losses were unforeseeable.   
 
Triantis makes the link between risk allocation, foreseeability and efficiency, stating that the 
manner in which risk is allocated creates incentives for parties to invest in mitigation and 
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avoidance measures that address the risk event, the level of which is determined by their risk 
appetite.232  Posner, however, cautions that foreseeability alone is not enough incentive to allocate 
a risk at the time of drafting the contract, proffering that likelihood of occurrence should also be 
high. 233  He also approaches this subject from a cost and efficiency perspective, as he posits that 
it would be more cost effective for the courts to ‘draft’ in the contractual term, in effect allocating 
the risk, only if and when the event occurs234. 
 
Another parameter that can be seen through the literature is the so-called doctrine of tradition 
which essentially means that risk allocation should follow usual industry practice.  The problem 
with this doctrine is that there is no general acceptance as to what ‘industry practice’ is, as this 
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and could also change, depending on factors such as 
market forces and balance of power between the parties.  For instance, Hewitt235 lists several 
heads of liability (risks) in a drilling contract,236 and then purports to allocate them traditionally 
between company (operator) and contractor.  However, he immediately enters the caveat that 
this is subject to the drafting of individual contracts.237 
 
Moomjian also refers to ‘customary’ risk-sharing formula pursuant to which he asserts that the 
contractor is responsible for death or injury to their personnel, as well as loss/damage to their rig 
and/or equipment.238 
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1.5.3  Negligence/Wilful Misconduct in Risk Allocation 
 
There are factors that could cause the responsibility for economic consequences of the 
occurrence of an event to shift from one party to another. For instance, where one party is better 
positioned to bear a specific risk, the responsibility for the economic consequences of that risk 
eventuating could shift to him.239  Likewise, when the potential cost of the occurrence of an event 
is too high for a party, this is a great incentive to seek to shift the economic burden to another 
party.240  Most times, these factors influence the manner in which risk is allocated prior to the 
occurrence of the event, and so parties can factor the risk allocation into their planning and risk 
profile.   
 
The point must be emphasised that this ‘shifting’ of the economic burden is only as between the 
contract parties themselves.  From a third-party perspective, the responsibility for the economic 
consequences of a wrongful act that has caused him harm or loss remains with the wrongdoer.  
In this context, legal liability equates to financial liability, and the third party is not concerned 
with whatever internal arrangements the wrongful party has made with another contract party to 
assume primary financial responsibility for the consequences of the occurrence that caused him 
harm or to indemnify him (the wrongful party) accordingly.   
 
From the literature, perhaps the most controversial attempts to shift the economic consequences 
of the occurrence of a specified risk event happens after the event has occurred, and this arises 
pursuant to a finding of negligence and/or wilful misconduct.  In Blyth v Birmingham 
Waterworks Co, negligence was defined as the failure to do something that a reasonable man 
would do, or conversely, doing something a reasonable man would refrain from doing, taking 
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into consideration the normal conduct of human affairs.241  The concept of ‘reasonable man’ is 
one which has been written on by several commentators242, and represents the attempt to 
determine objectively whether a party has been negligent, given a set of facts and circumstances.   
 
Under American jurisprudence, negligence has been graduated into different degrees, depending 
on the level of reasonable care required, which must be proportionate to the potential risk.243 
Consequently, a party’s conduct can be categorised as slight negligence, ordinary negligence or 
gross negligence244.  This categorisation has been problematic at both theoretical245 and practical 
levels.  Commenting on the court’s approach to the conduct of BP Exploration & Production, 
Inc (BP) in the Macondo oil spill law suit, LeCesne246 points out the extreme challenge that the 
court will face in trying to categorise BP’s conduct, given the factual and technical complexities 
surrounding the case.247  This difficulty is real despite the fact that liability may actually be 
dependent on whether negligence is ‘gross’, as this would have the effect of allocating (or re-
allocating) risk from one party to another.248 
 
Unlike the US system, English law does not generally categorise negligence into different 
degrees in line with perceived seriousness of the infraction. Although there have been debates as 
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to whether it should,249 the current state of the law is that the distinction between negligence and 
gross negligence is ‘sterile and semantic’250 (emphasis added).   
 
Wilful misconduct also has the effect of risk allocation (or re-allocation) when it is established 
to have occurred.  In Forder v Great Western Railway Co, this term is contrasted from accidents 
and negligence, and held to be intentional wrong-doing by a party who knowingly does it, and 
persists in doing this without any thought or care as to consequences.251  In some offshore drilling 
contracts, where wilful misconduct is established, it could make the operator vicariously liable 
for the acts of its senior supervisory personnel252.  The principles of negligence and wilful 
misconduct and the impact on risk allocation are further discussed in this study.253 
 
Conclusion 
Every action or omission has consequences.  These consequences may have a positive, negative 
or neutral effect upon a party.  Different writers have conceptualised this phenomenon as ‘risk’, 
and have approached it in diverse ways.  This study takes the position that ‘risk’ can be truly 
understood only when it is contextualised; being capable of different meanings, sometimes even 
within the same context, clarity is obtained in specific situations, in which the so-called risk 
event has been pitted against other surrounding events and circumstances. 
In this section of the study, the definitional challenge of the concept has also been highlighted, 
and approaches emphasising the upside and downside of risk presented and discussed.  Better 
                                                 
249 See, for instance, Tradigrain SA v Internek Testing Services, [2007] EWCA Civ 154 at para 23, Moore-Bick LJ 
observed that ‘The term “gross negligence”, although often found in commercial documents, has never been 
accepted by English civil law as a concept distinct from civil negligence …’.  In Camarata Property v Credit Suisse 
Securities [2011] EWHC 479, Mr Justice Andrew Smith accepted that the distinction between the terms is one of 
degree and not of kind.  However, Deakin et al have questioned the lack of distinction between the two concepts, 
especially where a defendant’s conduct is ‘not just bad, but repeatedly bad’: Deakin, S., Johnston, A. and 
Markesinis, B. (2012) Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law. Oxford University Press, at p. 27. 
250 Per Lord Justice Aikens in Springwell v JP Morgan [2010] EWCA Civ 1221 at para 193. 
251 (1905) 2 KB 532, at 535–536. 
252 See, for instance, Art. 4.6, AIPN Model International Operating Agreement 2002.  






understanding of risk has also been established by contrasting it from other similar but different 
concepts, which are sometimes used interchangeably, or serve as a basis for explaining how it 
applies in certain contexts. 
 
The classification of the concept into different schools of thought has also provided the 
theoretical framework for appreciating the philosophies underpinning the diverse approaches, 
with greater emphasis on the judicial and legislative perspectives in this regard.  This study posits 
that this judicial perspective can be gleaned at the inception of the risk allocation process when 
judges adjudicate in cases in which neither the contract parties nor legislation have made 
provision on how the economic consequences of the occurrence of a specific event shall be 
allocated.  The courts make this allocation based on principles of law, which could then be 
modified by contract parties using their contract provisions.  The courts are then called upon to 
consider the modified allocation mechanism by the contract parties, and could either agree or 
disagree with it.   
 
Where they disagree, the courts could interpret the contract in a manner that reinstates their 
previous position, or in an entirely different way.  This could trigger the legislature to intervene 
to order the behaviour of contract parties with legislation that overrides the position(s) of either 
or both the contract parties and the courts.  The justification for legislative intervention would 
be to ensure conformity with societal expectations of commercial transactions and desirable 
allocation mechanisms.  The contract parties could then seek to circumvent legislative intent by 
further contractual provisions, and this process continues in an iterative manner.  This is further 
explained in this study. 
 
The categorisation of risk management into steps and strategies infuses clarity into the character 






study finds that the ultimate objective of risk allocation is to determine how the economic 
consequences of the occurrence of specific events will be borne by the parties to the contract.  
To undertake this function effectively, the consequences from actions and omissions have to be 
identified, and a determination of whether these consequences have a positive, negative or 
neutral effect upon a party has to be made.  Thus, an understanding of which of the acts or 
omissions give rise to particular consequences is crucial in order to determine what steps or 
strategies can be adopted to influence and engender particular preferred outcomes. 
 
The study has shown that parties in a commercial arrangement (drilling contracts included) 
actually engage in all the strategies in the course of their risk management journey, even though 
the timing and sequence may differ.  In this study, therefore, ‘risk allocation’ is used 
coterminously with other risk management strategies as the context may permit. 
 
Having established the theoretical basis of risk and risk allocation, it is necessary to examine risk 
within the context of the drilling process, how they arise from that process, and how these are 
then reflected in the drilling contract.  Although the model contracts serve as the context and 
case studies of the thesis, discussions in the next chapter will focus on drilling contracts in 
general and not particularly on any of the model contracts.  Given the fact that the drilling process 
is subsumed within the petroleum oilfield lifecycle, the examination will begin with a discussion 







THE PETROLEUM FIELD LIFECYCLE AND THE DRILLING CONTRACT 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the focus is on the drilling process, and where it fits into the hydrocarbons 
exploration, appraisal, development and production value chain.  Importantly, this discourse will 
highlight the risks arising from the offshore drilling process, and how these risks are then catered 
for under the drilling contract.  In the first instance, this requires a discussion about the lifecycle 
of the petroleum field, followed by a closer examination of the offshore drilling process and the 
risks incidental thereto. 
 
Thereafter, the study will focus on the drilling contract and how the risks identified from the 
drilling process have been crafted into responsibilities for the contract parties.  This will entail 
an examination of the relationship between the primary parties – the operator and the contractor.  
Although non-operators under the joint operating agreement (JOA) are not parties to the drilling 
contract, they play a role in it that is also examined.  The study makes the point that risk may not 
always be coterminous with responsibility, and the way in which contract parties then allocate 
risks under the drilling contract is examined in a subsequent chapter. 
     
2.1 Phases in the Petroleum Lifecycle 
A petroleum field goes through different phases in its lifecycle, and the requirement for drilling 
is at the core of this process.  With drilling comes the risks incidental thereto, and in this section, 
the study situates the attendant risks within the drilling process to provide further clarity on the 
nexus between risks and the activities that are undertaken during the drilling process.  This 






clear that risks are not necessarily borne by the party who created them, as contract parties may 
then choose to allocate the responsibility for bearing the economic consequences of the 
occurrence of the risk events differently. 
 
Although there is no agreement on the nomenclature of the different phases of the drilling 
lifecycle,254 there seems to be agreement on the critical activities that characterise each phase, as 
well as their key components and objectives.  Thus, a commentator255 has categorised this 
lifecycle into the following phases: 
 
2.1.1 Gaining Access  
 
In this phase, a decision is made in respect of the contract area to be pursued in the quest for 
hydrocarbons.  This decision turns on the perceived prospectivity of the area, which is essentially 
the value that the investor attaches to it, depending on a range of factors such as the potential for 
finding hydrocarbons in commercial quantities, as well as the regulatory framework and socio-
political stability of the host country.  The higher the prospectivity of a given area, the more 
likely that an operator – and other co-venturers – will bid for it, and will be willing to pay an 
amount reflective of the perceived value attached.  This stage has been referred to as the 
‘lifeblood’ of an exploration and production company, without which there would be no 
petroleum oilfields to discover, or projects to develop.256  
   
                                                 
254 Mildwaters, K. (2016) Oil and Gas: Commercial Contracts Matrix. Dundee, UK: University of Dundee, Scotland, 
Unpublished Work. 
255 Ibid, at p. 5. 
256 Inkpen, A. C. and Moffett, M. H. (2011) The Global Oil & Gas Industry: Management, Strategy & Finance. 







   
Once the operator is granted access to the area via the petroleum authorisation, there follows the 
exploration phase in which petroleum geologists257 and geophysicists258 search for evidence of 
hydrocarbon deposits beneath the surface of the earth.259  Essentially, this involves conducting 
geological and geophysical surveys on the prospective area, guided either by visible features on 
the surface of the earth, such as oil seeps, or by more sophisticated seismic surveys.260  When the 
results from the seismic surveys have been analysed and evaluated against some set criteria with 
a satisfactory outcome, the operator makes the decision to drill an exploration well in order 
conclusively to validate the survey’s findings.  To do this, the operator needs to hire the services 
of a drilling contractor, and it is at this point that the drilling contract is first utilised.  This is 
discussed in more detail below. 
2.1.3 Appraisal  
  
In this phase, the operator’s objective is to establish whether the hydrocarbons that have been 
discovered can be exploited economically, as well as the best way to so this from a range of 
technical options. The necessity for this phase is controversial, especially when the exploration 
phase reveals the presence of hydrocarbons.  Some operators prefer to go straight from the 
exploration phase to the production phase, which enables them to start producing faster and 
recoup their investments earlier.  However, that strategy may be fraught with a lot of risks, 
especially in respect of the estimation of the true quantity of the find – the reserves – and the 
                                                 
257 This individual is one who specialises in exploring and developing petroleum reservoirs. 
258 This individual specialises in the physical properties and processes of the earth and space environment, including 
its shape, rock formation and internal structure, and analyses these by quantitative methods.  
259 Hyne, N. J. (2001) Nontechnical Guide to Petroleum Geology, Exploration, Drilling, and Production. 2nd ed. 
Tulsa, Okla.: PennWell, at p. 195. 
260 The seismic survey is a form of geophysical survey which measures the earth’s properties using physical 
principles like thermal, electric, gravitational, elastic and magnetic theories.  It tries to deduce the elastic properties 
of materials by measuring their response to elastic disruptions called seismic (or elastic) waves.  See, generally, 







sizing of the production facilities261.  To ascertain accurately the volume of the reserves, technical 
requirements, opportunities and threats surrounding producing the hydrocarbons economically, 
there may be the need to drill additional wells.  Yet again, the services of a drilling contractor 
are required, necessitating a drilling contract. 
2.1.4 Development   
 
After the results of the appraisal phase are analysed, and it has been determined that the volume 
of hydrocarbons makes economic sense to develop, a feasibility study is commissioned.  The 
study’s purpose is to determine the technical and economic strategy to be adopted in producing 
the hydrocarbons, and will include information on the surface and subsurface facilities, operation 
and maintenance philosophy, resource requirements, and the budget for implementation, among 
others.  All this information will be detailed in a document called the Field Development Plan 
(FDP), which becomes the most critical document for engaging stakeholders including the 
government, regulators, investors, and financial institutions, who all play a key role in the 
approval and implementation of the plan.262  Upon approval, the operator can commence the 
detailed design of the facilities, trigger the procurement process for the requisite construction 
materials, and start fabricating with the materials when procured.  This phase culminates with 
the installation, testing and commissioning of the facilities that are now ready for production. 
 
2.1.5 Production  
 
This is the phase in which the hydrocarbon crude oil and gas are obtained in tradeable quantities, 
and is the culmination of all the effort and expense of the previous phases.  However, to do this, 
                                                 
261 Mildwaters, K. (2016) Oil and Gas: Commercial Contracts Matrix, supra, at p. 17. 
262 See, for instance, the Oil & Gas Authority, the UK government agency responsible for approving FDPs 
https://www.ogauthority.co.uk/exploration-production/development/field-development-plans/; accessed 9 






production wells need to be drilled,263 necessitating, again, the services of a drilling contractor, 
and a drilling contract.  Production is undertaken in accordance with the operation and 
maintenance philosophy outlined in the FDP discussed above, and includes every aspect of that 
process until the hydrocarbon is safely evacuated for onward sale.  As production progresses, 
three sub-phases can be identified.  The first is the build-up period, in which the production wells 
are brought on stream in a structured manner,264 with preference given to better-performing wells, 
and a constant monitoring and juggling to ensure that the highest production is achieved with an 
optimal combination from the different wells: this process is known as production optimisation.  
The next is the plateau period, in which optimality has been achieved and the wells are producing 
in line with expectation and technical predictions.  The duration of this period may be different 
in different fields.  The last is the decline period, in which the useful life of the well is coming 
to an end, either because it has attained its reserves limit or because technical difficulties make 
it uneconomical or impractical to continue flowing the well.  Before a decision is made finally 
to shut in the well, the operator might utilise some production optimisation or enhancement 
strategies, including artificial lift265 or workover intervention.266  The scope of work will 
determine the nature of the intervention to be adopted.  Thus, where the scope of work is a rig 
re-entry to drill further into the hydrocarbon-bearing sands, the services of a drilling contractor 
are required, as well as a drilling contract. 
                                                 
263 Government, UK. (2013) Planning Practice Guidance for Onshore Oil and Gas. London, UK: Department for 
Communities and Local Government. 
264 Mildwaters, K. (2016) Oil and Gas: Commercial Contracts Matrix, supra, at p. 22. 
265 When artificial means are utilised to increase the flow of crude oil or other liquids, from a production well.  This 
is usually achieved by using mechanical devices inside the well or by injecting gas into the crude oil to reduce the 
weight of the hydrostatic column. 
266 This is the process of undertaking major maintenance or repair works on an oil or gas well.  It usually involves 
invasive techniques, such as coiled tubing, wireline, or snubbing. Sometimes, it could entail the pulling and 






2.1.6 Decommissioning  
   
Whether production optimisation and enhancement strategies have been implemented or not, 
there comes a point at which the well is no longer flowing as optimally as it should, and it 
becomes uneconomical to continue to flow it.  If the net cash flow turns negative, the field is 
decommissioned, together with the production infrastructure, and the wells will be plugged and 
abandoned.267 
2.1.7 Post-Decommissioning   
 
This phase involves the removal of the production infrastructure upon decommissioning.  The 
overarching aim is to restore the environment to the status quo ante as much as possible, even 
though this is difficult in practice.  Furthermore, several fundamental issues are raised in this 
phase, especially relating to residual liability upon decommissioning.  Detailed discourse of this 
is outside the scope of this study.  However, suffice it to say that this area has been receiving 
attention in recent times, with some governments, for instance in the UK, already regulating that 
space,268 and some operators having already started on their compliance journeys.269 
2.2 The Drilling Process  
The drilling process commences with the design of the well, and the most critical feature of this 
stage is the establishment of the drilling objectives and design premises.270  This is essentially 
the point at which the drilling engineers synthesise engineering principles with corporate 
objectives, philosophy and experience, to ensure that a well that is fit for purpose is drilled safely 
                                                 
267 Hyne, N. J. (2001) Nontechnical Guide to Petroleum Geology, Exploration, Drilling, and Production, supra, at 
pp. 448–449. 
268 See, for instance, the guidelines by the UK Government’s Department of Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy on the subject: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/oil-and-gas-decommissioning-of-offshore-installations-and-
pipelines; accessed 9 February 2018. 
269 See, for example, Shell’s Brent Field decommissioning: https://www.shell.co.uk/sustainability/decommissioning/brent-field-
decommissioning/decommissioning-in-the-uk.html; accessed 9 February 2018. 






and cost-effectively.  The engineering principles include the selection of the optimal mud weight, 
depth of the well, and casing sizes.  These parameters would, in turn, determine the type of rig 
to be utilised for the drilling activity.  When the well design has been finalised, it is usually 
discussed with government authorities to secure their approval, and to confirm that drilling is 
proposed to be undertaken in line with the petroleum authorisation as well as extant regulatory 
framework.  Where a well is not properly designed, it could lead to a failure of the drilling 
campaign, or to more catastrophic consequences.  For instance, in the aftermath of the Macondo 
disaster, BP was accused of having a poor well design that caused the failure of the cement 
barrier that should have prevented hydrocarbons from accessing the rig and causing the 
blowout.271  
 
After the well design has been completed, the rig selection process commences.  This pre-
supposes that the requisite approvals – for the work, plan and budget – have been obtained.  The 
selection process would typically entail the launching of a bid process in which the well design 
parameters and work plan would be issued to bidders – drilling contractors – based on which 
bids can be submitted.  The bid package would typically include the drilling contract template 
that the operator wishes to utilise when the bid process is eventually concluded.  It is typical to 
have negotiation meetings with shortlisted drilling contractors, during which technical, financial 
and contractual matters are discussed.  It is also typical to inspect the shortlisted rig to ensure 
that it is not only fit for purpose but also in a good state of repair.  An agreement is usually 
reached between the operator and the contractor on the timeline and cost of rectifying any issues 
identified during inspection.  The culmination of this process is the signing of the drilling 
contract, which details all the agreements reached by the contract parties and includes a 
                                                 
271 Mason, R. (2011) ‘Transocean Blames BP's Oil Well Design for Gulf of Mexico Disaster’, The Telegraph, 22 
June 2011. Available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/8592126/Transocean-blames-






commitment by the drilling contractor to drill the well safely and in accordance with the well 
design. 
  
When the drilling contract has been finalised and the rig has been selected, the government 
authorities are engaged in order to obtain the requisite approvals and permits.  As part of the 
approvals process, government authorities sometimes inspect the selected rig, and may require 
modifications to be made to comply with existing laws.  Approvals and permits are typically 
issued when the government authorities are satisfied with the well design and drilling 
programme, and that the selected rig is compliant and fit for purpose. 
 
The next stage is the mobilisation of the rig and the relevant personnel to the offshore well 
location.  However, prior to this happening, the operator must ensure that the well location is 
sound and safe enough for the rig to conduct drilling operations.  The operator would typically 
commission a geotechnical survey of the seabed to understand the subsurface conditions of the 
well location.  The results of this survey are passed to the drilling contractor and are then used 
to prepare for mobilising and positioning the rig when it arrives at the well location, and is 
prepared to commence drilling operations.  Depending on the type of rig and the depth of the 
water, either the rig is moored or its legs are jacked down to the sea bottom to secure it.  The 
requisite checks to further ensure preparedness are undertaken after which the rig is ready to 
commence drilling operations. 
 
Modern drilling is now undertaken with rotary drilling rigs, a name that reflects the fact that the 
rigs are powered by rotary drilling systems,272 which rotate a steel pipe that has a drill bit at the 
                                                 
272 This rotary system is made up of four main components: diesel engines called prime movers which supply power 
to the rig; hoisting system useful for lifting, lowering and suspending equipment in and out of the well; rotating 
system cuts the hole, and is comprised of the drill bit, drillstring and drillpipe; circulating system for pumping the 
mud into and out of the hole.  See, generally, Conaway, C. F. (1999) The Petroleum Industry: A Nontechnical Guide, 






end of it.273   The drilling bit rotates on the rock to cut the hole – the wellbore – and, with the aid 
of the drill string, grinds and crushes the rock into small particles called cuttings.  These cuttings 
are washed away from the surface of the rock with drilling mud.274  The drilling mud is pumped 
down the drill pipe and exits through small pores in the drill bit to wash away the cuttings.  It 
then flows back to the well surface, where the cuttings are separated from the drilling mud with 
mesh filters called shakers, treated and then disposed of as waste in line with the regulations of 
the host country. 
 
While drilling the well, progress will be constantly monitored, with several tests and analyses 
being carried out. The duration of the drilling process varies and, depending on the depth of the 
reservoir being targeted, as well as the rock type being drilled, can go on for a few weeks to a 
few months.  Sometimes, directional drilling technology is utilised if the targeted reservoir is 
not directly below the wellbore. This technology enables drilling to be conducted at an angle 
capable of accessing a reservoir that may be several hundred metres away or, for offshore wells, 
several thousand metres away from the wellbore. 
 
When the target reservoir is reached, specialised pieces of equipment called logging tools are 
utilised to assess the formation and analyse the fluids to verify whether hydrocarbons are present.  
If their presence is confirmed, flow tests are often performed to assess the production capability 
of the well.  While such tests275 are being conducted, any gas that is produced is typically flared, 
while oil or condensate is stored in receiving tanks and thereafter safely evacuated. 
 
2.3 Incidental Risks 
                                                 
273 Hyne, N. J. (2001) Nontechnical Guide to Petroleum Geology, Exploration, Drilling, and Production, supra., at 
p. 247. 
274 The drilling fluid is called ‘mud’ due to its appearance. It is made up of water and other additives, such as 
bentonite clay, which adjust its viscosity and density to make it compatible with the rock. 






Several challenges could be encountered while drilling, some with more impact than the others.  
In extreme circumstances, these problems can cause death, bodily injury or property loss or 
damage.  The challenges that are discussed in this section are those directly related to some of 
the risks discussed in the study, and are not exhaustive of the challenges that could be 
encountered while drilling. 
2.3.1 Fish Presence 
 
A usual challenge that occurs during drilling is that something either falls into the well, or breaks 
while being used in it.  For instance, a tool can fall into the well from the rig floor, or a drillstring 
can break off and fall into it.  In both cases, the normal drill bit is unable to drill through the 
foreign body, and drilling needs to be suspended to attempt a retrieval.  The foreign body is 
called a fish, and the retrieval process is called fishing, while the tools utilised for retrieval are 
called fishing tools.276  In some cases, it is impossible to retrieve the fish, which typically belongs 
to the contractor and forms part of contractor items and property – a situation that gives rise to 
the need for replacement.  In other circumstances, the retrieved fish is either damaged beyond 
repair or repairable at a cost.  Sometimes, drilling activities must be suspended to enable the 
repairs to be carried out. 
 
2.3.2 Stuck Pipe   
 
The drillstring277 can get stuck in the well, because of either differential wall pipe sticking or 
mechanical challenges.   The former occurs when the drillpipe sticks to the well walls because 
of suction, or a differential between the pressure of the mud column inside the well and the 
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277 A string of drillpipe that conveys torque and drilling fluid to the drill bit, and refers to the drill bit, drill collars 






pressure of the formation at the bottom.278  The pressure difference pushes the pipe so strongly 
against the side of the hole that it becomes immobile.  Pipe sticking due to mechanical challenges 
arises when there is a significant deviation in the well that is greater than 30 metres, and is usually 
caused when there is a marked change in the weight of the drill bit while drilling is ongoing.  
This situation is also known as dogleg, and it results in the drillpipe scraping against a groove 
inside the well that is smaller than the groove made by the drill bit.279  In some cases, it is 
impossible to retrieve the stuck pipe, which typically belongs to the contractor and forms part of 
contractor downhole equipment.  In other circumstances, the retrieved pipe is either damaged 
beyond repair, or repairable at a cost.  Here, again, drilling activities may be suspended to enable 
the repairs to be carried out. 
 
2.3.3 Formation Damage  
  
During drilling, a part of the drilling mud called the mud filtrate may escape into any rock that 
is adjacent to the wellbore and is permeable.  Depending on the pressure of the mud filtrate, it 
could either decrease the permeability of the reservoir rock, or destroy it.  Where permeability is 
decreased, the well can be restored by well stimulation such as hydraulic fracturing.280  However, 
where permeability is destroyed, the well is killed and abandoned.   
2.3.4 Sloughing Shale  
 
During drilling, shale281 may react with brine or water, causing it to increase in size, forming 
large balls and particles, that then fall to the bottom of the well.  The drilling mud cannot easily 
remove these large particles, and needs to be enhanced by chemicals such as potassium; oil-
                                                 
278 Hyne, N. J. (2001) Nontechnical Guide to Petroleum Geology, Exploration, Drilling, and Production, Op.Cit, at 
pp. 277–278. 
279 See, generally, Conaway, C. F. (1999) The Petroleum Industry: A Nontechnical Guide, supra, at pp.114–117. 
280 This is a well stimulation method in which the injection of high-pressure fracking fluid fractures a rock. The 
fluid creates cracks in the wellbore in the deep-rock formations so that hydrocarbons and liquids will flow freely. 







based drilling mud can also be utilised to dislodge the particles.  Typically, a lot of drilling mud 
and chemicals are required to remove such particles, and this is an expensive process overall.   
 
2.3.5 Corrosive Gasses  
  
During drilling, some corrosive gases such as hydrogen sulphide (H2S) and carbon dioxide (CO2) 
can egress the reservoir rocks into the well.  These gases destroy the steel on the drillstring and 
generally cause hydrogen sulphide embrittlement.282  They can also cause damage to the 
environment or to the contractor’s other equipment. 
 
2.3.6 Kicks and Blowouts   
 
A kick is a well control challenge in which the pressure within the rock being drilled is higher 
than the hydrostatic pressure in the drilling mud acting on the rock face or the borehole.  When 
this happens, the formation pressure, which is greater, tends to force fluids from the formation 
into the wellbore.  Sometimes, the formation pressure causes a mixture of mud and gases to be 
spewed to the surface, and this is known as a mud volcano.  The forced fluid surge is a kick and, 
where the flow is controlled successfully, the kick is expressed as killed. Where it is uncontrolled, 
and increases in severity, a blowout occurs, which has catastrophic consequences on lives and 
property, and is capable of causing multiple fatalities all at once.283  A fallout of a blowout may 
be the total loss of the rig and the mess caused by the resulting debris, which needs to be removed.   
 
2.3.7 Pollution  
  
During drilling, the drilling mud and other consumables are typically kept on the rig floor until 
they are required to be sent down to be utilised in the well.  It is not uncommon to have spillages 
                                                 
282 This is when metals such as steel become brittle and then fractures because of the introduction and circulation of 
hydrogen. 






occur during this interval, with the drilling mud and other consumables entering the sea thereby 
causing pollution.  Pollution can arise from surface activities and contractor equipment, or from 
the activities below the surface, especially when well control is lost.  When pollution occurs, it 
creates the obligation to remediate the impacted environment and to replace or repair any 
damaged equipment.  In extreme cases, death or bodily injury could occur, either to the personnel 




Offshore drilling can sometimes be marred by extreme weather conditions.  These conditions 
include strong winds and storms, thick fog and freezing cold temperatures, all of which affect 
the ability of personnel to function properly.  These conditions not only impair transportation of 
man and materials to the well location, but also affect the integrity of materials to be utilised for 
drilling operations and, thus, drilling outcomes.  This inevitably causes delays to the drilling 
programme, with attendant implications for cost.  In extreme circumstances, weather-related 
accidents can occur, leading to deaths or bodily injuries, as well as property loss or damage.284 
 
2.3.9 Fire  
 
The drilling process is a very complex and extremely volatile one.  Indeed, this was recognised 
by the court in Caledonia North Sea Ltd v London Bridge Engineering Ltd, in the aftermath of 
the Piper Alpha disaster, which stated as follows: 
‘Operations to exploit the oil and natural gas resources of the North Sea...are potentially 
hazardous.  It is plain beyond doubt that an oil platform is a dangerous place unless careful and 
proper safety precautions are taken. The platform holds contained under pressure large quantities 
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of gas and liquid hydrocarbon material which is explosive, very flammable and most dangerous 
if control of it is lost’. 285 
 
There are different possible causes of fire on a drilling rig.  The principal cause is human error, 
which is due to either negligence, wilful misconduct or incompetence.  Another possible cause 
is equipment failure, as was the case in the Macondo disaster in which the blowout preventer 
(BOP) failed.  Fire can also be caused by geological or geophysical challenges in the formation, 
typically manifesting in extreme pressure in the wellbore that causes an explosion if the drillers 
lose control of the well.  In all these instances, the result can be catastrophic, leading to death, 
bodily injury, property loss or damage.  Furthermore, fire events inevitably lead to cessation of 
drilling activities to ensure that proper investigations are carried out, and adequate safety 
measures implemented to prevent a re-occurrence.  This wastes time, delays drilling progress 
and escalates cost.       
 
2.3.10 Equipment Failure  
 
This occurs due to various reasons.  It may be that the wrong type of equipment is being used, 
the equipment is defective or the equipment is damaged.  Damage to equipment can occur during 
drilling, due to human error and intervention, or because of external factors such as weather 
conditions.  The impact of equipment failure or damage on drilling operations varies, depending 
on the criticality of the equipment.  For instance, if the top drive286 fails in service, this can grind 
drilling operations to a halt, as this equipment lies at the heart of drilling operations.  The 
contractor is required visually to check equipment for patent defects prior to use, whether the 
equipment belongs to it or to the operator.  Where a defect is discovered but ignored, or could 
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286 The top drive is a motor suspended from the mast or derrick of the rig, and is utilised in rotating the drill string 
while drilling.  It is the substitute for the conventional rotary table, and enables simultaneous drilling of the longer 






have been discovered upon inspection but was not, the resulting adverse event or consequence 
becomes a matter of contention, as the issue would transcend mere equipment failure to questions 
of human error, involvement and competence.  This process also wastes time, delays drilling 
progress and escalates cost. 
 
2.3.11 Accidents  
  
Drilling operations are very complex, as highlighted above.  One way to ensure that operations 
are conducted in a safe, consistent and approved manner is to issue standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) for every aspect of the operations – not only for actual drilling operations, equipment 
handling and storage, but also for more general issues such as evacuation and other emergency 
procedures.  Personnel are trained in these SOPs to ensure that they understand their contents, 
and measures are instituted to ensure compliance and monitor deviation.  Part of these measures 
include toolbox meetings,287 which are supposed to be held at the start of every shift during 
drilling operations; such meetings serve as the medium for evaluating the tasks for the day and 
the applicable SOPs.   
Unfortunately, despite these measures, personnel sometimes ignore SOPs, and this a major cause 
of accidents.  Part of the SOPs focus on communication protocols concerning all aspects of 
operations, especially between teams and shift personnel.  Again, ignoring such protocols have 
led to accidents, the chief example of which is the Piper Alpha disaster, which, to date, is the 
world’s worst offshore drilling incident.288  Accidents also occur when personnel have been 
                                                 
287 Toolbox meetings are informal safety meetings that form part of a company’s safety programme. They are 
typically conducted at the job site at the beginning of a job or work shift. They cover topics on safety aspects related 
to the task at hand, such as workplace hazards and safety practices. They are sometimes called tailgate meetings or 
safety briefings. 
288 The disaster occurred because of a gas leakage from a condensate pipe at the platform, which had the pressure 
safety valve of the injection pump removed for routine maintenance during the day shift, with the open pipe being 
sealed with two blind flanges temporarily.  The flanges remained in place during the change in the crew shift because 
maintenance work had not been completed. The day-shift engineer had updated the task permit stating that under 






negligent in undertaking assigned tasks.  This happens when personnel do not take reasonable 
care in discharging their obligations, as a result of which an adverse event occurs.  Personnel 
who disregard SOPs in the conduct of a task, which then results in an accident, may be held to 
have acted negligently.    
When accidents occur, they lead to death, bodily injury, property loss and damage.  Such events 
necessitate a cessation of drilling activities to ensure that personnel evacuations are conducted, 
proper investigations are carried out, and adequate safety measures implemented to prevent a re-
occurrence.  This wastes time, delays drilling progress and escalates cost.  Where the accident 
has led to a total loss of the rig, as happened in the Piper Alpha disaster, this brings the drilling 
campaign to an abrupt end, with attendant cost, resource and reputational implications. 
  
2.3.12 Collisions  
 
Drilling operations are supported by a vast number of personnel and materials that need to be 
transported to the rig.  Typically, crew changes and transportation of large and routine materials 
are done by supply vessels, while a limited number of personnel and emergency materials can 
be flown in by helicopter, provided that they meet the safety and size threshold for this mode of 
transport.  While supplying the rig, accidents can occur, and supply vessels can collide with the 
rig because of a variety of reasons, among which are incompetence of the vessel master, human 
error, weather conditions or equipment failure.289  When collisions occur, typically, this causes 
damage to the rig and the supply vessel, which may lead to temporary suspension of drilling 
                                                 
meant that the night crew staff did not find the task permit, and turned on the pump after the second pump failed. 
This action resulted in escape of gas condensate from the two blind flanges, leading to explosions on the rig platform. 
 
289 See, for instance, R. v McNair (Donald Niven) (1989) 11 Cr. App. R. (S.) 465; MarEx (2011) ‘Supply Ship Collides 
with Transocean Drill Rig off Newfoundland’; The Maritime Executive. Available at: https://www.maritime-







operations to effect any required repairs and implement safety measures that prevent a re-
occurrence.  The implication of any suspension of work has already been noted. 
      
The foregoing contextualises risk within the drilling process.  As noted above, the problems 
discussed are not exhaustive of all those that could arise during the drilling process and, by 
extension, they do not represent the totality of risks incidental thereto.  For instance, if, during 
the drilling process, it is discovered that the contractor did not provide a critical equipment to 
control kicks and blowouts, this may be a basis for asserting that the contractor failed to perform 
their obligations in a workmanlike manner, with due skill, care and judgment. 
 
2.4 Risk, Responsibilities and Relationships in a Drilling Contract 
Having introduced the drilling contract within the drilling process, and the risks incidental 
thereto, this section focuses on the nature of the relationship of the contract parties within the 
offshore drilling context.  This relationship is regulated by contract, and defined by the scope of 
responsibilities to be undertaken by the parties, the risks incidental thereto, and how both 
responsibilities and risks have been allocated inter se.  This study takes the position that risk may 
not always lie where responsibility resides, as the parties may have allocated risk differently.   
 
In examining this relationship, the study recognises that where contract parties fail in their 
responsibilities, adverse events can occur, arising from the risks inherent in the drilling process.  
Thus, this section will ask and answer questions as to which responsibilities are shared between 
the contract parties and how the drilling contract splits these up.  Subsequently, an examination 
of the way in which they then allocate the risks attendant thereto, and why have they allocated 







Although the relationship in a drilling contract is primarily between the operator under the joint 
operating agreement (JOA) and the contractor, the interface with the non-operator under the JOA 
will also be discussed.  Most operators in drilling contracts are in joint ventures with other co-
venturers, who, though not being operators or parties to the drilling contract, nevertheless 
contribute financially and administratively to the attainment of the drilling contract objectives, 
arising from the rights conferred, and the obligations imposed, upon them by their joint operating 
agreements.  Depending on the way in which the drilling contract is structured, such non-
operators may be contract parties conferred with rights within the drilling contract that elevate 
them to the same status as the operator and contractor.  It is therefore necessary that this 
relationship with the non-operator is also examined to determine its implications for risk and 
responsibility allocation within the drilling contract. 
Like any other contract, the drilling contract is a document of obligation.  Such obligations are 
captured within the responsibilities that are shared between the contract parties, and are 
ordinarily the product of law and negotiations geared towards achieving the mutual objectives 
agreed by them.  At the heart of the drilling contract is the requirement to conduct drilling 
operations; this is the primary reason for an operator procuring the services of a drilling 
contractor.  However, there are other ancillary regulatory and compliance requirements that 
impact the way in which the contract parties conduct drilling operations.  Furthermore, even 
though the contractual relationship is primarily between the operator and contractor, third-party 
services and interests of the non-operators are integral aspects of this relationship.  The major 
scope of responsibilities and the impact on third parties are examined below. 
 







Drilling operations are the crux of the drilling contract and encompass all activities that the 
parties are required to undertake to drill and, if necessary, complete,290 sidetrack,291 suspend or 
abandon a well in accordance with the law, the agreed drilling programme, good drilling practice 
and the contract.  As might be expected, the scale of the drilling operations requires that the 
operator and contractor share responsibilities to make the campaign a success.  The main 
responsibilities are discussed below. 
2.4.1.1  Provision of the Drilling Unit 
 
The drilling unit for offshore activities is also called the mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU), 
and has been defined as ‘a mobile platform, including drilling ships, equipped for drilling for 
subsea hydrocarbon deposits and mobile platforms for purposes other than production and 
storage of hydrocarbon deposits’.292  In common parlance, the MODU is also known as a ‘drilling 
rig’ and, in this study, the terms ‘drilling unit’, ‘drilling rig’ and ‘rig’ will be used 
interchangeably.   
 
Perhaps the most important responsibility in this regard is to ensure that the specifications of the 
drilling rig are accurate and correctly understood by all the parties.  According to industry 
practice, it is the responsibility of the operator to issue such specifications, driven by factors such 
as the well design, depth of the well to be drilled, the subsea and geotechnical conditions of the 
well location, safety considerations, cost, innovative technology, well configuration (single or 
multi), power ratings, capacity of top drive, mast, mud pumps and mud tanks.  Where these 
specifications are inaccurate, unfit for the required purposes or wrongly communicated, the rig 
                                                 
290 This is the process of getting a well ready to produce, and entails priming the bottom hole to contract 
specifications, setting the production tubing and down-hole tools, and, if necessary, stimulating and perforating. 
This could also include cementing the casing if required. 
291 This means re-entering a well from the surface to deviate from the existing well bore, either to resolve a challenge 
encountered in the existing bore, or to produce hydrocarbons from another zone or bottom hole location. 
292 ISO 17776: 2016, Petroleum and Natural Gas industries - Offshore Production Installations - Major Accident 






will be unusable, which may lead to increased cost exposure to make it fit for purpose.293  If the 
specifications have been correctly communicated, but the contractor still brought a rig that was 
not fit for purpose, the operator reserves the right to treat this as a breach of contract, entitling 
the operator to terminate the contract.294 
 
In certain instances, the contractor could make the obligation to provide the drilling unit subject 
to rig availability.  This inevitably impacts on the commencement date of the drilling contract, 
as drilling operations cannot commence without the rig being firmly secured.  This is why 
drilling contracts usually make a distinction between ‘effective date’ and ‘commencement date’.  
While the former indicates when the parties entered into the agreement with the intention of 
creating legal relations, the latter is triggered when the contractor has given the operator written 
notification that the drilling unit is ready.295  In most cases, the contractor would undertake to use 
‘best endeavours’, ‘reasonable endeavours’ or ‘all reasonable endeavours’ to procure rig 
availability by the expected commencement date.  Such an undertaking raises an issue as to the 
nature of the obligation imposed by these different provisions, as well as the distinction between 
them and the extent thereof.   
 
In the first instance, the courts have attempted to draw a distinction between ‘best endeavours’ 
and ‘reasonable endeavours’, and different approaches, sometimes conflicting – and, at other 
times, confusing – have emerged from this exercise.  For instance, in Terrell v Mabie Todd & 
Co Ltd,296 the court found that ‘best endeavours’ imposed the obligation to do all that could be 
reasonably done in the specific circumstances, while in Overseas Buyers v Granadex,297 the court 
                                                 
293 Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobras (2013) EWCA Civ 150. 
294 See, for instance, Amoco (UK) Exploration Co v British American Offshore Ltd (2001) All ER (D) 244 (Nov). 
295 In this context, this means when all inspections, tests and repairs required to be carried out on the drilling unit 
and ancillary equipment have been satisfactorily completed, and the drilling unit ready for movement to the well 
location to commence drilling operations. 
296 (1952) 69 RPC 234. 






held that it meant something different from doing all that was reasonably expected.  Indeed, the 
use of the word ‘reasonable’ in describing ‘best’ endeavours further confuses the issue, as both 
words could be interpreted as meaning the same thing, which was the approach in IBM v 
Rockware Glass Ltd.298  In acknowledging the onerous obligation imposed by ‘best endeavours’, 
the courts have further held that while the obligor may be expected to incur expenses to meet 
this obligation,299 the expenditure cannot be such that exposes it to economic ruin, or loss of 
goodwill or commercial standing.300  
 
In interpreting ‘reasonable endeavours’, the courts have approached it from the perspective of 
an objective standard that enquires into what an ordinarily competent individual who is similarly 
circumstanced might do, stating that a balance between the obligor’s obligation to the other party 
and the protection of its own financial interests had to be struck.301  The reference of the court to 
the protection of financial interest, which takes into consideration the same relevant commercial 
parameters such as cost and practicality as ‘best endeavours’, further confuses the clarity in 
distinction.302  However, in Rhodia International Holdings v Huntsman International,303 the court 
stated that while ‘reasonable endeavours’ implied the obligation to pursue at least one course of 
action out of many reasonable options, ‘best endeavours’ required that all reasonable courses of 
action must be explored and exhausted.  Although the court tried to infuse clarity by this 
distinction, the reference to ‘all reasonable courses of action (endeavours)’ – emphasis added – 
in defining ‘best endeavours’ defeated this purpose.  
   
                                                 
298 (1980) FSR 335. 
299 Jet2.com v Blackpool Airport Ltd (2012) EWCA Civ 417. 
300 Rackham v Peek Foods Ltd (1990) BCLC 895. 
301 Rhodia International Holdings v Huntsman International (2007) 2 All ER (Comm) 577. 
302 See, for instance, P&O Property Holdings Ltd v Norwich Union Life Assurance Society (1994) 68 P&CR 261. 






In Yewbelle v London Green Developments,304 the court considered the provision ‘all reasonable 
endeavours’, and said that it implied that the obligor was expected to keep using endeavours 
until all reasonable endeavours were exhausted, even though that did not impose an obligation 
to incur significant cost to settle a commercial transaction.305  This line of reasoning was followed 
in KS Energy Services Ltd v BR Energy (M) Sdn Bhd,306 in which the court held that, although 
all these terminologies307 were indicative of ‘non-absolute obligations’, the responsibility to use 
‘reasonable endeavours’ was less burdensome than the responsibility to use ‘all reasonable 
endeavours’.  It further stated that the test to be applied in determining whether the contractor 
had discharged the burden that ‘all reasonable endeavours’ imposed is to enquire whether they 
‘had taken all reasonable steps which a prudent and determined man, acting in the interests of 
the receiving party, and anxious to procure the contractually-stipulated outcome within the 
available time, would take’.308   
 
Clearly, the judicial position on this area of the law is still rife with confusion, necessitating a 
response by contract parties to infuse greater clarity in their contracts.  One way of doing this is 
by defining the terms used within the context of their contract.  Specifically, that definition 
should clarify whether the obligor is expected to incur any expenses in meeting the obligation, 
and the applicable threshold.309  It could also state the courses of actions expected and the 
timelines thereof.  A prudent drilling contractor would keep a record of such actions, and include 
                                                 
304 (2007) EWCA Civ 475. 
305 Contrast this with CPC Group v Qatari Diar Real Estate Inv Co (2010) All ER (D) 222 (Jun) where the court 
held that ‘all reasonable endeavours’ sometimes meant that the obligor’s commercial interest is subordinate to that 
of the obligee in respect of the desired objective. 
306 (2014) SGCA 16; (2014) B.L.R. 658. 
307 ‘best endeavours’, ‘reasonable endeavours’ and ‘all reasonable endeavours’. 
308 KS Energy Services Ltd v BR Energy (M) Sdn Bhd. (2014) SGCA 16, at paras 42–44, 62–63, 82–83, 88, 91–93.  
The court was guided by the test which was originally laid down in Travista Development Pte Ltd v Augustine 
(2007) SGCA 57. 
309 See, generally, Cannon, N. (2014) Best Endeavours, All Reasonable Endeavours and Reasonable Endeavours. 
London: Walker Morris. Available at: https://www.walkermorris.co.uk/publications/brief-february-2014/best-






a communication protocol that keeps the operator informed about steps taken in furtherance of 
the obligation to secure a drilling unit that complies with the specifications.      
  
2.4.1.2  Location Preparation and Acceptance of the Drilling Unit 
 
The operator has the responsibility of inspecting the rig and procuring the testing of critical 
equipment on board prior to accepting same as being fit for purpose310.  In this regard, the 
operator can accept the rig subject to any deficiencies observed, provided that the contractor 
remedies the deficiencies at its own cost.311  Where the operator fails to inspect the drilling unit, 
or fails to detect patent defects upon inspection, this should ordinarily estop them from 
subsequently asserting the deficiency of the rig.  However, most operators avoid this outcome 
by passing the responsibility of producing a fit-for-purpose rig to the contractor, requiring the 
latter to warrant that the rig is free from any damage or defects that could reasonably be expected 
to interrupt or delay drilling operations if repairs are necessary. 
 
It is crucial that the well location is adequately prepared to receive the drilling unit, and the 
operator is responsible for undertaking a seabed survey of the proposed location.  The operator 
is expected to obtain geotechnical evidence of the location’s suitability, and is also responsible 
for taking any remedial steps required to make the location fit for purpose.  If the location is not 
adequately prepared, in consequence of which the drilling unit suffers a punch-through,312 the 
operator is responsible for whatever rig repairs are required, as well as taking further steps to 
ensure the suitability of the well location.313 
                                                 
310 For instance, the load testing of the cranes. 
311 See, for instance, Norscot Rig Management PVT Ltd v Essar Oilfields Services Ltd (2010) EWHC 195 (Comm). 
312 A situation that occurs when one of the rig’s support legs penetrates the sea bed, causing it to slant and become 
unstable. 
313 See Seadrill Management Services Ltd v OAO Gazprom (2011) 1 All E.R. (Comm) 1077, in which the court 
held that the punch-through that occurred during ‘pre-loading’ was because of the negligence of the master of the 








2.4.1.3  Provision and Maintenance of Drilling and Other Ancillary Equipment 
 
The operator and contractor are responsible for providing different equipment for the drilling 
operations.  While the operator is responsible for providing equipment for coring, testing and 
completion services, including storage tanks, drilling mud, and separator, the contractor is 
responsible for providing equipment such as high- and low- pressure blowout preventers; and 
handling tools, which include drill pipes, collars and elevators; as well as safety equipment, 
which includes breathing apparatus and smoke, fire and gas detectors.  In most cases, the 
responsibility for providing equipment is not restricted to those that should be provided by the 
operator and contractor, but extends to the equipment of their subcontractors and other invitees. 
Thus, the responsibility is defined in terms of the group, and the reference is usually to ‘operator 
group equipment’ or ‘contractor group equipment’.  The implication of this is that both primary 
contract parties take responsibility not only for their own equipment but for those of the entities 
within their group, mirroring the indemnity structure of the drilling contract. 
   
This definition of equipment in group terms has a more significant implication.  Typically, 
drilling contracts define ‘completion date’ of the contract with reference to the date and time at 
which all the operator group equipment has been off-loaded from the rig, except where the 
parties agree otherwise.  This means that even if the operator has offloaded all its own equipment, 
the drilling contract is not deemed to be completed until the operator’s other contractors have 
offloaded their own equipment.  In some cases, the operator is unable to offload such equipment 
on behalf of the other contractors as it may be specialised equipment that has to be demobilised 
utilising specialist personnel and knowledge.  For instance, this is the case with cementing 






which the equipment remains on board the rig longer than the operator intends, the latter would 
nevertheless be responsible for the applicable rate payable for the on-going contract. 
 
In certain instances, the operator requires the contractor to provide equipment for which the 
operator pays.  Although the operator reimburses the contractor for such specific equipment, the 
drilling contract does not regard it as belonging to the class of operator group equipment, and 
the contractor retains responsibility for them. 
 
Both parties have responsibility for inspecting and testing the equipment respectively provided 
by them to ascertain their fitness for purpose.  For instance, industry practice is that the contractor 
is responsible for inspecting all drill collars, drill pipe and other down-hole equipment, while the 
operator inspects casings, tubings and pup joints.  In addition, both parties ensure that their 
respective contractors and subcontractors also inspect and, where required, test the equipment 
provided.  The results and certificates issued after such inspections and tests are supposed to be 
issued to the operator and, where necessary, both parties are required to carry out remedial work 
on any equipment that does not meet the standard agreed by both parties at their respective cost.   
 
The above notwithstanding, the operator retains responsibility for inspecting any of the 
equipment provided by the contractor to ensure that it is fit for purpose.  Likewise, the contractor 
is responsible for inspecting operator group equipment prior to using them, and to report any 
patent defects therein to the operator, allowing the latter the opportunity to repair or replace 
same.314  Some drilling contracts hold the contractor responsible for any ensuing loss arising from 
the failure to spot any patent defect, but not for latent defects.315 
 
                                                 
314 See, for instance, Amoco (UK) Exploration Co v British American Offshore Ltd (2001) All ER (D) 244 (Nov) at 
para. 68. 







To ensure that all the contractor group equipment provided, including the drilling unit, remain 
fit for purpose throughout the duration of the drilling operations, the contractor has responsibility 
for maintaining the equipment.  In this regard, the contractor is to be guided by the standards set 
by the original equipment manufacturers, who issue certificates evidencing such maintenance 
activities upon completion.  Maintenance of the contractor group equipment should be in 
accordance with the ‘contractor’s management system’, which is essentially a database that 
details all the planned and unplanned maintenance carried out on the equipment.  The contractor 
is also supposed to assist the operator in maintaining operator group equipment.  However, this 
is to be reimbursed by the operator.  The rationale for the contractor’s responsibility to maintain 
operator group equipment is that the equipment is being utilised by the contractor for drilling 
operations, and so the contractor is in the best position to know when maintenance is required 
and to effect same.316  Where the obligation to maintain operator group equipment is breached 
by the contractor, as a result of which the equipment falls into disrepair, this might be a ground 
for the operator to allege breach of contract, entitling the operator to claim for damages.317 
 
The equipment requires consumables such as fuel, oil, cleansing fluids, solvents and lubricants 
to function optimally, and the responsibility for providing these is usually shared between the 
operator and contractor.  For instance, the drilling contract may provide that the operator supplies 
the fuel for the drilling unit, while the contractor supplies the lubricants.  It may also provide for 
a reimbursement mechanism where one party makes a supply that is ordinarily the responsibility 
of the other party.     
 
2.4.1.4  Provision of Personnel and Catering Services 
 
                                                 
316 See generally Hess Corp v Stena Drillmax III Ltd (2012) EWCA Civ 522; (2012) 2 All E.R. (Comm) 559. 






Both parties have responsibility for mobilising their respective personnel to support the drilling 
operations.  Thus, while the operator mobilises key personnel such as the company man, mud 
engineer and geologist, the contractor mobilises the offshore installation manager, toolpusher, 
driller, roughneck and derrickman.  The personnel are expected to be competent, trained, suitably 
qualified, and sufficiently experienced properly to undertake their duties arising from the 
contract, and as may be appropriately assigned to them. Given the fact that the bulk of the 
personnel on a rig belong to the contractor, and the contractor is the party required to carry on 
the drilling operations, the contractor makes an express representation to the operator about the 
competence of the personnel provided.  On the strength of this representation, the drilling 
contract also gives the operator the right to request the replacement of any personnel found to be 
incompetent in the performance of assigned duties, or deemed by the operator to be unqualified 
for same. 
 
The operator also reserves the right to demand the replacement of any member of personnel who 
has been negligent in the performance of assigned duties.  This same right exists in respect of 
any member of personnel whose behaviour is incompatible with the discipline and good order 
required for operations on the rig – for instance, because they have contravened the drugs, 
alcohol or other prohibited substances policy.  Where the person who has contravened the drugs, 
alcohol or other prohibited substances policy commits an infraction that causes harm or loss to 
occur, this would constitute grounds for inferring that his conduct was wilful.  
 
Importantly, both parties have responsibility for ensuring that personnel who are mobilised for 
duties on the rig are medically – both physically and mentally – fit to undertake their duties.  The 
contractor has the obligation to conduct medical examinations on them, ensuring that this is done 
by qualified medical personnel.  If any specialised safety, survival or operational training courses 






also provides this to its personnel, while the operator ensures that operator group personnel have 
the requisite training prior to their mobilisation to the rig. The parties have responsibility for 
evacuating personnel who require medical treatment or emergency evacuation to a suitable 
hospital – in most cases by helicopter.  In Dusek v Stormharbour Securities LLP,318 the court held 
that employers owed personnel a duty of care to ensure that if evacuation was undertaken by 
helicopter, it is safe to do so and, if necessary, would need to conduct a risk assessment to 
determine this fact before allowing personnel to fly. 
 
The above measures to ensure medical fitness need to be documented in a coherent policy that 
provides clear guidance to personnel of the conditions and circumstances in which they would 
be working.  In Palfrey v Ark Offshore Ltd,319 the court held that the defendant was in breach of 
its duty of care to ensure the safety of their employees by failing to put in place an effective 
policy for advising personnel of the risks of diseases in their area of operation of the rig. This 
was especially required when personnel were mobilised to overseas locations for work purposes. 
 
The contractor is responsible for ensuring that personnel are provided with adequate catering, 
laundry and recreational facilities.  This extends to ensuring that the catering personnel are also 
medically fit, and are subjected to medical tests at designated intervals.  Given the sensitivity of 
food handling, preparation and service, the contractor is responsible for quality control in the 
entire food chain, ensuring that catering personnel comply with laid-down procedures on 
hygiene, clothing, mobilisation of foodstuffs, materials and consumables, storage and cleaning.  
Where the contractor fails in this duty and harm occurs to any personnel, the contractor may be 
liable in damages.320  
 
                                                 
318 (2015) EWHC 37 (QB). 
319 (2001) All ER (D) 304 (Feb). 






2.4.1.5  Conduct of Drilling Operations  
 
As stated previously in this section, drilling operations include all activities that the parties are 
required to undertake to drill and, if necessary, complete, sidetrack, suspend or abandon a well.  
The issue arises as to when drilling operations actually commence. This is because some joint 
operating agreements (JOAs), sale and purchase agreements (SPAs) and farm-out agreements 
contain provisions to the effect that drilling operations must commence by a given date as part 
of the conditions for the transaction.  Different opinions have been expressed as to when drilling 
commences.  While some commentators have stated that it commences when mobilisation of the 
drilling unit commences, others have stated that it occurs when the rig is pre-loaded or being 
prepared for drilling operations.321  In Vitol E & P Ltd v Africa Oil and Gas Corp,322 the court 
held that drilling operations commenced when ‘the drill penetrated the seabed’.323  This point, 
which is known as ‘spudding’, was the court’s preferred approach, its rationale being that this is 
the only conclusion that could be reached if the term ‘commencement of drilling’ was given its 
natural interpretation.324  The confusion in the different approaches to commencement of drilling 
operations is the reason why some contract parties prefer provisions that contain the term 
‘commencement of actual drilling’ (emphasis added).  This provision makes it clear that 
preparatory activities prior to actual drilling will not satisfy this term, as the piercing of the 
ground by the drill bits is indicative of actual drilling.325 
 
Perhaps the contractor’s most crucial responsibility arising from the conduct of the drilling 
operations is the need to ensure that it is in accordance with the operator’s drilling programme.  
                                                 
321 See, generally, Lowe, J. S. (1987) ‘Analyzing Oil and Gas Farmout Agreements’, SW LJ, 41, p. 759, at pp. 802 
– 803. 
322 (2016) EWHC 1677 (Comm).  See also Vickers v Peaker 227 Ark. 587, 300 S.W.2d 29 (1957). 
323 Ibid, at para 61.  
324 Ibid, at paras 38 and 61. 
325 Lowe, J. S. (1987) ‘Analyzing Oil and Gas Farmout Agreements’, supra, at p. 803.  See also I LAW OF 
FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES § 14.05[2] (1986), which discusses the case law and federal regulations that 






Where a contractor has agreed to a drilling programme and fails to adhere to it, it may be in 
breach of the drilling contract, entitling the operator to recovery as prescribed in the contract.  In 
Lukoil Mid-East Ltd v Barclays Bank plc,326 the court held that the operator was entitled to call 
on the bank guarantee that had been issued to guarantee the contractor’s timely performance and 
adherence to the drilling programme.     
 
This responsibility encapsulates the duty to comply with the instructions of the operator, 
particularly relating to the well-hole specifications and the course of the well.  The operator 
would typically designate the well depth and other dimensions, and the contractor is expected to 
comply accordingly.  To ensure that the well specifications are accurate, the contractor is 
responsible for measuring while drilling so that deviations can be observed in real time.  The 
operator reserves the right to ask for a re-drill of the well at the contractor’s cost if the deviation 
exceeds the tolerance limits. 
 
Likewise, the contractor is responsible for complying with the mud, casing,327 coring328 and 
testing329 programmes instructed by the operator.  Importantly, the contractor is responsible for 
ensuring that the drilling activities do not cause pollution, either from negligence or due to well 
conditions, and that, in line with existing laws, no unauthorised discharge into the sea is effected.  
If, in the course of undertaking the drilling programme, the rig or any of the contractor group 
equipment is wrecked or capsizes, the contractor is responsible for recovering and removing the 
debris so that no obstruction is caused to waterways. 
 
                                                 
326 (2016) EWHC 166 (TCC). 
327 The obligation here is to drill the well to the depth, and set casing of the size and at the depths as specified in the 
drilling programme, and then test all strings of casing vide the methods and manner that the operator may instruct. 
328 The obligation here is to core between the depths instructed by the operator, and thereafter deliver samples of all 
cores to a location designate by the operator for that purpose. 







Following closely on the responsibility for adhering to the drilling programme is the contractor’s 
responsibility to conduct the drilling operations in ‘a good, diligent, safe and workmanlike 
manner’.  The workmanlike standard of performance has been the subject of many judicial 
pronouncements, as the failure to meet this standard can create the basis for liability for the 
contractor.  Initially, ‘workmanlike manner’ was thought to mean work that is undertaken in the 
traditional manner that contractors in the same community do.330  In the absence of generally 
accepted standards, the courts were willing to consider the practices of the community as binding 
standards on its members, such that any deviation was sanctioned.  The community has 
traditionally been viewed as the purveyor of law and standards of behaviour.  Indeed, it was the 
codification of such laws and practices that led to the emergence of the common law.331   
 
However, as society developed and there was more interaction between members of different 
communities, this standard progressively changed to meaning the degree of knowledge, 
efficiency and skill ordinarily possessed by people in the same trade or business as the contractor.  
In this regard, the focus was shifted from the manner of performance within a community to the 
expected standard of performance within the trade itself.332  The standard became more objective 
and held contractors accountable for professional wrongdoing from which they would have been 
hitherto exculpated in their communities, even when they demonstrated that they had undertaken 
the task to the best of their ability, knowledge and skill.333  If the contractor demonstrated capacity 
                                                 
330 Metcalf, S. K. (2010) ‘Contract: What Is “Performance in A Good and Workmanlike Manner”?’, MMMC, 
Available: McDonald, McCann, Metcalf & Carwile, LLP; http://mmmsk.com/contract-what-is-performance-in-a-
good-and-workmanlike-manner/ accessed; 13 October 2017. 
331 On development of the common law, see Kiralfy, A. R., Lewis, A. D. E. and Glendon, M. A. (2017) 'Common 
Law', ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA Available: Encyclopædia Britannica, inc; 
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332 See, for instance, Kincaid, M. L. (1989) ‘Recognizing an Implied Warranty That Professional Services Will Be 
Performed in a Good and Workmanlike Manner’, Mary's LJ, 21, p. 685, at p. 701. 
333 Thomsen, C., Darrington, J., Dunne, D. and Lichtig, W. (2009) ‘Managing Integrated Project Delivery’, 






that was below that ordinarily expected of a practitioner within that trade, or the task fell short 
of the standard within the trade, the contractor was liable for the ensuing wrong. 
 
This approach has been approved judicially.  In Hancock v BW Brazier (Anerley) Ltd,334 Lord 
Diplock stated that the expression ‘workmanlike manner’ meant that the task shall be undertaken 
‘with due skill, care and judgment’.  This ratio was followed in Harrison v Shepherd Homes 
Ltd,335 in which the court held that the expression meant that the task would be undertaken with 
‘proper skill and care’.336  Where the contractor fails to reach this standard, this may give rise to 
liability for damages at the instance of the operator.  For instance, in E.B Duncan Drilling & 
Well Servicing Co. v. Robinson Research, Inc,337 the court held that a drilling contractor that 
failed to bring a wild well under control because it did not have the requisite equipment, which 
had been specified by contract, had not acted in a workmanlike manner, and was solely 
responsible for the blowout that ensued. 
 
The courts have also drawn a distinction between drilling practices and standards that require the 
contractor to perform in a ‘workmanlike manner’ and those that require them to act with ‘due 
diligence’.  In Matador Drilling Co. v. Post,338 it was held that while ‘workmanlike manner’ was 
indicative of how the work was done, ‘due diligence’ focused on when the work is done.  The 
rationale for this distinction was based on the court’s thinking that the operator would be without 
protection and recourse if the contractor undertook the drilling operations with skill and care, 
but wasted a lot of time in doing so.  In circumstances in which compensation to the contractor 
was based on daily rates, it provided a perverse incentive for a contractor to drag out the work 
in order to get more pay. 
 
                                                 
334 (1966) 1 W.L.R. 1317. 
335 (2011) EWHC 1811 (TCC). 
336 Ibid, at paras 39-43 and 165. 
337 147 So. 2d 95 (La. Ct. App. 1962). 






It is noteworthy that the contractor is not the only entity under the obligation to perform its tasks 
in a ‘workmanlike manner’.  Most JOAs typically impose the same duty on the operator in the 
discharge of their operatorship obligations,339 and this is owed to the non-operators rather than 
the contractor.  Although a full discourse on the nature of this obligation is outside the scope of 
this study, suffice it to mention that the applicable standard to determine whether the operator 
has fulfilled this obligation is that in accordance with ‘good oilfield practice’, which is defined 
as the application of customary oilfield practices with the prudence and diligence ordinarily 
expected of experienced operators engaged in similar activities.340  A similar requirement is often 
found in drilling contracts.  What is ‘prudent’ and ‘diligent’ is circumstantial and dependent on 
the state of technology at the specific time under consideration.341 
 
To demonstrate that drilling operations are being conducted in accordance with the operator-
approved drilling programme, the contractor has responsibility for providing to the operator daily 
drilling reports in an approved format.  This report will contain the details of daily activities on 
the rig, including the tests and repairs undertaken, as well as itemisation of the applicable rates 
to the nearest half hour, which would be indicative of the compensation payable by the operator.   
This report is expected to be complete and accurate, and will serve as the primary document for 
determining whether the contractor’s charge for any day is justified, taking into consideration 
the alignment between the charge and the actual activity undertaken.   
 
2.4.2 Regulatory Regime and Compliance Requirements 
 
                                                 
339 See, for instance, 6.2.2, 2009 UK Industry Model Form Joint Operating Agreement, published by Oil & Gas UK, 
and available at https://oilandgasuk.co.uk/oil-gas-uk-presents-suite-of-model-agreements-to-improve-industry-
efficiency/; accessed 19 January 2018. 
340 Ibid, at clause 1.1. 
341 Styles, S. (2007) ‘Joint Operating Agreements’, in Gordon, G., Paterson, J. & Usenmez, E. (eds) Oil and Gas 






The scale and potential effect of the drilling operations have necessitated government 
intervention that regulates various aspects of the drilling operations, requiring the parties to 
conduct them in a manner that complies with the relevant laws and regulations.  Indeed, post-
Macondo, governments have increased the oversight of the drilling industry, introducing new 
measures that ensure that drilling operations are carried on safely and responsibly.   
 
In this regard, the operator and contractor have the overarching responsibility for complying with 
the law, and procuring the compliance of members of their respective groups.  Both parties need 
to comply with all laws and regulations relating to certification of equipment and authorisation 
of their respective personnel to work within the jurisdiction of the well location.  The latter would 
include ensuring that all laws relating to insurance and work permits are fully complied with.  
Where either party fails to comply with the general requirements of the law, in consequence of 
which fines or penalties are imposed, the errant party will be solely responsible for this, except 
where the contract states otherwise.  The most relevant compliance requirements specifically 
related to drilling operations are discussed hereunder.  
 
2.4.2.1  Licences and Authorisations  
 
The operator is responsible for obtaining all the necessary licences and approvals required for 
the drilling operations to be legitimately undertaken at the well location.  The operator is also 
responsible for advising the contractor of any conditions, limitations or restrictions in any 
licences or authorisations that will limit the right of access and egress from the well location, as 
well as the conduct of the drilling operations. 
 
The operator shall be responsible for the consequences of any failure to obtain any licence or 
authorisation in a timely manner which causes delays in the drilling operations, or limits the right 






the terms of the petroleum authorisation,342 in consequence of which delays to the drilling 
programme occur, the operator will be responsible accordingly.   
 
The contractor also has responsibility for securing permission for the drilling unit to be utilised 
in the geographical jurisdiction of the area of operations.  Where the drilling unit is to be 
mobilised from one country to another, this would require obtaining an import licence that details 
the conditions precedent to the utilisation of the rig in the country of operations.  If the contractor 
fails to obtain the import licence or contravenes any of the conditions precedent to its usage in 
the location of operations, the contractor would bear this responsibility, except where the 
contract states otherwise. 
 
2.4.2.2  Compliance with Health, Safety and Environmental Regulations  
  
In the conduct of drilling operations, the operator and contractor are expected to protect the 
environment by acting to preserve air and water quality, to shield human, animal and plant life 
from harmful effects of the drilling activities, and to mitigate any nuisance potentially arising 
therefrom.  In this regard, the operator and contractor are mandated to comply with extant laws 
and regulations relating to environmental damage arising from the drilling operations, and any 
environmental requirements that specifically apply to the area of operations.  In the UK, the 
Environment Agency is the government entity responsible for issuing the relevant permits, and 
would typically conduct a risk assessment prior to issuing the relevant permits.343 
 
Although the primary responsibility for ensuring compliance with environmental laws and 
regulations is given to the operator vide the licence for the drilling operations issued by the 
                                                 
342 See, for instance, Dean v Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2017) EWHC 1998 
(Admin); (2017) 4 W.L.R. 158, in which the court held that the terms of a petroleum authorisation could be varied 
by the Secretary of State for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy.  






appropriate authority, the operator usually allocates such responsibility to the contractor and 
contractor group personnel in the drilling contract.  The operator requires the contractor to 
maintain an environmental management system (EMS) that contains its health, safety and 
environment (HSE) policy, as well as details of its plan to comply with the applicable 
environmental laws that regulate drilling operations.  The EMS will also contain information on 
the plan for training contractor group personnel to provide awareness training required for the 
applicable compliance requirements for the drilling operations.  In essence, the EMS has to 
demonstrate the contractor’s plan to ensure adherence to the highest standards of environmental 
protection and remediation, if required. 
 
The operator is responsible for conducting independent audits of the EMS to ascertain the level 
of compliance with extant laws and regulations.  This is notwithstanding the duty of the 
Environment Agency to conduct its own independent audits on organisations engaged in 
exploration in the North Sea, based on some specific parameters.344  In the USA, in the aftermath 
of the Macondo disaster, the government accepted a proposal that sought to tighten the regulation 
of certain specific operational requirements which directly impacted well control.345  In addition, 
the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) proposed 
additional regulation of operators’ safety and environmental management system (SEMS) that 
authorise impromptu rig inspections and mandated independent audits of SEMS programmes.346  
BOEMRE was subsequently split into the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and 
                                                 
344 These parameters include oil-in-produced water mass; oil spill volume rate; CO2 emissions; greenhouse gas 
emission rate, and operations waste recycling/reuse. 
345 The operational requirements include rig audits, acoustically controlled subsea BOP systems, kick detection and 
response procedures, shear ram design, pressure testing, redundant BOPs, and also prescribed minimum standards 
for well control training – See the Report to the President by the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon 
Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling that was released on September 14, 2011.  The report can be accessed here: 
https://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/oilspill/20121210172821/http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/  






the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), with BSEE now vested with the 
authority to monitor SEMS programs347. 
 
2.4.2.3  Customs Duties, Fees and Taxes   
 
Another compliance requirement is in respect of the payment of customs or excise duties, taxes 
and fees.  Responsibility for this compliance requirement is shared between the operator and 
contractor.  For instance, while the contractor is responsible for the import and export of the rig 
and its equipment and spares where applicable, the operator is responsible for the customs and 
excise duties, fees and taxes payable thereon.  However, the operator’s responsibility does not 
extend to the excise duties, fees and taxes payable on contractor group equipment during drilling 
operations.  Both parties are responsible for duties, fees and taxes payable on their respective 
equipment as well as on the personal property of the personnel in their respective groups. 
 
With respect to income accruing from the performance of the drilling contract, the contractor is 
responsible for reporting, filing and remitting all applicable taxes, as well as all fines, penalties 
and interest that may be assessed on the income, profits and gains arising therefrom.  The 
contractor is also to ensure that subcontractors and other members of contractor group report, 
file and remit all applicable taxes.  Responsibility for members of operator group lies with the 
operator, and both parties typically absolve each other from any liability arising from tax-related 
default except as stated in the drilling contract.  This absolution from liability would also extend 
to any salaries, wages, or income, remuneration, emoluments, social security payments or 
deemed benefits paid to any member of the operator group personnel or contractor group 
personnel respectively. 
 
                                                 







The above notwithstanding, the operator has responsibility for deducting and remitting 
withholding tax (WHT) from payments due to the contractor in line with the applicable law.  
Where applicable, the operator also deducts and remits value added tax (VAT) from relevant 
payments due to the contractor, and in both cases, provides evidence of remittance to the latter 
to enable them to claim the WHT credit to net off their corporate income tax liability.  
 
Importantly, the operator has the responsibility of reimbursing the contractor for any increase in 
the tax, fees or levies arising from a change in the laws within the jurisdiction of operations 
during the firm term of the drilling contract if the parties have so agreed.   
 
2.4.2.4  Reporting and Compliance Monitoring 
   
The authorisation to drill given by the government to the operator imposes the responsibility for 
making formal reports in a prescribed manner upon the occurrence of certain events. For 
instance, if death or personal injury occurs during the drilling operations, the operator is 
supposed to notify the relevant government agency which would take whatever steps are 
required, either to cause an investigation into the incident with a view to preventing a re-
occurrence, or to impose sanctions as appropriate.    
 
The operator delegates this responsibility for making formal reports to the contractor as the entity 
in control of the actual drilling operations.  Thus, the contractor is mandated by the drilling 
contract to notify the operator of any accidents or incidents resulting in personal injury to or the 
death of any person or damage to any property arising out of or in consequence of the drilling 
operations.  In addition to taking all necessary remedial actions regarding any such accident or 
incident, the contractor is responsible for preparing the requisite reports as dictated by extant law 







This delegation of authority by operator to contractor might impede drilling operations if there 
is a communication gap in the expectations of both parties.  Where, for instance, there is no 
clarity as to the division of the responsibilities for preparing and filing requisite reports or 
approval requests with the relevant government agency, tasks remain undone, and this may 
impact on drilling operations negatively.348 
 
If significant spillage of lubricants, fuel, chemicals or other consumables349 occurs during drilling 
operations, the contractor is responsible to ensure that this is immediately reported to the 
operator, and the latter is expected to notify the relevant government authorities.  The same 
responsibility exists in respect of major outbreak of diseases within the drilling unit.  The 
operator is then responsible for informing the relevant health authorities, who may elect to 
undertake an occupational health audit to review the contractor's compliance with the hygiene 
standards, quality control and mobilisation protocols for foodstuffs, consumables and other 
relevant materials. 
 
The contractor is expected to undertake scheduled training of the contractor group personnel, 
especially as it relates to survival within the specific area of operations.   Such training will 
include BOSIET,350 HUET351 and MIST,352 and evidence of their delivery will be given to the 
operator, who is responsible for reporting same to the relevant government authorities. 
 
                                                 
348 See, for instance, Whitfield, S. (2017) Macondo Contractor/Operator Gaps Identified by CSB. Oil and Gas 
Facilities Newsletter. USA: Society of Petroleum Engineers. Available at: https://www.spe.org/en/ogf/ogf-article-
detail/?art=2637; accessed: 31 October 2017, where the issue was the policies on conducting negative pressure tests 
on the Macondo well.  While Transocean averred that BP was responsible for the development and obtaining 
approval of plans from the Mineral Management Service of the US Department of Interior, BP stated that 
Transocean had this responsibility. 
349 What constitutes significant spillage will be defined in the contractor’s EMS. 
350 Basic offshore safety induction and emergency training which equips personnel with knowledge of basic 
emergency response and skills for travelling to and from offshore installations by helicopter, as well as specific 
safety issues and regimes relevant to offshore installations.  
351 Helicopter underwater escape training which arms personnel with skills for emergency exit in the event of a 
crash landing over water. 






2.4.3 Third-Party Services, Rights and Benefits 
 
For the purposes of this section, there are three classes of third parties.  The first is constituted 
by people who claim that a certain benefit or right has been conferred upon them by a term in a 
contract, which entitles them to legal protection and enforcement of that benefit or right.  In the 
UK, they are afforded statutory recognition under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 
1999; even though the protection is limited by qualifications that impact on the real effect of the 
reprieve supposedly granted.  This class of people will be discussed in a separate section in this 
study.353 
 
The second class is made up of people who are negatively impacted by the operations of 
contracting parties that cause death, injury or other damage to them, their property or their 
relatives (in case of death).  Protection of these third-party interests is founded on the law of tort 
and is justified by the duty of care that is owed to persons who are close enough to the contract 
activity locus as to be impacted by it.  The responsibility of the contract parties to this class of 
people is discussed as being grounded in the law of torts,354 which would also be the basis for 
imposing liability when culpability is established.  
 
The third class of third parties is constituted by entities who are members of the operator group 
(other than the operator) or contractor group (other than the contractor).  This class would 
ordinarily be covered by the definition of group for both operator and contractor, and so should 
not be considered as third parties properly so called but, for the purposes of this section, fall into 
this enlarged categorisation of people who are owed specific responsibilities by the operator and 
contractor arising from the activities under the drilling contract.  These responsibilities are 
discussed below. 
                                                 
353 Under the section on Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.   






2.4.3.1  Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999   
 
Under this Act, the operator and contractor can confer a benefit expressly stated as being 
enforceable by the third party,355 or the term of the contract can purport to confer a benefit on 
the third party,356 which the third party is –  or is presumed to be – able to enforce if there is 
nothing in the contract that rebuts that presumption.357  The aim of this legislation is not to abolish 
the privity of contract principle, but to reform it by creating a statutory exception, essentially 
allowing third parties enforceable rights under contracts,358 by stipulating circumstances in which 
the third party is legally able to sue the promisor and enforce the promise contained in the 
contract conferring a benefit to him.  This legislation is discussed in detail in this study.  
 
Most drilling contracts generally rebut that presumption, and expressly provide that no provision 
of the contract shall, pursuant to the Act, confer any benefit on, or be enforceable by, any person 
who is not a contract party.  The Act allows contract parties to contract out of the effects of its 
provisions,359 and most drilling contracts exercise this discretion accordingly.  However, drilling 
contracts could also allow partial compliance, by restricting the application of the Act only to 
certain provisions of the contract.360  Thus, the drilling contract can prescribe that the provisions 
relating to indemnities, consequential losses, insurance, intellectual property rights and patent 
infringement should be subject to the Act.     
 
Perhaps the most critical class of people impacted by the restricted application of the Act to third 
parties are those in the third class of third parties, which is constituted by entities who are 
members of the operator group (other than the operator) or contractor group (other than the 
                                                 
355 Section 1(1)(a), Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. 
356 Ibid, s. 1(1)(b). 
357 Ibid., s. 1(2). 
358 Yeo, T. (2001) ‘When Do Third Party Rights Arise Under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 
(UK)?’, Singapore Academy of Law Journal,13, p. 34, at p. 36. 
359 Op.Cit, s. 1(2). 






contractor).  This class can be further sub-divided into non-operators and other contractors or 
subcontractors.  Within this categorisation, the responsibility owed to non–operators – also 
known as co-venturers – by the operator and contractor is particularly instructive and is discussed 
hereunder.  
 
The drilling contract is ordinarily between the operator and the contractor.  Sometimes, the 
operator contracts on behalf of itself alone or on behalf of itself and the non-operators.  The 
responsibility of the non-operators to the operator with respect to any liability resulting from the 
operator’s performance of its functions will depend on the law of agency as well as the terms of 
the joint operating agreement (JOA) – the document that regulates and defines their relationship 
inter se.  Typically, the JOA would provide that all rights and liabilities arising under the 
petroleum authorisation granted are to be borne in proportion to the respective percentage 
interests held by the co-venturers.361   
 
If the JOA mandates the operator to contract for itself and as agent for the non-operators, the 
operator does this qua agent, and the non-operators are disclosed principals.  Indeed, the 2009 
Model JOA362 prescribes that all contracts made on behalf of the non-operators by the operator 
should disclose the existence of the non-operators.363  By the rules of agency, whatever liability 
is incurred by the operator is done as agent of the non-operators, meaning that all the non-
operators are also liable for the ensuing loss.364  In this regard, the non-operators have an interest 
in knowing whether they can sue and be sued on a contract in respect of liabilities arising 
therefrom during the pendency of the operator acting as their agent.  Thus, they may require 
                                                 
361 Black, A. J. and Dundas, H. R. (1992) ‘Joint Operating Agreements: An International Comparison from 
Petroleum Law’, J. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L., 8, pp. 49–79, at p. 63. 
362 Developed by Oil & Gas UK in February 2009: https://oilandgasuk.co.uk/oil-gas-uk-presents-suite-of-model-
agreements-to-improve-industry-efficiency/; accessed 16 June 2018. 
363 Clause 6.5.8. 
364 Gounari, Z. (2002) ‘Duties and Liabilities of the Operator under UK Oil and Gas Joint Operating Agreements: 






express clarification and confirmation of the operator’s status both in the JOA and the drilling 
contract.  
 
Where the JOA mandates the operator to contract for itself and as agent of the non-operators, 
the operator contracts in a dual capacity – qua agent and qua principal.  This study posits that 
the practical effect of contracting either solely qua agent and in a dual capacity – qua agent and 
qua principal – is the same.  In both cases, the operator and the non-operator will be liable for 
all losses in line with their JOA, making it a moot point as to whether the operator contracts 
either solely qua agent or in a dual capacity.365     
 
From the contractor’s perspective, the operator’s status as agent of the disclosed principals, the 
non-operators, means that the contractor can elect to sue any or all of them for any ensuing 
liability, as the operator will be deemed as acting based on the express or ostensible authority of 
the non-operators.366  To prevent this possibility contractually, the drilling contract would 
typically provide that the contractor shall look only to the operator for the due performance of 
the contract and is not entitled to commence any proceedings against any non-operator or 
principal other than the operator.  This contractual provision remains effective even where there 
is a dispute between the JOA co-venturers.367  The contractor will sue the operator as normal, 
and the operator will use the cash call mechanism under the JOA to request the contributions of 
the non-operators in line with their percentage interest, to satisfy the liability, the dispute between 
the principals notwithstanding. 
 
                                                 
365 See, for instance, Domsalla (t/a Domsalla Building Services) v Dyason (2007) EWHC 1174 (TCC); (2007) 
B.L.R. 348, paras 63–70, in which the court held that the respondent was liable as principal and as agent, given the 
fact that the principals were disclosed, and the parties intended liability to attach as such. 
366 See generally, Stone, R. (1996) Law of Agency. London: Cavendish, at p. 98. 
367 See, for instance, Pan Petroleum AJE Ltd v Yinka Folawiyo Petroleum Co Ltd, YFP Deepwater Co Ltd, EER 
(Colobus) Nigeria Ltd, Newage Exploration Nigeria Ltd, PR Oil & Gas Nigeria Ltd. (2017) EWCA Civ 1525, in 






Likewise, the drilling contract would also empower the operator to act on behalf of the non-
operators and for itself, with respect to bringing actions against the contractor to enforce any 
obligation or liability.  Where the contract parties agree to this provision, this would be enforced 
under the Act, as the parties’ intention is paramount in this regard.368 
 
The question then arises as to whether the non-operators and the contractor, who are restricted 
from direct enforcement of the contract inter se – by the drilling contract, and under the Act, 
reflecting the intention of the parties – can circumvent the restrictions placed on them thereto.  
In other words, what is the effectiveness of the way in which risk has been allocated by the 
primary contracting parties – the operator and contractor – against the backdrop of these 
restrictions?  This inevitably leads to the question of what responsibility the contractor and 
operator owe the non-operators if the contractor has been negligent as a result of which loss has 
occurred, and the operator is either unwilling or unable to bring an action to recover against the 
contractor because of the indemnity, liability and exclusion clauses in the drilling contract.  
Again, the contractor may be trying to recoup expenses from the operator in circumstances in 
which the non-operators may be called upon to contribute. 
 
This question requires an examination of the relationship between the non-operator and the 
contractor other than in contract or under the Act.  Thus, this relationship would be examined in 
tort and in agency.   
 
When an entity undertakes a task for another entity pursuant to a voluntary or contractual 
relationship, then, irrespective of the nomenclature of this relationship – contractual, special or 
non-contractual – liability will attach, by reference to either the contract terms or the general 
principles of negligence, or under the principle of voluntary assumption of responsibility.  
                                                 






Furthermore, a voluntary task performed by one entity for another may give rise to concurrent 
liability in contract and tort.  If the courts were to find that a ‘contract’ nevertheless exists, the 
absence of consideration notwithstanding,369 the mere fact that those two entities have a 
‘contractual’ relationship does not preclude the existence of a duty of care in tort, especially if 
assumption of responsibility can be established against one of the ‘parties’.370  This subject is 
examined in detail in subsequent sections.   
 
The fact that the non-operators are disclosed principals means that they can sue or be sued on 
the contract, subject to the restriction imposed by the contract, and supported by the JOA already 
discussed.  This also means that concurrent liability can attach in tort if the existence of a duty 
of care can be established.  This duty of care can either be directly between the non-
operator/principal and the contractor, or between the operator/agent and the contractor.371  The 
fact that the contractor can sue any or all the disclosed principals means that they are proximate 
enough for a duty of care to exist, which in turn gives rise to a basis for an action in tort inter 
se.372  Thus, this study posits that the non-operator can ordinarily proceed against the contractor 
in tort, and vice versa.  This is especially true when the contractor’s activities under the drilling 
contract have harmed the interest of the non-operators in circumstances which, but for the 
indemnity and liability structure in the drilling contract, would have given rise to liability on the 
part of the contractor.   
 
Again, under the principles of agency, he who does something through another, does it himself.  
There is no disputing the fact that where the principals are disclosed, the operator also contracts 
qua agent, meaning that the non-operator/principal may be vicariously liable for the acts of the 
                                                 
369 As happened in De La Bere v Pearson (1908) 1 KB 280. 
370 Mulheron, R. (2016) Principles of Tort Law. Cambridge University Press, at p. 18.  This is however subject to 
any expressed intent of the contract parties to exclude or limit liability in tort:  Biffa Waste Services Ltd and Another 
v Maschinenfabrik Ernst Hese Gmbh and others (2008) EWHC 6 (TCC) 169(4). 
371 Stone, R. (1996) Law of Agency, supra, at p. 116. 






operator/agent.  Since the non-operators would have themselves been liable for any ensuing 
harm, undertaking the task through the operator does not alter their liability position, both by the 
doctrines of agency373 and vicarious liability.  Furthermore, the non-operators may also be 
simultaneously directly liable to the contractor if the task performed by members of the operator 
group personnel, and the resulting harm, are underpinned by a non-delegable duty of care owed 
to the contractor.374  For instance, if the negligent activities of a member of the operator group 
personnel were exacerbated by the operator’s failure to provide adequate materials375 and 
competent staff,376 ensure a proper work system and effective supervision,377 and a safe work 
environment,378 then this can be imputed directly to the non-operators, entitling the contractor to 
proceed against them directly in agency. 
 
The above notwithstanding, whether the non-operators and the contractor are able, in fact, to 
proceed directly against each other in tort or agency, given the restriction in the drilling contract 
and the JOA, can be argued from the different perspectives presented below. 
 
Drilling Contract Restriction Applies 
The drilling contract would typically exclude liability notwithstanding the sole, contributory, 
gross, active or passive negligence of any party, or members of their group, or any breach of 
contract, tort, duty (statutory or otherwise, whether or not involving fault), or any under any 
other legal theory (including strict or product liability) that may be applicable.  This exclusion 
purports to deny any other course of action from being undertaken in respect of activities arising 
from the drilling contract.  Indeed, it is on this basis that insurance companies are unable to 
                                                 
373 Qui facit per alium facit per se. 
374 Mulheron, R. (2016) Principles of Tort Law, supra, at pp. 969–970.  See also Majrowski v Guy’s and St. 
Thomas’s NHS Trust (2006) UKHL 34, per Lord Nichols. 
375 Parkinson v Lyle Shipping Co. Ltd (1964) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 79. 
376 Hudson v Ridge Manufacturing Co Ltd (1957) 2 QB 348. 
377 General Cleaning Contractors Ltd v Christmas (1953) AC 180, at 194. 






proceed against parties whose actions have caused the harm that triggered the indemnification 
by the indemnitor and payment by the insurance companies.  Once the contract parties have a 
waiver of subrogation clause379 in the contract, this effectively prevents the insurance company 
from any further recovery.  In Fraser River Pile & Dredge Ltd v Can-Dive Services Ltd,380 the 
Supreme Court refused to allow an insurance company to recover money from a tortfeasor whose 
negligent action had caused the sinking of a barge.  The court’s rationale was that the waiver of 
subrogation clause effectively extinguished all rights of action against a tortfeasor who was the 
target of the clause.  The fact that the tortfeasor was not a party to the insurance contract was not 
a bar to the operation of the waiver of subrogation clause and that, in these circumstances, the 
doctrine of privity of contract would be relaxed.  The court was convinced that relaxing the 
operation of the doctrine to give effect to the waiver of subrogation clause was in consonance 
with the commercial reality of the relationship of the parties, and ‘was a permissible incremental 
change in the common law needed to address enduring needs and values in society’.381  
   
By that decision, the court upheld the primary contract between the contract parties, and refused 
to recognise any other route as being accessible to defeat the intention of the parties as espoused 
in the contract.  If the drilling contract is seen as superseding other legal routes available – in tort 
and agency – the same outcome as the court in Fraser River Pile may prevent the non-operators 
and/or contractors from any recourse other than as stated in the drilling contract, thereby 
preserving the indemnity, exclusion and liability structure agreed between the operator and the 
contractor. 
 
                                                 
379 The waiver of subrogation is an exclusion clause which extinguishes the right to subrograte. This is the right that 
an insurer possesses to proceed against a third party whose actions caused an insurance loss to the indemnitor, with 
a view to recovering the amount paid by the insurer to the insured for the loss; see Morris v Ford Motor Co (1973) 
QB 792. 
380 (2000) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 199. 






This view is supported by the decision of the court in Natol Petroleum Corp v Aetna Insurance 
Co382 in which the court had to decide whether an insurance contract to which the parties to a 
drilling contract had looked for the value of equipment that was lost in hole, covered liability 
assumed by ‘contract’, or only liability ‘imposed by law’.  It was common ground that the 
operator’s liability for the lost-in-hole equipment was assumed under the drilling contract, and 
that the loss was not occasioned by negligence, neither could liability be founded in any other 
tort.  The court held that the operator’s liability assumed by contract was not covered by the 
insurance contract, and their rationale was that the assumption of liability under the terms of a 
contract – which was enforceable in accordance with contract law – is distinct from liability 
‘imposed by law’ - such as tort law - in the absence of a contract (emphasis added).383  This 
rationale clearly shows that the court accorded priority to the intention of the parties as expressed 
in contract, and refused to countenance any other legal theory or route as superseding the 
contract. 
 
Drilling Contract Restriction Does Not Apply 
Where the existence and identity of the non-operators as the principal(s) of the operator-agent 
are disclosed, according to the general principles of agency, the non-operators can ordinarily sue 
and be sued by the contractor.384  Even where the principal(s) are undisclosed, they can still sue 
on the contract entered by their agent, provided that the fact of their existence was made to known 
to the contractor, even though the actual identity was not disclosed.385  Although agency 
relationships are mostly based on contracts, some writers situate the law of agency as being sui 
generis within the body of commercial law.386  Indeed, while labelling agency as a ‘power-
                                                 
382 466 F.2d 38 (10th Cir. 1972). 
383 Ibid, at p.42. 
384 Styles, S. (2007) ‘Joint Operating Agreements’, supra, at pp.384–383. 
385 Reynolds, F. (2016) Unidentified Principals in Common Law. in ‘Agency Law in Commercial Practice’, Danny 
Busch, Laura Macgregor, Peter Watts (eds) Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 55–94, at p. 57. 






liability’ relationship,387 one writer makes the point that special relationships such as this should 
not be constrained by the narrow compartmentalisation of the law, stating that elegantia juris 
can be achieved only if the law is approached dynamically rather than being placed in a strait 
jacket.388 
 
It is, perhaps, in line with this thinking that the courts sometimes engage in judicial activism in 
their quest to do substantive justice when confronted with cases the outcomes of which would 
not accord with this quest if they were to be decided on extant legal principles. For instance, and 
as discussed below,389 as it related to the doctrine of common employment, the courts’ attitude 
was to keep curtailing its scope of application, and conversely, keep enlarging the scope of 
recovery for claimants harshly affected by its strict application.390  
  
One way in which the courts have demonstrated their willingness to do substantive justice is by 
resort to the equitable remedy of constructive trust to prevent wrongdoing.  An example of such 
resort is seen in International Corona Resources Ltd v Lac Minerals,391 in which the court 
deemed a constructive trust to be in existence to prevent unjust enrichment.  It reached this 
decision after evaluating other remedies such as ‘restitution’, ‘damages’, and ‘account for 
profits’, which it found did not address the justice of the case.  Restitution could not be ordered 
as the property in question could not be ‘given back’ to the claimants, as they never owned it in 
the first instance; damages were inappropriate because a one-off payment would deny the 
claimant the benefit of the fruits of their proprietary information on a continuing basis; and 
                                                 
387 A relationship in which one party is vested with the power to alter the legal relations of another, and the latter 
accepts the liability of having his legal relations altered.  
388 Dowrick, F. E. (1954) ‘The Relationship of Principal and Agent’, The Modern Law Review, 17(1), pp. 24–40, at 
pp. 36–38. 
389 Under the heading: ‘Liability for Death, Injury and Loss/Damage’.  
390 Smith v Charles Baker & Sons (1891) AC 325.   






account for profits would not address the proceeds from the use of the confidential proprietary 
information on an on-going basis.392 
 
Similarly, prior to the enactment of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, the courts 
would use the instrumentality of constructive trust to provide equitable relief for a third-party 
beneficiary to take the benefit conferred under a contract.393  Ordinarily, the principle of privity 
would have prevented this legal route from being available.  However, the courts resorted to this 
in deserving circumstances to prevent unjust enrichment.  Even with the enactment of this Act, 
contract parties are at liberty to exclude its application to their transaction, either wholly or 
partially.  It is submitted that the courts are still able to resort to the mechanism of constructive 
trust, as the inherent jurisdiction of the court to do substantive justice has been neither diminished 
nor fettered.394   
 
Flowing from the above, it is plausible that, in deserving circumstances, the courts can allow a 
direct action between the non-operator and the contractor despite the restriction in the drilling 
contract – for instance, if the contractor makes available confidential information to the operator, 
who then discloses same to the non-operators qua co-venturers, but then a non-operator uses or 
distributes that information in an unauthorised manner, to the contractor’s detriment.  In this 
circumstance, the contractor cannot proceed against the operator who has done nothing wrong; 
the drilling contract would typically permit the sharing of information with co-venturers.395  If 
the operator has informed the non-operator of the confidential and proprietary nature of the 
                                                 
392 See also Minera Aquiline Argentina v IMA Exploration (2006) BCSC 1102. 
393 Merkin, R. (ed.) (2000) Privity of Contract: The Impact of the Contracts (Right of Third Parties) Act 1999. 1st 
ed Oxford: Informa Law from Routledge, at pp. 18–24. 
394 Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed. (London: LexisNexis UK, 1973), vol. 37, at para. 14: ‘the inherent 
jurisdiction of the court is a virile and viable doctrine, and has been defined as being the reserve or fund of powers, 
a residual source of powers, which the court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, 
in particularly to ensure the observation of the due process of law, to prevent improper vexation or oppression, to 
do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial between them’. 






information, but the latter nevertheless uses or distributes it in an unauthorised manner to the 
contractor’s detriment, this study posits that the contractor can proceed against the non-operator 
for breach of their common law duty of confidence, provided that the ingredients396 for 
establishing liability have been satisfied.   
 
Although the contractor did not communicate this information directly to the non-operator, the 
latter may nonetheless be liable to the former.  This is because some drilling contracts have 
provisions to the effect that if information that is otherwise confidential, is disclosed by a third 
party who is in possession of same lawfully, ‘who is under no obligation not to disclose’397 
(emphasis added), then no liability attaches.  By parity of reasoning, where the third party is 
under an obligation not to disclose, as in the present scenario in which the operator informs the 
non-operator of the confidential nature of the information, together with the request not to 
disclose, if the latter goes ahead to disclose unauthorisedly, that non-operator may be liable to 
the contractor if the latter suffers loss thereby. 
 
The above notwithstanding, this study further posits that the possibility of direct action between 
the non-operator and the contractor presents the potential problem of circularity due to the 
indemnity structure of the drilling contract.  For instance, if the non-operator successfully sues 
the contractor for negligence and recovers damages thereby, the contractor can claim indemnity 
from the operator if the drilling contract allows indemnification in that circumstance.  For the 
operator to meet the indemnity obligation, it may either call on the insurers to settle the claim or 
issue a cash call on the non-operators under the JOA.  In both scenarios, the responsibility for 
bearing the economic consequences of the indemnity is ultimately borne by the co-venturers, 
                                                 
396 See Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd (1969) RPC 41, at 47–48 per Megarry J.  The tests are as follows: (a) the 
information must possess the necessary quality of confidence; (b) it is communicated in circumstances importing 
an obligation of confidence; and (c) the information has been used in an unauthorised manner, to owner’s detriment. 






including the non-operator who recovered the damages from the contractor.  To avoid this 
circularity, most JOAs provide that proceedings can be commenced only by the operator.  Thus, 
even in circumstances in which the non-operator has a cause of action against the drilling 
contractor, the non-operator is unable to proceed, and it is doubtful that the operator would 
proceed against the drilling contractor in circumstances which would create this circularity 
because of the indemnity structure of the drilling contract.  
 
2.4.3.2  Intellectual Property Rights and Patents Infringement  
 
The operator and contractor share the responsibility for ensuring that there is no infringement of 
any patent, proprietary or protected right belonging to any entity during the drilling operations.  
In this regard, both parties are responsible to ensure that any patent, copyright, proprietary right 
or confidential know-how, trademark or process provided by the other party is not infringed or 
misused, as the intellectual property rights in them remain with the party who has provided them 
accordingly.398  
 
Furthermore, the operator is responsible for ensuring that none of the technical information, 
instructions, materials or equipment that it issues to the contractor infringes any known patent, 
proprietary or protected right.  Likewise, the contractor assumes the same responsibility in 
respect of any technical information, materials or equipment that it utilises in the performance 
of the drilling operations.  Where either party infringes any intellectual property rights, that party 
bears the consequences of this breach, except where the drilling contract provides otherwise.399   
 
                                                 
398 Rockwater Ltd v Technip France SA (formerly Coflexip SA) (2004) EWCA Civ 381. 







During the drilling operations, if any potential patent or registrable right emerges from the 
activities of the contractor, which is wholly based on data, substances, materials, equipment, 
processes in the contractor’s possession at the inception of the contract, the contractor is entitled 
to those rights.  In this vein, the contractor is responsible for pursuing such registration to its 
logical conclusion, and is expected to grant the operator unfettered, royalty-free licence to such 
patents or other registrable rights, as well as to any equipment manufactured therefrom.400  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined how risks arise within the drilling process, what those risks are and how 
they are then reflected in the drilling contract.  The discussion commenced with a discourse on 
the petroleum lifecycle, situating the drilling process and the drilling contract therein.  The 
complex and volatile nature of the drilling process makes it inevitable that risks would arise in 
all aspects of the process.  The consequences of such risks eventuating ranges from property loss 
or damage, and in extreme circumstances, bodily injury or death.  Indeed, the occurrence of 
certain adverse events has led not only to fatalities, but large numbers of them. 
It then becomes crucial to ensure that measures are taken to ensure that adverse events do not 
occur or that, if they do, a contract party is responsible for bearing the economic consequences 
of their occurrence.  This is what contract parties are expected to do in a structured manner in 
the drilling contract, and in line with the responsibilities arising therefrom.   
However, contract parties have not always allocated risks inter se, in the way that is currently 
done in the drilling contract.  Consequently, the courts had to allocate risk between them upon 
the occurrence of adverse events, guided by doctrines of law as well as extant legislation.  Indeed, 
the legislature also intervened in the risk allocation process where it felt that intervention was 
                                                 






necessary to protect public interest and social cohesion.  Understanding the way in which risk 
allocation has evolved is relevant in explaining rationales for the current state of practice, as this 
serves as the bedrock for the manner of that allocation.  This evolution is discussed in Chapter 







RISK ALLOCATION BY THE COURTS IN THE ABSENCE OF CONTRACT 
Introduction 
One may wonder why anybody, besides the parties to a contract, should be concerned about the 
way in which parties choose to allocate risks within their contract.  One would further expect 
that the principle of freedom of contract should ordinarily enable parties to agree the terms and 
conditions that govern their relationship, and that these should be respected and upheld so long 
as they are not unlawful.  This expectation is far from current reality.    
 
Legislative and/or judicial intervention in risk allocation has been justified for different reasons.  
The most common is on grounds of public policy, which, though devoid of a universally accepted 
definition, can be conceived of as meaning an action or decision undertaken or made by a 
government, supra-government or courts401 or by a private entity acting on behalf of government, 
which is designed to benefit the citizenry.402  This is particularly seen in anti-indemnity statutes 
in the USA, relating to the construction, oil and gas, and mining sectors.  For instance, in the 
construction sector, Gwyn and Davis note that the legislature was concerned about the worrisome 
trend of requiring weaker parties to indemnify stronger parties, even for the latter’s own 
negligence,403  and hence the resort to statute.   
 
                                                 
401 The UK Supreme Court recently dealt with the issue of public policy in Patel v Mirza (2016) UKSC 42.  Without 
defining ‘public policy’, it confirmed that, inter alia, public policy considerations will continue to be paramount in 
assessing the effect of illegality in claims, with the overarching aim of preserving the integrity, proportionality and 
coherence of the justice system. 
402 Hill, M. and Varone, F. (2014) The Public Policy Process. Routledge, at pp 15–19.  It has also been formulated 
thus: ‘A condition is against public policy if it is in the interest of the state that it should not be performed’: Williams, 
S. W. J. and Sherrin, C. H. (2002) Williams on Wills. Vol. 1., London: Butterworths, at p. 335.  The UK courts have 
generally described public policy and justified several decisions on this basis.  In Egerton v Brown (1853) 4 HLC 
1, Justice Truro made the following pronouncement: ‘No subject can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be 
injurious to the public or against the public good which must be termed, as it sometimes has, the policy of the law 
or public policy in relation to the administration of the law’. 
403 Gwyn, A. H. and Davis, P. E. (2003) ‘Fifty-State Survey of Anti-Indemnity Statutes and Related Case Law’, 






In the oil and gas sector, Tade404 notes that, as a general rule, indemnification for own negligence 
was not viewed as being contrary to public policy, provided that intent was unequivocally 
expressed.  This is similar to the position in the UK in which indemnification for own negligence, 
or other breach of contractual obligations, is also permitted if this is the manifest intention of the 
parties.405  However, the Texas anti-indemnity statute406 was an exception to this general rule. 
This is also true of the Louisiana statute.407  In these circumstances, the legislature was also 
concerned that weaker parties were being exploited in the specific sectors to which the statutes 
applied, and intervened on grounds of public policy.   
 
The public policy rationale is further buttressed by the argument that parties could be induced to 
behave badly if they thought another party will be responsible for the negative economic 
consequences of their actions, which is reflected in the manner of risk allocation.408  Kleinberger 
disagrees with this submission, and asserts that the whole notion of indemnity being an 
inducement for bad behaviour is supported by neither evidence nor logic.409  In the UK, the 
Supreme Court recently indicated in Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi410 that 
the courts will be unwilling to interfere in the manner of risk allocation if the bargaining power 
of parties to a negotiated contract, who have been properly advised, is comparable.411  The court’s 
                                                 
404 Tade, J. B. (1987) ‘Texas and Louisiana Anti-Indemnity Statutes as Applied to Oil and Gas Industry Offshore 
Contracts’, Hous. L. Rev., 24, p. 665. 
405 See, for instance, Deepak Fertilisers and Petrochemicals Corpn v ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd [1999] 1 All 
ER (Comm) 69.  
406 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. 
407 Tade (1987), Op.Cit. at p. 668.  The Louisiana Act (LA. Rnv. STAT. ANN.) 
408 Kleinberger, D. S. (1987) ‘No Risk Allocation Need Apply: The Twisted Minnesota Law of Indemnification’, 
William Mitchell Law Review, 13(4), pp. 777–842, at pp. 824–825.  Kleinberger refers to the hearings before the 
Law Reform Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, on the proposed anti-indemnity statute on 6 April 
1983. Here, the argument was made that indemnification was a basis for ‘passing off’ liability – a situation that runs 
contrary to public safety interests. 
409 Ibid, at p. 826. 
410 (2015) UKSC 67. 






rationale is that balance of power between the parties puts them in a better position to determine 
the manner of risk allocation and the applicable consequences in the event of a breach.412  
  
Intervention is also rationalised on the ground that risk has not been efficiently or optimally 
allocated.  According to Herring and Kubler,413 efficient allocation requires that the risk is 
allocated to the party who is best able to bear the risk, and this is determined by enquiring into 
which party is best able to diversify risk more cost-effectively, and who can best avoid the cost 
of financial distress if the risk event happens.414  
 
Stretching the efficiency argument, Hartman and Snelgrove suggest that lack of clarity in risk 
allocation by parties to contracts will lead to project inefficiencies, increased transactional costs, 
and adversarial relationships.415  This will justify judicial intervention, the objective of which 
would be to clarify risk allocation provisions and reach decisions based on the judge’s construct 
of the ‘real’ intention of the parties.416    
 
The protection of third-party rights/interests can also be rationalised as a justification for judicial 
and/or legislative intervention.  For these purposes, there are two classes of third parties.  The 
first class is constituted by people who claim that a certain benefit or right has been conferred 
upon them by a term in a contract that entitles them to legal protection and enforcement of that 
interest.  This class of people relies on the common-law principle of jus quaesitum tertio to the 
effect that a third-party beneficiary to a contract may be able to sue on it and enforce that interest.  
This is in contra-distinction to the doctrine of privity of contract which states that only parties to 
                                                 
412 This is also consistent with the rationale of the court in St Gobain Building Distribution v Hillmead Joinery 
[2015] EWHC B7 (TCC). 
413 Herring, R. and Kubler, F. (1994) ‘Allocation of Risk in Cross--Border Deposit Transactions’, Northwestern 
University Law Review, 89(3), at pp. 942–1028. 
414 Ibid, at p. 1014. 
415 Hartman, F. and Snelgrove, P. (1996) ‘Risk Allocation in Lump-sum Contracts – Concept of Latent Dispute’, 
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 122(3), pp. 291–296, at p. 291. 






a contract may sue and be sued on it.  In the UK,417 they are also afforded statutory recognition 
under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999; even though such protection is limited 
by qualifications that may nullify the real effect of the reprieve supposedly granted. 
 
The second class is made up of people who are negatively impacted by the operations of 
contracting parties, which cause death, injury or other damage to them, their property or their 
relatives (in case of death).  Protection of such third-party interests is founded on the law of tort 
and is justified by the duty of care which is owed to persons who are close enough to the contract 
activity locus as to be impacted by it.418 
 
Flowing from the justifications above, the judiciary and the legislature have intervened with 
different laws and legal principles that impact on risk allocation in contracts, in general, while 
some relate more directly to drilling contracts.  The effect of these laws and principles is either 
to nullify, clarify or modify the risk allocation provisions in a contract, which could, in effect, 
alter the risk allocation originally intended by the parties.  Some of these laws and principles 
apply as a matter of course irrespective of the contracting parties’ preferences, while others give 
parties a choice as to application of the law in its entirety, or allow them to qualify application 
in the manner prescribed by law.419 
 
However, to better understand the current state of the risk allocation regulatory regime, the 
proper foundation has to be laid, and this entails an examination of this regime from the time at 
which neither contractual parties nor the legislation had made provisions for risk allocation upon 
the occurrence of certain risk events in the relevant areas that concern this study, and it was down 
                                                 
417 This Act is applicable to only England, Wales and Northern Island, and excludes Scotland which has its own 
regulations on the rights of third parties. 
418 This is based on the ‘neighbour principle’ formulated in Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932) AC 562. 
419 See, for instance, the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.  This law gives the promisor the latitude to 
escape the effects of the Act by astute drafting; additionally, contracting parties can exclude the application of the 






to the courts to determine whether or not any liability should be imposed for loss or damage 
arising from the occurrence of these events.  A discussion is necessitated as to the basis upon 
which they made this determination and, where appropriate, the manner in which they allocated 
liability for the relevant loss or damage, as well as the consequences, if any, flowing from such 
allocation of liability.   
 
In examining the decisions that form the bedrock of the risk allocation regime, the focus is on 
the rationale enunciated by the courts in reaching those decisions.  The underlying legal theories 
of liability for loss or damage that form the basis of these decisions are also discussed to provide 
clarity and greater understanding.   
 
Thereafter, in Chapter 4 there follows a discussion of how contractual parties have responded to 
the manner in which the courts allocated liability through the use of contractual provisions 
(indemnities, limitation of liability, exclusion/exception provisions). Although most contract 
provisions allocate risk in one manner or the other in order to achieve certain objectives,420 the 
selected provisions are the primary instruments vide which contractual risk is allocated in a 
deliberate manner. 
 
The courts’ response to the risk allocation approach by contractual parties is then considered, 
after which the intervention of the legislature is also discussed in Chapter 5, in response to the 
manner in which both the courts and contractual parties have dealt with this issue. 
 
3.1 Indemnities, Limitation of Liability and Exclusion/Exception Clauses 
In this section, the study focuses on indemnities, limitation of liability and exclusion/exception 
clauses, and how these have evolved till the present day.  It proceeds on the assumption that 
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contract parties have not allocated risks for certain specified events, leaving the courts to make 
this allocation.  The rationale for the manner in which the courts allocate risk, together with the 
parties’ response thereto, is discussed hereunder. 
 
3.1.1  Loss of Life, Bodily Injury and Damage to Property  
 
3.1.1.1  Default Position – Where Contract Parties Have Not Allocated Specific Risks 
 
When death, injury or damage to property occurs within a contract setting, either to one of the 
parties or to third parties,421 but the contract parties have not allocated the burden of the economic 
consequences of the occurrence of these events, the courts will first seek to understand the 
sequence of events that led to that occurrence.  In practical terms, and as far as those specific 
events are concerned, this equates to a situation in which no contract exists, and the persons and 
events involved fall to be regulated, not by the law of contract, but by the law of torts.  The 
court’s role in this regard would be to review the events with a view to making a finding of 
tortious liability and then allocate responsibility accordingly.  
 
This is inevitably an enquiry into the manner in which contract parties undertook their tasks 
under the contract, the aim being to determine whether negligence or wilful misconduct can be 
established.  Although negligence and wilful misconduct have been defined previously in this 
study,422 it is worth noting that, in the absence of contractual provision or definition, the courts 
necessarily have to resort to the law of torts in order to properly decide the relevant issues of 
duty and standard of care, as well as the tests as to whether the relevant party met the standard 
in the particular instance.  When there exists concurrent liability in tort and contract,423 it makes 
                                                 
421 For the avoidance of doubt, the third parties being referenced here belong to the second class previously 
highlighted in the Introduction to Chapter 2. 
422 See section 1.6.3 ‘Negligence/Wilful Misconduct in Risk Allocation’. 







it easier for the courts to make this cross-over, especially because the duty is the same, whether 
under contract or tort.424 
 
However, a discourse on the manner in which the contract parties undertook their tasks under 
the contract is incomplete without first understanding how the responsibility for those tasks was 
assumed, as well as the status of the party that assumed it. The nature of the risk events, and the 
economic consequences of their occurrence, which will ultimately be borne by the parties, will 
also aid understanding of the default position in which neither contractual nor legislative 
provisions cover the resulting events, or the allocation of responsibility for the economic 
consequences arising therefrom.  For the purposes of gaining this understanding, different 
scenarios that impact the drilling contract, and the relationship between the operator (Blackacre) 
and the contractor (Whiteacre), are examined hereunder. 
 
3.1.1.2       Whiteacre Undertakes Task X for Blackacre – Without Agreement or Consideration 
 
The drilling contract allocates responsibilities to both parties but is essentially the tool with 
which the drilling operations are carried out by the contractor (Whiteacre).  While most of the 
tasks required to be undertaken by the contractor will be stated in the contract, it is inevitable 
that additional tasks may arise during the performance of the contract that Whiteacre undertakes 
with or without the prior approval of Blackacre.  Furthermore, there are tasks that necessitate a 
variation to the contract, and require additional payment, which is agreed with Blackacre.  
However, there are also tasks that the contractor performs without seeking recompense for same. 
Again, Whiteacre may not, in fact, have any ‘contract’ with Blackacre in the strict understanding 
of that term, but, nevertheless, undertakes a task for the latter without seeking compensation for 
                                                 






same.  There is undoubtedly still a relationship between Whiteacre and Blackacre, and, while 
this may not necessarily be proximate enough to be called ‘contractual’, given the absence of 
consideration, it is not so distant as to regard them as strangers. If Blackacre agrees to 
compensate Whiteacre for the task undertaken, then a contract exists, as parties reached an 
agreement after the requisite offer and acceptance, and had a mutual commercial exchange. This 
exchange is called consideration, and it is the price that one party pays in return for the promise 
by the other party,425 which validates their transaction as a bargain: a contract properly so-called.  
This exchange could be in the form of a right, benefit or interest accruing to one party, or a loss, 
forbearance or detriment suffered by the other party.426  The law enforces this bargain if, inter 
alia, the consideration is valuable,427 is given by the promisee in return for the promisor’s 
promise,428 and relates in time and context to the promise it purports to ‘pay’ for.429 
 
Thus, it would be correct to term the voluntary and gratuitous relationship which exists between 
Blackacre and Whiteacre, in the absence of contract, as a ‘special relationship’, similar to that 
within the contemplation of the court in Galoo Ltd. (In liq) & Others v Bright Grahame Murray 
(a firm) and Another,430 which introduced the concept of ‘voluntary inter-personal’ relationship 
that recognised the non-existence of a contract simply because of the absence of consideration.431  
Thus, whether this non-contractual relationship is labelled ‘special’ or ‘voluntary inter-personal’, 
the courts have recognised this as being sufficient to create a duty of care. 
 
Unfortunately, harm can ensue during the performance of any of the tasks undertaken by 
Whiteacre, the economic consequences of which still need to be borne by the parties in the 
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429 Westminster City Council v Duke of Westminster (1991) 4 All ER 136, at 145. 
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absence of contractual or legislative provisions.  Over time, the courts have made this allocation 
based on different rationales leading up to the present time, and the nature of the tasks, 
circumstances of performance of the tasks, as well as the consequences of the ensuing harm, 
have all been factors that have been considered as part of the decision-making and risk-allocation 
process. 
 
Where, for instance, Whiteacre undertakes a task for Blackacre without prior agreement with the 
latter, and for which no compensation has been agreed or paid, it was said that Whiteacre 
undertook this task voluntarily.432  For a long time, courts were confronted with the issue of 
determining liability for harm or loss that resulted pursuant to tasks undertaken voluntarily. At 
the heart of this challenge was whether liability lay in contract or in tort, and this explains the 
legal conundrum that exists in this area of law till the present day.  Grounding liability in contract 
proved problematic given the absence of ‘agreement’ and/or ‘consideration’ for the specific task 
undertaken, even if other ancillary tasks were properly situated within, and provided for, by the 
contract.  In addition, grounding liability in tort required that negligence had to be established, 
which in turn called into question the scope of the existence of a duty of care,433 and as to whether 
Whiteacre owed same to Blackacre, which had been breached in the particular situation.  
 
This difficulty was compounded by the thinking that liability between contract parties could only 
be based on the intention of contract parties which had been objectively discerned by the court;434 
the challenge was that the voluntary task could not be said as having been undertaken pursuant 
                                                 
432 Pollock, S. F. (1950) Pollock’s Principles of Contract. 13th ed, Sir Percy H. Winfield. ed.: London; Stevens, at 
p. 140.   
433 Furmston, M. P., Cheshire, G. C. and Fifoot, C. H. S. (2012) Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract. 
Oxford University Press, at p. 118. 
434 This fact was restated by Lord Hoffmann in Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc (The Achilleas) 






to the ‘intention’ of the parties, as it was neither within the contemplation of both parties at the 
time of contract, nor was there any agreement as to the manner that liability will attach thereto.   
In De La Bere v Pearson,435 the courts attempted to resolve this challenge by resorting to a 
contractual construct which introduced consideration into the transaction, justifying the 
existence of a contract, which could then ground liability for damages.436  This case highlighted 
the seeming desperation of the courts to assume the existence of contract as a basis for imposing 
liability, prompting some commentators437 to question the thought process as well as the finding 
of the court in this regard.  
 
The passing of time made it rather apparent that the approach in De La Bere v Pearson was not 
tenable, and could not be followed in situations where it was clear that there was neither 
agreement nor consideration for the task undertaken.  Indeed, the discourse on liability from 
voluntary undertakings got bound up with the larger issue of the continued relevance of 
consideration, given the recognition that it narrowed the definition of contract, and sometimes 
resulted in judgments that were deemed unjust and unreasonable in transactions between 
parties.438 The doctrine of consideration has not been abolished,439 even though this idea has been 
discussed,440 perpetuating the concerns of the English legal system in imposing liability for 
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damages arising pursuant to voluntary undertakings. It became imperative to seek for a solution 
that modified De La Bere, which would do justice in cases which were clearly not ex contractu. 
 
Resorting to negligence simpliciter also proved problematic as the basis for liability was the 
existence of the duty of care owed by Whiteacre to Blackacre,441 and the courts at the time were 
inclined to think that the duty of care would arise only where there was a ‘special relationship’ 
between the parties.442  On this basis, the courts denied the existence of the duty of care when 
this special relationship could not be established.443 
 
This notion of special relationship was given firm judicial expression in Hedley Byrne v Heller 
& Partners Ltd,444 in which the court recognised that, aside from relationships based on contract 
or fiduciary duty, other relationships ‘equivalent to contract’ exist.  Important for this study is 
the fact that the court also introduced the concept of voluntary assumption of responsibility, 
which essentially recognised that circumstances will abound which would have equated to 
contracts properly so called but for the absence of consideration.445  Notwithstanding the 
gratuitous nature of the relationship between the parties, and the voluntary service rendered, the 
court found that the relationship was ‘sufficiently proximate’ as to establish a duty of care.446  
Explaining this principle, the court in Caparo Industries v Dickman447 clarified that even though 
a service is rendered voluntarily, the law imputes to the doer, an assumption of responsibility, 
which becomes the basis for imposing liability.448  This also extends to statements and is not 
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confined to services or tasks rendered.  The court also stated449 that if there is a dispute as to 
whether a duty of care was created in respect to a specific event or circumstances, the court could 
be guided by the three-stage test comprising foreseeability of the damage; proximity of the 
parties to warrant a finding of the duty of care; fairness, justice and reasonableness to make this 
finding. 
Adopting this principle in Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd., Lord Goff stated: 
‘…for if a person assumes responsibility to another in respect of certain services, there is no 
reason why he should not be liable in damages in respect of economic loss which flows from the 
negligent performance of those services.’450 
This dictum makes it self-evident that the wrongdoer must also bear responsibility for the 
economic consequences of the occurrence of the event. 
   
In Phelps v Hillingdon LBC,451 the court very succinctly explained that ‘voluntary assumed 
responsibility’ is a misnomer, as it gives the impression that a person deliberately and knowingly 
accepted responsibility in the manner suggested. The court clarified that this assumption was 
imputed ex lege where it deems that a duty of care has arisen.  Thus, a person can be held as 
voluntarily assuming responsibility even in circumstances that he did not consciously or 
deliberately intend to.  
  
Recently, the court in Customs and Excise Commrs v Barclays Bank Plc,452 again clarified that 
assumption of responsibility can arise in a relationship akin to contractual, with characteristics 
akin to contract, except for consideration.  This makes it self-evident that where parties have 
reached agreement for a voluntary task to be undertaken, assumption of responsibility can still 
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arise.  Even more recently, in Michael v South Wales Police,453 the UK Supreme Court confirmed 
that, although the assumption of responsibility doctrine seemed to be applied more widely to 
cases involving economic loss, there is no reason why it cannot apply to wider contexts, 
including cases of physical injury or loss/damage to property. 
 
From the foregoing, certain conclusions can be drawn.  First, that a service is rendered 
voluntarily will not exculpate Whiteacre from responsibility to Blackacre.  Irrespective of the 
nomenclature of this relationship – contractual, special or non-contractual – liability will attach, 
either by reference to the contract terms, or the general principles of negligence, or under the 
principle of voluntary assumption of responsibility.  Given the fact that the latter principle has 
been cited with approval in case law since Hedley Byrne, it can now be regarded as an established 
principle of law.454  Indeed, a commentator has opined that it is now being utilised as an 
autonomous basis of a duty of care in English law, supported by the three-stage test enunciated 
in Caparo.455 
 
Secondly, a voluntary task performed by Whiteacre for Blackacre may give rise to concurrent 
liability in contract and tort.  If the courts were to find that a ‘contract’ nevertheless exists, the 
absence of consideration notwithstanding,456 the mere fact that Whiteacre and Blackacre have a 
contractual relationship does not preclude Whiteacre from owing Blackacre a duty of care in tort, 
especially if assumption of responsibility can be established against Whiteacre.457  However, in 
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a recent case, the court in Wellesley Partners LLP v Withers LLP458 accepted the argument that 
where liability was concurrent, and the claimant pursues both actions independently, the stricter 
test for determining liability for damages in contract, the reasonable contemplation test, should 
also apply to the claim in tort.  The court justified this position by stating that a party cannot be 
presumed to assume responsibility for a greater scope of damages than what is deemed to be 
assumed under the contract.459 
 
Thirdly, Whiteacre’s liability attaches irrespective of the head of damage that occurs.  Thus, 
whether the task results in death, injury, or loss of, or damage to, property, the voluntary nature 
of the task will not absolve them from liability. 
   
Fourth, notwithstanding the fact that the task undertaken was voluntary and gratuitous, 
Whiteacre is under a duty to undertake same with reasonable care and skill, and Blackacre can 
expect that the quality of work undertaken should be consistent with that which a professional 
with similar skill and qualification should produce.  Burrows alludes to this when he asserts that 
a person who receives a free television can sue if it injures him due to a defect, but cannot sue if 
the television is not working.460  The courts agree with this opinion.  In the very recent case of 
Burgess v Lejonvarn,461 the court held that an architect who supplied her services free of charge 
to her friends owed them a common law duty of care – ‘not to provide the services that she had 
undertaken – but to exercise reasonable skill and care in doing so’.462  The court’s rationale lay 
in the fact that, even though no contract existed between the parties, there was an assumption of 
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responsibility by the architect, which made her friends her clients in a professional sense, and 
not necessarily a contractual sense.463  Since professionals expected people to place reliance upon 
their work, a relationship of reliance had been created, which thereby created a duty of care that 
the architect had breached.464 
 
Given the conclusion from Burgess, the issue arises as to whether Blackacre can compel 
Whiteacre to re-perform the task which was performed unsatisfactorily, though gratuitously, or 
whether they are only entitled to damages.  The question is, if Blackacre did not pay for the 
service in the first instance, can a court order that Whiteacre pay damages for the unsatisfactory 
performance which amounted to a breach of the duty of care, or will specific performance be 
ordered?  In Burgess, the claimants’ action for damages stemmed from the fact that they had 
incurred losses arising from the reliance placed on the advice given by the defendant architect.  
Although the court recognised that these were economic losses, in respect of which there is a 
divergence of opinions as to their protection and recovery,465 the court did not make the order for 
payment of damages as this was not pleaded in this action, being an appeal on the preliminary 
issue of the existence of the duty of care in this circumstance. 
 
It is trite that damages will be awarded only when the claimant has suffered a loss that is 
recognised by law; if no loss has been suffered, but there has, nevertheless, been a breach, either 
of duty of care, or of contract, the court may award nominal damages to the innocent party.466  It 
is also settled law that the courts will make an order for specific performance only if damages 
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are not adequate to compensate for the loss suffered.467  Thus, if Blackacre can show that they 
have suffered loss, or that the duty of care owed them has been breached, because of the 
gratuitous but unsatisfactory task performed by Whiteacre, they may be entitled to damages 
thereby.  It is difficult to imagine a situation in which the court would make an order for re-
performance of the work in these circumstances.468 
 
3.1.1.3  Whiteacre Undertakes Task X for Blackacre – With Agreement or Consideration 
 
If Whiteacre had secured Blackacre’s agreement to the task, but still received no compensation 
for it, the task would nevertheless be voluntary.  Further, because this agreement is not backed 
by consideration, it is not a contract.  The justification for this position, to the effect that no 
contract exists in gratuitous transactions, can be found in the judicial acceptance of the notion 
that only transactions which equate to ‘bargains’ should be enforced.469  If there was no exchange 
in a commercial context, then that transaction was not deemed to be a contract properly so called; 
it was a gratuitous promise that could only be enforced if it was under deed.470  In Eastwood v. 
Kenyon, the court stated that the law requires more than a mere promise or moral obligation for 
a transaction to be equated to a binding contract.471 
 
Thus, as far as Whiteacre’s liability for any harm that ensued was concerned, the foregoing 
discussion remains unchanged.  Whiteacre’s liability was founded, either in negligence 
simpliciter or under the doctrine of assumption of responsibility. 
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It would be different if the agreement were backed by consideration, as a mutual commercial 
exchange would have occurred, and their transaction would be a contract properly so-called.  
Provided that the consideration furnished is valuable,472 this transaction will be enforced as 
matter of law. 
 
If Whiteacre committed an infraction that led to death, injury, or loss of, or damage to, property, 
in the absence of contractual stipulation, the courts have recognised Blackacre’s right to pursue 
a claim in negligence.  This is based on the acceptance that concurrent liability in tort and 
contract can arise, and that the victim is free to pursue whichever action he deems more 
advantageous.473  In Jackson v Mayfair Window Cleaning Co. Ltd,474 the independence of the 
claim in negligence from any action for breach of contract was explained by reference to a wider 
duty of care which Whiteacre owed Blackacre not to damage their property.  This duty is 
different from any obligation owed under the contract, and will subsist despite any contractual 
duty.475  Burrows agrees with this approach, and justifies it by saying that liability in this 
circumstance will be based on the ‘harmful interference’ by the defendant and not merely on the 
fact that Blackacre has not reaped a certain benefit under the contract.476  He draws support for 
his position from Lord Fraser’s opinion in Junior Books Ltd. v Veitchi Co Ltd,477 in which the 
court recognised that the standard of care imposed by the tort of negligence is higher than 
whatever is contractually owed by Whiteacre to Blackacre, especially when third-parties have 
been harmed.478  
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This position was recently confirmed by the court in Wellesley Partners LLP v Withers LLP.479 
While upholding the right of Blackacre to pursue either action in negligence or contract, and for 
courts to respect this freedom, the court qualified its ruling by making a change to the principles 
of causation, stating that the more restrictive approach in contract – the reasonable 
contemplation approach480 – would apply in cases of concurrent liability, rather than the tortious 
approach of reasonable foreseeability481.  The court rationalised this position by referring to the 
prior opportunity for contract parties to reach a consensus on liability and allocation of 
responsibility, and must be deemed to have operated their contract on that basis. The court found 
no reason why this consensus should be undermined because of the concurrence of liability in 
tort, especially when it is the same responsibility that was contractually assumed that is being 
considered in tort.482 
    
3.1.1.4       Whiteacre Undertakes Task X for Blackacre – Through an Employee or Third Party 
 
If Whiteacre chose to procure the services of another person to undertake the task which 
Whiteacre was supposed to perform for Blackacre, the status of this person will determine the 
incidence of liability and assist the court in reaching a determination as to who bears the 
economic consequences of the occurrence of a harmful event. 
 
For instance, where Whiteacre undertakes the task via an employee, the courts have looked to 
the doctrine of vicarious liability to establish whether the act of the employee can be legally 
attributed to the employer, Whiteacre, and by extension, the resulting liability and burden of the 
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economic consequences of the occurrence of the harmful event.  Vicarious liability has been 
aptly described as the legal substitution of an innocent party for the wrongdoer,483 and has been 
stated to be antithetical to the fundamental thrust of the common law to hold the wrongdoer 
himself accountable for his wrongful acts.484  Although the law allows the victim of the wrongful 
act to sue Whiteacre in vicarious liability, this does not absolve the employee of his wrongdoing, 
and the victim has the right to pursue him directly.485 
   
Different theories abound as to the rationale of this doctrine.  The most common is the ‘deeper 
pocket’ rationale, which justifies pursuit of the employer, as against the employee who caused 
the infringement, because the former is more able to bear the economic consequences of the 
occurrence of the wrongful act.486  A variant of the economic rationale approaches this from an 
insurance perspective, to the effect that the employer can absorb the cost of the liability through 
insurance, and can also adjust product pricing and recovery strategy to internalise these costs.487  
Again, the benefit rationale suggests that the employer who benefits from the employee’s 
services, should also bear the burden of any wrongful act that results therefrom, as one cannot 
purport to take a benefit without the corresponding responsibility.488  Other rationales include the 
selection of employee justification which asserts that the employer should bear the burden of his 
poor judgment in selecting an employee capable of causing harm,489 as well as the deterrence 
rationale which justifies vicarious liability as it would serve as a warning to all employers as to 
their potential exposure, and help in ensuring that good employee practices are both mandated 
and institutionalised.490  
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Where the status of the employee is not contested, the issue then turns on whether the 
circumstances of the transaction would permit an application of the doctrine.  For Whiteacre to 
be legally substituted with their employee, the infraction must have occurred in the course of 
employment of the employee.491  At this point, it is important to state that Whiteacre’s 
authorisation of the task is a good indication of the fact that it was undertaken in the course of 
employment, but the absence of this authorisation does not preclude the same conclusion.492 
 
This is just one of the tests that the courts developed to discern whether a task was undertaken 
in the course of employment, and is known as the Salmond test.493  This test also confirms that 
undertaking in an unauthorised or improper manner, a task which the employer has authorised, 
will not negate a finding that the task was undertaken in the course of employment.494  Flowing 
from this test, the courts have also held that where Whiteacre authorised a task undertaken by an 
employee, they may not only be vicariously liable for the economic consequences of the 
occurrence of the ensuing wrongful act, they may also be directly liable.495  The courts reached 
this conclusion by differentiating between the strict liability that the doctrine of vicarious 
liability imposes on the employer, and the circumstances in which Whiteacre owes a personal 
duty of care to Blackacre that was breached.  Although the infraction is committed by the 
employee, the direct liability is ascribed to Whiteacre because they have an overarching duty to 
ensure that their organisational system neither encourages nor allows infringements of the sort 
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committed by the employee to occur.  This duty is said to be non-delegable, giving rise 
simultaneously to vicarious and direct liability in some circumstances.496 
 
Although the Salmond test was cited and applied with approval by the courts, it was soon realised 
that the test was not far reaching enough, especially in cases of deliberate wrong-doing by the 
employee.497  Quite often, the employee’s wrongful behaviour could not be construed as an 
‘improper or unauthorised’ mode of carrying on his duties, making it difficult to hold employers 
vicariously liable even in deserving cases.  In Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd,498 the court laid down 
another test: the close connection test, which enquires whether the wrongful act was so closely 
connected with his employment that it would be fair and just to hold the employer vicariously 
liable.499  This test is admittedly wider than the Salmond test – among other reasons because it 
introduced policy considerations of fairness and justice which allowed the court more discretion 
in making the connection between the wrongful act and the employee’s employment. 
 
As laudable as the court’s intent may be, the wide formulation of the close connection test has 
been viewed negatively by some commentators who opine that the wide test has created more 
confusion, as it does not delineate the scope or degree of connection necessary for a finding of 
vicarious liability.500 This inevitably creates more room for judicial discretion, and ultimately, 
the courts would arrive at different decisions given the subjective nature of the test, increasing 
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the latitude for confusion.501  Despite this criticism, the close connection test remains relevant till 
this day, and has been applied by the courts in deciding a plethora of cases.502 
 
Thus, where Whiteacre carry out the voluntary task through an employee, the foregoing confirms 
that Whiteacre remain vicariously liable for any resulting harm, and must bear the economic 
consequences of the occurrence of the wrongful act.  This study has already established that the 
voluntary nature of the task notwithstanding, Whiteacre’s liability is preserved either in 
negligence simpliciter or under the doctrine of voluntary assumption of responsibility.  Since 
Whiteacre would have themselves been liable for the ensuing harm, undertaking the task through 
another does not alter this legal position, both by the doctrines of agency503 and vicarious liability.  
Furthermore, Whiteacre may also be simultaneously directly liable to Blackacre if the task 
performed by the employee, and the resulting harm, are underpinned by a non-delegable duty of 
care owed to Blackacre.504   
 
If Whiteacre procured a third party to undertake the task, the courts would enquire into the status 
of the relationship between Whiteacre and the third party, to determine whether the latter acted 
as an independent contractor.  In the absence of dispute as to status of the third party as an 
independent contractor,505 the courts would proceed based on the general rule that Whiteacre 
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were not vicariously liable for any tort committed by the independent contractor during the 
execution of the task assigned by the former.506  Likewise, Whiteacre would, in general, not be 
vicariously liable if the tort was committed by the independent contractor’s own employee.507  
The rationale for this was founded in policy, as courts thought it would be unfair to impute 
liability to the employer who had no control over the way in which the independent contractor 
undertook his task.508  
 
However, there were exceptions to this general rule.  In certain circumstances, Whiteacre could 
be either directly or vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of the independent contractor.509 For 
instance, if Whiteacre authorised or ratified the commission of a tort, liability in this 
circumstance was direct, rather than vicarious, and so Whiteacre would be jointly liable with the 
independent contractor to Blackacre for that infringement.510  The issue that courts have been 
confronted with in this circumstance is the determination of what constitutes ‘authorisation’ 
and/or ‘ratification’.  This is because the mere fact that Whiteacre commissioned the task does 
not mean that they authorised the way in which it would be executed.511  This creates the incentive 
for Whiteacre to be prescriptive as to the manner of undertaking the task which presumably 
avoids any harm from ensuing.  This approach presents its own challenges, because any harm 
that results from the implementation of the method prescribed by Whiteacre, will potentially 
expose Whiteacre to direct, as well as vicarious liability, as there is no denying the fact that 
‘authorisation’ occurred in this circumstance.  Again, there is the danger that courts may construe 
this as ‘employment’ because one of the tests for distinguishing between an employee and an 
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independent contractor is the control test, which highlights the employer’s ability to direct the 
way in which tasks were undertaken.512 
  
Whiteacre could also be directly liable for the tort committed by the independent contractor if 
the courts find that it selected the latter negligently, or failed to supervise the task effectively.  
The rationale for this is found in common law, which obligates employers to validate the 
expertise of a proposed independent contractor, and to do so with reasonable care.513  Where 
harm ensues from the task undertaken by the independent contractor, and it is subsequently 
discovered that the latter lacked adequate training or expertise to undertake the specific task, 
Whiteacre’s liability is direct, and it become a joint tortfeasor with the independent contractor.514 
  
Whiteacre could also be directly liable for any ensuing harm if it was discovered that the 
independent contractor has failed to obtain public liability insurance.515  This is particularly in 
situations when the independent contractor undertakes ‘ultra-hazardous’ tasks that have great 
potential of causing injury.516  However, there is no overarching duty on the employer to check 
that the independent contractor carries this insurance in other situations.517 
 
Whiteacre may be vicariously liable for the wrongful act of the independent contractor that 
results in harm, where they owe Blackacre a non-delegable duty of care – for instance, ensuring 
the safety of employees – which has been breached by the negligent act of the independent 
                                                 
512 See, for instance, Short v J&W Henderson Ltd. (1946) 79 LI. L. Rep. 271. 
513 Mulheron, R. (2016) Principles of Tort Law, supra, at p. 1010. 
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516 Bottomley v Todmorden Cricket Club (2003) EWCA Civ 1041; (2003) Q 443. 






contractor.518  Although the courts recognise that the employer has not been negligent, the 
rationale for vicarious liability is found in the thinking that a non-delegable duty remains with 
the primary obligor permanently.  Thus, he may delegate the task, but cannot be absolved from 
the responsibility which the duty imposes.519   
 
Unfortunately, the courts have not given enough guidance as to when a duty can be said to be 
non-delegable.  At best, there are examples of statutory and common law duties which the courts 
have, in deserving circumstances, held to be non-delegable. For instance, different statutes vest 
public officials with the power to undertake certain tasks, which require that the officials exercise 
reasonable care in carrying them out.  While the courts have found that some of these statutory 
duties are non-delegable,520 giving rise to vicarious liability, they have also found that some 
statutory duties are not as far reaching, and that while they are required to be undertaken with 
reasonable care, do not give rise to vicarious liability; the independent contractor would remain 
solely responsible for the economic consequences of the occurrence of any ensuing liability.521  
 
The common law position on non-delegable duties tell a similar story. For instance, in nuisance, 
while the court in Spicer v Smee522 held that employers will generally be liable for torts committed 
by their independent contractors, the court in Matania v National Provincial Bank Ltd523 held 
that no such general rule applies, but that liability would depend on whether the task had the 
‘inherent risk’ of causing a nuisance, necessitating precautionary measures by the employer, who 
then falls to be liable if these measures are not taken, and harm results.524 
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521 Rivers v Cutting (1982) 1 W.L.R. 1146. 
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If Whiteacre ‘borrowed’ the services of the independent contractor’s employee, during which 
harm ensued, Whiteacre may be vicariously liable for the resulting tort.  The rationale for this is 
that the independent contractor’s employee was under Whiteacre’s control and direction at the 
material time when the infraction occurred, and it is only fair and just that they be answerable 
for any tort committed during this period.  This principle was established in Mersey Docks & 
Harbour Board v Coggins and Griffiths (Liverpool) Ltd,525 and was restated recently in Hawley 
v Luminar Leisure Plc.526  The courts have, however, clarified that this principle functions in the 
manner of a legal presumption, placing ‘a heavy burden’ on Whiteacre, the temporary employer, 
to rebut, and show, in effect, that the independent contractor still had control of their employee, 
and remained liable for his negligent act.527 
 
Where the independent contractor voluntarily undertakes the task for Whiteacre, the absence of 
consideration would mean that no contract exists between Whiteacre and the independent 
contractor, and certainly none with Blackacre either.  If harm ensues, the issue is whether 
Whiteacre would be vicariously liable for the independent contractor’s tort.  
 
In answering this question, the discourse on the status of a voluntary undertaking of the same 
task by Whiteacre needs to be restated, as this would provide some insight into his vicarious 
liability for the independent contractor’s voluntary task that causes harm.  In this regard, the 
study has already taken the position that the voluntary nature of the task notwithstanding, 
Whiteacre’s liability is preserved either in negligence simpliciter or under the doctrine of 
voluntary assumption of responsibility. Since Whiteacre would have themselves been liable for 
                                                 
525 (1947) AC 1 (HL) 10. 
526 (2006) EWCA Civ 18. 
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the ensuing harm, undertaking the task through another does not alter this legal position given 
the doctrine of agency.528   
 
Thus, even if the independent contractor undertakes the task voluntarily, he would still be liable 
for any ensuing tort he commits.  Whiteacre may also be jointly liable with the independent 
contractor for the tort committed based on the agency relationship with the independent 
contractor.  This agency relationship is created by the fact that Whiteacre appointed the 
independent contractor and is deemed to have ratified and acquiesced to their actions as well.  In 
SEB Trygg Holding Aktiebolag v Manches,529 the court stated that ratification must be 
unequivocal, and can be inferred from conduct which clearly demonstrates the principal’s 
adoption or recognition of the acts of the agent.530  It further stated that ratification is a unilateral 
act of will which need not be communicated to anyone, even the agent.531  This is what the court 
in Sino Channel Asia Ltd v Dana Shipping and Trading Pte Singapore, Dana Shipping and 
Trading SA termed ‘silent ratification’.532  Thus, by accepting the voluntary and gratuitous 
services of the independent contractor, Whiteacre ratified their actions, ipso facto creating an 
agency relationship between them. 
 
It would be different if the independent contractor undertook the task for consideration, and by 
extension, that Blackacre also furnished consideration to Whiteacre for the task which they then 
delegated to the independent contractor.  Both relationships are contractual. Thus, if harm ensues 
during the task, the independent contractor could be concurrently liable to Whiteacre in contract 
and in tort of negligence.533  Likewise, Whiteacre could also be concurrently liable in contract to 
Blackacre and in tort of vicarious liability if the transaction falls within one of the categories that 
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will give rise to vicarious liability.  For instance, if the nature of the task that the independent 
contractor has undertaken is extra-hazardous, and death or injury results, Whiteacre may be 
vicariously liable for the resulting liability, and can be legally substituted with the independent 
contractor to bear the economic consequences of the occurrence of the harm.534   
 
Furthermore, Whiteacre may be liable to Blackacre in contract under the express and/or implied 
terms of the contract which require that the task be carried out in line with the standard ordinarily 
expected of professionals of like competence and qualification, which thereby imposes a duty 
on Whiteacre not to damage property or cause any harm.535  The foregoing is, of course, subject 
to the principle in Wellesley Partners LLP v Withers LLP,536 that where liability was concurrent, 
and the claimant pursues both actions independently, the stricter test for determining liability for 
damages in contract, the reasonable contemplation test, should also apply to the claim in tort.537 
 
3.1.1.5  Liability for Death, Injury and Loss/Damage 
  
Where the performance of the task by Whiteacre results in death or injury to their own personnel, 
or loss of, or damage to, their (Whiteacre’s) property due to their own negligence, the courts 
traditionally held that they would not give a remedy to right a wrong sustained by a person’s 
own fault.538  The courts’ rationale for this stance stemmed from their belief that a person cannot 
cause injury through his own carelessness, and yet to seek to be rewarded for it.539  In Cruden v. 
Fentham540, the court admonished that a person who caused injury through his own act was 
deemed to have courted that outcome voluntarily, and must suffer the consequences therefrom. 
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However, progressively, the courts demonstrated willingness to consider the totality of the 
transaction, especially if someone else was harmed because of the same act of negligence.  If 
they were convinced that despite Whiteacre’s negligence, that person could still have avoided 
the injury to himself, the absence of proximate cause would negate a finding of culpability of 
Whiteacre.541  The courts believed that person was still expected to exercise reasonable care even 
if Whiteacre was responsible for the wrongdoing.  
 
If the negligent act was performed by Whiteacre’s employee, on his behalf, and resulted in the 
employee’s death or injury, or loss of/damage to his own property, or indeed death or injury to 
a third party, or loss of/damage to the third party’s property, this raised the issue of liability for 
Whiteacre on two levels.  In respect of the harm that the employee has suffered, there is 
potentially a direct liability as employer, and vicarious liability for the harm that his negligent 
act has caused to the third party.542  
  
Whiteacre’s direct liability to their employee has been held by the courts to be non-delegable, 
and whilst not being strict, requires the employer to ensure that there is no want of care.543  What 
the courts set out to do in this instance is to inquire into whether it was the failure by Whiteacre 
that was the proximate cause of the negligent performance of the task by the employee that led 
to his death, injury or property loss/damage.  In Wilsons and Clyde Coal Ltd. v English,544 the 
House of Lords clarified that this non-delegable duty could be further broken into the duty to 
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provide adequate materials545 and competent staff,546 ensure a proper work system and effective 
supervision,547 and a safe work environment.548 
   
Given the non-absolute nature of the non-delegable duty, the court is guided by the 
circumstances of each case in reaching a determination whether the legal requirement had been 
satisfied.  In all these circumstances, however, the courts have held that the burden is not 
discharged merely by issuing orders, but by taking concrete steps, and ensuring that these 
elements of the duty as enunciated in Wilsons and Clyde Coal Ltd are present and fit for 
purpose.549 
 
The employer’s potential vicarious liability has been discussed in the foregoing paragraphs and 
needs not be restated.  Suffice it to say that the vicarious liability is in respect to the harm caused 
by the employee’s negligent act that resulted in a third party’s death, injury, property loss or 
damage. The negligent act must have occurred in the course of employment of the employee.550   
 
The question then arises as to whether the conclusions relating to the third party above will be 
different if that third party was another Whiteacre employee who was engaged in other tasks 
when the negligent employee’s acts caused him, the innocent employee, death, injury, property 
loss or damage.  The issue raised by this scenario is Whiteacre’s liability for the tort committed 
by one employee against another, and fell within the ambit of the doctrine of common 
employment.551  This doctrine stated that employers were not vicariously liable for the wrongful 
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acts inflicted by one employee on another employee, and the rationale for this was founded in 
the assumption of risk principle, which presumed that employees understood and accepted the 
risks of injury from fellow employees with whom they were in ‘common employment’.552  The 
operation of this doctrine worked a lot of hardship on employees as they could not recover 
damages in deserving circumstances,553 and the courts in England were inclined towards 
circumventing its application, especially when the insurance industry became capable of funding 
the liability payments that would become payable in favour of injured employees.554 
 
The courts eventually achieved this objective by developing the non-delegable duty principle 
which meant that the employer could delegate the performance of his task and duty to the 
employee or a third party, but could not delegate the responsibility for negligent performance.555 
Although the doctrine of common employment subsisted, the courts’ attitude was to keep 
curtailing its scope of application, and conversely, keep enlarging the scope of recovery for 
claimants harshly affected by its strict application.556  In Radcliffe v Ribble Motor Services Ltd,557 
the courts further narrowed the doctrine’s application by stating that it only applied where the 
fellow employees were engaged in ‘common work’, and it would not apply merely because the 
injured party was another employee.  The court’s rationale was that the employees had to be 
engaged in a ‘joint venture’ that exposed them to the same risks of negligence from each other.558  
 
If a third party – an independent contractor – who is undertaking the task for Whiteacre in 
Whiteacre’s premises dies, is injured or damages/loses his property while performing the task, 
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on whom does liability fall?  Based on the position in Cruden v. Fentham,559 generally, a person 
who caused injury through his own act was deemed to have courted that outcome voluntarily 
and must suffer the consequences therefrom.  The real issue in this context is whether Whiteacre 
could be found liable for the resulting harm, irrespective of the independent contractor’s fault. 
 
The courts looked to the doctrine of occupiers’ liability to resolve this issue.  This doctrine 
creates a duty of care on occupiers, owners and tenants of premises in respect of visitors and/or 
trespassers to the premises, and defines their liability to these categories of people, arising from 
accidents which may occur because of a defect or dangerous condition.560  It was underpinned 
by the common law philosophy that a landowner had the right to enjoy the use of his land, 
inviting and excluding whom he willed.561  However, he still had an overarching duty to ensure 
that the premises were not kept in a manner that caused harm to those that came upon it, and 
liability resulted if he failed in that duty. 
 
In determining who an occupier was, the courts applied a control test, such that anyone who 
exercised a degree of occupational control over premises was regarded as the occupier; the 
greater the degree of this control by an individual, the more likely the finding that the latter is 
the occupier.562  Also, ‘premises’ was considered as being much more than real estate or bricks 
and mortar, as it included lifts, aeroplanes, and a berth in the wharf.563  There is no doubt that the 
area of petroleum authorisation – the contract area or block – where drilling takes place, and the 
rig, will also qualify as ‘premises’ properly so-called. 
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In apportioning liability, the courts made a distinction between the visitor and the trespasser.  A 
visitor was legitimately invited to the premises by the occupier, and could be a contractor,564 an 
invitee565 or a licensee:566 a trespasser was an unwanted intruder, or an invitee who had exceeded 
the scope and tenor of his welcome.  The occupier owed the highest duty of care to the contractor 
who was undertaking a task on the premises.  The rationale for this was based on the contract 
between Whiteacre and the contractor, into which the courts implied a warranty relating to the 
fitness for purpose of the premises where the task was to be undertaken.  The occupier was thus 
liable to the contractor if the state of the premises fell short of the contractual expectation.567 
 
The standard of care for invitees was lower than for contractors but higher than that of licensees.  
In Indermaur v Dames, the court held that the occupier was required to exercise reasonable care 
to ensure that harm does not ensue from unusual danger known to, or ought to have been known 
to him.568  The rationale for the lower standard for invitees lay in the understanding that only 
‘bargains’ – contracts – could give rise to duties of a higher standard, which require deliberate 
actions by the occupier to comply.569  Since invitees were not in a contractual relationship with 
the occupier, no such higher obligation existed.  This would also explain why the standard of 
care towards licensees was less affirmative, as the occupier was only required to notify them of 
any concealed trap or other danger source which he knew about.570  There was no requirement 
to be proactive in making the premises safer than it was on their account, and the law did not 
impute any knowledge of the danger source to the occupier.   
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The foregoing makes it clear that the occupier – Whiteacre – can indeed be liable for the harm 
to the independent contractor if there was a breach of the former’s obligation to maintain the 
premises in a safe condition as anticipated by the contract between them.  If the harm was 
attributable to an unsafe condition in the premises, for instance if the premises contained pockets 
of high-pressure gas, then Whiteacre’s liability was direct, and they were unable to escape 
culpability thereby.   
However, the courts have also stated that a competent independent contractor ought to satisfy 
himself about the safety of the part of the premises in which he is to undertake the task.571  In 
Roles v Nathan,572 Lord Denning MR made it clear that an independent contractor is deemed to 
be a specialist in his line of business, and should ordinarily appreciate the dangers attendant upon 
that specific task within the premises, and be cautious of same.  The court rationalised this stance 
by reference to the skill and expertise of the contractor, which should extend to the identification 
of apparent hazards in the premises, that could ordinarily impact on the safety of their work.  
Thus, the expertise of the independent contractor and the nature of the hazard on the premises, 
will be considered in determining whether Whiteacre have failed in their duty of care, and the 
apportionment of responsibility thereto. 
 
Again, if harm resulted to a third party associated with the independent contractor, due to the 
latter’s negligence, Whiteacre could be vicariously liable as this study detailed in the foregoing 
paragraphs.  This is especially if Whiteacre fell within any of the exceptions which gave rise to 
liability for the tort committed by the independent contractor.  Thus, in Bottomley v Todmorden 
Cricket Club,573 the court held that the company was vicariously liable to the independent 
contractor’s agent who was injured due to the independent contractor’s negligence, while the 
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agent was lawfully assisting him.  The court rationalised this decision based on their finding that 
the company failed to take the precautions necessary to prevent the ensuing explosion from a 
hazardous activity on their premises.  The court also found that the company failed in their duty 
to take reasonable care in selecting the independent contractors.  It was therefore foreseeable that 
an accident could occur given the incompetence of the independent contractor as well as the 
failure to take necessary precaution to prevent the explosion.574  In the circumstance, the court 
also held that it was just and fair to find that vicarious liability arises and was, in this case, 
properly imputed.575 
 
The question then arises as to whether the conclusion in Bottomley would be different if the third 
party were not associated with the independent contractor, but was undertaking other tasks on 
behalf of Whiteacre, but was either killed, injured or suffered property loss/damage due to the 
negligent acts of the independent contractor.  In this scenario, this third party would be 
considered as being yet another independent contractor who was in Whiteacre’s premises at the 
same time with the independent contractor who was negligent in undertaking his own task.  In 
this regard, liability could arise on two levels.  In this first instance, Whiteacre could be 
vicariously liable for the tort committed by the negligent independent contractor against the 
injured independent contractor.  Whiteacre could also be directly liable to the injured 
independent contractor under the doctrine of occupier’s liability if the harm from the negligent 
independent contractor arose from the use of the premises in a dangerous manner. 
 
Whiteacre’s vicarious liability could arise from any of the circumstances in which the employer 
would be liable for the tort of the independent contractor examined in the foregoing paragraphs. 
Thus, where Whiteacre had not investigated and validated the competence of the negligent 
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independent contractor, they could be vicariously liable for the resulting harm.576  In Gwilliam v 
West Hertfordshire Hospitals NHS Trust, the court held that the investigation as to competence 
necessarily included making an enquiry as to whether the independent contractor had the 
requisite insurance for the task, but did not include checking the terms of the insurance policy.577 
   
Whiteacre’s direct liability could arise as the occupier of the premises in which the innocent 
independent contractor was killed or injured.  As detailed in the foregoing paragraphs, if there 
was a breach of Whiteacre’s obligation to maintain the premises in a safe condition as anticipated 
by the contract between them, and the resulting harm was attributable to an unsafe condition in 
the premises, then Whiteacre’s liability was direct, and they were therefore unable to escape 
culpability.  Thus, the same conclusion in Bottomley would apply in this circumstance. 
 
If the third party578 were a person not associated with any of the parties to the contract, but had 
been harmed by the negligent acts of Whiteacre or their independent contractor, the question as 
to who bore responsibility for the economic consequences of the occurrence of the wrongful acts 
arises.  To answer this question, the status of the third party should first be determined, that is, 
whether he was a trespasser on the premises in which the harm occurred, or an innocent bystander 
or passer-by who was harmed by the escape of the hazard from the premises. 
 
If the third party was a trespasser, this means that he came into the premises without the 
invitation, knowledge and/or consent of the occupier579.  At common law, occupiers did not owe 
trespassers any duty of care, and so could not be liable for any harm to them in the occupier’s 
premises, provided there was no intent to deliberately harm them.580  This wreaked a lot of 
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hardship on the trespassers who wandered upon the premises without ulterior motive, especially 
children, prompting the House of Lords in British Railways Board v Herrington581 to change the 
common law position by holding that the occupier owed the trespasser a duty of common 
humanity.  This duty was not the same as the common law duty of care, but essentially recognised 
that the trespasser was not without recourse in deserving circumstances, the trespass 
notwithstanding.  The court’s rationale was based on the thinking that common sense requires 
that the occupier take appropriate steps to warn the trespasser about danger on the premises, and 
to avert or mitigate same, within reasonable limits.  This duty was a duty owed to the trespasser 
qua human being and enured to his benefit by virtue of his humanity. 
 
Thus, where the harm to this third party, who was not associated with Whiteacre or Blackacre, 
was caused solely by Whiteacre’s actions, they may be liable to the trespasser for harm that 
ensued while the latter was on the premises. 
This study has already established the circumstances under which Whiteacre will be vicariously 
or directly liable for the tort committed by the independent contractor.  If the tort was committed 
by the independent contractor against the third party, and the transaction did not fall under any 
of the circumstances already discussed, Whiteacre was not vicariously or directly liable, and the 
liability was solely for the independent contractor.  
  
If the third party was an innocent bystander or passer-by who, not being on the occupier’s 
premises, was harmed by the escape of the hazard from the premises, liability was based on 
negligence, in general, and on the rule in Rylands v Fletcher582 in particular.  For negligence to 
apply in this situation, the courts have held that a duty of care would be imputed to Whiteacre if 
the resulting harm was reasonably foreseeable, and the relationship between Whiteacre and the 
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third party was sufficiently proximate to justify a finding that it was fair, just and reasonable to 
impose liability in the circumstance.583 
   
In Donoghue v Stevenson,584 the court rationalised the relationship between the manufacturer of 
the sub-standard ginger beer and the claimant on their thinking that the former must have 
intended that the product reach the ultimate consumer without the necessity of intermediate 
inspection, thereby preserving the nexus between the parties, and therefore the liability structure.  
The court was thus able to impute to the manufacturer, knowledge of the injury that a sub-
standard product could cause the ultimate consumer, underpinning their liability. 
   
In similar fashion, the court in Rylands imputed to the owner/occupier of a premises, knowledge 
of the harm that could ensue if something which was brought onto the premises escaped and 
caused injury.585  The courts rationalised this as a strict liability offence, and held Whiteacre 
liable irrespective of fault.  From the ruling in Rylands, this would be true even where the escape 
and harm was caused by a negligent independent contractor.586.  Whiteacre was strictly liable 
because something that was put to a non-natural use on their premises escaped and caused injury, 
and they are inherently responsible for the escape of the thing that they deliberately brought on 
to their land, knowing that it could cause injury if it escaped.587 
 
If Blackacre, their employee or their independent contractor suffered death, injury or loss 
of/damage to property arising from the negligent act of Whiteacre, their employee or their 
independent contractor, the assumption is that Blackacre, their employee or independent 
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contractor were proximate to the locus at which the task was negligently undertaken, leading to 
the ensuing harm. 
  
Where the harm was caused directly by Whiteacre, they were liable to bear the economic 
consequences of the occurrence of the tortious event.  As detailed in the foregoing paragraphs, 
in the absence of contractual provision, the courts have recognised Blackacre’s right to recover 
in negligence, based on the doctrine of concurrent liability in tort and contract.588  Since only 
Whiteacre and Blackacre are in a contractual relationship, the other impacted persons – 
Blackacre’s employee and independent contractor – can only seek redress in negligence. 
 
Whiteacre’s liability is rationalised by the courts by reference to a wider duty of care that 
Whiteacre owed Blackacre not to cause them harm or injury,589 different from Whiteacre’s 
contractual obligations.590  This duty is present when third parties have been harmed, and is not 
dependent on the existence of contract.591  This is also the basis of Whiteacre’s liability to 
Blackacre’s employee and independent contractor. 
   
If the harm was caused by Whiteacre’s employee or independent contractor, the question whether 
Whiteacre is vicariously or directly liable arises again.  If the harm was inflicted by the employee 
in the course of employment,592 Whiteacre may be vicariously liable for the economic 
consequences of the occurrence of the event.  Likewise, if the harm was inflicted by the 
independent contractor in any of the circumstances giving rise to either direct or vicarious 
liability, Whiteacre would accordingly be liable as such.593 
  
                                                 
588 Wellesley Partners LLP v Withers LLP (2015) EWCA Civ 1146. 
589 Jackson v Mayfair Window Cleaning Co. Ltd. (1952) 1 All ER 215. 
590 Ibid, at pp 217–218. 
591 Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd (1983) 1 AC 520. 
592 See, for instance, Rose v Plenty (1975) EWCA Civ 5; (1976) 1 All ER 97. 






Where the harm occurs only to Blackacre’s employee and/or independent contractor, the issue 
as to Blackacre’s liability to that employee and/or independent contractor, stemming from 
negligence on the part of Whiteacre, their employee or independent contractor, arises.  In this 
circumstance, Blackacre would be no different from Whiteacre as far as liability for the torts of 
their own employees and independent contractors is concerned. Thus, Blackacre would be 
vicariously or directly liable to their employee or independent contractor for the harm committed 
by Whiteacre, their employee or independent contractor in the circumstances already discussed. 
3.1.1.6  Contributory Negligence 
 
A further question arises as to how the courts allocated risks and determined who bore the 
economic consequences of the occurrence of an event which was caused by the failure of both 
the claimant and the defendant to take care.  In the absence of contractual and legislative 
intervention, this section examines how the courts dealt with issues in which contributory 
negligence was alleged as between Whiteacre, Blackacre, their employees and independent 
contractors. 
 
At common law, if it could be shown that the claimant’s fault contributed in some way to the 
ensuing harm, the courts denied recovery to him because causation had not been established 
against the defendant.594  While not denying the defendant’s wrongdoing, the courts would not 
award damages to a claimant who was also negligent, no matter how trivial his contribution was, 
on the grounds that a person could not be protected from his own negligence.595  The courts were 
guided, not so much by the quality of the claimant’s contribution, but by the fact of its nexus to 
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the ensuing harm to himself.  When the defendant successfully raised and proved this defence, 
it operated as full defence, absolving the latter from liability.596 
 
The harshness of this position to claimants, even in deserving circumstances, prompted the courts 
to rethink their approach.  Progressively, the courts sought to ameliorate this harshness, for 
instance, by stating that mere negligence on the claimant’s part would not suffice to deny him 
recovery; the negligence had to be such that directly contributed to the ensuing harm.597  In 
Davies v Mann,598 the courts laid down the ‘last opportunity’599 test, which essentially states that 
when both parties have been negligent, liability would fall on the party who had the last 
opportunity to avoid harm from ensuing.600  The court’s rationale was founded in their belief that 
it made common sense not to deny a claimant recovery solely based on his contributory 
negligence, especially when this contribution was insignificant, and the ensuing harm could still 
have been avoided by the defendant if the latter took due care.601  Further rationale included 
reference to proximate cause which conceived the claimant’s negligent act as being past, 
overtaken in time by the more negligent act of the defendant, even though it contributed to the 
ensuing harm.602 
  
Although the last opportunity test provided some relief from the harsh effects of the common 
law position, it presented its own problems. For instance, there was some uncertainty as to how 
to determine which act was last, and as to whether it presented a real opportunity603 which the 
                                                 
596 Butterfield v Forrester (1809) 11 East 60. 
597 Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd (1940) A.C. 152 at 165. 
598 (1842) 152 ER 588 (Exch). 
599 Also called the ‘last clear chance’ or ‘last clear opportunity’ test. 
600 The Boy Andrew (1948) A.C. 140 at 148–149. 
601 Jones, M. A. J. (2010) Clerk & Lindsell on Tort, supra, at p.206, para 3-46. 
602 James, F. J. (1937) ‘Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine’, supra, at p. 710. 
603 See, for instance, the court’s statement in Leinback v Pickwick Greyhound Lines, 138 Kan. 50, 65, 23 P. (2d) 
449, 456 (1933): ‘a chance is a clear chance if exercise of vigilance would have discovered the helpless peril and 
avoided the injury’.  This naturally throws up the issue as to the standard of vigilance expected in individual cases, 






defendant could have utilised to avoid the ensuing harm, the negligence of the claimant 
notwithstanding.  The courts seemed to be straining every nerve to find a reason to exculpate a 
claimant who had also been negligent, resulting in harm to himself.604 
   
Thus, if Blackacre, their employee or independent contractor negligently contributed to the 
ensuing harm respectively to themselves, the liability of Whiteacre, their employee or 
independent contractor would depend on whether they had the last opportunity to avoid the harm, 
which their respective negligence primarily engendered.  Since the last opportunity test was 
based on proximity and opportunity, where the circumstances supported this finding, liability 
was imposed on Whiteacre, their employee or independent contractor for the negligent acts 
which caused harm to Blackacre, their employee or independent contractor. 
 
3.1.1.7  Commentary 
 
The different scenarios examined so far in this chapter have necessitated recourse to the law of 
torts, given the absence of contractual and legislative provisions applicable to the specific 
situations, leaving the courts to adjudicate based on extant principles of law.  Although the 
different rationales for the decisions reached by the courts have been discussed, it is worth noting 
that in most of the scenarios, the courts have had to resort to the doctrine of reasonableness to 
do justice.605  Indeed, since the test as to whether negligence has occurred is underpinned by what 
a reasonable man, similarly circumstanced, will do, policy considerations of reasonableness, 
fairness and justice will always guide the courts in their determination of cases coming within 
this purview.   
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This is particularly important in establishing the existence of the duty of care in a contractual 
relationship.  In giving contract parties the freedom to largely decide their own bargain, the law 
also expects that they act responsibly, both inter se and in respect of the wider community.  This 
is why the law recognises and upholds the notion of restitutio in integrum,606 the philosophical 
foundation upon which remedies are founded, as recompense when parties fail to meet the 
standard they have set for themselves, and also imposes liability when they behave carelessly, in 
a manner that hurts the other party, and/or the wider community.   
 
When the existence of the duty of care has been established, the next question is whether it has 
been breached.  Generally, this question is answered by resorting to an objective standard which 
takes into consideration whether a reasonable person of the same skill, knowledge and 
experience would have committed the same infraction in similar circumstances.607  This is 
particularly so in situations in which a person has held himself out as possessing a certain skill 
and knowledge, as he would be required to demonstrate the level of expertise held by people of 
similar skill and knowledge.608   
 
The courts are also guided by the probability that a party’s acts or omissions may actually 
increase the likelihood that harm will occur.609  The extent of damage that has ensued, or is likely 
to ensue from those acts or omissions, is also considered in reaching a decision on whether the 
duty of care has been breached.610 
 
                                                 
606 This means restoration to the position that the innocent party would have been but for the breach: Furmston, M. 
P., Cheshire, G. C. and Fifoot, C. H. S. (2012), supra, at p. 746; Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Exch. 850; Graham 
v. Egan 15 La. Ann. 97, 98 (1860). 
607 Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 11 Ex. 781. 
608 Cooke, J. (2015) Law of Tort. 12th Ed. U.K.: Pearson Education Ltd, at p. 154.  See also Bolam v Friern Hospital 
Management Committee (1957) 2 All ER 118. 
609 Hayley v London Electricity Board (1965) AC 778. 






Economic efficiency parameters can also be discerned in the manner in which courts have 
approached the finding of negligence. In what seems to be the courts’ own way of discerning the 
party best able to bear a risk, ability to shoulder the economic consequences of the occurrence 
of the event have featured in their decisions.  Thus, Denning, MR, stated that courts are moving 
away from the notion of ‘no liability without fault’ (emphasis added), to one that questions, ‘on 
whom should the risk fall?’611 (emphasis added).  In this case, the fact that a party had insurance 
weighed heavily in the mind of the court in making a finding of negligence, as this demonstrated 
the ability to bear the economic consequences of the occurrence of the event. 
 
Furthermore, the courts seem to be focusing on the real cost of a breach, and have suggested that 
if the cost of preventing the occurrence of the risk event is less than the severity of the harm that 
could ensue therefrom, then a finding of negligence is appropriate.  For instance, in Tomlinson v 
Congleton Borough Council,612 the court gave due consideration to the gravity of the injury, the 
cost of preventive measures, as well as the social value of the activity giving rise to the event in 
arriving at a decision.  Where a positive finding is made as to the cost effectiveness of the 
preventive measure, it has the effect of shifting the burden of the economic consequences of the 
occurrence of the event from the claimant to the defendant.613 
 
The economic consequences to be borne by the wrongful party in this respect is primarily in the 
form of damages.  This is the primary means of compensating the innocent party for any loss or 
damage suffered,614 and it is meant to restore the claimant to the position in which he would have 
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612 (2003) 3 All ER 1122. 
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perspective, that it ran against the mill of proportionality to close a factory after flooding occurred because the owner 
had taken reasonable steps to eliminate the after-effects of the episode. 
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been, monetarily, had the contract been performed,615 or, in the case of third-parties, had the 
infraction not occurred.  In most cases, an action for damages, which is based on negligence, 
could be brought either in contract, for parties, or in tort, for third parties.616  
 
When parties did not stipulate any amount in damages in the contract, the court determines what 
is payable as damages, and are primarily guided by the principle of restitutio in integrum.  Where 
the parties have stipulated specific amounts, the courts would determine whether the stipulation 
is indeed a penalty, which is not a genuine recompense to the innocent party, but is in terrorem 
of the defaulting party.617  This distinction between damages and penalties is discussed below.  
Since the aim is not to let the claimant profit from the wrongful act of the defaulting party, the 
court’s primary quest from an economics perspective, is to restore the parties or third-party to 
the status quo ante.   
 
If the economics rationale for compensating an innocent party for bodily injury or damage to 
property is to put him in a position that he would have been, but for the wrongful act of the other 
party,618 one would question the rationale for compensation for a dead party or victim who cannot 
be so restored.  The answer to this question is found in the mechanism for calculating the 
damages payable upon the demise of a victim.  Both the courts619 and commentators620 agree that 
the loss of expectation of life is the basis for compensating the estate of the victim, as the 
wrongful act is adjudged as cutting short his expectation of longevity.  ‘Life’ is seen as an 
enjoyable resource of significant value, entitling the estate to recover damages from the wrongful 
party when this is terminated prematurely.621 The victim’s prospect of acquiring material 
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possessions and indulging in the pleasures of this world on the one hand, and the support that he 
could have provided to dependants,622 both of which have now been truncated by his untimely 
death, justify the imposition of liability when the court finds that a breach of the duty of care 
owed to the victim has occurred. 
 
If wilful misconduct was alleged, the courts would enquire into the mental altitude of the 
wrongdoer to ascertain whether the wrongful act was deliberately done despite awareness of the 
consequences.  In this regard, the court had to satisfy itself that the wrongdoer courted the natural 
consequences of his action.  Consequently, the mere fact that the act had been committed, harm 
had ensued, and fault could be ascribed, was not sufficient; it had to be established that the 
wrongdoer knew and intended the consequences of his action.623  The courts are also able to come 
to this conclusion if recklessness can be discerned in the manner in which the alleged wrongdoer 
conducted himself.624   
 
In not caring about the consequences of his actions, the wrongdoer falls below the standard of 
behaviour expected under the contract, and would bear the economic consequences of remedying 
the ensuing harm.625  
 
 
3.1.2  Liability for Pollution 
  
In the absence of contractual or legislative provision, liability for pollution was dealt with under 
the tort of nuisance in actions brought at the instance of the injured third party who alleged that 
his enjoyment of his property had been impacted by the activities of the tortfeasor.  In this 
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instance, the courts would need to decide as between the contract parties, who should bear the 
liability for the economic consequences of the pollution.  The traditional approach of the courts 
in this regard was to impose fault-based liability,626 essentially to the effect that the loss would 
lie where it fell.  In Ilford UDC v Beal,627 the courts restated the fact that nuisance is usually 
caused by the intentional activities of a party, who can then not be exculpated from liability if 
the facts and circumstances of the case support this.  This presupposes that the ingredients 
underpinning liability for nuisance are present and have been proved by the claimant.628  In 
Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan,629 the court held that the appropriate party to be sued is one 
that bore some degree of personal responsibility in nuisance as far as the harmful event was 
concerned (emphasis added); the courts’ rationale was that the resulting harm from the 
responsible party’s actions were foreseeable, and it was reasonable in the circumstances to 
impose liability.630 
    
In appropriate circumstances, the courts also made findings of vicarious liability, which meant 
that Whiteacre was made responsible for the pollution caused by their employee, provided this 
was done in the course of his employment.631   The different rationales for imposing liability on 
Whiteacre in this circumstance were detailed in the foregoing sections of this study, but it 
suffices to be said that the law allows this legal substitution based on their position that it is fair, 
just and reasonable to impose liability on the employer for the infraction of the employee who 
ordinarily works for his overall benefit and under his direction and control.632  Closely related to 
                                                 
626 Fleischer, C. A. (1976) ‘Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Offshore Operations’, Scandinavian 
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this is the fact that Whiteacre may also be liable if the pollution occurred when the employee 
was doing something closely connected with the work he was employed to do, even if the task 
was not stricto sensu within the course of his employment.633 
 
If the pollution was caused by a third party who was Whiteacre’s independent contractor, there 
are two schools of thought as to whether liability should be imputed to Whiteacre.634  In Matania 
v National Provincial Bank Ltd and Elevenist Syndicate Ltd,635 the court held that an employer 
would be held vicariously liable for the nuisance committed by his independent contractor where 
the task to be carried out is inherently prone to the nuisance that resulted.  The court focused on 
the nature of the activity, and was willing to impute scienter and liability, especially when the 
task is of an ultra-hazardous nature.  The view of the court in Matania runs contrary to the 
position of the House of Lords in Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd,636 in which it refused to recognise 
an overarching head of liability for ultra-hazardous activities, and, by extension, refused to admit 
that vicarious liability in this circumstance was presumed. 
 
However, in Bower v Peate,637 an earlier case, the court had expressed the opinion that employers 
owed a non-delegable duty of care to third parties, for the task undertaken by their independent 
contractors, especially where it was foreseeable that harm could result.  The court held that the 
burden remained with the employer to ensure that appropriate precautionary measures were 
taken to prevent the eventuation of the potential risk.638 
   
In reconciling both approaches, this study posits that, in seeking to impute vicarious liability on 
Blackacre – (the employer/operator) – for the pollution caused by Whiteacre – (the independent 
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635 (1936) 2 All ER 233. 
636 (1947) AC 156. 
637 (1876) 1 QBD 321. 






contractor/driller) – the courts seemed to focus on the party who authorised the task rather than 
solely on the party who executed the task.  The element of control in deciding the task that was 
undertaken, as well as who undertook it, was as important as the fact that the resulting harm was 
foreseeable, given the inherent nuisance content and potential of the specific task. 
 
Where the third party is neither connected with Whiteacre nor Blackacre, he was regarded as a 
trespasser, and if the pollution was caused by his activities, the issue arose as to which party bore 
responsibility for the economic consequences of the damage caused by the pollution.  The courts 
usually looked to the occupier of the ‘premises’ as one who had sufficient control of the 
premises,639 and who had the responsibility of ensuring that no harm came to people on the 
premises – (invitees, visitors and trespassers) or outside the premises – (innocent bystanders or 
passers-by).640  In this regard, Blackacre – the operator – was regarded as the ‘occupier’ for all 
intents and purposes, as they were not only in control of the premises, but were typically seised 
of the responsibility for applying for the requisite permits that enabled the hazardous activity to 
be carried on.  Even if the rig is deemed as the premises, the party who authorised the task – 
Blackacre – was still deemed to be in control, and would be responsible for the economic 
consequences of the damage caused by pollution, except where Whiteacre was negligent. 
     
That notwithstanding, the courts did not prima facie ascribe liability for pollution by a trespasser 
to Blackacre.  Liability was imputed only if it was proved that Blackacre knew, or ought to have 
known, about the activities of the trespasser that led to the pollution.641  Indeed, if it could be 
proved that Blackacre knew about the interference by the trespasser, but failed to take steps to 
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remedy the situation, they were deemed to have ‘adopted’ the nuisance, hence their vicarious 
liability.642 
 
Apart from vicarious liability, the courts also imposed a regime of strict liability arising from the 
rule in Rylands v Fletcher.643  In this vein, the courts looked to the occupier of the land – 
Blackacre – as being liable for bringing or permitting the bringing onto his land, dangerous 
substances which then escape and cause harm to a third party.  Even in circumstances in which 
the occupier has not been personally negligent, the courts have held that the strict liability regime 
imposes a non-delegable duty which would attract sanctions if breached.  In this vein, identifying 
the occupier in this context becomes a critical exercise which the court must undertake before 
any applicable sanctions can be imposed.  Thus, in Colour Quest Ltd and Others v Total 
Downstream UK Plc,644 the court had to decide who was the occupier of the premises from which 
pollution occurred, and thus the appropriate party to sue, as between Total Downstream UK Plc 
and Hertford Oil Storage Ltd, both of whom were contract parties.  The court found that Total 
Downstream UK Plc was indeed the appropriate party in this circumstance, as it was the legal 
owner of the pipelines, and then imposed strict liability for the ensuing damage.645 
   
In allocating risk between the stakeholders in this instance, the courts were guided by several 
factors.  Of paramount consideration was the urge to strike the right balance between preserving 
the social benefit of the activity that produced the pollution, and the economic interest of the 
injured party.646  On the one hand, the courts sought to encourage wealth-maximisation which 
was the natural consequence of the socially beneficial activity, and on the other, to uphold the 
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643 (1865) 3 H. & C. 774 (Court of Exchequer). 
644 (2009) EWHC 540 (Comm.). 
645 Ibid. Also available at [2010] EWCA Civ 180. 







interest and right of the claimant to the full enjoyment and utilisation of his land which had been 
impacted by the activity of the defendant.  Case law shows that the courts did not default to the 
protection of the so-called socially beneficial activity, as the analysis of the decisions of the 
courts reveals that they were more focused on the protection of the rights of the claimants. 
   
For instance, in Adams v Ursell,647 the court had no concerns in choosing to discontinue the 
defendant’s activities which were the source of the nuisance to the claimant.  It rationalised their 
decision on the fact that the defendant could have carried on his business elsewhere without 
creating nuisance such as was evident in their current location.  Although the court 
acknowledged the socially beneficial nature of the defendant’s activities, yet it recognised that 
the interest of justice was best served by upholding the right of the claimant to full economic 
value of his property. 
   
The courts were also concerned with balancing environmental concerns with the socio-economic 
benefits of the activities.  Where pollution or other nuisance had occurred, the courts were faced 
with the option of either issuing an injunction to stop the activity and thereby abate the nuisance, 
or they could choose to deny an injunction and award damages instead.  In deciding, the courts 
were expected to ‘balance the equities’ in exercising their discretionary powers,648 and would 
issue injunctions only if damages were not adequate to compensate the aggrieved party.649  
Generally, the courts were obliged to grant injunctions if it was ‘just and fair’ in the specific 
circumstance to do so,650 and would normally take into consideration a wide range of factors in 
making this determination.651 
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One such consideration was the economic disproportion in what was at stake for the respective 
parties.  So, if the defendant had a huge investment which was the source of the pollution, the 
courts undertook an economic analysis of the value of the land of the injured party to determine 
whether it was optimal to issue the injunction and lose the utility from Blackacre’s activity, or 
permit Blackacre’s activity to continue, and, instead, award the claimant damages equivalent to 
the market value of the claimant’s land which had been negatively impacted by pollution arising 
from Blackacre’s activity.652  Indeed, the courts sometimes took into consideration Blackacre’s 
economic position in determining the nature and extent of the duty owed the claimant, and the 
damages to be awarded in the circumstance.653 
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CONTRACTUAL RESPONSE BY PARTIES 
 
The default position adopted by the courts, and enunciated above, is fault based and, in most 
cases, entails a contract party bearing the entirety of the economic consequences of the 
occurrence of specified risk events, once fault – breach of duty of care – is established.  This 
posed significant hardship on contract parties, especially those exposed to risks which outstrip 
their risk appetite or tolerance limits.  This is more so in offshore drilling campaigns, during 
which catastrophic events with huge economic consequences can and have occurred.654   Parties 
to the drilling contract recognise that if the default risk allocation applies, the contractor may be 
unable to accept the work, as the economic consequences of the occurrence of the default 
allocation of risk event might render it insolvent. 
 
This chapter examines the mechanisms that contract parties adopted in responding to the default 
risk allocation by the courts.  In the first instance, the study generally explores the mechanisms 
adopted and how they have evolved to the present time, indicating how they depart from the 
fault-based manner of allocation by the courts.  Thereafter, the specific manner in which the 
contract parties have utilised these mechanisms to allocate risk inter se in the drilling contract is 
fully discussed. 
  
4.1 Mechanisms Utilised by Contract Parties in Response to Risk Allocation by Courts 
In this section, a full discourse on indemnity clause and its component parts is presented.  
Thereafter, the other mechanisms – mutual hold harmless, exclusion/exemption, limitation of 
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liability, liquidated damages, and insurance – are discussed, highlighting how the contract parties 
utilise same in allocating risk inter se different from the way that the courts allocated risk 
between them in the absence of contract. 
  
4.1.1 Structure and Evolution of the Indemnity Clause 
 
It was against this backdrop that parties decided to alter the default risk allocation method, and 
adopt the indemnity regime.  Indemnity is defined as ‘an undertaking by which the promisor 
agrees to make good any loss or damage the promisee has incurred, or to safeguard the promisee 
against liability’.655  This promisor is also known as the ‘indemnitor’, while the promisee is 
referred to as the ‘indemnitee’.  The indemnity regime essentially exists to provide a framework 
within which contract parties can allocate risks in a manner which both ensures that contract 
objectives are met, without any party being unduly burdened by risks that could potentially affect 
their performance of the contract. 
   
This is particularly true from the contractor’s perspective as the party seised of the responsibility 
for the actual drilling of the well that is the subject-matter of the contract.  Taking on all the 
burdens of the economic consequences of the occurrence of all the specified and unspecified 
adverse events arising from the performance of the work under their purview, as would be 
required by the default risk allocation mechanism, would be too onerous, and could negatively 
affect the way in which work is performed and, by extension, the achievement of contract 
objectives.  Inevitably, the contractor had to be indemnified by the operator, the latter electing 
to bear the economic consequences of the occurrence of the events that the contractor is unable 
to shoulder. 
 
                                                 






The key elements of the indemnity clauses in the model contracts are discussed in this section.  
Importantly, the rationale for, and implication of, their inclusion is examined, with a view to 
providing clarity as to their purport and how they evolved from the bedrock position examined 
above till the present time. 
(a) Requirement to ‘indemnify, defend, release and hold harmless’ 
(i) ‘to indemnify …’ is defined as a contractual stipulation whereby an indemnitor agrees to pay 
an indemnitee if the latter has suffered loss arising from certain events.656  It has also been defined 
as ‘securing another against an anticipated loss or to prevent him from being damnified by the 
legal consequences of an act or forbearance on the part of one of the parties or of some third 
person.657  In Pitts v Jones,658 the court stated that indemnity represents ‘the right of one party to 
look to another to satisfy his losses, and may arise under a contract (for example under a contract 
of insurance) or by operation of law’.659  In this study’s construct, and within the context of the 
offshore drilling contract, this means the obligation to bear the economic consequences of the 
occurrence of events that have led to losses, damages, liabilities and expenses, accruing to or 
incurred by another party. 
   
In the UK, Blackacre and Whiteacre recognised that the latter’s liability exposure in a contractual 
relationship was high, especially when third parties were involved, and sought to mitigate this. 
To avoid the harshness of the voluntary assumption of responsibility principle that applied as 
stated in the foregoing sections in which Whiteacre undertook voluntary tasks, Whiteacre and 
Blackacre ensured that their transactions were ‘bargains’ properly so-called by furnishing 
                                                 
656 Gordon, G. (2011) ‘Risk Allocation in Oil and Gas Contracts (Chapter 14)’, in Gordon, G., Paterson, J. and 
Usenmez, E. (eds.) Oil and Gas Law: Current Practice and Emerging Trends. Dundee: Dundee University Press, 
pp. 443-497, at p.444. 
657 Dresser Industries, Inc v Page Petroleum, Inc 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex.,1993) quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 
(5th ed. 1979) 692. 
658 (2007) EWCA Civ 1301. 






consideration.  However, this still did not solve the problem of Whiteacre’s liability exposure, 
especially to third parties.  To address this exposure, the parties entered into contracts of 
suretyship or guarantee.  These contracts consisted of a promise by Blackacre to ‘answer for the 
debt, default or miscarriage’ by Whiteacre,660 thereby constituting Blackacre into a secondary 
obligor or guarantor/surety responsible for bearing the economic consequences of any infraction 
contemplated by the promise, while Whiteacre remained primarily liable. 
   
Although this arrangement was a clear departure from, and improvement to, the bedrock scenario 
in which Whiteacre was sole obligor, it had several flaws.  First, the scope of application of the 
guarantee was limited, as it was intended to apply primarily to transactions in which debt was 
involved, leaving other commercial transactions subject to the default bedrock scenario in which 
Whiteacre was solely responsible for bearing the economic consequences of the occurrence of 
any adverse event.  Secondly, the target of the guarantee was always a third party, which meant 
that as between Blackacre and Whiteacre, the latter remained solely responsible for any loss of 
life, injury, loss of/damage to property, on both sides, provided that it was caused by Whiteacre’s 
activities.  Thirdly, because Blackacre was the secondary obligor whose obligation was triggered 
only when Whiteacre defaulted on the primary obligation, this meant that Whiteacre still retained 
sole liability exposure in some cases, thereby defeating the purpose of trying to mitigate the 
harshness of the bedrock regime. 
 
It was against this backdrop that the indemnity regime arose.  Blackacre and Whiteacre now 
inserted provisions into their contract which offered Whiteacre protection from liability that went 
beyond debt repayment, and encompassed loss of life, injury, loss of/damage to property, either 
to Blackacre, Whiteacre, their employees and/or independent contractors.  The courts recognised 
                                                 






the ability of parties to contract out of the default common law position on risk allocation.  In 
Smit International (Deutschland) v GmbH Josef Mobius,661 Morrison J. described the 
indemnification principle as a ‘crude but workable allocation of risk … ’, while the court in EE 
Caledonia Ltd v Orbit Valve Co Europe Plc662 stated that it was an industry practice that had 
arisen to cater for the peculiarities of the oil and gas sector, especially in respect of offshore 
operations.  Although the court in EE Caledonia Ltd focused on the oil and gas sector, evidence 
abounds that the indemnity practice is not exclusive to this sector, encompassing other sectors 
such as construction,663 marine664 and insurance.665  
  
However, there were concerns as to the nature of conduct by the contract parties which was 
permissible under the indemnity regime.  Specifically, the UK courts questioned whether 
negligence – especially when this was attributable to the indemnitee – and wilful misconduct 
were covered, and, therefore enforceable.  From the courts’ perspective, it was one thing for 
Blackacre to offer liability protection to Whiteacre, but it was another thing to retain that 
protection when the infraction arose from Whiteacre’s own negligence or wilful misconduct.  
This was especially against the backdrop of the default bedrock position in which Whiteacre was 
solely responsible for the consequences of their own negligence.666 
  
In Canada Steamship Lines Ltd v The King,667 this question was considered within the wider 
issue of construction of contracts.  Although this case originated from Canada, it had profound 
impact on the jurisprudence in the UK, especially because it was decided by the Judicial 
                                                 
661 (2001) CLC 1545. 
662 (1995) 1 All ER 174. 
663 See, for instance, Meyers III, R. L. and Perelman, D. A. (1988) ‘Risk Allocation Through Indemnity Obligations 
in Construction Contracts’, SCL Rev., 40, p. 989. 
664 See, for instance, Chalmers, M. D. E. S. and Owen, D. (1907) The Marine Insurance Act, 1906. London: W. 
Clowes. 
665 See, for instance, Dionne, G. (ed.) (2013) Handbook of Insurance. 2nd ed. New York: Springer Science & 
Business Media. 
666 See, for instance, Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan (1940) AC 880. 






Committee of the Privy Council.  In answering the question as to whether a party could be 
indemnified for own negligence, the court laid down a three-phase test that provides guidance in 
this regard. 
   
First, if the indemnity clause expressly exculpates the indemnitee from own negligence, then it 
must be upheld.  Secondly, in the absence of express reference to negligence, if the indemnity 
clause contains words which are wide enough to cover own negligence, then this should also be 
enforced; however, any doubts are to be resolved in favour of the indemnitor.  Thirdly, and 
flowing from the second test, if the words are wide enough to cover own negligence, then the 
courts must inquire into other heads of liability that could also be covered other than negligence.  
Where other heads of liability exist, then, in the absence of an express reference to negligence, 
the indemnitee is unable to take the benefit of the indemnity, provided the other heads of liability 
are not too remote that it could not have been within the contemplation of the indemnitee that 
protection against it was required.668  In formulating the third test, the court relied on an earlier 
case, Alderslade v. Hendon Laundry Ltd, in which the same issue of liability for own negligence 
was decided, and the court held that an indemnitee would be exculpated if negligence was the 
only head of liability possible in the circumstance.  If this was not the case, then liability for own 
negligence had to be expressly stipulated to be applicable.669 
   
In reaching a decision, the court in Canada Steamship was guided by the principles of ‘natural’ 
construction of the contract terms, to the effect that words should be given their ordinary meaning 
in the absence of ambiguity.670   
                                                 
668 Ibid, at 793–794.   
669 (1945) K.B. 189. 
670 Canada Steamship Lines Ltd v The King (1952) 2 D.L.R. 786 (P.C.).  See also the statement per Lord Hoffmann 
in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 898 that words will be 
given their ‘ordinary, popular, and commonly accepted meaning’.  Lord Hoffmann also stated in Mannai Investment 
Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd (1997) 2 W.L.R. 945 that where these words have more than one 






This rationale was carried through to subsequent cases, which also applied the test laid down in 
Canada Steamship.671  In one of the cases that arose in the aftermath of the Piper Alpha disaster, 
EE Caledonia Ltd v Orbit Valve Co Europe Plc, the court affirmed the application of the 
principle that indemnity clauses are subject to narrow and restrictive construction, especially in 
respect of the events the indemnity purports to cover.672  In the other case that emerged from the 
Piper Alpha disaster, Caledonia North Sea Ltd v London Bridge Engineering Ltd,673 the court 
applied this principle when it held that a contractual indemnity is the primary indemnity which 
a contract party has, enabling insurers to exercise the right of subrogation to recover against the 
wrongful party. That the indemnitee has taken the initiative to insure himself against the same 
risk the insurer seeks to be subrogated to will not impact on the obligation of the indemnitor to 
indemnify the indemnitee, neither will it diminish the amount payable thereto. 
 
However, the principles guiding interpretation of contracts were revised in Investors 
Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society,674 and since indemnity clauses are 
embedded in contracts, the manner in which they are interpreted will inevitably be caught by the 
nascent provisions.  In Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd, Lord Hoffmann stated that the 
meaning which would now be ascribed to words in a contract would be that which a reasonable 
person who had the same background knowledge that the contract parties are reasonably 
expected to possess would ascribe to it.  In essence, Lord Hoffmann opined that the ‘natural’, 
narrow or literal meaning of words in a contract is no longer sufficient for the purposes of 
construction of contracts, but would now encompass a wider contextual and objective approach.  
                                                 
671 See, for instance, Smith v South Wales Switchgear Ltd (1978) 1 All E.R. 18 (H.L.). 
672 Termed the Orbit Valve case: (1995) 1 All ER 174. 
673 (2002) UKHL4; (2002) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 553, HL.   






In the era in which Canada Steamship was decided, it was only in the cases of ambiguity in the 
natural understanding of words that resort to the contextual background could be had.675 
In Arnold v Britton,676 the UK Supreme Court further clarified that in implementing the 
contextual approach laid down in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd, the actual words used by 
the contract parties are of utmost relevance, and should not be subordinated to the overarching 
commercial purpose of the contract.677  The court was basically cautioning against interpreting a 
contract in a manner that protected one of the parties but amounted to a re-draft of the contract, 
thereby rendering the actual words used redundant. 
 
In Canada Steamship, the second principle that Lord Morton laid down also stated that the 
indemnity clause should be enforced even in the absence of express reference to negligence, if 
it contains words which are wide enough to cover own negligence, admonishing, however, that 
any doubts are to be resolved in favour of the indemnitor, against the party seeking reliance on 
the indemnity clause, the proferens.  This principle embodies the contra proferentem rule which 
generally states that ambiguities in contracts are to be construed against the maker, and in the 
other party’s favour.678  This is a common-law rule which arose in response to the unequal 
bargaining positions of contract parties, and sought to protect the weaker parties, who were, in 
most cases, not the makers of the document.  In contemporary times, this rule has been applied 
to adhesion or standard form contracts where the consumer is deemed to be the weaker party, 
and seeks to give the latter the benefit of any doubt in the document. By so doing, the courts are 
tacitly admonishing makers of document to be crystal clear in both intent and meaning of the 
contract terms. 
 
                                                 
675 See Burrows, A. (2016) A Casebook on Contract. 5th ed. UK: Hart Publishing, at p. 245. 
676 (2015) UKSC 36; (2015) AC 1619. 
677 Ibid, at para. 19. 






Juxtaposed with the principles laid down in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd, a school of 
thought believes that the contra proferentem rule may be heading into redundancy in UK 
jurisprudence, especially against the backdrop of the call by Lord Hoffmann for jettisoning ‘old 
intellectual baggage’ of construction of contracts.679  This is consistent with the thinking of the 
court in the very recent case of Transocean Drilling UK Ltd v Providence Resources plc.680   
Although the Court of Appeal did not condemn the rule, it disagreed with the trial judge for 
applying the contra proferentem rule in that instance, and stated that it had no place when the 
parties had equal bargaining power,681 and where the clause sought to be interpreted was 
beneficial to both parties.  Likewise, in the even more recent case of Persimmon Homes Ltd v 
Ove Arup and Partners Ltd,682 the same court cautioned that it is to be used as a last resort, even 
though it recognised that it still plays a limited role in the interpretation of contracts.683 
  
The House of Lords has cautioned that the principles laid down in Canada Steamship should not 
be viewed as a code or statute but merely serve as guidance on the approach for interpreting 
contracts, as it does not provide ‘certain and predictable’ results each time.684  This admonition, 
notwithstanding, there is evidence that the courts are still guided by the principles in Canada 
Steamship in construing indemnity clauses, as was self-evident in the Court of Appeal decision 
in MIR Steel UK Ltd v Morris.685  In this case, the court rejected the argument arising from the 
Canada Steamship principles to the effect that, if liability for own negligence had to be expressly 
excluded to be enforceable, the same rule should apply to liability for intentional wrongdoing. 
                                                 
679 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society (1998) 1 WLR 896, at 912– 913.  See 
also Lord Hoffmann’s dictum in his dissenting judgment in Bank of Credit and Commerce International v Ali (2002) 
1 AC 251 at para 62, in which he called for ‘artificial rules’ of construction to be discarded, in preference for the 
modern trend, ostensibly referring to the principles laid down in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd. 
680 (2016) EWCA Civ 372, at paras 20–24. 
681 See also K/S Victoria Street v House of Fraser (Stores Management) Ltd (2011) EWCA Civ 904; (2012) Ch 497 
at para. 68. 
682 (2017) EWCA Civ 373. 
683 See also Hut Group Ltd v Nobahar-Cookson (2016) EWCA Civ 128. 
684 HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank (2003) 2 Lloyd’s Law Reports 61, para 11. 






The court’s rationale was that upholding this argument would be tantamount to a mechanistic 
manner of construing indemnity clauses. 
 
In line with the new thinking on interpretation of contracts in general, and indemnity clauses in 
particular, the courts seem to have adopted the approach in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd.  
In Westerngeco Ltd v ATP Oil & Gas (UK) Ltd,686 the court stated that where the intention to 
indemnify for liability for own negligence is manifest in the contract, the intention is usually 
enforced.  The court then went on to clarify that this intention must be discerned by construing 
the contract in its entirety, and not just the provisions of the indemnity clauses.  In the present 
case, the relevant contract was substantially based on the LOGIC Offshore Services form687 
which clearly allows indemnification for own negligence.  The relevant indemnity clause688 
relating to liability to third parties, occasioned by the contractor’s negligence, contained the 
parties’ agreement that the contractor would be indemnified by the operator in respect of any 
amount by which the third-party liability was greater than the total contract sum.  However, the 
clause stated that it had to be a ‘liability under this contract’ –  a provision that seemed 
straightforward and non-controversial.  In denying the indemnity sought, the court was guided 
by the construction of the contract in its entirety, and found that the parties had clearly intended 
‘liability under this contract’ to mean liability only between the contract parties, not extending 
to third parties. The court’s rationale for this decision was that contract parties were bound by 
the wording and intent of their whole contract, and this intent would be given effect, especially 
when contract parties had access to legal advice. 
  
                                                 
686 (2006) EWHC 1164 (Comm). 
687 Clause 19, LOGIC General Conditions of Contract for Offshore Services, Edition 1-June 1997, at 
https://www.logic-oil.com/content/standard-contracts-0 accessed 25 June 2017. 






In the USA, before contract parties inserted indemnity provisions into their contracts, the courts 
have been willing to hold that the obligation to indemnify may be imposed under the common 
law.689  The rationale was that there were factual situations in which equity and good conscience 
made it inevitable that the onus of meeting the financial obligations of a judgment needed to shift 
from a party who was seeking indemnification, to the other party against whom this was sought.  
Being guided by notions of equity and good conscience, this regime crystallised into an equitable 
indemnity principle premised on the rationale that a contract party has a right of recovery against 
another party who caused him, the former, to incur liability and/or expenses.690  This was an 
extension of the argument that a person is responsible for the consequences of his tortious act, 
especially those which cause harm or loss to be incurred.691 
 
Rather than leave this within the exclusive domain of common law, parties subsequently made 
provisions for the obligation to indemnify in their contracts.  Where parties have provided for 
indemnities in their contract, the courts have held that the obligation to indemnify applied only 
when the wording of the contract was clear and unambiguous.  Like any other provision in the 
contract, the obligation to indemnify will be construed in line with the extant principles of 
interpretation to discern the intent of the parties.692  Thus, words will be given their ordinary, and 
natural meaning, and where these words have more than one meaning, the background and 
circumstances of the transaction will aid the court in discerning the intention of the parties, and 
evidence in this regard will be admitted.693 
 
                                                 
689 Herrero v Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 74 (Ct. App. 1964). 
690 Li v Yellow Cab Co, 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975). 
691 Am. Motorcycle Ass’n v Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899, 912 (Cal. 1978). 
692 Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Gaubert, 829 S.W.2d 274, 281 (Tex.App.1992). 






Once the courts have ascertained the intent of the parties, the obligation of the indemnitor is then 
construed strictly and narrowly, in line with the doctrine of strictissimi juris,694 to the effect that 
the indemnity obligation cannot be extended beyond the express provisions of the contract, either 
by implication or construction.695  
  
Indeed, the courts have taken the position, not only to interpret the indemnity clauses strictly, 
but have also decided that this will be interpreted strictly in favour of the indemnitor.696 
    
However, this does not preclude the application of the contra proferentem rule of construction 
if there is an ambiguity in the wording and/or intent of the indemnity clause.  As usual, this will 
be construed against the indemnitor if the latter is the maker of the document and/or seeks to rely 
on it.697  At first glance, this looks like a contradiction to the strictissimi juris principle, however 
this study posits that the two principles are complementary and not contradictory.  Since the 
contra proferentem principle is a rule of construction, it will be the first in time to apply, as it 
aids in determining the intent of the parties.  It is only after this intent has been determined that 
the extent of the reach of the indemnity obligation can be investigated, with the strictissimi juris 
principle applying to ensure that the boundaries of the obligation are not breached. 
   
The obligation to indemnify makes a fundamental assumption that the specific events that will 
trigger the enforcement of the indemnity are also clearly expressed and defined.  Where an event 
                                                 
694 Meaning ‘to be interpreted in the strictest manner, or of the strictest right or law’: Black’s Law Dictionary (7th 
ed.1999) 1435. It has been labelled as being a principle of substantive law: Torain v Clear Channel Broadcasting, 
Inc  651 F.Supp.2d 125, 149 (S.D.N.Y., 2009). 
695 See E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co v Shell Oil Co, 259 S.W.3d 800, 805 (Tex.App.2007).   
696 Baird v Lease Acquisition Partners, Inc 2000 WL 1508263, 3 (Tex.App.-Austin). 
697 See, generally, Boardman, M. E. (2005) ‘Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate’, Mich. L. 






does not come within the purview of the obligation as captured in the contractual provision, the 
courts have interpreted this strictissimi juris so as to deny cover.698 
   
The current position of the law in the USA relating to indemnities was confirmed in Re: Oil Spill 
by the Oil Rig ‘Deepwater Horizon’ in the Gulf of Mexico,699 in the aftermath of the Macondo 
disaster.  In a summary judgement in the Transocean/BP litigation, Judge Barbier restated the 
position of the law relating to the scope and effect of indemnities.  In rejecting BP’s argument 
which was to the effect that the scope of the obligation to indemnify Transocean700 did not extend 
to sole or gross negligence for subsea pollution, the court held that indemnity provisions will be 
given their plain meanings in the absence of ambiguity.701  In the present case, since there was 
                                                 
698 ‘A Turtle Offshore’ (2008) EWHC 3034.  See also Corbitt v Diamond M. Drilling Co, 654 F.2d 329, 333 (5th 
Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981). 
699 The Transocean/BP litigation, Case 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS Document 5446 Filed 01/26/12 at United States 
District Court Eastern District of Louisiana.  The summary judgment was handed down on 26 January 2012. 
700 As contained in the combined effect of Arts 24.1, 24.2 and 25.1 of the drilling contract between them. 
701 The Transocean/BP litigation, Case 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS Document 5446, Op.Cit at p.5.  The drilling contract 
is available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1451505/000145150510000069/exhibit10_1.pdf accessed 
28 June 2017. The original parties were Vastar and Reading & Bates, forerunners to BP and Transocean 
respectively.  
The relevant provisions are as follows: 
Article 24.1: Contractor shall assume full responsibility for and shall protect, release, defend, indemnify, and hold 
Company and its joint owners harmless from and against any loss, damage, expense, claim, fine, penalty, demand, 
or liability for pollution or contamination, including control and removal thereof, originating on or above 
the  surface of the land or water, from spills, leaks, or discharges of fuels, lubricants, motor oils, pipe dope, paints, 
solvents, ballast, air emissions, bilge sludge, garbage, or any other liquid or solid whatsoever in possession and 
control of contractor and without regard to negligence of any party or parties and specifically without regard to 
whether the spill, leak, or discharge is caused in whole or in part by the negligence or other fault of company, its 
contractors, (other than contractor) partners, joint venturers, employees, or agents. In addition to the above, 
contractor to a limit of fifteen million dollars (us$ 15,000,000.00) per occurrence, shall release indemnify and defend 
company for claims for loss or damage to third parties arising from pollution in any way caused by the drilling unit 
while it is off the drilling location, while underway or during drive off or drift off from the drilling location. 
 
Article 24.2: Company shall assume full responsibility for and shall protect, release, defend, indemnify, and hold 
Contractor harmless from and against any loss, damage, expense, claim, fine, penalty, demand, or liability for 
pollution or contamination, including control. 
 
Article 25.1: Except to the extent any such obligation is specifically limited to certain causes elsewhere in this 
contract, the parties intend and agree that the phrase “shall protect, release, defend, indemnify and hold harmless” 
means that the indemnifying party shall protect, release, defend, indemnify, and hold harmless the indemnified party 
or parties from and against any and all claims, demands, causes of action, damages, costs, expenses (including 
reasonable attorneys’ fees), judgments and awards of any kind or character, without limit and without regard to 
the cause or causes thereof, including pre-existing conditions, whether such conditions be patent or latent, the 






no ambiguity, a mere disagreement over the meaning of the words will not erode the obligation 
to indemnify and make Transocean whole in respect of the compensatory damages owed to third 
parties, arising from claims relating to the subsea pollution.702 
 
(ii) ‘to defend…’ is the obligation to shield from, or support another party in respect of court 
proceedings, allegations, suits, claims, which may be instituted against him pursuant to a 
contract, irrespective of the fact that the proceedings may have no basis, or are fraudulent or 
false.703  In Argos Ltd v Argos Systems Inc,704 this was defined as stepping in to defend a claim 
brought pursuant to a breach.705  In the UK, the courts have drawn a distinction between the duty 
to indemnify and the duty to defend.  In Astrazeneca Insurance Co Ltd v XL Insurance (Bermuda) 
Ltd,706 the court held that the duty to defend will not be automatically assumed unless it is 
expressly stated in the contract.707  This is notwithstanding the fact that the subject contract 
already contains the duty to indemnify.  This is consistent with the decision in John Wyeth & 
Brother Ltd v Cigna Insurance Co of Europe SA NV (No. 1),708 which had suggested that the 
obligation to defend an action in court may arise before the obligation to indemnify, which may 
or may not arise.709  The rationale of the court was based on their acceptance of the argument that 
there is a difference between the obligation to reimburse costs upon the establishment of the 
claims in a given action, and the obligation to pay for the cost of the action itself.710 
                                                 
expressed or implied, breach of contract, strict liability, tort, or the negligence of any person or persons, including 
that of the indemnified party, whether such negligence be sole, joint or concurrent, active, passive or gross or any 
other theory of legal liability and without regard to whether the claim against the indemnitee is the result of an 
indemnification agreement with a third party. 
702 Ibid, at p.6. 
703 G. Hilliker, Liability Insurance Law in Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto and Vancouver: Butterworths, 2001), cited in 
Sheehan, M. F. (2002) ‘Duty to Defend: General Principles’, Fasken Martineau, Available: Fasken Martineau 
DuMoulin, LLP; http://www.fasken.com/files/Publication/ accessed 15 February 2017). 
704 (2017) EWHC 231.  
705 Ibid, at para 339(3). 
706 (2013) EWHC 349 (Comm); (2013) 2 All E.R. (Comm) 97. 
707 Ibid, at para 28. 
708 (2001) EWCA Civ 175; (2001) Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 420. 
709 Ibid, at para 35. 







Where an indemnitor has been notified by the indemnitee of a contingent liability, and the former 
refuses to uphold his separate duty to defend, he is estopped from questioning the validity and 
quantum of payment which the indemnitee makes to the third party in this circumstance if 
eventually the duty to indemnify is triggered.  In Cheltenham & Gloucester Plc v Sun Alliance 
and London Insurance Plc,711 the court held that this estoppel will apply unless the indemnitor 
has expressly disclaimed liability to the indemnitee and expresses no interest in either defending 
the third-party action or getting involved in the quantum of payment involved.712 
 
Although the duty to defend imposes an obligation on the indemnitor to fund the legal 
proceedings for the benefit of the indemnitee, it does not impose an obligation on the indemnitee 
to consign the actual handling of the defence to the indemnitor.  In Codemasters Software Co 
Ltd v Automobile Club de l’Ouest,713 the court held that the indemnitee has the right to request 
the indemnitor to conduct the legal proceedings on his (indemnitee’s) behalf, but it is not 
mandatory that the indemnitor take over these proceedings.714  Indeed, the right of the indemnitee 
to choose his own counsel and conduct his own proceedings has been recognised and upheld in 
the UK.  In Pine v DAS Legal Expenses Insurance Co Ltd,715 the court held that an indemnitee 
who had a ‘before the event’ (BTE) insurance,716 had the right to appoint her own counsel, and 
refused to recognise the high value and complexity of the case as ‘exceptional circumstances’ 
that would enable the insurance company to exercise the right of appointment.  The rationale of 
the court is found in their thinking that mandating the indemnitee to utilise a barrister appointed 
                                                 
711 (2001) S.C. 965; (2001) S.L.T. 1151. 
712 Ibid, at para 16. 
713 (2010) F.S.R. 12; (2009) EWHC 2361 (Ch). 
714 Ibid., at para 40. 
715 (2011) EWHC 658 (QB). 
716 That is, insurance obtained before the cause of action giving rise to legal proceedings.  This right to appoint own 
counsel in this type of insurance is usually subject to ‘exceptional circumstances’ which then entitle the insurance 
company/indemnitor to make this appointment.  There is no indication as to what would constitute ‘exceptional 






by the insurance company, was tantamount to making her utilise the services of a legal 
representative that was not her choice and was therefore a breach of her insurance policy.717  This 
right has now been protected by law.718 
  
There is no indication that the consent of the insurance company/indemnitor is required for the 
indemnitee to validly exercise the right of appointment; the insurance contract/policy should 
already grant this right, and the law upholds it.  However, if contractual consent were required, 
the courts have recently given guidance on their expectation as to how this should be approached. 
The issue of contractual consent was dealt with in the case of Braganza (Appellant) v BP 
Shipping Ltd and another (Respondents).719  In this case, the court, citing another case,720 stated 
that: 
‘[A] decision-maker’s discretion will be limited, as a matter of necessary implication, by concepts 
of honesty, good faith, and genuineness, and the need for the absence of arbitrariness, 
capriciousness, perversity and irrationality. The concern is that the discretion should not be 
abused’.721 
 
If the court in Pine v DAS Legal Expenses Insurance Co Ltd had used the same rationale 
stipulated above, it would have come to the same conclusion that ‘exceptional circumstances’ 
had not been made out by the indemnitor, and it would have amounted to a lack of good faith 
and arbitrariness to fetter the discretion of the indemnitee to appoint her own counsel.  It would 
appear that the right of the indemnitor, as a contract party, in exercising the discretionary right 
of consent, needs to stand up to the same standard of scrutiny enunciated in Braganza.722 
   
                                                 
717 See also Brown-Quinn & Another v Equity Syndicate Management Limited & Another (2011) EWHC 2661. 
718 Insurance Companies (Legal Expenses Insurance) Regulations 1999.   
719 (2015) UKSC 17; on appeal from (2013) EWCA Civ 230. 
720 Socimer International Bank Ltd v. Standard Bank Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 116, paras 60–66. 
721 Braganza (Appellant) v BP Shipping Ltd and Another (Respondents) (2015) UKSC 17 at 33. 







The duty to defend has been held to apply even in criminal proceedings in circumstances in 
which the indemnitee’s actions, and grounds for the criminal proceedings, have arisen in the 
course of an obligation performed pursuant to a contract.  In Coulson v News Group Newspapers 
Ltd,723 the court held that it was not contrary to public policy for an indemnitor to pay the legal 
fees of an indemnitee facing a criminal charge, drawing a parallel with the functions of the 
Criminal Defence Service, the office in the UK that pays for legal representations for those faced 
with criminal charges that are unable to afford same.  The court’s rationale is found in the 
thinking that the performance of one’s obligation in a criminal manner does not frustrate an 
indemnity and would cover payment for activities such as the proceedings in the police station 
during interviews, as well as the bail process, as these were integral parts of the criminal justice 
system.724 
 
In the USA, the obligation to defend is different from the obligation to indemnify and, like the 
entire notion of indemnity, arose from the insurance industry.725  However, this was not always 
the approach of the courts.  In Crawford v Weather Shield Manufacturing, Inc,726 the court held 
that the duty to defend was embedded in the duty to indemnify, and this would be presumed by 
the court unless the parties express a contrary intention.727  According to the court, the duty to 
defend actually exists prior to the legal proceedings that determine whether indemnification is 
required in the instant case, and so is not dependent on the outcome of those proceedings.728  The 
court drew a distinction between the duty to defend and the duty to reimburse the costs of defence 
upon the conclusion of proceedings, and held that since the latter stems from the duty to 
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725 Farmers Texas Mutual County Insurance v Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81, 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 103 (Tex. 1997). This is 
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indemnify which subsists throughout the life of the contract, one could not extricate one duty 
from the other.729 
   
Although the court sought to justify this approach by reference to statute730 which implied 
obligations of the duty to defend into every indemnity contract, this approach has been criticised 
as failing to consider the freedom of contract principle which overrides that presumption.731  In 
effect, Riecken was arguing that the notion of freedom of contract should allow contract parties 
the latitude to agree to the duty to indemnify without necessarily agreeing to the duty to defend. 
 
Even though the approach in Crawford v Weather Shield Manufacturing, Inc conceptualises both 
duties to defend and indemnify as intertwined, it inadvertently recognises that the one could exist 
without the other.  For example, even if it is finally determined that the obligation to indemnify 
does not exist in a particular instance, this does not impact on the existence of the duty to defend, 
pursuant to which the litigation that produced the result on non-indemnification arose. 
  
In Flexsys America LP v XL Insurance Co Ltd,732 a case involving an American company and a 
UK company, which was tried in the UK as the contract was governed by English law, an 
important distinction between the approaches of the UK and USA courts to the duty to defend 
emerged.  In this case, the court held that, in US jurisprudence,733 the duty to defend was broader 
than the duty to indemnify, and that the determination of the existence of the duty to defend is 
routinely made long before the duty to indemnify is established.  The court found that the 
approach of the courts in Ohio was to find that the broader duty to defend existed, otherwise the 
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730 S.2778, CAL. CIV. CODE § 2778 (2009). 
731 Riecken, G. S. (2010) ‘The Duty to Defend under Non-Insurance Indemnity Agreements: Crawford v Weather 
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doctrine of issue estoppel would preclude it from making a finding of the existence of the 
narrower duty to indemnify.  This is unlike English law, which does not automatically make the 
finding of the existence of the duty to defend in the absence of the clearly expressed intent of the 
parties in their contract.  There is also nothing that precludes an English court from holding that 
the duty to indemnify exists even when the duty to defend has not been established.734 
 
In English v BGP Intern, Inc, the courts concluded that an indemnitee was owed a separate and 
distinct duty to defend, whether or not the duty to indemnify ever arose.  In particular, the court 
stated that both duties were of a different nature and rationalised this by stating that every word 
that is utilised in a contract ought to be given reasonable effect, especially where the meaning of 
the words is not ambiguous.735  Given the fact that both words – defend and indemnify – feature 
separately, the courts were able to pronounce them as being different, in effect and application.736  
This position was recently confirmed in Penta Corp v Town of Newport v AECOM Technical 
Services, Inc,737 in which the court stated that an indemnitor may be in breach of contract if he 
refuses to honour an unambiguous duty to defend, even while the issue of ultimate culpability 
has not been decided.738 
  
The inclusion of the duty to defend in the indemnity clause is not merely academic. This is the 
provision that empowers the indemnitor to decide the modalities for the appointment of counsel 
that will undertake the defence of the indemnitee upon the occurrence of the specified events.739  
Thus, where the provision exists but the indemnitor fails or neglects to abide by it, he not only 
loses this right to counsel appointment, but could also be liable in tort.740  Furthermore, the 
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indemnitor is estopped from contesting the reasonableness of the cost of defence, neither can he 
refuse to bear the burden of the economic consequences arising therefrom.741 
  
While the duty to defend allows the indemnitor to appoint the defence counsel, it usually requires 
the indemnitee’s consent to such appointment to be first sought and obtained, even though 
consent should not be unreasonably withheld.742   
(iii) ‘to release…’ has been approached by the UK courts as the mechanism with which parties 
desirous of settling a dispute reach agreement that terminates obligations inter se.743  It is the 
relinquishment of a right of action,744 and can also be achieved when a party covenants not to 
pursue a claim.745  A ‘release’ connotes finality, as the intention is to make a ‘clean break’ on the 
disputed issue, enabling the parties to part ways with no residual liability other than as agreed.746  
A release is usually expressed as being in ‘full and final settlement’ of the associated claims, and 
the parties are entitled to assume that no further litigation would ensue pursuant to the claims so 
covered.747  
  
In Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs,748 the court held that where 
a release is granted to a party, this release necessarily extends to his employees and agents in 
respect of the same subject-matter covered by the release.749   The court’s rationale is found in 
the thinking that if a party were allowed to proceed against an employee or agent in respect of 
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the same subject-matter, upon a finding of liability against the latter, they would still be entitled 
to be indemnified by the same principal who had settled the very same liability with the 
claimant.750  
 
Likewise, where the release is given in respect of a subject-matter in which liability can be 
imputed to more than one party, then the release given to one party is generally regarded as 
releasing all the parties in respect of that subject-matter.751  This is based on the common law 
rule to the effect that where a joint cause of action exists against two or more people, a release 
of one amounts to release of all.752 
   
For a release to be effective, it must be unequivocal and unconditional.  Where a condition is 
attached to the release, the courts will be unwilling to find that a release exists unless the 
condition has been performed.  In Deepak Fertilisers and Petrochemicals Corp Ltd v Davy 
McKee (London) Ltd,753 the court refused to enforce a release where it was unclear that the 
condition precedent had been fulfilled.  This requirement is consistent with the UK courts’ stance 
on the interpretation of indemnities and exclusion clauses, to the effect that they had to be 
express, clear and unambiguous.754  The rationale for this is found in the courts’ stance that it is 
implausible that a contract party will exculpate the other from liability, even when this is 
attributed to the latter’s negligence, unless this is expressed in very clear terms.  This is because, 
by releasing the other party, the releasor inevitably accepts to bear the economic consequences 
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of the occurrence of the event, either wholly or pro tanto,755 effectively re-allocating the risk in 
this regard. 
   
The attitude of UK courts to releases even for own negligence is captured succinctly in Biffa 
Waste Services Ltd and Another v Maschinenfabrik Ernst Hese Gmbh and Others,756 in which 
the court drew a distinction between the way that UK courts approach exclusion clauses and 
limitation of liability clauses.  The court said that the latter are construed less rigorously than the 
former, the rationale being that it is inherently improbable that a party’s intention was to release 
the other party from liability accruing from that other party’s negligence, but it is less improbable 
that he intended to limit it, utilising the applicable provision.757  This decision is consistent with 
the ratio in Canada Steamship758 and Ailsa Craig Fishing v Malvern Fishing Co.759 
 
In the USA, ‘release’ is defined as the surrendering of all rights and obligations between contract 
parties,760 and entails a releasor relinquishing his right of action and/or to compensation if a 
specified wrong is committed against him, either innocently or negligently.  A release differs 
from an indemnity, even though there has been some confusion with regards to both concepts.761  
For instance, it was thought that while a release extinguishes claims between the contract parties, 
to the exclusion of third-party claims, indemnities only apply to protect parties against third-
party claims.762  It is now clear that each concept is quite different and applies in different 
contexts.763  While a release operates as a total discharge of the released party in respect of the 
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target events,764 an indemnity exculpates a party from the economic consequences of the 
occurrence of the events, but does not bar the possibility of action by the indemnitee against the 
indemnitor.765 
  
It is settled law that indemnity provisions in general can apply even where the parties are 
negligent, provided this intention is clearly expressed.766  Indeed, Springer opines that, like the 
obligation to indemnify, the obligation to release is subject to the express negligence767 principle 
and, unless clearly expressed in the contract between the parties, a release will be 
unenforceable.768  Springer reaches this conclusion based on the assumption that the policy 
considerations that underpin both concepts are similar enough to justify the extrapolation of the 
principle to apply to releases just as it applies to indemnities.769  
  
However, as it relates to releases, a key issue is whether a release will be effective to bar an 
action against a party who has been grossly negligent.  Given the fact that UK jurisprudence does 
not make the distinction between negligence and gross negligence,770 this query is resolved by 
reference to the US courts.  In this regard, a review of the case law shows that courts have 
approached this issue differently.  While some courts have refused to enforce releases in the face 
of gross negligence or intentional acts,771 justified by public policy considerations,772 other courts 
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have upheld contracts releasing a party from his own gross negligence.773  In justifying the 
enforcement of releases in this circumstance, the courts have held that the notion of freedom of 
contract supports this stance – subject, however, to the application of both the contra 
proferentem and strictissmi juris principles.774 
 
This issue came up recently in the aftermath of the Macondo disaster.  In the Transocean/BP 
litigation,775 the court held that the release given by BP to Transocean even for gross negligence 
and strict liability will be enforceable in respect of third-party compensatory damages claims, 
but will be unenforceable in respect of punitive damages.776  In making this distinction between 
compensatory and punitive damages, the court was guided by the competing principles of 
freedom of contract and public policy.  The court acknowledged that the freedom of contract 
principle allowed the parties, who in this case, were of ‘roughly’ equal bargaining power,777 to 
agree to release each other from liability even for gross negligence, but public policy 
considerations will disallow the extension of this freedom to indemnify a party who is liable to 
pay punitive damages, as this will defeat the intention of the applicable statute that was 
breached.778  The court’s rationale was that punitive damages are meant to act as a deterrent by 
punishing egregious behaviour, and that the aim would be defeated if this burden could be 
avoided by contractual release.779 
 
The conclusion can then be reached that releases that exculpate liability in the face of gross 
negligence will be enforceable only after due consideration of the nature of the specific event or 
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breach and its likely consequences. Thus, where the event would ordinarily lead to the imposition 
of compensatory damages in the absence of a release, the courts would be willing to enforce the 
release.  This would be different if the likely outcome would have been the imposition of punitive 
damages, as public policy considerations will prevent enforcement. 
   
Given the fact that punitive damages are generally awarded in the US when statutes have 
prescribed this as the recompense for contravention of the applicable provisions,780 or in the face 
of egregious behaviour by a party which is not justly recompensed only by compensatory 
damages, parties can be guided accordingly in drafting their contracts.  This distinction between 
compensatory and punitive damages as likely consequences of parties’ action will undoubtedly 
feature in contracts, with the point being made that the latter will not trigger the release 
provisions. 
 
In the UK, even though gross negligence is not currently recognised as a separate head of 
liability, it is unlikely that the courts will adopt this distinction in adjudicating on releases, even 
in cases in which punitive damages are awarded as expressly authorised by statute.781 Where a 
contract party has breached a statutory provision, and seeks to avoid culpability by a contractual 
release, it is doubtful that the UK courts would make the distinction as marshalled in the 
Transocean/BP litigation.  In Persimmon Homes Ltd v Ove Arup and Partners Ltd,782 the court 
held that contractual releases will be enforced for breaches of statutory duty so long as the parties 
express that intent. If the contractual provisions are clear, then the courts will enforce that as 
being the agreed risk allocation method of the parties, and will not seek to curtail this by making 
the Transocean/BP litigation distinction.  Importantly, the court also stated that in interpreting 
the release clause, the role of the contra proferentem principle, which requires that ambiguities 
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be resolved against the contract party who proposed and sought to rely on the clause, has now 
been whittled down, especially between parties in equal bargaining position, as has been 
previously discussed.783  In effect, that principle is now more relevant in considering indemnities 
rather than exclusions and releases, and is a modification of the approach laid down in the 
Canada Steamship Lines Ltd v The King.784 
 
(iv) ‘to hold harmless …’ was once thought by the UK courts to be the obligation to prevent an 
indemnitee from suffering loss arising from specified events.  In this regard, the cause of action 
only arose against the indemnitor if the indemnitee suffered loss.785  This followed the common 
law understanding of a contract of indemnity, which permitted an action for unliquidated 
damages only when the indemnitee could demonstrate actual loss.786  Thus, ‘hold harmless’ was 
conceived as part of the definition of indemnity, having no independent meaning of its own, and 
was simply a promise to hold the indemnitee harmless against certain losses.  Indeed, the court 
in Golstein v Bishop787 seemed to tow this line when it drew this distinction: 
‘…an obligation to indemnify a person against a loss (for instance, an insurer’s obligation to his 
insured) is a very different creature from an obligation to “indemnify” (that is to say, keep 
harmless) for an amount…where the person indemnified has never suffered a loss in the sense 
relevant to the sort of indemnity considered…’.788 
 
Clearly, the court saw ‘hold harmless’ through the prism of an ‘indemnity’, however, while 
indemnity simpliciter operates before the loss is incurred, and so was the same thing as ‘hold 
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harmless’, indemnifying against a loss operates after the loss is incurred, and is effectively a 
compensation to, or restoration of, the indemnitee. 
 
The UK Supreme Court saw things differently in Farstad Supply AS v Enviroco Ltd789 – a case 
that holds great significance for this study.  At first instance, Lord Hodge stated that ‘defend, 
indemnify and hold harmless’ transcended indemnity simpliciter: it was not just the obligation 
to recompense, but had the effect of renouncing the right to claim any damages from the 
indemnitee.790  In Lord Hodge’s opinion, given the exculpatory nature of the clause, the only way 
for an indemnitor to protect himself from liability was to take steps to guard against it – for 
instance by insurance.791  The Supreme Court agreed, and even though it acknowledged that the 
expression ‘defend, indemnify and hold harmless’ has been traditionally conceived as meaning 
compensation of one party for losses suffered, averred that it is wide enough to be used by a 
contract party as a defence to claims made by another contract party on the one hand, and to 
serve as an indemnity in respect of third-party claims, on the other hand.792 
 
Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that ‘defend, indemnify and hold harmless’ could be 
regarded as an ‘indemnity’ simpliciter when it operated to determine responsibility for ‘third 
party exposure’, and as an ‘exclusion’ clause when it operated in circumstances of ‘direct 
exposure to the other contracting party’.793  In effect, the court found that shielding an indemnitee 
from exposure was different from merely indemnifying him, and that this is the effect that ‘hold 
harmless’ has when it is used in a contract. 
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The ruling by the UK Supreme Court represents a shift in the understanding of how indemnities 
work because, for the first time, they can now also be considered as exclusion clauses.  The 
immediate implication of this is the potential that these clauses may now trigger the application 
of the Unfair Contracts Terms Act 1977 (UCTA).  This legislation establishes an anti-indemnity 
regime by prohibiting the limitation or exclusion of liability for death or personal injury arising 
from negligence,794 and subjects a limitation or exclusion clause for any other type of 
loss/damage arising from negligence to the reasonableness test.795  Given that this is the very type 
of liability that indemnity clauses in oil and gas contracts seek to regulate via risk allocation, the 
likelihood that they may be subjected to the restrictions and conditions in the UCTA is high.  The 
rationale for this statement is explained below. 
However, there is a view that the UCTA’s application may not have the damning effect 
postulated, especially as it concerns personal injury, as ‘neither contracting party will have 
corporeal bodies to injure …’.796  From this perspective, episodes of personal injury will not 
qualify as ‘direct exposure to the other contracting party’, and so will not be considered as an 
exclusion clause, thereby negating the trigger of the UCTA’s application.  This study questions 
this submission, as there is no indication from the Supreme Court’s ruling that ‘direct exposure 
to the other contracting party’ should be interpreted in such a restrictive manner.  Indemnities 
and exclusion clauses, by their very nature, seek to allocate risk, inter alia, for death, personal 
injury or property damage.  This means that the sufferers of the events can sometimes be human 
entities – especially with respect to death and personal injury – and not corporate entities, even 
though the protection is given at the corporate level to the contracting entity.  Besides, it is settled 
law that, even though a company has corporate personality and is separate and distinct from its 
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shareholders, directors, officers, and employees,797 it must still carry out its business through 
human agents.798  Indeed, it is always the death or injury of the employee or officer of the 
company that forms the basis of the action to establish liability and determine risk allocation, 
just as it is the same acts of the employee that give rise to vicarious liability.  It is, therefore, not 
unthinkable that an interpretation of “direct exposure to the other contracting party” may refer 
to the human agents of the contracting party, and not the corporate entity. 
   
If the above scenario occurs, then it is possible that the potential application and impact of the 
UCTA will be more real and probable, with the attendant consequence of excluding liability for 
own negligence in the indemnity structures of most offshore oil and gas contracts, including 
offshore drilling contracts.  Judicial pronouncement on this issue is required to give clarity to the 
status of exclusion clauses in drilling contracts vis-à-vis the extent and reach of the UCTA 1977.  
This clarity will end the speculation on this subject, evidenced by the different opinions thereto, 
and infuse certainty in transactions, which in turn enhances the quality of commercial 
engagements between the parties. 
 
 From a US perspective, to ‘hold harmless’ is to take responsibility for all expenses necessary 
for the defence of a claim, and wholly to recompense a party for what he has lost or expended.799  
The understanding of this concept has not been without controversy, as courts have approached 
it differently.  In Mays v Pierce,800 the court held that ‘hold harmless’ was identical to a release, 
but this approach has been disputed and disapproved by other courts.801  Indeed, the court held, 
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in MG Bldg Materials, Ltd v Moses Lopez Custom Homes, Inc, that ‘hold harmless’ was not a 
release, but was akin to the duty to indemnify.802 
   
In likening the obligation to hold harmless to the duty to indemnify, courts in Canada have held 
that “hold harmless” is basically the duty to indemnify from liability, which encompasses an 
obligation to pay in advance, monies to cover expenses and costs for a specified liability to the 
relevant indemnitee, as soon as the amount is determined, effectively saving the indemnitee from 
paying for same, and then seeking re-imbursement by the indemnitor.803  In adopting this 
approach, the courts here are essentially distinguishing an indemnitor’s responsibility to protect 
the indemnitee from liability or just from damages.  Thus, ‘hold harmless’ in respect of damages 
will recompense the indemnitee for any imposed damages, fines, costs and the like only after he 
has paid the charge804.  In respect of liability, ‘hold harmless’ implies that the indemnitee is 
entitled to protection from even incurring the liability, the latter becoming payable by, and 
enforceable against the indemnitor as soon as the exposure crystallises.805 
  
In Canada, the courts have provided some clarity on the distinction between hold harmless and 
save harmless, which had caused some confusion within that jurisdiction.  It was initially thought 
that these two terms had different implications, but the courts have clarified that these mean the 
same thing and can be used interchangeably.806  Thus, it is clear that the real confusion is between 
the obligation to hold harmless and the duty to indemnify.  Canadian jurisprudence has not quite 
delineated the boundaries between both concepts; indeed, commentators have questioned the 
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additional obligation that hold harmless imposes, and as to whether this is only limited to 
protecting the indemnitee from the burden of defence costs.807  Given this uncertainty, they advise 
potential indemnitors to avoid using this expression until there is greater clarity in this area of 
law.808  
 
This uncertainty has caused some commentators to call for the total excision of the verbiage from 
contracts.  Adams opines that the use of the phrase ‘hold harmless’ is both redundant and 
pernicious and proposes drafting verbiage that just says ‘indemnify’.809 
   
It is doubtful that Adams’ opinion will be given serious attention by contract parties given the 
fact that the distinction between the duty to indemnify and the obligation to hold harmless has 
been accepted by courts in the UK and the USA, and so represents the current state of legal 
jurisprudence in these jurisdictions.  Although there are still debates about the meaning, scope 
and extent of this distinction,810 a contract party might be doing himself a disservice if these 
provisions are not reflected in their contract, especially if the objective is indeed to ensure the 
assumption of responsibility for the overarching liability of the indemnitee as against just the 
damages, in which case compensation will always happen after the fact. 
(b) ‘ … arising from, relating to or in connection with the performance or non-
performance of the CONTRACT’  
                                                 
807 Kangles, N., Rogers, R. B., Allidina, Z. and Harris, C. (2011) ‘Risk Allocation Provisions in Energy Industry 
Agreements: Are We Getting It Right?’, Alta. L. Rev., 49, pp. 339 – 367, at p. 352. 
808 Ibid, at p. 367. 
809 Adams, K. (2012) ‘Revisiting “Indemnify”’, Adams on Contract Drafting. Available at: 
http://www.adamsdrafting.com/revisiting-indemnify/ accessed 20 February 2017. 
810 For instance, the argument that Gordon makes on whether the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Farstad Supply 
AS v Enviroco Ltd will not trigger the application of the reasonableness test in line with the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act 1977, since the court stated that indemnity and hold harmless clauses can sometimes operate as exclusion of 
liability clauses: Gordon, G. (2011) ‘Risk Allocation in Oil and Gas Contracts (Chapter 14)’, in Gordon, G., 
Paterson, J. and Usenmez, E. (eds) Oil and Gas Law: Current Practice and Emerging Trends. Dundee: Dundee 






For indemnities to apply, the death, injury or loss must have occurred in circumstances that can 
be attributed to the activities carried on within the contract.  The words with which this 
relationship between the infraction and the contract are expressed is a matter of choice for the 
contract parties, however, they must be clear and wide enough to capture the essence of 
condition-precedent to the triggering of the indemnity.  In Smith v South Wales Switchgear,811 
the court stated that the expression ‘arising out of, or in the course of, or by the execution of this 
order’ could only be interpreted as meaning the actual doing of the work authorised by the 
order.812  In line with this interpretation, the court denied indemnity cover to the indemnitee based 
on the rationale that the obligation to indemnify had to be linked with the actual work required 
to be carried out – that is, the scope of work, and not just to the other contract activities.813   
However, this ratio was distinguished in Shaun Campbell v Conoco (UK) Ltd, Amec Process 
and Energy Limited, Salamis SGB Ltd,814 in which the court held that the decision in South Wales 
Switchgear turned on its own facts and depended on its own context and provisions.815  In 
considering the meaning of ‘ … arising from, relating to or in connection with the performance 
or non-performance of the contract’, it was argued by the indemnitor that the expression ‘in 
connection with’ narrowed the interpretation of the whole provision.  The indemnitor opined that 
this expression required a nexus to be established between the injury that ensued and the actual 
work to be done under the contract, just like it had been decided in South Wales Switchgear.816  
The indemnitor contended that the use of ‘in connection with’, together with the wider 
expression ‘regardless of the cause or the reason therefore …’ served to narrow the liability 
giving rise to indemnity to the actual performance of the scope of work of the contract.817 
                                                 
811 (1978) 1 WLR 165. 
812 Ibid, at 169 and 173. 
813 Ibid, at 169. 
814 (2002) EWCA Civ 704. 
815 Ibid, at para 26. 
816 Ibid, at para 10. 






   
The court rejected this argument, stating that there was no justification for the ‘strained or 
artificially restrictive interpretation’ on ‘ … arising from, relating to or in connection with the 
performance or non-performance of the contract’, as the latter sentence is wide enough and 
sufficient to establish the relationship between the injury and the liability.818  In support of this 
position, the court referred to the ratio in EE Caledonia Ltd v Orbit Valve Co Europe Plc,819 in 
which the court held that an employee who was on board the Piper Alpha platform, but was 
asleep when the explosion in which he lost his life occurred, was within the contemplation of the 
clause ‘resulting from or in any way connected with the performance of this order’, and so was 
qualified to be indemnified.820  That court also criticised the decision in South Wales Switchgear 
as being too restrictive, stating that the entire clause had to be given its natural meaning, which 
in the specific context being considered did not lead to any absurdity or exposure to unreasonable 
liability.821 
 
In interpreting this part of the indemnity clause, the courts have, again, affirmed the emphasis 
on the clarity of the language of the contract in discerning the intent of the parties.  Just like the 
principles guiding the interpretation of indemnities and exclusion clauses, the courts would 
normally construe them narrowly especially when the language is clear and the interpretation 
would not lead to absurdity or defeat the business efficacy of the contract.822  However, very 
recently, in Impact Funding Solutions Ltd v AIG Europe Insurance Ltd (formerly Chartis 
Insurance UK Ltd),823 the UK Supreme Court clarified that this narrow interpretation of 
                                                 
818 Ibid, at para 18. 
819 (1995) 1 All ER 174. 
820 Shaun Campbell v Conoco (UK) Ltd, Amec Process and Energy Ltd, Salamis SGB Limited (2002) EWCA Civ 
704, at para 26. 
821 EE Caledonia Ltd v Orbit Valve Co Europe Plc (1995) 1 All ER 174, at paras 233H–234E. 
822 Tektrol Ltd (formerly Atto Power Controls Ltd) v International Insurance Co of Hanover Ltd (2006) 1 All ER 
(Comm) 780. 






indemnity and exclusion clauses would only apply to clauses ‘excluding or limiting a legal 
liability arising by operation of law’, for instance excluding liability for own negligence or when 
the law implies the existence of a contract, otherwise, the clause would be interpreted in the 
context of all the relevant terms of the contract.824  Thus, it would be correct to conclude that the 
clause ‘ … arising from, relating to or in connection with the performance or non-performance 
of the contract’ will continue to be interpreted within its wider context as enunciated by the court 
in Shaun Campbell. 
(c) ‘ … loss of or damage to the property of any third party …caused by negligence or 
breach of duty (whether statutory or otherwise)’ 
Blackacre would typically enter into several contracts to prosecute the drilling campaign, as 
different skills set and equipment are required at different stages of the programme.  This would 
inevitably involve many people working on the rig simultaneously and at different times too.  To 
protect themselves, Blackacre indemnifies Whiteacre, and holds them harmless in respect of 
death, personal injury or property damage to their (Blackacre’s) employees, and Whiteacre 
reciprocates this gesture by providing the same indemnities to Blackacre in respect of their 
(Whiteacre) own employees and subcontractors at all levels.825  This indemnity structure is 
explained in detail in the next section, but suffice it to say that an indemnity scheme exists which 
extends the indemnity cover to each contract party’s affiliates, parents, subsidiaries, 
subcontractors, officers, directors, shareholders and employees.826  These classes of people 
respectively form the Company Group and Contractor Group.827 
   
                                                 
824 Ibid, at p.79, para 7. 
825 Gordon calls this the anterior contract - Gordon, G. (2011) ‘Risk Allocation in Oil and Gas Contracts (Chapter 
14)’, in Gordon, G., Paterson, J. and Usenmez, E. (eds) Oil and Gas Law: Current Practice and Emerging Trends. 
Dundee: Dundee University Press, pp. 443–497, at p. 456. 
826 Moomjian, C. A. (1999) ‘Contractual Insurance and Risk Allocation in the Offshore Drilling Industry’, Drilling 
Contractor, January/February at p. 20. 






Third parties are not part of the Company Group or Contractor Group, even though it is 
recognised that the activities under the contract could impact them negatively.  Again, for these 
purposes, there are two classes of third parties.  As previously discussed in the bedrock section, 
the first class is made up of visitors and the trespassers, the former being legitimately invited to 
the oilfield by Blackacre, and could be contractors,828 invitees829 or licensees,830 while the latter – 
a trespasser – was an unwanted intruder, or an invitee who had overstayed his welcome. 
  
Although contractors should be part of the indemnity structure alluded to above, sometimes, the 
terms of the contract between Whiteacre and their subcontractor who are lower down the 
contractual chain do not go far enough.  Even if they did, and all the contracts embody identical 
indemnity provisions, the contractor employees are still ‘third parties’ from the perspective of 
the other contractors, and theoretically, nothing stops them from suing the errant contractor or 
Blackacre when harm ensues.  The only recourse here for Blackacre is that they can call on the 
indemnity structure with Whiteacre or the employee’s employer to indemnify them (Blackacre) 
of the cost of settling the action brought by the harmed employee.  To avoid this circularity, the 
employee’s employer absorbs the cost in line with the indemnity structure.  Furthermore, the 
parties could also define ‘third party’ in their contract as any party who is neither a member of 
company group or contractor group, making it clear that the remedy of an injured employee will 
be situated within the indemnity structure. 
 
The second group of third parties are innocent bystanders or passers-by who are close enough to 
the contract activity locus as to be impacted by it.  Protection of these third-party interests is 
                                                 
828 A person with whom the occupier had a contractual relationship, and who entered the premises pursuant to, or 
in connection with, the performance of the contract. 
829 A person with whom the occupier had a mutual business or interest, and who is on the premises in pursuance of 
that interest. 







founded on the law of tort and is justified by the duty of care which is owed to persons.831  The 
issue then is, who bears the responsibility for the economic consequences of the occurrence of 
any event which causes harm to this group of people, and to what extent? 
 
As stated in Chapter 3, liability was based on negligence, in general, more specifically on the 
rule in Rylands v Fletcher,832 and usually allocated based on the traditional fault regime.  Parties 
who have caused the harm to ensue would typically bear the responsibility for the economic 
consequences of the occurrence the harm, and indemnify the other party for the ensuing harm 
accordingly.833  The fault would usually lie where it fell, and the default risk allocation by law 
will not be altered.  Given the fact that Whiteacre remain responsible for the consequences of 
their own negligence as far as liability to third parties is concerned, they can mitigate their 
exposure by limiting it, either to the amount of monies paid under the contract or the limit of the 
cover provided by insurance.834  In this regard, the contract can then provide that any excess 
above the specified limits would be covered by Blackacre.  As always, this intent would have to 
be clearly stated, without any ambiguity otherwise the courts will not enforce it, as the clause 
would be interpreted narrowly.835  In WesternGeco Ltd v ATP Oil & Gas (UK) Ltd,836 the court 
declined to enforce a clause that provided that the claimant’s ‘liability under this contract’ was 
limited to the total aggregate of the monies received by them under the contract and required the 
defendant to pay the excess over and above that.  As discussed earlier, the court’s rationale was 
that the wording of the relevant provision in the contract did not quite convey that intent, and the 
                                                 
831 This is based on the ‘neighbour principle’ formulated in Donoghue v Stevenson (1932) AC 562. 
832 (1865) 3 H. & C. 774 (Court of Exchequer). 
833 Moomjian, C. A. (1999) ‘Contractual Insurance and Risk Allocation in the Offshore Drilling Industry’, Drilling 
Contractor, March/April at p. 14. 
834 Ibid, at p.15. 
835 Impact Funding Solutions Ltd v AIG Europe Insurance Ltd (formerly Chartis Insurance UK Ltd) (2017) A.C. 
73. 






circumstances of the subject loss were such that it was disputable that it was a ‘liability under 
this contract’.837 
 
The fault-based risk allocation regime in which the wrongdoer bears the responsibility for the 
economic consequences of the harm caused to third parties seems like a fair way of resolving 
third party liabilities, unless it has been alleged that both parties contributed to the negligence 
that caused the harm.  In this regard, it becomes onerous and time consuming to determine, first 
the culpability of each party, and then the degree of negligence of either party, as well as the 
associated contribution required.  It was for this very reason, to avoid the tedium associated with 
this fault-finding exercise, that contract parties chose to allocate risk on a knock-for-knock basis, 
so the process of determining contributory negligence in this circumstance totally defeats the 
mutual indemnity risk allocation regime. 
 
Even though there is nothing that prevents the parties from deviating from the traditional liability 
regime in respect of third parties, and actually allocate responsibility for third-party liabilities to 
one party or the other, the crucial issue is whether the third party can enforce the clause detailing 
that allocation.  Where applicable, this category of people may rely on the common law principle 
of jus quaesitum tertio to the effect that a third-party beneficiary to a contract may be able to sue 
on it and enforce that interest.  This is contrary to the doctrine of privity of contracts which states 
that only parties to a contract may sue and be sued on it.  In the UK, they are also afforded 
statutory protection under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999; even though the 
protection is limited by qualifications that may nullify the real effect of the reprieve supposedly 
granted.  This issue is more fully discussed in the section on the Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) Act 1999. 
                                                 






(d) ‘ … All exclusions and indemnities …shall apply irrespective of cause and 
notwithstanding the negligence or breach of duty (whether statutory or otherwise) of the 
indemnified party or any other entity or party and shall apply irrespective of any claim in 
tort, under contract or otherwise at law’ 
The philosophical basis for the departure from the fault-based risk allocation regime in which 
the wrongdoer bears the economic consequences of the occurrence of his wrongful act in contract 
needs to be restated.  The complexity and high risk of the extractive industries in general, and 
offshore drilling in particular, make it inevitable that different skills set and equipment from 
different people would be required and deployed during a drilling campaign.  This complexity 
is worsened when scarce resources, including time and money, are expended on litigation and 
investigations designed to determine cause, negligence and culpability which then aid in 
identifying the wrongdoer, and allocating the responsibility of bearing the economic 
consequences of the wrongful act accordingly.838  Furthermore, the fault-based risk allocation 
regime leaves parties practically insuring for all sorts of eventualities, because they do not know 
which risk is going to eventuate due to their negligence or other cause, with the attendant cost of 
insurance premia, which is ultimately internalised in the contract price, escalating it 
unnecessarily.839 
   
With the increased complexities and risks in drilling contracts, parties have had to focus on 
mechanisms for allocating risks in a simplified manner that achieves their individual contract 
objectives, while ensuring that specific risks are known to, and assumed by, parties best suited 
to manage them, all relevant factors considered.  Essentially, this entailed changing the default 
risk allocation method that bears the fault element, in preference for one in which fault, 
                                                 
838 Aubin, Y. and Portwood, T. (2001) ‘Mutual Indemnity and Hold Harmless Agreements’, International Business 
Law Journal, pp. 671– 698, at p. 676. 






howsoever occasioned, was irrelevant.  This meant that parties could still be indemnified and 
held harmless even if they had been negligent as a result of which the other party suffers harm.  
Provided that this intent is clearly and unambiguously expressed by the parties, the courts will 
uphold and enforce indemnification for own negligence.840 
   
Courts, have however, tried to draw distinctions between ‘negligence’, ‘gross negligence’ and 
‘wilful misconduct’, trying to narrow the scope of the liability regime instituted by contract 
parties.  Unlike the US system, UK jurisprudence does not generally categorise negligence into 
different degrees in line with perceived seriousness of the ensuing harm. Although there have 
been debates as to whether it should,841 the current state of the law is that the distinction between 
negligence and gross negligence is sterile and semantic842 (emphasis added).  However, another 
school of jurisprudence that seeks to give meaning to ‘gross’ seems to be emerging in the UK.  
In Camarata Property Inc v Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Ltd,843 Mr. Justice Andrew Smith 
rejected an argument that there was no distinction between ‘negligence’ and ‘gross negligence’, 
stating that the relevant enquiry was not whether the latter was known to English law, but what 
the parties intended it to mean.844  Even though he accepted that the distinction between the terms 
is one of degree and not of kind, he opined that the parties must have intended it to mean 
something ‘more fundamental than failure to exercise proper skill and/or care constituting 
negligence’.845  On this basis, and in line with the ‘conventional English law principles of 
                                                 
840 EE Caledonia Ltd v Orbit Valve Co Europe Plc (1995) 1 All ER 174.  See also Moomjian, C. A. Jnr. (1999) 
‘Contractual Insurance and Risk Allocation in the Offshore Drilling Industry’, Drilling Contractor, May/June, at p. 
26 where he stated that the clear expression of indemnification for own negligence is called ‘Talismanic language’ 
or ‘magic words’ that enable the indemnity to be enforced. 
841 See, for instance, Tradigrain SA v Internek Testing Services, [2007] EWCA Civ 154 at para 23, Moore-Bick LJ 
observed that ‘The term “gross negligence”, although often found in commercial documents, has never been 
accepted by English civil law as a concept distinct from civil negligence…’. However, Deakin et al have questioned 
the lack of distinction between the two concepts, especially where a defendant’s conduct is ‘not just bad, but 
repeatedly bad’: Deakin, S., Johnston, A. and Markesinis, B. (2012) Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law. Oxford 
University Press, at p. 27. 
842 Per Lord Justice Aikens in Springwell v JP Morgan (2010) EWCA Civ 1221 at para 193. 
843 (2011) EWHC 479. 
844 Ibid, at para 161. 






construction’, the court required the claimant to demonstrate more than mere negligence on the 
part of the defendant before liability could be established.846 
 
Wilful misconduct also has the effect of risk allocation (or re-allocation) when it is established 
to have occurred.  In Forder v Great Western Railway Co, this term was held to be the intentional 
wrongdoing by a party who knowingly does it and persists in doing this without any thought or 
care as to consequences.847  However, contract parties can choose to indemnify and hold harmless 
any party who is allegedly liable for wilful misconduct.  Again, this intent needs to be clearly 
expressed in their contract.848  In some offshore drilling contracts, where wilful misconduct is 
established, it could make Blackacre or Whiteacre vicariously liable for the acts of their senior 
supervisory personnel.849  These circumstances have been discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
Although Cameron argues that this traditional risk allocation mechanism is now being 
challenged post-Macondo,850 this study respectfully disagrees as there is no evidence that any 
such change to the risk allocation regime has occurred, neither has any viable alternative which 
is acceptable to all parties been proposed.  He further states that, as operator, Blackacre are on 
the frontline; they interfaced with government regulators to obtain the relevant permits, were 
particularly favoured by the risk – reward balance in the project, evidenced by the structure of 
the contract, obviously with deeper pockets and so were the party best able to bear the economic 
consequences of the occurrence of a catastrophic event.851   These apparent advantages over 
Whiteacre have, however, not prevented Blackacre from seeking to allocate the responsibility 
for bearing the economic consequences of the occurrence of a catastrophic event to Whiteacre, 
                                                 
846 Ibid, at para 162. 
847 (1905) 2 KB 532, at 535–536. 
848 De Beers UK Ltd v Atos Origin IT Services (2010) EWHC (TCC). 
849 See, for instance, Art 4.6, AIPN Model International Operating Agreement 2002.  
850 Cameron, P. D. (2012) ‘Liability for Catastrophic Risk in the Oil and Gas Industry’, International Energy Law 
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as was the situation in the Macondo case. Here, BP sought not only to enquire into the cause of 
the pollution, but also to impose liability on Transocean and Halliburton in circumstances in 
which conventional indemnities-based risk-allocation methods would have presumed that BP 
would assume liability.852 
 
The foregoing makes it imperative that contract parties must take steps to express their intent 
more clearly and unequivocally in their contract.  Indeed, some commentators take the view that 
there seems to be evidence of ‘judicial hostility’ to the enforcement of indemnity and exemption 
clauses, prompting the call for contract parties to consider spelling out every possible head of 
liability which they seek to indemnify and exclude from culpability, including ‘recklessness and 
wilful default’.853  This is aside from the conventional exclusions of own negligence, breach of 
contract and/or statutory duty.  Although the advice may seem pedestrian, it remains at the heart 
of the approach that the courts have consistently taken in interpreting and enforcing indemnity 
and exemption clauses. 
 
4.1.2 Indemnities and Mutual Hold Harmless 
 
The exploration and production of hydrocarbons from the North Sea in the 1960s witnessed the 
incorporation of the mutual indemnity structure from insurance contracts into the drilling 
contract.  Also known as knock for knock or mutual hold harmless,854 it meant that each contract 
                                                 
852 Ibid, at p. 210. 
853 Warne, P. and Westbrook, B. (1994) ‘Indemnity Clauses: Need for Clear Wording’, International Insurance Law 
Review, 2(8), pp. 129–131, at p. 131. 
854 There seems to be some confusion as to the origins of the knock-for-knock principle, even though there is 
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companies had to resort to a no-fault regime in which everyone bore their own losses.  The insurance companies 
not only dispensed with the need for laborious investigations, but also waived their right to recourse against the 
insurance companies of the liable vessels. The second version rehashes the same reasons as given herein, but in 






party agreed to indemnify the other in respect of liabilities arising from injuries – including death 
and disease – to their own personnel, and loss of or damage to their own property, including own 
consequential losses, but excluding losses and claims from third parties.855  Compared with the 
unilateral indemnity offered only by Blackacre to Whiteacre, the mutual indemnity structure 
presents a platform through which parties could distribute liability efficiently.856  In this context, 
efficiency stems from the fact that both parties reduce transactional costs by obtaining optimum 
insurance against their own specific risks, can better evaluate their risk profile and, by extension, 
optimise their total capital outlay.  Efficiency is also achieved because of the mutual allocation 
of risks to parties who are best able to manage them.857  
Although the knock-for-knock indemnity structure is produced by contract parties, it has been 
judicially noticed by the courts within the context of offshore drilling contracts.  In Caledonia 
North Sea Ltd v London Bridge Engineering Ltd,858 the court accepted this as industry practice 
which was known to, and accepted by, the courts.859  In justifying this position, the court 
approached the mutual indemnity structure, not just as a risk allocation mechanism, but also as 
a tool through which the real intentions of the contract parties could be discerned, and upheld, 
especially when the wording of the indemnity provisions is clear and unambiguous.860 
 
Given the large number of services and associated contractors required to prosecute a drilling 
campaign, the mutual indemnity between Blackacre and Whiteacre is not far reaching enough to 
                                                 
outstripped whatever benefits that process produced, and that the reduced cost of insurance attendant upon the 
elimination of multiple covers for the same risks, was a more worthwhile, sensible and cost-effective option.        
855 Andrade, M. M. (2011) ‘Knock for Knock Indemnities: Contract Practices and Enforceability Issues’, Oil, Gas 
& Energy Law Intelligence, 9(6), at p. 4. 
856 Ibid, at p. 3. 
857 Hearn, B., ‘The Canadian Institute’s Legal & Business Guide to Public Procurement’, (2004) Allocating and 
Managing Procurement Risks Toronto, Canada: McMillan Binch LLP, at p. 32. 
858 (2002) UKHL4; (2002) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 553, HL.  This was one of the cases that arose in the aftermath of the 6 
July 1988 catastrophe in the North Sea in which an oil and gas platform, Piper Alpha, was impacted by explosion 
that led to the death of 167 people.    
859 Ibid, at para. 10. 
860 Ibid, at para. 43. See also Smit International (Deutschland) v GmbH Josef Mobius (2001) CLC 1545, in which 






ensure adequate cover of all the eventualities that could occur on the oilfield.  In effect, the 
primary contract parties could still be left bearing the residual economic consequences of the 
occurrence of events occasioned by their subcontractors or other invitees to the oilfield.  In the 
absence of an indemnity structure that traverses the entire service chain, the mutual indemnity 
between Blackacre and Whiteacre defeats the very purpose for which it was structured.  This is 
why the ‘inurement’ provision was introduced, which extends the indemnity cover to each 
contract party’s affiliates, parents, subsidiaries, subcontractors, officers, directors, shareholders 
and employees.861  These classes of people respectively form the Company Group and Contractor 
Group862 and, although they are not contract parties, they are entitled to the same indemnity 
benefit as the contract parties.  Indeed, the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 enables 
them to enforce this benefit as named beneficiaries in the contract.  A full discourse on this 
legislation is detailed in the following sections in this chapter. 
 
Despite the enlargement of the class of protected persons, there was still a gap in the indemnity 
cover, as the contract parties may still be exposed to liability arising from acts of subcontractors 
down the service chain on both sides, given the fact that there is no privity between the 
contractors.  The industry mutual hold harmless (IMMH) scheme was developed to address this 
challenge in respect of venturers in the UK Continental Shelf.  This scheme, which was 
developed by LOGIC,863  created the basis for back-to-back indemnities, and was based on a 
Deed of Adherence to which contractors in the offshore oil sector signed up.864 
   
                                                 
861 Moomjian, C. A. Jnr. (1999) ‘Contractual Insurance and Risk Allocation in the Offshore Drilling Industry’, 
Drilling Contractor, January/February at p. 20. 
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This Deed creates a contractual nexus between the contractors, and suffices to extend the 
indemnity structure between and among themselves, by which they respectively agree to be 
responsible for liabilities arising from injuries – including death and disease – to their own 
personnel, and loss of, or damage to, their own property, including own consequential losses, 
and extends this to the classes of people who form their respective Contractor Groups.  The 
Deed applies only to personal injury, property loss or damage and consequential losses.  Risks 
such as pollution are not covered even though they were considered, but were excluded as they 
were thought to be less quantifiable and potentially complicated.  The focus on property, 
personnel and consequential loss is based on the thinking that a signatory is best positioned to 
evaluate applicable risks and arrange requisite insurance as required.  
 
The IMHH covered only offshore activities, and onshore activities were excluded, as the framers 
posited that extending cover to onshore activities could potentially lead to situations in which it 
would apply to unintended circumstances (such as motor vehicle accidents), thereby creating 
avoidable ambiguity.865  Thus, where a signatory had a project with both onshore and offshore 
components, the IMMH only applied to all signatories engaged in the latter.  However, nothing 
prevented two or more signatories from entering into a separate mutual hold harmless agreement 
to cover onshore risks. 
 
How the deed works in practice is instructive.  Blackacre and Whiteacre enter into a drilling 
contract in which Blackacre indemnifies Whiteacre, and holds them harmless in respect of death, 
personal injury or property damage to their (Blackacre) employees, and Whiteacre provides the 
same assurances to Blackacre in respect of their (Whiteacre) own employees and subcontractors 
                                                 






at all levels.866  In this regard, both parties assume responsibility for the economic consequences 
of any losses arising from the specified events, to the classes of people mentioned in the 
indemnity clause. 
  
 Similarly, where Whiteacre then enters into a contract with their subcontractor, both parties also 
agree to indemnify and hold harmless each other in respect of their respective personnel; in 
addition, Whiteacre also assumes the risk in respect of Blackacre’s personnel, while the 
subcontractor agrees to be responsible for the losses incurred by their own subcontractors, that 
is, Whiteacre’s sub-subcontractors, at all levels.867  When the indemnity given by the 
subcontractor to Whiteacre is placed in context, it has the effect of moderating the indemnity 
that Whiteacre gave to Blackacre, effectively restricting Whiteacre’s liability to losses incurred 
by their own employees.  This is brought about by the fact that Blackacre’s contract with 
Whiteacre already recites that both parties will be responsible for the members of their respective 
Groups, and so if Whiteacre’s contractor gives Whiteacre the same indemnity which recites that 
both parties – Whiteacre and contractor – will be responsible for the members of their respective 
Groups, this effectively means that each party – Blackacre, Whiteacre and contractor – will bear 
the economic consequences of the occurrence of any adverse event to members of their 
respective Groups.  Thus, even though Whiteacre had covenanted to Blackacre to be responsible 
for members of their Group, those members end up being responsible for themselves, thereby 
moderating the covenant made to Blackacre in the anterior contract.  
  
The contract between the subcontractor and the sub-subcontractor would entail both parties 
assuming the responsibility for their respective employees, with the subcontractor also assuming 
                                                 
866 Gordon calls this the ‘anterior’ contract: Gordon, G. (2011) 'Risk Allocation in Oil and Gas Contracts (Chapter 
14)', in Gordon, G., Paterson, J. and Usenmez, E. (eds.) Oil and Gas Law: Current Practice and Emerging Trends. 
Dundee: Dundee University Press, pp. 443-497, at p.456. 






those losses to Whiteacre and Blackacre, while the sub-subcontractor also assumes those of any 
subcontractors he may have.  The latter contract between the subcontractor and the sub-
subcontractor would achieve the same effect of moderating the indemnity that the subcontractor 
gave to Whiteacre, thereby restricting the subcontractor’s liability to losses incurred by his own 
employees, as explained above.  This is provided the fact that the subcontractor has secured an 
effective indemnity and hold harmless agreement from Whiteacre in respect of Whiteacre’s and 
Blackacre’s employees.  In this way, every party that is within this indemnity structure ends up 
being responsible only for their own personnel, which is the overarching aim of the mutual hold 
harmless concept. 
 
Currently, the IMMH is only subscribed by contractors as this is the target audience.  Since the 
contract between Blackacre and Whiteacre has the indemnity structure that recites Whiteacre’s 
responsibility for all tiers of their subcontractors, Whiteacre has an incentive to bring all their 
subcontractors within the indemnity structure by reference to the mutual hold harmless scheme, 
otherwise they – Whiteacre – would be responsible for those subcontractors at all tiers.  
Blackacre have already protected themselves through the indemnity structure in the anterior 
contract. 
 
 Contractors subscribed to the IMMH on a company basis, and not as part of a group structure, 
as this ensured that their subscriptions were not impacted by changes in the organisation or group 
structure.  The overarching benefit of the IMMH to contractors was evident where the specific 
contract that they may be working on did not extend indemnity cover to the other contractors 






scheme, they were protected to the very same extent as though the contract had provided the 
cover.868 
 
However, not all drilling contracts utilise the IMMH indemnity structure, with many resorting 
to the knock-for-knock indemnity structure in the first instance, and then requiring that the 
parties extract back-to-back indemnities from their subcontractors of all tiers.  The knock-for-
knock indemnity structure requires each contract party to bear the economic consequences of the 
occurrence of specified adverse events such as death of, or injury to, employees and contractors, 
as well as property loss or damage, regardless of fault, with each party also indemnifying the 
other party accordingly when these events impact their own property and/or personnel.869  The 
protection afforded by the indemnity structure typically transcends the primary contract parties, 
and extends to their employees, officers, directors, affiliates, contractors and subcontractors. 
 
The back-to-back indemnity structure that the contract parties are required to extract from their 
subcontractors of all tiers is supposed to mirror the provisions in the primary contract between 
Blackacre and Whiteacre.  In effect, the contracts entered into by Blackacre and Whiteacre with 
other contractors and subcontractors are supposed to have indemnity provisions identical to those 
contained in the primary contract.  Where this is done, it has the same effect as the IMMH, 
moderating the indemnity given by Blackacre and Whiteacre inter se, leaving each party, 
including the subcontractors and sub-subcontractors, to bear the economic consequences of the 
occurrence of the specified adverse events to their own personnel and property.            
4.1.3 Exclusion/Exemption Clause 
 
                                                 
868 Hewitt, T. (2008) ‘Who is to Blame? Allocating Liability in Upstream Project Contracts’, Journal of Energy & 
Natural Resources Law, 26(2), pp. 177–206, at p. 184. 
869 Saraceni, P. and Summers, N. (2016) ‘Reviewing Knock for Knock Indemnities: Risk Allocation in Maritime 






From the discussions on the bedrock and the foregoing sections, it is clear that parties were liable 
for every infraction committed, as the fault-based risk allocation regime dictated this approach.  
The indemnity structure examined above was developed by parties as a scheme that restored 
them to the status quo ante in respect of specific adverse events, in some cases after the event, 
but before the loss had been incurred – hold harmless – and, in other cases, after the loss had 
been incurred.  Thus, it recognised that liability was first ascribed to one party, but then allocated 
the responsibility for bearing the economic consequences of the occurrence of the adverse events 
to another party. 
   
However, there were circumstances in which Whiteacre did not want to incur any liability if 
certain events occurred.  It was apparent that the indemnity structure did not address this, as the 
structure functioned on the basis of imposed liability and re-allocation of risk.  Another response 
had to be developed by the parties to cater for situations where liability was wholly disclaimed, 
and this is why exclusion/exemption clauses were introduced into contracts. 
 
Exclusion/exemption clauses operate to exculpate a party from liability870 in respect of certain 
adverse events, and so have the effect of allocating risk from the party who seeks reliance on 
them, to another contract party.  In commercial contracts, exemption clauses usually exclude 
consequential losses, as well as losses resulting from wilful misconduct and gross negligence.  
The rationale for excluding recovery of damages for consequential losses can be traced to the 
rule in Hadley v. Baxendale.871  In considering circumstances in which damages could be 
awarded for losses suffered by a claimant, the court made a distinction between direct and 
indirect (consequential) losses, stating that a party can recover damages if they could be 
considered as arising naturally from an alleged breach, or if they could reasonably be presumed 
                                                 
870 See Farstad Supply AS v Enviroco Ltd and Asco UK Ltd (2010) UKSC 18. 






as being recoverable within the contemplation of the parties, at the time of contract.  Where the 
losses suffered did not satisfy either of these two conditions, they were categorised as indirect 
or consequential, and were not recoverable by a claimant.872 
 
Although there is unanimity of agreement that consequential losses fall within the second limb 
of the rule in Hadley v Baxendale, the actual determination of what is indirect or consequential 
loss has been more difficult to deal with.  For instance, the expression ‘loss of profit’ has often 
been regarded by the courts as a direct rather than an indirect loss.873  The rationale of the courts 
for this determination lies in the fact that the expression on its own is not automatically regarded 
as being indicative of consequential loss, but its function in the contract would turn on its 
interpretation within the particular context in which it is expressed.874   
 
Again, the use of terms such as ‘other’ and ‘including’ has been held to have a restrictive effect 
on the interpretation of an exclusion clause.  In University of Keele v Price Waterhouse,875 the 
court was tasked with the construction of the following clause: 
‘We accept liability to pay damages in respect of loss or damage suffered by you as a direct result 
of our providing the Services. All other liability is expressly excluded, in particular, 
consequential loss, failure to realise anticipated savings or benefits … ’.    
  
The court held that this clause failed to exclude the loss of tax savings, which it found to be 
direct rather than indirect. The court construed the term ‘other’ and stated that it was suggestive 
of the precedence accorded the first part of the clause by the contract parties, over the latter part.  
Thus, the latter part only excluded loss and damage not covered by the first part, in effect, only 
indirect losses.  The court held that the correct approach to construing a contract clause is to 
                                                 
872 See, for instance, Croudace Construction v Cawoods Concrete Products (1978) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 55 CA. 
873 See, for instance, Deepak Fertilisers and Petrochemical Corp Ltd v Davy McKee (London) Ltd (1999) 1 All ER 
(Comm) 69.  See also BHP v British Steel (2000) 2 LLR 277 (CA). 
874 See, for instance, Pegler Limited v Wang (UK) Limited (2000) BLR 218. 






consider it as a whole to determine whether separate limbs therein were capable of 
harmonisation.876  
 
Australian courts view consequential losses from a standpoint of reasonableness, stating that it 
should be interpreted as what an ordinary business person (emphasis added) will term as 
reasonable and recoverable.877 The resort to ‘reasonableness’ as a standard for determining 
whether a loss can be termed as consequential is certainly novel, but there is no evidence that 
this has ever been accepted by English courts as part of the jurisprudence on this subject. 
 
Generally, a contract party who negotiates an exclusion clause should be allowed to take the 
benefit of it,878 whether this is relative to another contract party or to a third party.879  This is the 
stance that the court took in Transocean Drilling UK Ltd v Providence Resources plc.880  In 
overruling the decision of the High Court,881 the Court of Appeal insisted that the consequential 
losses clause had to be given its natural and ordinary meaning, just like other clauses in the 
contract.  It further criticised the High Court’s narrow interpretation of the words in the exclusion 
clause, which sought to limit the ordinary meaning of words, and re-affirmed that the agreement 
of the parties will be upheld where the meaning of words is clear.882  A commentator has stated 
that the English courts are adopting a pragmatic approach and actually reaching their decisions 
based on foreseeability of the damage that ensued, whether they admit this or not.883 
                                                 
876 Ibid, at para 24. 
877 Environmental Systems Pty Ltd v Peerless Holdings Pty Ltd (2008) VSCA 26. 
878 Cane, P. (1991) Tort Law and Economic Interests. Clarendon Press, at p. 334. 
879 In this context, the term ‘third party’ is used to represent both classes referred to in the Introduction to this 
chapter, and includes third parties claiming certain benefit(s) under the contract, and those who have been impacted 
negatively by the activities of contract parties under the contract. 
880 (2016) EWCA Civ 372. 
881 Transocean Drilling UK Ltd v Providence Resources plc (2014) EWHC 4260 (Comm). 
882 Transocean Drilling UK Ltd v Providence Resources plc (2016) EWCA Civ 372, at paras 20–24.  The court also 
found that resort to the contra proferentem rule of construction is done only when the words used in the exemption 
clause are ambiguous.  Since the meaning of the words was clear in this instance, the court criticised the application 
of that rule of construction. 
883 Polkinghorne, M. (2012) ‘Exclusion Clauses: Navigating the Minefield’, Oil, Gas & Energy Law Journal 







From the Court of Appeal’s ruling, this study finds that ‘consequential loss’ is ultimately what 
the parties say it is, even though in most cases, parties fail to define this term.  This is especially 
so when the parties have equal bargaining power.  Indeed, if the parties define the heads of losses 
which are intended to be excluded in a consequential loss clause, the courts will uphold this, 
provided that the meaning of the words is clear, and the intention of the parties is manifest in the 
circumstances.  The freedom of the parties to determine this is further strengthened by the fact 
that, in addition to excluding whatever heads of losses they agree to, they can also specify the 
remedy applicable if any of the excluded losses occurs. 
  
In Scottish Power UK Plc v BP Exploration Operating Co Ltd and Others,884 the court upheld 
the sole remedy clause that the parties agreed would apply upon the occurrence of certain heads 
of losses contained in the exclusion clause.  Even though it found that the relevant loss was not 
excluded by the exclusion clause, it recognised the parties’ right to prescribe a remedy and, so 
long as the sole remedy clause proposed covers the exigency ‘excluded’ in the exclusion clause, 
the sole remedy will be enforced.885 
 
Excluding losses arising from wilful misconduct and gross negligence follows the same 
principles. The courts have demonstrated their willingness to uphold the intent to exclude 
liability arising from losses attributable to wilful misconduct and gross negligence once this is 
                                                 
884 (2015) EWHC 2658 (Comm).  The court followed the principle in Transocean Drilling UK Ltd v Providence 
Resources plc (2014) EWHC 4260 (Comm) at first instance to the effect that an exclusion clause will usually 
exclude secondary and remote losses, which both go beyond the normal or basic measure of loss, and which are not 
ordinarily expected to arise.  The court interpreted the exclusion clause narrowly and found that the exclusion clause 
did not, in fact, exclude the head of loss in contention (‘spread costs’), and found for Scottish Power on that point.  
It is doubtful whether this reasoning and decision will be upheld on appeal following the decision in Transocean 
Drilling UK Ltd v Providence Resources Plc (2016) EWCA Civ 372, even though the case was ultimately decided 
in favour of Scottish Power UK Plc.  See also Glencore Energy UK Ltd v Cirrus Oil Services Ltd (2014) EWHC 87 
(Comm). 
885 But contrast with the decision in ABRY Partners V, L.P. v F & W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1034 (Del. 
Ch. 2006) in which the court in Delaware, USA, refused to enforce a sole remedy (also called ‘exclusive remedy’) 






clearly expressed.886  Although gross negligence has not been accepted as part of English law,887 
the courts agree that, within the context of exclusion clauses, this term could mean ‘a serious 
disregard of, or indifference to, obvious risk’.888  It is typical in offshore drilling contracts for 
parties to exclude liability for losses arising from negligence but not from gross negligence.  It 
then becomes a matter of facts and circumstances to convince the court that the errant behaviour 
is gross negligence, which is not excluded, and not mere negligence which is excluded. 
 
It is important to highlight that exemption clauses can be subjected to the test of reasonableness. 
Thus, courts can enquire into the purpose of the exemption clauses vis-à-vis the purport of the 
contract and can find that the clauses are unreasonable in themselves or irrelevant to the purpose 
of the contract889 (emphasis added).  Again, if the contents of the exemption clause are too 
onerous to be enforced, the courts could refuse to do so on the basis of unreasonableness.890  
Although it has been suggested that the courts can also refuse to enforce an exemption clause on 
grounds of fairness,891 there is no evidence that this has ever been done in English courts. 
 
The discussion above reveals that the intention of the parties seems to be the overriding 
consideration in determining enforceability and efficacy of exclusion clauses.  Thus, upon the 
demonstration of clarity of meaning and certainty of intention, the courts have upheld exclusions, 
even when a party seems to be benefitting from his own infraction.892  Indeed, in this way, it is 
                                                 
886 Gillespie Bros Ltd v Roy Bowles Transport Ltd (1973) QB 400 at 419; Alderslade v Hendon Laundry (1945) KB 
189 at 192. 
887 See, for instance, Springwell v JP Morgan [2010] EWCA Civ 1221 at para 193. 
888 Camarata Property Inc v Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Ltd (2011) EWHC 479 (Comm) at 161. 
889 Watkins v Rymill (1883) 10 Q.B.D. 178 at 189. 
890 Thompson v London, Midland & Scottish Ry (1930) 1 K.B. 41 at 56. 
891 Laceys Footwear (Wholesale) Ltd v Bowler International Ltd (1997) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 369, at 384–385. 
892 This position recognises that there are other tools in the hands of the court with which to nullify an exclusion 
clause. For instance, if the exclusion amounts to a fundamental breach of contract (Suisse Atlantique Societé 
d’Armement Maritime SA v NV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale (1967) 1 AC 361), or it purports to exclude liability 






no different from indemnities considered earlier; contract parties understand the power that 
freedom of contract bestows and have not shied away from using it. 
  
However, subjecting the exemption clauses to the test of reasonableness ensures a balance 
between the conflicting interest of freedom and overarching policy considerations. Society does 
not expect that contract parties should be allowed, under the guise of freedom of contract, to 
escape liability even for serious infractions; there must be a mechanism which overrides freedom 
in this regard, acting as a failsafe contraption to bring the contract in line with societal norms 
and mores. 
   
Given the penchant for abuse, and on grounds of policy, it was inevitable that the legislature 
would intervene to attempt to infuse a semblance of order in this area of the law.  The nature, 
scope and intent of this intervention, done by the enactment of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977 (UCTA 1977), is discussed below. 
 
4.1.4 Limitation of Liability 
 
Parties can agree to limit their exposure in respect of the extent of the economic consequences 
that they are willing to take responsibility for in the event that a specified risk event occurs. 
Courts recognise this approach, and apply the contra proferentem rule less rigorously, as they 
generally prefer parties to limit their liability rather than exclude it entirely.893 
   
In this vein, parties can limit their liability based on heads of loss, types of breach, amount of 
money, or by restricting the timing and procedure for the other party to make a claim.894  Liability 
                                                 
893 Ailsa Craig Fishing Co v Malvern Fishing Co Ltd and Securicor (Scotland) Ltd (1983) 1 W.L.R. 964; George 
Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd (1983) 2 AC 803. 






can also be limited based on participating interest in a given undertaking, typically found in joint 
operating agreements.895  
 
In offshore drilling contracts, similar to most commercial contracts in the oil and gas sector, the 
contractors almost always request for a limit on their financial liability.  Gordon rationalises this 
by saying that exemption clauses do not offer as much protection to the contractor because the 
costs which can be directly attributable to the loss occasioned by a risk event can be inexorably 
higher than the contractor can bear, and even then, might be open to challenge. A cap on financial 
liability thus represents a valuable means of ensuring that the contractor’s exposure is not 
indeterminate.896  In some cases, liability capping is also driven by the apprehension that the 
potential losses may far outstrip the contract sum.897 
   
Although the attitude of the court is more relaxed as far as construing limitation of liability 
clauses, it has been stated that the courts ought to require that this be expressed with the same 
level of clarity and intent as is expected of an exclusion clause, especially where the 
consequences of enforcing the limitation of liability clause is dire.898 
 
This study finds that the treatment of limitation of liability clauses should be similar to the 
manner in which sole remedy clauses are construed and considered.  The factors that should 
weigh on the mind of the court should include the balance of power between the parties, the 
clarity of the meaning intended by the relevant clause, and the rationale of the stated mechanism 
                                                 
895 Josephson, M. D. (2003) ‘How Far Does the CAPL Travel – A Comparative Overview of the CAPL Model Form 
Operating Procedure and the AIPN Model Form International Operating Agreement’, Alta. L. Rev., 41, pp. 1–28, at 
p. 10. 
896 Gordon, G. (2011), supra, at p. 497.  See also, Clause 35, General Conditions of CONTRACT for Supply of 
Major items of Plant and Equipment, LOGIC, Edition 2 – December 2005, http://www.logic-
oil.com/sites/default/files/documents/Supply%20of%20Major%20Items%20of%20Plant%20and%20Equipment%
20Edition%202.pdf, accessed 24 September 2016. 
897 Ailsa Craig Fishing Co v Malvern Fishing Co Ltd and Securicor (Scotland) Ltd (1983) 1 W.L.R. 964, at 970. 






for arriving at the relevant limit.  Thus, where, for instance, the parties have capped liability to 
the contract sum, this should suffice as rationale for the capping, which the court should uphold. 
  
Where parties have equal bargaining strength, the party that accepts the limitation of liability is 
deemed to understand that he bears the residual risk of the remainder of the economic 
consequences of the occurrence of the relevant risk event.  It is then up to that party to take 
appropriate steps to manage, mitigate and/or prevent the risk event from occurring, steps which 
may include taking out insurance to cover that eventuality. 
  
4.1.5 Liquidated Damages 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, in the fault-based risk allocation regime, if parties failed to 
stipulate any amount in damages in the contract, the court determines what is payable as 
damages, guided by the principle of restitutio in integrum.  Quite often, a contract party may 
find the mechanism adopted and/or quantum of damages awarded by the court unsatisfactory. 
   
Contract parties can allocate risk by pre-determining the consequences of a breach of contract 
by prescribing both the mechanism to be adopted and/or quantum of damages to be paid in the 
event of a breach of contract.  In this way, parties are able to quantify the economic consequences 
of the occurrence of the risk event upfront, and can take adequate measures to prevent the risk 
event from occurring or ensure their ability to bear the risk if the adverse event occurs.  This 
approach is also adopted to avoid the tedium of proving the actual extent of damage899 which 
justifies a specified amount of money as damages.900  When risk is allocated in this manner, this 
is referred to as liquidated damages.901  The courts have held that specified and quantifiable 
                                                 
899 Peel, E. (2011) Treitel The Law of Contract. 13th ed. London, UK: Sweet & Maxwell, at p. 1073. 
900 McGregor, H. (2003) McGregor on Damages. 17th ed. UK: Sweet & Maxwell, at p. 424. 






property stated as being transferable upon a breach of contract can also be termed as liquidated 
damages.902 
  
The modern formulation for determining whether a specified amount equates to liquidated 
damages, is traced to the guidelines laid down in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co v New Garage and 
Motor Co.903  Essentially, a clause will be termed as liquidated damages if it represents a genuine 
pre-estimate of the loss that will be incurred upon a breach of the contract,904 and is basically a 
‘calculation’ of the components of the loss presumed to be suffered by the innocent party, which 
the latter party is entitled to as compensation in accordance with the contract. 
 
A distinction is drawn between liquidated damages and penalties.  While the former is accepted 
and enforceable, the latter, formulated as being a provision which is extravagant and 
unconscionable relative to the breach which it seeks to cure,905 is unenforceable and void.  The 
latter is, thus, not considered as being a genuine recompense to the innocent party but is deemed 
as being in terrorem of the offending party.906  The rationale for the non-enforcement of penalties 
lies in the fact that they actually serve no useful purpose other than as punishment to the 
offending party, even though the innocent party can be justly and fairly recompensed otherwise. 
 
Recently, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (UKSC) laid down new rules to be utilised 
for the discernment of penalty clauses.  In a significant departure from the previous law contained 
in the Dunlop case, the Supreme Court, hearing together the cases of Cavendish Square Holding 
BV v Talal El Makdessi and ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis,907 stated that the first consideration is to 
                                                 
902 Jobson v Johnson (1989) 1 W.L.R. 1026, CA. 
903 (1915) A.C. 79, at 86–88. 
904 See also Clydebank Engineering Co v Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo y Castaneda (1905) A.C. 6, at 19. 
905 McGregor, H. (2003), supra, at p. 425. 
906 Furmston, M. P., Cheshire, G. C. and Fifoot, C. H. S. (2012), supra, at p. 785. 






determine whether the breached provision is a secondary obligation908 or a conditional primary 
obligation.909  Where the provision is a conditional primary obligation, it cannot be termed as a 
penalty, as it would be deemed to be in furtherance of the legitimate interest of the innocent 
party, who has the right to enforce it.  However, if it is a secondary obligation, the next step is to 
enquire whether it imposes on the wrongful party, ‘a detriment out of all proportion to any 
legitimate interest of the innocent party in the enforcement of the primary obligation’ (emphasis 
added).910  Where the court makes a finding of this nature of detriment, it is ipso facto a penalty 
which is unenforceable. 
 
These new rules have profound implications on the law of liquidated damages and penalties.  
First, it represents a departure from the age-old doctrine of genuine pre-estimate discussed 
above.  Provided the relevant provision serves a legitimate commercial interest, and is not 
extravagant, exorbitant or unconscionable911 (emphasis added), it will not be labelled as a 
penalty, and is therefore enforceable. 
  
Secondly, the court confirmed the supremacy of the notion of freedom of contract, holding that 
the penalty rule merely interferes with the parties’ freedom, and recognising the potential for this 
interference to lead to uncertainty which should be avoided.912  This is especially where the 
parties have equal bargaining power and have had the benefit of legal advice.913 
 
                                                 
908 Ibid, at para. 14.  This arises where a contract requires performance of an act by one party, failing which, he must 
compensate the innocent party with a specified amount of money; this payment is capable of being labelled a 
penalty. 
909 Ibid, at para. 14.  Where there is no contractual obligation on a party to perform an act, however, there is a 
provision that a specified sum of money must be paid to the other party if the first party fails to perform. This 
requirement to pay is a conditional primary obligation and cannot be labelled a penalty. 
910 Ibid, at para. 32. 
911 Ibid, at para. 152. 
912 Ibid, at paras. 33 and 257.  See also Caudill v Keller Williams Realty, Inc, 2016 WL 3680033 (7th Cir. July 6, 
2016) in which the court’s decision re-affirmed the fact that the notion of parties’ freedom of contract in agreeing 
damages applicable upon breach of a contract is moderated by legislative and judicial intervention –  for instance, 
the rule on penalties. 






Thirdly, it re-affirmed the fact that the penalty doctrine is only triggered by the breach of a 
contractual provision,914 and not otherwise. 
 
The position above differs from the views of the Australian court in Paciocco v Australia and 
New Zealand Banking Group Ltd.915  Both courts agree that legitimate commercial interests can 
go beyond recovery of damages based on a pre-estimate of loss, and on the notion of the 
supremacy of freedom of contract.  However, the Australian court ruled that penalty doctrine can 
be triggered, not only by the breach of contractual provisions, but also recognises that a party’s 
legitimate interests may transcend the recovery of damages for breach of contract.916   In widening 
the scope of operation of the doctrine, the Australian court stated that it is incorrect to assume 
that only ‘stipulations which engage the penalty doctrine must be those which are contractual 
promises broken by the promisor’917 (emphasis added). 
   
In determining whether the provision to protect a legitimate interest is not a penalty, the courts 
will consider whether it is extravagant, exorbitant or unconscionable.918  The determination of 
this must depend on the relevant facts, and must necessarily enquire into the extent of damage 
suffered vis-à-vis the quantum of compensation provisioned.  
Perhaps more important to the English jurisprudence is the retention of the principle of 
unconscionability in the test on penalties.  This was first seen in the guidelines laid down by 
Lord Dunedin in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co v New Garage and Motor Co.919  Given its retention 
in an expanded test in the Cavendish case, this study posits that the determination of clauses as 
                                                 
914 Ibid, at paras. 12 and 120; See also Moss Empires Ltd v Olympia (Liverpool) Ltd (1939) AC 544; Export Credits 
Guarantee Department v Universal Oil Products Co (1983) 1 W.L.R. 399 (‘ECGD’). 
915 (2016) HCA 28. 
916 McDougall, R. ‘Revisiting the Penalties Doctrine: Paciocco v ANZ’, The Commercial Law Association of 
Australia, Sydney, NSW, 1–29, at p. 25. 
917 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 205, at para. 45.  This case preceded 
the Paciocco case at first instance, and Paciocco only became the claimant on appeal. 
918 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi and ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis (2015) UKSC 67, at para. 152. 






penalties will increasingly depend on what the courts deem as unconscionable, and the subjective 
nature of this enquiry will widen the scope of discretion of the courts in reaching this 
determination.  Progressively, the courts will widen the scope of application of the rule on 
unconscionability and, before long, it will assume the status of a doctrine, such that contracts, in 
general, may be required to satisfy the conscionability test920 before they can be enforced. 
   
This view is supported by the fact that the Australian jurisprudence already has this doctrine as 
part of their laws, and the UK may seek to adopt this someday.  As French, CJ stated in the 
Paciocco case:  
 
‘All of the common law jurisdictions are rich sources of comparative law whose traditions are 
worthy of the highest respect, particularly those of the United Kingdom as the first source.’921 
 
The day might come when the courts of the UK might reciprocate this respect from their 





In the previous discussion on insurance,922 this study examined the role of insurance as a risk 
management strategy, and surmised that the contractual obligation to take out insurance is 
usually pursuant to indemnity provisions which offer protection to parties.  In the bedrock and 
foregoing sections, the fault-based risk allocation regime was shown to be the reason for the 
                                                 
920 The conscionability test enquires into whether contract terms are manifestly unjust, or unreasonably one-sided 
and unduly favourable to the party whose bargaining power is stronger to such an extent that they are contrary to 
good conscience. In jurisdictions where the doctrine applies, the courts would refuse to enforce a contract deemed 
to be unconscionable if they decide that no informed or reasonable person would ordinarily accept the relevant 
provisions. A finding of unconscionability depends on the circumstances existing at the time of contract, and would 
include factors like bargaining power, mental capacity, availability of options age, and superior knowledge. 
921 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2016) HCA 28, at p. 6, para 10. 






introduction of indemnities, exclusion/exemption and limitation of liability clauses in 
commercial contracts.  This section examines the mechanisms through which the contract parties 
actually utilise insurance as a tool for risk allocation in response to the need to provide cover for 
the obligations assumed under the indemnities, exclusion/exemption and limitation of liability 
clauses in their contracts. 
 
Under the contract, insurance can be voluntarily undertaken by an entity, arise pursuant to a 
contractual obligation, or be mandated by legislation.  Irrespective of the manner in which the 
insurance is requisitioned, it must cover the relevant risks under the contract.  To achieve this 
objective, multiple insurance contracts923 may need to be entered, with various policy limits 
which are set, either by contract or by operation of law.  
  
A duty of disclosure exists at two levels, as far as the insurance policy is concerned.  First, the 
insured is expected to disclose all material facts to the insurer, otherwise, the insurance policy 
can be voided on grounds of material failure to disclose or material misrepresentation.924  
Secondly, the indemnitee can request the indemnitor to furnish the insurance policy, which the 
former is entitled to scrutinise to determine whether the insurance is adequate in respect of the 
policy limits as well as the risks covered, confirm whether they have been endorsed as additional 
insured on the policy,925 verify that the applicable law is that which is contemplated by the 
contract between the indemnitor and indemnitee, and that the insurance premia have been paid.  
In the USA, a further check is required to ensure that the law of the state that is detailed as the 
                                                 
923 Insurance contracts may include: Commercial General Liability; Employers Liability/Workmen’s Compensation; 
General Third Party; Third Party and Passenger Liability, Protection and Indemnity and Hull and Machinery. 
924 Higherdelta Ltd v Covea Insurance Plc (2017) CSOH 84; (2017) G.W.D. 21-349. 
925 Anderson, R. (2008) ‘“Certificates of Insurance” and “Additional Insured” Coverage - Maximize Value and 






governing jurisdiction permits additional insured endorsements, as some states have enacted 
laws which prohibit this.926 
 
Importantly, the indemnitee must satisfy themselves about the viability of the insurer and their 
ability to bear the economic consequences of the occurrence of the events underpinning the 
insured risks. 
 
Aside from being endorsed as additional insured in the indemnitor’s insurance policy, the 
indemnitee must ensure that the policy contains a mechanism for notification by the indemnitor 
to the indemnitee if any change is made thereto, and that insurance premia are paid.  Possible 
changes include a reduction in the level of cover, amendment of the cover tenor, or cancellation 
of the policy.927  It is in the indemnitee’s interest to validate the tenor of the insurance, to ensure 
that it covers the duration of the contract between the indemnitor and indemnitee.  Furthermore, 
if there is a need to keep the policy valid beyond the end of their contract, perhaps because of 
anticipated or contingent liabilities, then the indemnitee needs to ensure that this is done.928 
   
The fact that the indemnitor has taken out insurance to cover the relevant risks does not preclude 
the indemnitee from taking out their own insurance.  If this happens, and the contract parties 
have insurance that covers the same risks, the contract should designate the indemnitor’s 
insurance as ‘primary and non-contributing’.929  This will clearly delineate the insurance policy 
that will be utilised if this is required. 
 
                                                 
926 See, for instance, Walsh Constr Co v Mutual of Enumclaw, 104 P.3d 1146 (Or. Jan. 27, 2005) in which the 
Oregon Supreme Court held that Oregon's Anti-Indemnification Statute nullifies any clause mandating the 
indemnitor to endorse the indemnitee as an Additional Insured in its CGL policy. 
927 Thornsjo, D. O. and Hasan, N. B. (2007), supra, at p. 62. 
928 Ibid, at p. 31. 






Where the indemnitor owes the indemnitee a duty to defend, this must be expressly stated in the 
contract between the indemnitor and indemnitee, as the courts will not automatically assume its 
existence.930  The insurance policy must reflect this obligation, and can only be utilised if the 
action instituted against the indemnitee requests damages in respect of the liability contemplated 
by the duty to defend.  As was confirmed in the foregoing sections, even though the indemnitor’s 
insurers are obliged to pay the defence costs, in the UK, the indemnitee retains the right to 
appoint own counsel, and to carry on their own defence.931   This is different in the USA, where 
contract parties typically agree that the insurance company retains the right to control and 
conduct the defence.932  
   
4.2 Risk Allocation between Parties to a Drilling Contract 
Having examined the mechanisms which contract parties have generally utilised to allocate risks 
inter se in response to the fault-based manner in which the courts allocated risk in the absence 
of contract, this section now examines how the contract parties have utilised these mechanisms 
in the drilling contract.  The discourse below recognises that parties to the drilling contract may 
not always allocate risk in the manner stipulated, as risk allocation in specific contracts is 
influenced by factors such as the balance of power between the parties, prevailing 
market/economic conditions, risk appetite, determination of the party best able to bear the risk, 
and affiliation of parties to drilling associations.  Although the model contracts serve as the 
context and case studies of the thesis, discussions in this section will focus on drilling contracts 
in general and not particularly on any of the model contracts. 
 
                                                 
930 Astrazeneca Insurance Co Ltd v XL Insurance (Bermuda) Ltd (2013) EWHC 349 (Comm); (2013) 2 All E.R. 
(Comm) 97. 
931 Pine v DAS Legal Expenses Insurance Co Ltd (2011) EWHC 658 (QB). 






Incentive theory recommends optimal risk sharing between the operator and contractor, which 
ensures that a balance is achieved between considerations of risk sharing and incentives.  A 
situation in which a disproportionate amount of risk is transferred to the contractor may result in 
unwarranted high-risk premium which escalates rates unnecessarily.933  However, optimality 
must itself be balanced with the need to adequately incentivise the contractor, and this can be 
achieved through different means including guaranteeing loans by the contractor for rig 
construction that provides financing access and lowers interest rates, strengthening the rig 
ownership model, perhaps by a joint venture with the operator, and adjusting risk sharing for 
specified heads of costs via the compensation mechanism in the drilling rig contract.934 
 
Compensation mechanism has been recognised as a tool for risk allocation in the drilling 
contract, and this is especially so in tight rig market conditions.935  Indeed, when Coates declared 
that most of the provisions of contracts allocate risk, the compensation section fell within that 
category.936  The rates in the compensation section typically reflect the level of risk that the 
operator is willing to take in achieving the drilling objectives for the contract, and internalise 
different parameters which have been evaluated and weighted during the bidding process to 
arrive at them.  For instance, a typical bid evaluation process would include such criteria as 
performance efficiency and previous achievements, HSE culture, experience and financial 
capability.  The contractor and operator negotiate rates which take all the relevant factors into 
consideration, and both parties expect that the level of risks that are allocated inter se are such 
that enable the delivery of the project on time and on budget, especially from the contractor’s 
perspective.   
                                                 
933 See, generally, Osmundsen, P. (2015) ‘Optimal Strategies for Rig Procurement’, Journal of Petroleum Science 
and Engineering, 126(Supplement C), pp. 11–15, at p.13. 
934 Ibid, at pp. 13–14. 
935 Osmundsen, P., Sørenes, T. and Toft, A. (2008) ‘Drilling Contracts and Incentives’, Energy Policy, 36(8), pp. 
3138–3144, at p. 3141. 
936 Coates, J. C. IV (2012) ‘Allocating Risk through Contract: Evidence from M&A and Policy Implications’, 







The role of the compensation mechanism as a risk-allocation tool is more visible in certain types 
of drilling contracts.  Thus, where drilling is undertaken based on a turnkey or footage contract 
models, the contractor takes on more risk than in daywork contracts, as previously discussed,937 
and this is reflected in the rates and incentives applicable to the contract.938      
 
The study takes the position that the allocation proffered below is typical of the oil and gas sector, 
and some of the rationales and underlying bases for the allocation are examined in the next 
section.  Irrespective of the risk allocation formula adopted by the parties, it is imperative that 
the risk allocation intention and provisions are express, clear and unequivocal, otherwise they 
may not be enforceable, thereby altering the allocation outcomes anticipated by the parties and 
potentially increasing transaction costs.    
 
4.2.1 Risks Typically Assumed by the Operator 
 
In determining which risks to accept during contracts negotiations between the operator and 
contractor, both parties evaluate the risks sought to be allocated to see whether this is already 
accommodated within their cost profile or insurance portfolio.  Where this is not the case, the 
parties then evaluate whether the risk can be covered by available insurance, and if this is 
available, and the other party is willing to pay for this, the first party would typically assume the 
allocated risk.  As previously discussed,939 the negotiation process through which risk allocation 
is achieved can sometimes be adversarial and rancorous, as parties seek to negotiate more 
advantageous positions for themselves. With the increased complexities and risks in drilling 
contracts, parties have had to focus on mechanisms for allocating risks in a manner that achieves 
their individual contract objectives, while ensuring that specific risks are assumed by parties best 
                                                 
937 In the Introduction. 
938 Osmundsen, P., Sørenes, T. and Toft, A. (2008) ‘Drilling Contracts and Incentives’, supra, at p. 3142. 






suited to manage them, all relevant factors considered.  Although some of these factors are 
outside their control – for instance, the balance of power between the parties, and prevailing 
market/economic conditions – they must still grapple with all applicable factors, with due regard 
to their respective risk appetite, optimality, and affiliation to drilling associations, to strike a 
bargain that is acceptable to both sides.  
   
That notwithstanding, there are risks that are typically reserved for the operator, as underwriters 
usually exclude them from the cover which they are either willing to, or routinely provide to 
contractors.940  From the contractor’s perspective, all or most of the risks in the drilling contract 
should be reserved for the operator. This is because the operator is traditionally able to obtain 
insurance for the risks, and stands to benefit from the ultimate production of the oil well, to the 
exclusion of the drilling company.  In practice, though, the operator does not bear all the risks in 
the drilling contract, and the risks that they traditionally bear are discussed hereunder. 
 
It must be noted, however, that variations to this responsibility exist, depending on whether the 
drilling operations are undertaken on a daywork, footage, or turnkey basis.  These variations are 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
4.2.1.1  Death of, or Personal Injury to, Operator’s Personnel  
  
As discussed in the preceding sections, the indemnity structure in the drilling contract mandates 
the operator to bear the economic consequences of any event that causes death of, or personal 
injury to, any of their personnel, notwithstanding how this event was caused.  This responsibility 
subsists even when the event was caused by the negligence of the contractor, and the latter is 
absolved from liability even in circumstances in which, but for the indemnity structure, the 
                                                 
940 For instance, insurance for wild well risks.  See Moomjian, C. A. (1999) ‘Contractual Insurance and Risk 






contractor would have borne the economic consequences of the occurrence of the adverse event 
resulting to death or personal injury.  
 
Even though this risk is contractually borne by the operator, legislation has intervened to re-
order the allocation mechanism by the contract parties.  Thus, the anti-indemnity statutes in the 
USA and, arguably, the Unfair Contracts Terms Act 1977 (UCTA) in the UK, have restricted 
the ability of a party to a drilling contract to be indemnified for own negligence, or to escape 
liability therefrom.  However, there are exceptions to this rule.  For instance, the Texas anti-
indemnity statute941 allows indemnification for own negligence resulting in death or personal 
injury if there is a written agreement by the parties that the indemnitor will provide the insurance 
that covers this lability.942   
 
In the UK, there is still no agreement as to whether the UCTA applies to commercial transactions 
such as the drilling contract, and until there is judicial clarification of this question, the current 
state of the jurisprudence in this regard is that the operator is bound by the indemnity structure 
of the drilling contract that allocates the responsibility of bearing the economic consequences of 
death and personal injury to members of operator group to the operator, irrespective of cause or 
fault.943 
 
4.2.1.2  Loss of, or Damage to, Own Equipment    
 
                                                 
941 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§127.001 – 127.007. 
942 Ibid, at 127.005(a). 
943 See, for instance, Michael Duthie v Transocean North Sea Ltd and Others (2015) CSOH 20, in which a service 
technician employed by a third-party drilling company, at the instance of the operator, to work on the rig, developed 
a heart condition – myocardial infarction – and suffered injury.  Although the action for summary judgment failed, 
had it succeeded, the operator would have been responsible to bear the economic consequences of the injury, as the 
technician is deemed to be part of operator group, even though the contractor had negligently failed to ensure that 






This is a continuation of the obligations imposed by the mutual hold harmless indemnity 
structure of the drilling contract.  The operator remains liable for any damage to its equipment, 
whether caused by its own personnel, or by the contractor personnel.  This is notwithstanding 
the fact that the equipment are in the contractor’s custody, and the latter is responsible for 
ensuring that the equipment are properly stored and re-delivered to the operator in good condition 
upon completion of the drilling programme.  The contractor is also responsible for maintaining 
some of the operator’s equipment in their custody, even though this is typically at the operator’s 
cost.  Although the contractor is required to visually inspect operator group equipment for patent 
defects, the indemnity granted the contractor functions as a release, making the operator fully 
liable for the economic consequences of any adverse events resulting from the use of defective 
equipment, especially when the operator has been notified of same.944          
 
4.2.1.3  Loss of, or Damage to, Contractor’s Equipment in Certain Circumstances  
 
Although the mutual hold harmless indemnity structure generally allocates the risk of loss of, or 
damage to, contractor group equipment to the contractor, there are circumstances in which the 
operator bears this risk.  First, the operator bears the risk of damage to, or loss of, the contractor’s 
equipment if the damage arises from an unsound location which is due to the operator's failure 
to ensure location adequacy and readiness.  This head of risk is especially applicable to the 
drilling unit, and relates to information about the seabed, subsurface or soil conditions possessed 
by the operator.   
 
                                                 
944 See, for instance, Point West London Ltd v Mivan Ltd (2012) EWHC 1223 (TCC); Warren-Bradshaw 








In this vein, the operator’s responsibility and liability coincide, as the operator is both responsible 
to ensure that the offshore location is ready to receive the drilling unit, and bears the 
responsibility for the economic consequences of any failure to do so which results in damage to 
the drilling rig.  The operator is required to commission a geotechnical survey of the conditions 
of the well location prior to the arrival of the drilling rig.  The operator is further required to 
forward the results of the geotechnical survey to the contractor, and, notwithstanding the fact 
that the operator cannot validate the veracity or adequacy of the information, would remain liable 
for any damage arising from subsurface conditions such as pipelines, craters and power lines.  
The burden to bear the economic consequences for the contractor’s equipment covers payments 
of the applicable day rate for the period during which the drilling rig is standing by for repairs 
arising from the damage occasioned by the unsound location, as well as the time taken, either to 
implement any remedial steps required to make the location fit for purpose, or to select a new 
location.  The rationale for this imposition is because the well location is selected by the 
operator,945 and the contractor is not privy to the steps taken by the operator to prepare the well 
location and is only guided by the geotechnical survey provided by the operator in respect of the 
subsurface conditions that could damage the rig or lead to its total loss. 
 
Secondly, the operator bears the responsibility for the economic consequences of any damage 
to, or loss of the contractor’s down-hole or surface equipment if this event is caused by acidic 
substances such as brine or drilling fluids.  This liability extends to damage or loss occasioned 
by exposure to a corrosive environment, including, but not limited to corrosion arising from 
emissions from the well.  In the case of loss of, or damage to down-hole equipment, the rationale 
for holding the operator liable is because the operator is the ultimate beneficiary of the output 
from the well, and every piece of equipment that is lost or damaged down-hole is directly in 
                                                 






pursuit of that objective.  The only exception is if the contractor is negligent in the handling of 
the impacted equipment, in which case the contractor bears the liability exclusively.  This is one 
of the circumstances specifically excluded from the mutual hold harmless indemnity structure, 
and is still based on the fault-based risk allocation mechanism.   
 
4.2.1.4  All Pollution Except Arising from Surface Activities and Contractor Equipment 
 
The operator bears the responsibility for the economic consequences of all pollution emanating 
from well operations, cratering, blowout, fire, seepage, or any other unrestrained flow of water, 
oil, gas, or other substance, and would extend to the expenses incurred in control and/or 
remediation of the pollution.  The exception to this responsibility relates to pollution which 
emanates from above surface, and from the contractor’s equipment.  In the case of the latter 
situations, the contractor bears the responsibility.946   
 
Post-Macondo, the real issue concerning liability for pollution has not been whether the operator 
bears the responsibility for subsurface pollution, but whether the operator is able to seek 
contribution from the contractor if the resulting pollution occurred due partly to the gross 
negligence of the latter.  This is because the indemnity structure would typically allocate the 
responsibility for bearing the economic consequences of the incidence of pollution on the 
operator, irrespective of negligence.947   
 
As previously discussed,948 the concept of gross negligence is not known to UK jurisprudence,949 
even though the courts have recently held that where the contract parties have this verbiage in 
                                                 
946 Foster, S. J., Gibbie, K. W., Mason, D. C. and Baron, S. L. ‘Risks Assumed In Drilling Contracts: Global 
Comparison and Case Histories’. SPE/IADC Drilling Conference: Society of Petroleum Engineers, at p. 3. 
947 See, for instance, Art. 14.11, IADC Daywork Drilling Contract; Art. 18.12, IADC Footage Drilling Contract.  
See also Anderson, O. L. (1989) ‘The Anatomy of an Oil and Gas Drilling Contract, supra, at pp. 440–441. 
948 Under the heading: ‘Requirement to “indemnify, defend, release and hold harmless”’. 






their contract, it would imply that they intended same to have a meaning different from mere 
negligence, and within the context of exclusion clauses, this term could mean ‘serious disregard 
of, or indifference to, obvious risk’.950  
 
Thus, UK courts are unlikely to allow contribution in this manner unless there is a clear intention 
by the contract parties, expressed unequivocally by the wording of the contract, and not qualified 
or excluded when the contract as a whole is construed.951 
 
4.2.1.5  Operator’s Consequential Losses  
 
The indemnity structure allocates the responsibility for bearing the economic consequences of 
own consequential losses on the operator, irrespective of cause or fault.  This will include bearing 
the burden for certain heads of liability such as loss of revenue, loss of, or delay in drilling, profit 
or anticipated profit (if any), spread costs, loss and/or deferral of production, loss of product, 
cost of, or loss of use.  As straightforward as this sounds, a lot of issues have arisen from the 
consequential losses clause, as parties have often contended on both meaning and scope of this 
exclusion clause.  
 
Within the context of offshore drilling contracts, the pronouncement in Transocean Drilling UK 
Ltd v Providence Resources Plc952 is relevant.  In overruling the decision of the High Court,953 
the Court of Appeal insisted that the consequential losses clause had to be given its natural and 
ordinary meaning, just like other clauses in the contract.  
 
Given the approach to interpretation adopted by the courts, which may sometimes be inconsistent 
with the intention of the parties, it is typical to see offshore drilling contracts define the meaning 
                                                 
950 Camarata Property Inc v Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Ltd (2011) EWHC 479 (Comm) at 161. 
951 See, generally, Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society (1998) 1 WLR 896. 
952 (2016) EWCA Civ 372. 






ascribed to consequential losses.  In this vein, the contract parties succinctly state the heads of 
losses which constitute consequential losses, putting it beyond contention what their intention 
is, leaving a court little choice other than to give effect to same, if there is no ambiguity.    
 
4.2.1.6  Wild Well Control Expenditure 
  
Even though the responsibility to provide well control and fire prevention equipment, including 
blowout preventers (BOP), lies with the contractor, who is also responsible for the physical effort 
to control a well if and when this is required, yet, the operator typically retains the responsibility 
to bear the economic consequences of the actual occurrence of a wild well or fire event, even 
though variations to this responsibility exist, depending on whether the drilling operations are 
undertaken on a daywork, footage or turnkey basis.  These variations are discussed in Chapter 5.   
 
Just like consequential losses, contract parties often define wild well components, especially 
‘blowout’, to prevent ambiguity and ensure that the courts will enforce the terms of the contract 
relating to this.  Post-Macondo, this has become even more crucial, as more disputes are expected 
to arise from this definition.954  However, even where this term has been defined, the potential 
for disputes still exists.  There is some agreement that a blowout is an uninhibited flow of gas, 
oil, debris or other drilling fluids into the atmosphere,955 however the details of when an actual 
blowout has occurred continues to be problematic.  In Phillip Rosamond Drilling Co v St. Paul 
Fire and Marine Insurance Co,956 the insurance company declined coverage in circumstances 
where drilling fluid had egressed the well, and control was lost.  Their argument was that a 
blowout properly so called had not occurred as the well was not completely wild.  The court 
                                                 
954 See Amoco (UK) Exploration Co v British American Offshore Ltd (2001) All ER (D) 244 (Nov), in which BOPs 
were fully discussed. 
955 How Does Blowout Control Work? (2017): Rigzone. Available at: 
http://www.rigzone.com/training/insight.asp?insight_id=300&c_id=1  accessed 27 October 2017. 






disagreed, holding that if the pressure or flow of liquid and/or gas from a well cannot be 
restrained by the addition of drilling fluid in a way that allows normal drilling operations to 
continue, then the well will be deemed as completely uncontrollable.957  
 
Drilling contracts now address new regulatory requirements for BOP testing and certification.  
Provisions requiring the contractor to comply with the operator’s safety and environmental 
management system (SEMS) standards are mandated by operators, together with more rigorous 
requirements for maintenance, testing and certification of BOP, as well as rig crew training.958  
This is in the aftermath of the Macondo blowout catastrophe relative to which BP sought 
contribution from Cameron – the manufacturers of the BOP – based on the findings that BOP 
was overall defective and not fit for purpose.959  That notwithstanding, BP remained the primary 
obligor in respect of the expenditures from the blowout incident for which it agreed to pay $21 
billion to the US federal and state governments in settlement of the liability arising therefrom.960 
 
4.2.1.7  Loss of, or Damage to Well, Reservoir or other Subsurface Formation 
 
The operator bears the responsibility for the economic consequences of a loss of, or damage to 
the well, reservoir or other subsurface formation.  This loss or damage may arise from blowouts, 
fire, or from the process of bringing a wild well under control.  However, if the loss or damage 
occurred by the sole negligence or wilful misconduct of any member of contractor group, the 
contractor will be required to drill another hole to an equal depth as the first hole had been 
                                                 
957 Ibid, at p.633. 
958 Group, D. H. S. (2011) ‘Final Report on the Investigation of the Macondo Well Blowout’, Center for 
Catastrophic Risk Management, University of California at Berkeley, at pp. 119–123. 
959 Schleifstein, M. and Thompson, R. (2013) BP Oil Spill Trial: Blowout Preventer on Macondo Well Had Dead 
Battery, Miswired Solenoid, Expert Testifies: NOLA.com | The Times-Picayune Available at: 
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2013/03/bp_oil_spill_trial_blowout_pre.html; accessed 28 
October 2017. 
960 Gilblom, K. and Jordan, A. (2018) ‘BP’s $60 Billion Gulf Spill Tab Rises as Lawsuits Wind Down’, Bloomberg 
Quint; Bloomberg LP. Available at: https://www.bloombergquint.com/business/2018/01/16/bp-takes-1-7-billion-






previously drilled.  If the hole is damaged, the contractor will be required to repair the damaged 
hole, reinstating it to its original state.  The contractor is obliged to take these steps if the rig is 
still on the well location, and the contract parties are expected to agree a special re-drill rate at 
the inception of the contract to cater for this exigency. 
 
However, if the loss or damage of the hole occurred because of the malfunctioning of the casings 
or tubings that the operator provided, or any other operator group equipment, or due to the failure 
of the cementing job, the operator is obliged to bear the full responsibility for the economic 
consequences of the restorative work performed to salvage the hole, including the costs of 
moving the rig to a new location if a substitute well is to be drilled. 
 
4.2.1.8  Third Party Death, Injury or Property Damage Due to Operator’s Negligence  
 
In this section, ‘third party’ refers to any person or entity who does not belong to the operator 
group, operator group personnel, contractor group or contractor group personnel; the class of 
people that Moomjian refers to as ‘true third parties’961 – people who are negatively impacted by 
the operations of contracting parties, which cause death, injury or other damage to them, their 
property or their relatives (in case of death), because they are close enough to the contract activity 
locus as to be impacted by it.962   
 
The operator bears the economic consequences of any third-party death, personal injury, loss of, 
or damage to property arising from the operator’s sole negligence.  Where the operator has 
merely contributed to the resulting event, their liability is determined by the proportion of their 
contribution to subject event, and the courts will decide the quantum of damages to be imposed, 
                                                 
961 Moomjian, C. A. (1999) ‘Contractual Insurance and Risk Allocation in the Offshore Drilling Industry’, Drilling 
Contractor, March/April at p. 14. 






as previously discussed.963  The third party’s claim will usually be founded in negligence – or 
nuisance – and he would have to prove that he was harmed by the breach of an existing duty of 
care owed by the operator, which was occasioned by the tortious event.    
 
The Privy Council has recently pronounced on the principle of causation enabling a third party 
to succeed in a claim in this context.  In Petroleum Co of Trinidad and Tobago Ltd v Ryan and 
Another,964 the court held that the ‘but for’ test of causation was still the appropriate test to be 
applied in establishing the nexus between the tortious act and the resulting harm.  Even if the 
courts were inclined to adopt a more relaxed approach to bridge any evidential gaps for policy 
reasons in deserving cases, it could only do so if a causative link had ordinarily been 
established.965   
 
Even though as between the operator and the contractor, third-party claims are typically to be 
borne in proportion to their respective liabilities, where applicable, under the law of negligence 
or nuisance in respect of the subject event, most drilling contracts would situate all liability for 
third party claims arising from a blowout, fire, crater, or any circumstances in which the well 
was out of control on the operator.   
 
The operator’s liability to third parties in this context has been stated in economics terms to be 
based on the notion of correctional justice rather than on the utility that it maximises, focusing 
on the third party’s quest to ventilate a grievance that he has suffered from a specific tortfeasor.  
In this regard, the third party seeks recompense as a matter of right, and not necessarily to reduce 
accident costs or ensuring that the cheapest cost-avoider is made responsible for bearing the 
economic consequences of the tortious act.966  Therefore, it is crucial that the operator maintain 
                                                 
963 Under the heading: ‘Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945’. 
964 (2017) UKPC 30. 
965 Ibid, at paras 47– 49.  






adequate insurance which spreads the risk and ensures that the responsibility attached to the 
liability can be discharged,967 since decisions of liability are also not based on whether the third 
party is better placed to insure against the wrongful act, but on the fact that the operator breached 
their obligations for which they should be held accountable.968 
 
This study posits that the economics perspective in the context of third party liability is bound 
up with the debate as to whether the aim of law in society is to achieve substantive justice or 
distributive justice.969  In passing third-party liability judgments, courts are not guided by the 
ability of the third party to insure against the risk that eventuated, neither do they embark on an 
enquiry as to who is best able to bear the risk.  They are simply guided by the fact that a 
substantive duty which was owed the third party by the operator was breached, thereby 
occasioning harm which must be recompensed.  Unless the contract parties have otherwise 
allocated risk in a different manner, the courts are likely to make a finding of liability based on 
default risk allocation method that bears the fault element. 
 
Furthermore, in determining the quantum of damages to be imposed, they are guided by the 
principles of restitutio in integrum which seeks to restore the third party to the status quo ante.  
To proceed in any other manner, and enquire into the third party’s ability to insure against the 
risk that eventuated as a basis for liability, or seek to impose liability on an entity other than the 
tortfeasor, based on the ability to avoid cost more efficiently, will be tantamount to denying 
substantive justice to the victim, and negating the time-hallowed principle of ubi jus ibi 
remedium.      
 
                                                 
967 Ibid, at p. 206. 
968 Ibid, at p. 207. 
969 See, generally, Lucy, W. N. R. (1989) ‘Contract as a Mechanism of Distributive Justice Comment’, Oxford J. 







4.2.2 Risks Typically Assumed by the Contractor 
 
The full scale of the risks borne by the contractor would usually be driven by factors such as the 
balance of power between the parties, prevailing market/economic conditions, available 
insurance and affiliation to drilling associations.  In tight market conditions, the contractor can 
extract more favourable terms from the operator, and shift the responsibility for bearing the 
economic consequences of the occurrence of some events that would typically be the contractor’s 
responsibility.970   
 
From the contractor’s perspective, most of the risks in the drilling contract should be borne by 
the operator because the latter gets the ultimate benefit of the drilling operations.  However, there 
are some risks which the operator is unable to bear, for instance the risk of total loss of the 
drilling unit, as insurance is typically available to the contractor for those specific heads of losses.  
In those instances, the contractor is evidently the party that is best able to bear the risk, and is 
allocated the same accordingly. 
 
Given the mutuality of the indemnity structure, responsibility for some risk events overlap 
between the operator and contractor.  These events have been detailed below, and from the 
perspective of the contractor in appropriate cases.  Other risk events that are solely the 
responsibility of the contractor are also discussed below. 
 
4.2.2.1  Death of, or Personal Injury to, Contractor’s Personnel  
 
The contractor is under a similar obligation - as the operator with respect to operator group - to 
bear the economic consequences of the death of, or personal injury to, any member of contractor 
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group or contractor group personnel.971  As previously discussed,972 this liability is predicated 
on the indemnity structure in the drilling contract, which assumes that the mutual hold harmless 
provisions are contained therein.  This obligation subsists even when the operator has made 
payments to settle the claim brought by a member of contractor group or contractor group 
personnel.  The contractor is still obliged to reimburse the operator for any payments made, even 
when the operator’s insurance company has settled the claims.973 
 
One way in which the operator tries to guard against death or injury to contractor group 
personnel is by requiring that the contractor present only competent, trained and qualified 
personnel to work at the well location.  However, this raises the issue as to whether the contractor 
is adequately incentivised to do this, especially if the contractor has multiple drilling campaigns 
for different operators.  In other words, is a contractor more likely to provide its best personnel, 
who are probably better able to work devoid of negligence that leads to death and injury, if the 
operator offers adequate incentives?  The incentive theory suggests that this is possible, 
especially if the incentive offered is the promise of future business.974 
 
However, there are also disincentives that can arise from an approach that equates personnel 
competence with safety outcomes.  Such an approach is in the danger of assuming that once 
personnel are competent, then safety is assured, but this thinking has been disputed by other 
writers who state that safety and quality measures transcend competent personnel, as they 
permeate all aspects of the drilling operations, and should be managed holistically.975  They opine 
that safety outcomes cannot optimally be achieved by incentive agreements, and advocate for a 
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reduction of such personnel-focused incentives, and an increased focus on adequate safety 
control measures.976         
 
The above notwithstanding, for any incentive design to be effective, it must satisfy the 
controllability principle. If the incentives are to engender the desired benefits, they must be 
aligned with quantities and conditions within the contractor’s sphere of influence.977  Thus, being 
able to select the personnel, as well as the ability to replace them, though subject to the operator’s 
approval, ensures that the contractor is incentivised, not only to present their best personnel, but 
also guarantees that personnel will work in compliance with the standards and requirements that 
avoid death and injury to them.   
 
4.2.2.2  Loss of, or Damage to, Own Equipment including the Drilling Rig    
 
The contractor bears the responsibility for the economic consequences of any loss of, or damage 
to their equipment when they are above the rotary table, irrespective of whether drilling 
operations are being undertaken on a turnkey, footage or daywork basis. This responsibility 
extends to equipment such as drilling tools and appliances which are used above the rotary table, 
and the contractor retains responsibility for such loss or damage notwithstanding the negligence 
of the operator.   
 
However, there are important exceptions to this position.  When the damage to the contractor’s 
surface equipment has resulted from obstructions above the rotary table that should have been 
removed by the operator, the latter will be responsible.978  The operator would get a reprieve from 
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this liability if the contractor’s insurance covers the head of loss experienced, and they – the 
contractor – would only be expected to cover any shortfall in the insurance.979   
 
 Again, the operator will be responsible for any loss of, or damage to, the contractor’s surface 
equipment which results from emissions from the well, this is regarded as being on the same 
pedestal as damage from a wild well situation, which encompasses blowouts and other 
discharges from the well,980 as previously discussed.981    
 
Although the operator ordinarily assumes the responsibility for the economic consequences of 
any loss of, or damage to, the contractor’s in-hole equipment, this is when the drilling operations 
are conducted on a daywork basis.  Where drilling is undertaken on a turnkey or footage basis, 
the contractor is effectively in charge of the operations, and in full control of the well.  Thus, the 
contractor would be responsible for any loss of, or damage to, any of their own in-hole equipment 
arising from down-hole operations.  However, the responsibility for the in-hole equipment will 
shift to the operator if difficult or hazardous formations are encountered during drilling, or if 
abnormal pressure is experienced in the hole.982 
 
The foregoing shows the intricacies of dealing with a loss of, or damage to the contractor’s 
equipment vis-à-vis the operator’s equipment.  This is even more pronounced when it is the 
drilling unit itself that is damaged or destroyed.  A practical problem is presented when the 
drilling unit is damaged by a supply vessel hired by the operator.983  If the supply vessel contractor 
has signed up to the industry mutual hold harmless (IMHH) scheme previously discussed,984 they 
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were protected to the very same extent as though the contract had provided the cover.985  
However, if the IMMH scheme is not in place, then recourse would be had to the drilling contract 
which should typically contain knock-for-knock provisions, and if the operator’s contractors and 
subcontractors are listed as part of operator group, then the supply vessel contractor may escape 
liability, leaving the drilling contractor to bear the economic consequences of the damage caused 
to the drilling unit. 
 
If, on the other hand, the operator’s contractors are not protected by the drilling contract’s 
indemnity structure, then the supply vessel contractor is a third party for all intents and purposes, 
and the drilling contractor is entitled to be indemnified by the operator for the ensuing damage.986  
The drilling contractor can also proceed directly against the supply vessel contractor in 
negligence, as there has been a breach of the latter’s duty of care to the former which has resulted 
in damage.987   
 
In general, however, the contractor is responsible for any loss of, or damage to, the drilling unit, 
and is also responsible for raising and removing it, if it becomes stranded, or a wreck, or 
otherwise capsizes, sinks or constitutes an obstruction to navigation.988  In these instances, it is 
usually a matter between the contractor and their insurers.989  For instance, in the aftermath of 
the Macondo catastrophe on 20 April 2010, the drilling unit – Deepwater Horizon – sank on 22 
April 2010.  On 5 May 2010, the owner of the rig, Transocean, received a partial insurance 
settlement in the sum of US $401 million for its total loss.990    
                                                 
985 Hewitt, T. (2008) ‘Who is to Blame? Allocating Liability in Upstream Project Contracts’, Journal of Energy & 
Natural Resources Law, 26(2), pp. 177-206, at p. 184. 
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4.2.2.3  All Pollution Arising from Surface Activities and Contractor Equipment  
 
When pollution arises in the ordinary course of drilling operations, above the rotary table, the 
contractor bears the responsibility for the economic consequences of the occurrence thereof.  
This is especially if the pollution emanated from substances and equipment that were within the 
use and control of the contractor, and this liability would attach notwithstanding the negligence 
of the operator.  This position is relatively straightforward and is seldom contested by the 
contract parties. 
 
The more contentious issue relates to the contractor’s liability for pollution emanating from a 
blowout for which the contractor has been alleged to have been contributorily negligent.  The 
contractor’s liability for pollution following the occurrence of a blowout was an issue in the 
aftermath of the Macondo catastrophe.  BP alleged gross negligence on Transocean’s part as a 
basis for liability for pollution emanating from below the rotary table, but this claim was rejected 
by the court, which found that Transocean had only been negligent but not grossly negligent991.  
The court found that BP’s reckless and egregious behaviour had caused the spill, and that 
Transocean’s negligence lay in the fact that it had not adequately trained its personnel to use the 
diverters that would have diverted the erupting hydrocarbons away from the drilling unit.992  If 
this allegation had been upheld by the court, Transocean would have been required to share the 
responsibility of bearing the economic consequences of the blowout with BP.   
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As previously discussed,993 the concept of gross negligence is unknown to English law,994 
although the courts recently held that where the contract parties have this provision in their 
contract, it would be interpreted as the intention to ascribe to it a meaning different from mere 
negligence and, within the context of exclusion clauses, this term could mean a serious disregard 
of, or indifference to, obvious risk.995  
 
Thus, English courts are unlikely to allow contribution in this context unless there is a clear 
intention by the contract parties, expressed unequivocally by the wording of the contract, and 
not qualified or excluded when the contract as a whole is construed.996 
 
The potential for contributory negligence on the part of the contractor for pollution emanating 
from blowouts, is real, in circumstances where the drilling contract makes this provision, and 
simultaneously tasks the contractor with responsibility of providing and maintaining the 
equipment essential for ensuring safety and for controlling and preventing blowouts, and 
imposes the obligation to use every reasonable means to undertake this task.   
 
Although this responsibility looks onerous for the contractor, new regulations that emerged in 
the USA, in the aftermath of the Macondo disaster, have provided guidance on specific 
operational requirements which directly impact well control, as well as the full complement of 
equipment to be maintained.997  It is this study’s position that a contractor who can demonstrate 
full compliance with the regulations, as well as the fact that they acted in a ‘a good, diligent, safe 
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and workmanlike manner’ will stand a good chance of defeating a claim of gross negligence in 
these circumstances.998   
 
4.2.2.4  Contractor’s Consequential Losses  
      
The contractor bears the responsibility for the economic consequences of any consequential 
losses incurred while performing the drilling contract.  Likewise, the contractor is contractually 
protected from assuming the responsibility of the economic consequences of any consequential 
losses incurred by the operator arising from the contractor’s activities under the drilling contract. 
 
From the contractor’s perspective, the most crucial obligation owed to them by the operator is 
the obligation to pay the applicable rate agreed by both parties.  The operator is also contractually 
liable to pay liquidated damages in certain specified circumstances, or upon the occurrence of 
certain specified events – for instance, early termination of the contract.  In this regard, it is in 
the contractor’s interest to ensure that the definition of consequential losses captures these 
obligations and circumstances, specifically excluding them from the other classes of prohibited 
events, thereby ensuring that the operator pays accordingly. 
 
Although the drilling contract generally excludes recovery of consequential losses, the courts 
have held them to be recoverable in deserving circumstances, such as where the action causing 
the breach by the contractor was specifically prohibited by the contract, and the loss occasioned 
thereby is significant.999  There is no denying the fact that if the drilling contract is silent on the 
exclusion of liability for consequential losses, the contractor stands to lose more, given the fact 
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that the contractor is more exposed to the operator as the former are usually in control of the 
actual drilling operations.1000 
 
4.2.2.5  Third-Party Death, Injury or Property Damage Due to Contractor’s Negligence   
 
Just like the operator, the contractor is responsible for the economic consequences of any harm 
inflicted upon a third party arising from their – the contractor’s – activities under the drilling 
contract.  As previously stated,1001 this responsibility will not extend to third-party harm arising 
from well control issues like blowouts and craters, irrespective of whether the contractor was 
responsible for the well at the time of the incident.   
 
In the same vein, the contractor typically assumes the responsibility for the economic 
consequences of any third-party harm occasioned by rescue or salvage operations conducted 
from or to the drilling unit.  Third-party harm in this context would typically arise from pollution, 
navigation accidents caused by the wreckage of the drilling unit itself, or the wreckage removal 
equipment mobilised at the instance of the contractor.  The cost of these operations can be quite 
significant,1002 and so drilling contractors typically belong to P&I (Protection & Indemnity) clubs 
that would assume financial responsibility for third-party liabilities of members.1003  A P&I club 
functions as an insurance company, law firm and loss adjuster for the benefit of its members.1004 
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Even though the contractor has the benefit of insurance, they would usually seek to ensure that 
their liability for third party harm aligns with the limits detailed in their insurance contract:1005 
they would seek to allocate the risk of anything above this limit to the operator.  To accept this 
residual risk, the operator would typically require the contractor to be completely transparent 
about its insurance terms and scope, which would then be evaluated for adequacy and 
reasonableness when such factors as the size, structure and resources of the contractor are 
considered.1006   
 
It is important to reiterate that the foregoing discussion on third parties focuses on the class of 
people who are negatively impacted by the operations of contracting parties, which cause death, 
injury or other damage to them, their property or their relatives (in case of death).  Protection of 
these third-party interests is founded on the law of tort and is justified by the duty of care that is 
owed to persons who are close enough to the contract activity locus as to be impacted by it.1007  
This assumes that the other class of third parties whose services have been retained by either 
contracting party are part of the indemnity structure, and so any injury to them, or their property, 
would be covered by the knock-for-knock indemnity principle.  
 
4.2.2.6  Intellectual Property and Patent Infringements 
   
From the contractor’s perspective, the risk of intellectual property infringement is very real, as 
they undertake actual drilling operations, and advise on the additional services to be mobilised 
in furtherance of the drilling campaign.  Intellectual property infringement is on the same 
pedestal as inflicting third party harm, as the infraction would almost always be in respect of 
improper dealing in a manner inconsistent with the ownership of an entity that is not party to the 
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drilling contract.  Where the infraction is against the proprietary interest of another contract 
party, the indemnity structure will be triggered to allocate risks between the contract parties inter 
se accordingly. 
 
Depending on the scope, scale, public policy considerations and manner of infringement, 
intellectual property infractions could give rise either to civil and/or criminal liability.1008  The 
most common type of intellectual property typically infringed within the drilling context falls 
under the law of patents,1009 and only gives rise to tortious liability.1010  Where established, this 
tortious liability can be very costly, and the process for determining the damages payable can 
also be very rigorous.1011   
 
The foregoing creates the incentive for the contractor to limit their exposure to the potential 
liability to third parties.  Even though the contractor, and the operator, should ordinarily bear the 
responsibility for the economic consequences of their intellectual property infringements, the 
contractor would typically seek to cap their liability to the limits of their insurance.  While the 
operator would seek to exclude intellectual property from the aggregate liability,1012 so that any 
occurrence would be recompensed fully by the contractor, the latter would seek to subsume 
intellectual property infringement within the aggregate liability, potentially leaving the operator 
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with a higher possibility of bearing the responsibility for the economic consequences of the 
residual risk.1013  This situation is typically resolved by negotiation and compromise by the 
contract parties, but market conditions and the balance of power between them also play a role 
in this regard. 
       
4.3      Rationale for the Manner of Risk Allocation between Parties to a Drilling Contract 
The preceding sections focused on the allocation of responsibilities and risks by the parties to 
the drilling contract inter se, highlighting the different perspectives of operator, non-operator 
and contractor.  That section essentially built on the previous chapter of the study in which the 
default risk allocation methods – the bedrock – were examined, together with the contractual 
response by contract parties which modified the default positions.  Focusing on the allocation of 
responsibilities and risks by the parties to the drilling contract inter se deepens understanding, 
not only of the distinction between the default risk allocation method and the modification by 
the parties, but also of the dynamics of the distribution of those responsibilities and risks, further 
consolidating the departure from the default risk allocation methods. 
 
Having examined what the risks are, and how they are allocated by the parties, this section 
examines why they have been allocated in the manner that they have, and whether they could 
have been allocated in a different manner.  Essentially, this is an analysis of whether the way the 
parties have allocated risks is effective in achieving their contract objectives, especially when 
juxtaposed with the bedrock positions relating to the different risk events.        
 
4.3.1 Risk Allocation Rationales based on Industry Practice 
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Some rationales for risk allocation have arisen from long and sustained practice within the oil 
and gas industry.  Although this practice has not emanated from any written convention or 
agreement, the global nature of its adoption and/or application lends credence to its existence 
and relevance.  Like any other practice that is not backed by force of law, it remains of persuasive 
character, and contract parties are at liberty to ignore it and allocate risks inter se as they deem 
fit.   
 
Furthermore, even when contract parties seem to have ‘adopted’ the practice, there is no evidence 
of any documentation which attributes the manner of risk allocation to any practice.  Given the 
private nature of contracts and contracts negotiations, unless parties actually reflect the 
underlying philosophies of the contract terms in the drilling contract, rationale in specific 
contexts can only be a matter of conjecture.  Reference is only made to the ‘adoption’ of the 
practice in retrospect, and to its global existence, when multiple instances of that adoption can 
be established across different jurisdictions.     
 
4.3.1.1  Doctrine of Tradition 
 
The doctrine of tradition operates on the premise that risk for designated personnel, equipment 
and procedure is usually assigned to the contractor, leaving the other obligations/risks to be 
allocated between the parties by negotiation, in the absence of which any unallocated risk will 
default to the operator.1014  In this vein, the doctrine of tradition is complemented by the concept 
of custom by which terms arising from the usage or practice of a given trade or market, or from 
prior dealing between the relevant parties, may be implied into their contract.1015 Although there 
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is no list of obligations or risks that fall under the purview of the doctrine of tradition, it is 
possible to deduce some of them by reference to sustained practice by contract parties.   
 
Thus, it is customary, for instance, to expect that the drilling contractor would supply the drilling 
unit, together with most of the crew required to carry on the drilling operations, while the 
operator would furnish the drilling mud, coring equipment, storage tanks, testing and completion 
services, as well as the requisite equipment.1016 
   
In the same vein, whichever party was responsible for providing any equipment or personnel 
traditionally bore the risks associated with that provision.  Although it is recognised that this may 
not always be true for all circumstances, this approach was said to represent the ‘base case’ which 
was present in the drilling contract market place, regulating the drilling contract relationship, 
much in the same manner that the market forces of demand and supply regulate price and 
output.1017     
 
A parallel can be drawn between the doctrine of tradition and the risk allocation method 
discussed in the bedrock section.  The hallmark of the bedrock is the default risk allocation 
method that bore the fault element.  Essentially, liability was imposed based on responsibility, 
which coincided with risk upon the occurrence of the adverse event.  However, the difference 
between them is the fact that the bedrock applied by default to the contract parties whether or 
not they consented to it, while the doctrine of tradition is still based on the will of the parties, 
and industry practice, which supposedly evolved over time.   
 
Even though the doctrine of tradition is only persuasive in nature, there may be repercussions 
attendant upon allocating risk in a manner that goes contrary to its dictates.  Undoubtedly, if a 
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contract party takes on risk that should traditionally be borne by the other party, then the former 
would need to take additional steps to ensure that they are able to meet the obligations required 
by that risk allocation.  In most cases, this would mean deploying resources and taking out 
insurance which they would not ordinarily require, and subsequently internalise this in the cost 
of the contract, inevitably increasing this cost. This is admittedly a ‘lose – lose’ situation for both 
parties, whether or not they realise – or even acknowledge – this fact. 
 
4.3.1.2  Doctrine of Best Knowledge 
 
This doctrine stipulates that risk should be allocated to the contract party who is most 
knowledgeable about the specific risk, and better placed to avoid legal action ensuing 
therefrom.1018  It is epistemological in approach, and knowledge here would typically be gained 
from experience relating to risk events, processes and procedures, geographical considerations 
and specificities.   
 
The doctrine of best knowledge finds philosophical support in the previous discussion on the 
distinction between risk and uncertainty.1019  The thrust of the doctrine is to avoid legal action 
that arises from lack of knowledge about the specific risk subject-matter and, by so doing, 
eliminate, or at least reduce, the uncertainty that ordinarily characterises risk.  Writers such as 
Althaus1020 recognise that knowledge mitigates the ‘unknown’ factor in risk, and attempts to 
control the randomness that would otherwise ensue.  Indeed, in Rumsfeld’s ‘unknown 
unknowns’,1021 the infusion of knowledge into the specific context would re-characterise the 
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mantra to ‘known known’ or ‘known unknown’, both of which demonstrate a better grasp of the 
risk situation.  The same would be true of Taleb’s Black Swan event. 1022  
 
Thus, allocating the risk of an unsound well location to the operator, for instance, is based on 
their expected knowledge of the well site, garnered from the results of the geotechnical survey 
of the seabed conditions of the well location prior to the arrival of the drilling rig.  Likewise, 
allocating the risk of loss or damage of the drilling unit to the contractor is consistent with the 
doctrine of best knowledge as no other party can claim to know the drilling unit better than the 
contractor.   
 
Indeed, the cost of allocating risk to a party who lacks requisite knowledge about the subject 
matter or responsibility can be very dire.  In Callon Petroleum Co v Big Chief Drilling Co,1023 
the responsibility and risk of ensuring a sound location were allocated to the operator, who 
procured the services of a third party for this purpose.  However, the contractor unilaterally 
altered the location approved by the operator, resulting in a significant increase in the cost of the 
directional drilling.  It was held that the contractor had, by that action, assumed the risk of 
ensuring a sound well location, which it had failed to do, and was thus responsible for bearing 
the economic consequences of the failure to do so. 
 
4.3.1.3  Doctrine of ‘Clay Feet’ 
 
 This doctrine stipulates that the contract party who is under a legal obligation to perform or 
refrain from performing an act, the breach of which would attract legal action and/or sanction, 
should bear the economic consequences of the occurrence of the legal action or imposition of 
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the sanction.1024  The doctrine’s premise is that a legal obligation cannot be outsourced or 
transferred.  Legal obligations are typically imposed by statute or other subordinate legislation, 
together with the sanctions applicable upon a breach, which would usually be targeted at the 
obligor. 
 
Thus, where for instance, as previously discussed, the operator bears the legal responsibility of 
obtaining the requisite drilling permits and the risk of non-compliance,1025 this doctrine ordinarily 
presupposes that they are unable to allocate this risk by contract to the contractor.  This would 
also imply that the obligor is unable to share the risk with the other party, neither are they legally 
able to allege contributory negligence in respect of the legal obligation.      
 
However, there is evidence that contract parties have purported to allocate risks arising from 
legal obligations and statutory duties using indemnities and exclusion clauses.  This practice has 
also been judicially recognised and approved.  In Persimmon Homes Ltd v Ove Arup and 
Partners Ltd,1026 it was held that contractual releases will be enforced for breaches of statutory 
duty if the parties express that intent. Provided the contractual provisions are clear, then the 
courts will enforce that as being the agreed risk allocation method of the parties.  This position 
is different from that adopted by the court in the Transocean/BP litigation,1027 in which the court 
held that the release given by BP to Transocean even for gross negligence and strict liability will 
be enforceable in respect of third-party compensatory damages claims, but will be unenforceable 
in respect of punitive damages based on public policy considerations.1028 
 
                                                 
1024 Rankin, M. D. and Richardson, D. R. ‘The Offshore Drilling Contract-Operator and Contractor Perspectives’, 
Op.Cit, at p. 3. 
1025 Under the heading ‘Licences and Authorisations’.   
1026 (2017) EWCA Civ 373. 
1027 Case 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS Document 5446, Op.Cit. at pp.10–19. 






To reconcile the different approaches taken by the UK and USA courts, this study posits that, as 
between the relevant statutory authority and the contract party-obligor, the legal obligation 
remains where it falls.  Thus, the operator, for instance, would always be answerable to the state 
if it fails to obtain a relevant drilling permit.  However, contract parties are not precluded from 
allocating risks between themselves as they deem fit as a corollary to that.  Hence, the legal 
obligor could answer directly to the government authority, and then require the contractual 
obligor to recompense for the loss.   
 
This position also seems to have judicial support as can be seen from the decision in Caledonia 
North Sea Ltd v London Bridge Engineering Ltd.1029  In this case, the court found that the operator 
of an offshore oil and gas production platform is made responsible for any death or personal 
injury that occurred from radioactivity pursuant to the Offshore Installations (Operational Safety, 
Health and Welfare) Regulations 1976 (SI 1976/1019).1030  Pursuant to these regulations, the 
operator settled the claims relating to the fatalities that occurred on 6 July 1988 on the Piper 
Alpha oil platform.  Thereafter, it sought indemnification from the contractor in respect of the 
payments relating to their own staff who also died in the explosion based on the knock-for-knock 
indemnity structure contained in their drilling contract.  The House of Lords had no difficulty in 
finding for the operator, its rationale being that nothing precluded the operator from recovering 
in these circumstances since the contractual provision was clear and unequivocal.1031       
 
4.3.1.4  Doctrine of Accountability 
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This doctrine focuses on the contract party in control of the process that gives rise to legal 
proceedings, and states that this party should be allocated the risk of the occurrence of the 
harmful event emanating from the process.1032    
 
The thrust of the doctrine immediately highlights the distinction between accountability and 
responsibility, and confirms the study’s position that responsibility does not always coincide 
with accountability, as far as risk allocation is concerned.  Indeed, a contract party may be in 
‘control’ of a certain procedure, but may not be responsible for physically carrying out the 
required task.  This is the scenario where the operator is allocated the risk of blowout, fire, 
explosion, cratering or any uncontrolled well condition as well as damage to the reservoir or 
geological formation.  This allocation is typical, notwithstanding the fact that the contractor is 
responsible for the physical drilling operations. 
 
The question then arises as to how to establish ‘control’, and which of the parties is seised of this 
in respect of a given procedure.  The issue of control was dealt with in Chapter 31033 in respect of 
vicarious liability of an employer, as one of the tests for distinguishing between an employee 
and an independent contractor.  The control test highlights the employer’s ability to direct the 
way in which tasks were undertaken.1034   
 
Still under Chapter 3, the issue of ‘control’ was also discussed in determining who an occupier 
of premises was.  The courts applied a control test, such that anyone who exercised a degree of 
occupational control over premises was regarded as the occupier; the greater the degree of this 
control by an individual, the more likely the finding that the latter is the occupier.1035 
 
                                                 
1032 Rankin, M. D. and Richardson, D. R. ‘The Offshore Drilling Contract-Operator and Contractor Perspectives’, 
supra, at p. 3. 
1033 Under the heading ‘Whiteacre Undertakes Task X for Blackacre – Through an Employee or Third Party’. 
1034 See, for instance, Short v J&W Henderson Ltd (1946) 79 LI. L. Rep. 271. 
1035 Wheat v E Lacon & Co Ltd (1966) 1 All ER 582, in which the ‘occupier’ was defined as a ‘convenient label for 






The common denominator between these discourses is the enquiry into the directing mind of the 
subject endeavour.  Where it is established that a separate entity directed the affairs constituting 
a specific subject matter, that entity remains accountable, even though the instructions were 
carried out by another entity.  Most drilling contracts make it an obligation of the contractor to 
comply with lawful instructions issued by the operator.  This puts it beyond contention that the 
operator is the directing entity, which may be the reason why contractors seek to allocate the 
majority of the risks to it – (the operator) – and only accept for themselves – (the contractors) – 
the remainder of the risks that they traditionally own and for which they can obtain insurance.1036    
 
4.3.2 Risk Allocation Rationales based on Legal/Economic Considerations 
 
There are other rationales that, by their thrust and content, seem to have emerged from 
legal/economic considerations.  These focus on the optimality of risk allocation with the aim of 
ensuring that risk is allocated in the most efficient way possible in the circumstances.  They 
proceed on the premise that, like every other resource that is capable of being allocated, risk can 
create inefficiencies if allocated sub-optimally, thereby creating a deadweight loss or allocative 
inefficiency. 
 
4.3.2.1  Party Best Able to Bear the Risk 
 
The concept of the party who is best able to bear a specified risk subsumes several elements, 
each of which aids in understanding the relative positions of each contract party, and how 
allocative efficiency can be achieved through the way in which they allocate contractual risk.  
According to Posner, the party who is best able to bear a given risk is the party who can bear it 
                                                 
1036 See, generally, Warren, T. ‘The Operator-Contractor Relationship – Contract Changes, 1982 to 1984’. 
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Allocating Liability in Upstream Project Contracts’, Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, 26(2), pp. 177– 






cheapest.1037  In this study’s construct, this means placing the obligation to bear the economic 
consequences of the occurrence of a given event on the party who can deal with this more cost-
effectively.   
 
Perhaps the most critical factors in risk bearing from a cost perspective are the availability and 
cost of insurance.  Taken together, these factors would determine the contract party who is best 
able to insure.  Insurance undoubtedly increases the contract cost, and one way of keeping the 
contract cost effective is to ensure that the party that can procure the lower cost insurance is 
allocated the relevant risk.  There is evidence that contract parties can engage in risky 
commercial ventures once they can procure insurance to cover it, however, the insurance 
procured in these circumstances may not always be optimal.1038  This is the result when a party 
that is not in the best position to insure takes on the relevant risk, thereby creating cost 
inefficiency in the contract.  To avoid this, the party with the comparative insurance advantage 
should be allocated the risk, which is the reason why contractors often insist that the operator 
assume all risks relating to the well, as contractors are not best able to procure insurance for these 
purposes.1039 
 
The foregoing notwithstanding, the determination of the contract party that is best able to bear 
the risk goes beyond the determination of the party that is best able to insure.  Importantly, it 
calls into question the capacity of a party to bear a given risk.1040  In this context, capacity is 
determined by access to, or ownership of, resources with which to deal with the risk, if it 
eventuates.  This would entail having the right level of expertise and authority, as well as the 
                                                 
1037 Posner, R. A. (1986), supra, at p.44. 
1038 See, generally, Arrow, K. J. (1992) ‘Insurance, Risk and Resource Allocation’, Foundations of Insurance 
Economics: Springer, at pp. 220–229. 
1039 See, for instance, Moomjian, C. A. (1999) ‘Contractual Insurance and Risk Allocation in the Offshore Drilling 
Industry’, Drilling Contractor, March/April at p. 14. 
1040 Loosemore, M. and McCarthy, C. (2008) ‘Perceptions of Contractual Risk Allocation in Construction Supply 






resources with which to implement other risk management strategies that ensure that contract 
objectives are met.1041   
 
Undoubtedly, capacity to meet the exigencies of the occurrence of an adverse event is paramount 
from the contractor’s perspective, which is why, for instance, they tend to reject being allocated 
the risk of blowouts, cratering, pollution emanating therefrom, or any other well control events.  
The rationale remains their lack of capacity to deal with the economic consequences of these 
events when they occur.  It is doubtful, for instance, that Transocean could have paid $21 billion 
that BP has so far had to settle for the post-Macondo litigation, or whether it could have found 
an insurer willing to cover it for that liability.1042          
 
4.3.2.2  Overall Efficiency Rationale 
 
There are other parameters that contribute to transactional efficiency which also serve as 
rationales for deciding the way in which risk could be allocated between contract parties.  One 
such parameter is risk diversification – and this entails an enquiry into which party is best able 
to diversify risk more cost-effectively by spreading risk out into various undertakings to avoid 
exposure to the adverse effects of any one endeavour – and who can best avoid the cost of 
financial distress if the risk event happens.1043  This rationale is premised on the assumption that 
a party that has the capacity to mitigate risk volatility, given the breadth of their assets or 
investment relative to the specific risk, should be allocated that contractual risk. 
 
It is on this basis, for instance, that contractors bear the responsibility for the economic 
consequences of any damage to the drilling unit.  The thinking is that the contractor owns 
                                                 
1041 Ibid, at p.95. 
1042 Gilblom, K. and Jordan, A. (2018) ‘BP’s $60 Billion Gulf Spill Tab Rises as Lawsuits Wind Down’, Bloomberg 
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multiple rigs in respect of which they can procure good insurance deals, the discount of which 
can be internalised in day rates.  Furthermore, because they are assumed to work for different 
clients simultaneously, they can leverage their entire contracts portfolio, deploying men, 
materials and technology across the fleet to optimise individual contracts.    
 
Overall efficiency can be achieved only if contract parties co-operate and share information 
transparently about risk profile, risk appetite and insurance to aid this process.  When parties fail 
to share information, or engage in misinformation or disinformation, this inevitably creates 
informational inefficiencies, eroding the possibility of achieving optimality.1044  There is 
evidence that contract parties to a drilling contract sometimes engage in disinformation in 
circumstances where the balance of power and market conditions disfavour the party.  For 
instance, a contractor who misinforms about their risk and insurance profile just to get work from 
the operator in a depressed rig market, may duly get work and accept risk that the operator 
allocates, even when they know that they cannot afford to bear the economic consequences of 
the occurrence of the adverse event.1045  This would inevitably lead to a dispute if the risk event 
occurs, and litigation may ensue therefrom, a situation which is indicative of economic 
inefficiency as resources are deemed to have been sub-optimally allocated. 
 
The value proposition of the contract parties would affect the manner of risk allocation, and 
impact the attainment of economic efficiency.  For instance, a contract party might think that it 
is fair and equitable to allocate risk in a certain manner based on their preference and perceptions 
of fairness and equity, while the other contract party might focus on market conditions, seeking 
to maximise whatever benefits it presents, to allocate risk in a different manner.1046  Thus, where 
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an operator seeks to take advantage of a weak rig market to allocate the risk of loss of, or damage 
to their equipment, or to the reservoir, to the contractor, the implication is that the latter then 
assumes the position, not only of driller, but also of insurer, thereby creating a distortion in the 
overall efficiency of the contract.        
 
4.3.2.3  Economic Benefit Rationale 
 
This rationale proceeds on the basis that the contract party that stands to reap the benefit of any 
specific procedure should be allocated the risk arising therefrom as well.  It has its roots in the 
benefit principle, a concept of taxation which states that those who benefit more from 
expenditure by the government ought to pay higher taxes to support that expenditure.1047  This 
principle is the conceptual equivalent of the benefit rationale discussed in Chapter 2 on vicarious 
liability,1048 which suggests that the employer who benefits from the employee’s services, should 
also bear the burden of any wrongful act that results therefrom, as one cannot purport to take a 
benefit without the corresponding responsibility.1049  Furthermore, it is underpinned by the theory 
of risk and reward,1050 which posits that parties, as rational people, will accept higher risk 
provided this translates into higher profits, which exceed the cost of capital attendant upon the 
increased risk. 
 
The economic benefit principle justifies the typical position adopted by contractors who posit 
that the majority of the risks arising from the drilling contract should be allocated to the operator 
                                                 
1047 See, generally, Oakland, W. H. and Testa, W. A. (1996) ‘State-Local Business Taxation and the Benefits 
Principle’, Economic Perspectives-Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 20, at pp. 2–18. 
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who stands to benefit economically from production in the oilfield – assuming that commercial 
discovery and development have occurred – in which they have proprietary interest long after 
the drilling contractor has exited the scene.1051  In addition, when contract parties allocate the risk 
of consequential losses on a knock-for-knock basis, essentially stating that each party bears their 
losses, this is a tacit validation of the economic benefit principle.  The definition of consequential 
losses ordinarily encompasses ‘loss of profit’; the profit element is the economic benefit that 
parties ordinarily intend to obtain pursuant to the contract.  Where profit is lost in a manner 
anticipated by the contract, the economic benefit principle requires that parties respectively 
absorb this, in the same manner as they would have benefited had drilling operations gone 
according to, or better than, plan.            
 
4.3.2.4  Foreseeability Rationale 
 
This rationale posits that risk should be allocated to the party who is best able to foresee the 
potential adverse events that could occur, and is able to act to avoid the risk events from 
occurring.1052  From this perspective, risk allocation should ultimately be about parties allocating 
the economic consequences of the occurrence of events between themselves in a manner that 
ensures allocation to the party who is best able to manage the likelihood of the occurrence of the 
event and, if it occurs, the economic consequences of the event occurring.   
 
Foreseeability rationale is premised on sufficient knowledge and experience of the subject matter 
covered by the allocated risk, especially relating to procedures, resources, potential pitfalls and 
challenges.  It also presupposes that the contract party possesses adequate resources to prevent 
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the foreseen risk from eventuating, and assumes that the risk is truly foreseeable, as a party can 
be relieved from the consequences of their breach if the promisee’s losses were unforeseeable.1053   
 
However, there must be an incentive for the contract party to invest in mitigation and avoidance 
measures that address the risk event.  From an efficiency perspective, the cost of mitigation must 
be lower than the cost of the risk occurring, otherwise it becomes more efficient to allow the 
adverse event to occur, and then deal with the economic consequences of its occurrence.  The 
incentive may also arise if both foreseeability and likelihood of occurrence are high,1054 
prompting the obligor-contract party to act to prevent it from occurring.  
 
The courts have opined that the risk of any event which could be foreseen, should be allocated 
by the contract parties, as its occurrence would not excuse performance.1055  However, contract 
parties are not always able to foresee future events, the occurrence of which may be unintended 
and unforeseeable.  For these situations, parties insert the force majeure clause in their contracts 
which essentially allocate risks to lie where they fall, each party bearing whatever proportion of 
the adverse event that occurred is attributable to them as losses. 
   
Conclusion 
The foregoing sections have focused on the contractual response to the fault-based risk allocation 
regime by contract parties.  This response was predicated on the harshness of this regime and the 
conflict with the manner in which parties would have allocated the responsibility of bearing the 
economic consequences of the occurrence of the adverse events if they had adverted their minds 
to it.  The rationale for the different responses examined above range from commercial 
expediency to cost optimisation; contract parties wanted to exercise their freedom of contract in 
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a way that served their purposes rather than leave this to the discretion of the court, which the 
parties had already found to be unsatisfactory.   
 
However, in exercising this freedom, contract parties sometimes went overboard, failing to take 
into cognisance the overarching effect of their actions and preferences on the wider society, 
members of which were the unwilling sufferers of these excesses. Where the way the economic 
consequences of the occurrence of an event is being allocated could create a disequilibrium in 
society, and/or otherwise threaten societal cohesion, legislative intervention is seen as necessary 
to safeguard the public space from perceived negative private interests and opportunistic 








LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION IN CONTRACTUAL RISK ALLOCATION 
 
5.1 Anti-Indemnity Legislation  
Dissatisfied with the manner in which contract parties sought indemnification, certain states in 
USA enacted anti-indemnity statutes.1056  These statutes forbid indemnification against death, 
injury or damage caused by the indemnitee’s negligence, and expressly void any provision in 
any agreement under their purview which purports to circumvent and/or defeat the prohibitive 
aim of the legislation.1057  These statutes arose from perceived public policy concerns about 
weaker contractual parties who were made to indemnify stronger parties for the latter’s own 
negligence, due to the former’s weak bargaining position.  This also imposed unwarranted 
financial obligations on the weaker parties, further justifying legislative intervention.  The 
wording of the anti-indemnity statutes is nearly identical in explaining the types of indemnity 
agreements which are unenforceable.1058  For instance, the Louisiana Act provides as follows: 
‘Any provision contained in, collateral to, or affecting an agreement pertaining to a well for oil, 
gas, or water, or drilling for minerals which occur in a solid, liquid, gaseous, or other state, is 
void and unenforceable to the extent that it purports to or does provide for defense or indemnity, 
or either, to the indemnitee against loss or liability for damages arising out of or resulting from 
death or bodily injury to persons, which is caused by or results from the sole or concurrent 
negligence or fault (strict liability) of the indemnitee, or an agent, employee, or an independent 
Contractor who is directly responsible to the indemnitee’.1059 
   
                                                 
1056 The Wyoming Act (Wyo. STAT. §§ 30-1-131 to -133 (1983); the New Mexico Act (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-
7-2 (1986); the Louisiana Act (LA. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2780 (West Supp. 1989); the Texas Act (TEX. CIV. 
PRAC. & REM. CODE §§127.001 – 127.007). 
1057 See, for instance, the Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act (‘LOAIA’), La. Rev. Stat. 9:2780(g). 
1058 Redfearn R. J., (2005) ‘Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Acts and Their Impact on Insurance Coverage: A Comparative 
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For the statutes to apply, certain conditions need to be satisfied.  First, the subject matter must 
relate to ‘agreement pertaining to wells for oil, gas, or water or to a mine for a mineral’.1060  As 
straightforward as this sounds, this provision has been the reason for a lot of litigation, all geared 
towards determining whether specific agreements fall within the scope of the statutes.  
Indemnitors who are required to indemnify another party for the latter’s own negligence have an 
incentive to bring the agreement within the scope of the statutes.  For instance, in Gainsco 
Insurance Co v Amoco Production Co,1061 the court held that delivering oil by truck to a tank 
battery is not an activity closely related to well drilling, and so was not caught by the provisions 
of the Wyoming statute.  The court came to the same conclusion in Reliance Ins Co v Chevron 
USA, Inc,1062 in which it held that an agreement to dig pits to collect waste fluids emanating from 
a fire that ensued at a gas separation facility did not fall within the scope of the Wyoming statute, 
even though the facility processed gas for reinjection for artificial lift and well pressure 
maintenance.  In both cases, the courts upheld the indemnity provisions that indemnified for own 
negligence, leaving the indemnitors with the burden of bearing the economic consequences of 
the occurrence of the adverse events caused by the indemnitees’ negligence. 
 
Secondly, the agreement must seek to indemnify a party against its own negligence. Thus, where 
the negligence complained about was caused by the indemnitor rather than the indemnitee, the 
relevant provisions of the statutes were not triggered.  In this regard, the mere fact that an 
indemnity provision exists in an agreement falling within the scope of the statutes does not 
automatically invalidate it.  This point was emphasised in Cities Serv Co v Northern Prod Co,1063 
which also stated that even where both the indemnitor and indemnitee were concurrently 
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negligent, the indemnity would be invalid to the extent of the indemnitee’s negligence, and by 
the same token, be valid to the extent of the indemnitor’s negligence.1064 
      
The condition that the agreement must seek to indemnify a party against its own negligence is 
itself subject to the fair notice principle, laid down in Spence & Howe Constr Co v Gulf Oil 
Corp,1065 to the effect that it is only right that a party who is exposed to assuming significant risk 
on behalf of the other party, even in circumstances of that other party’s negligence, should be 
put on notice.  This principle is made up of two other principles: the express negligence principle, 
which was established in Joe Adams & Son v McCann Constr Co,1066 and states that the intent to 
indemnify a party against its own negligence must be clear and unequivocal; and the 
conspicuousness principle, which requires the indemnity provision to be conspicuously 
displayed in the contract to avoid injustice that would be occasioned by the indemnitor not 
actually distinguishing the provision from other provisions in the contract.1067  In Dresser 
Industries, Inc v Page Petroleum, Inc,1068 the Texas Supreme Court clarified that the standard of 
conspicuousness required was the same as that contained in the Uniform Commercial Code.1069  
These measures are taken to ensure that the parties fully understand and accept the nature of 
obligations to which they intend to sign up in the contract, and can be traced to the legislature’s 
intent to intervene to prevent injustice and unfairness being meted out to contract parties in 
weaker bargaining positions.  Thus, even in circumstances where indemnification for own 
negligence would be valid, the fair notice principle ensures that this intent is not only 
unequivocal but also distinctly communicated and accepted by contract parties. 
                                                 
1064 See also Accord Tipton v Texaco, Inc, 103 N.M. 689, 696-97, 712 P.2d 1351, 1358-59 (1985). 
1065 365 S.W.2d 631, 634 (Tex. 1963). 
1066 475 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex. 1971). 
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1973, writ ref'’d n.r.e.).  It was held that an indemnity provision which is surrounded by unrelated contract provisions 
did not meet conspicuousness standard). 
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Thirdly, the statutes only cover certain heads of liability or losses.1070  In general, the heads of 
losses and liability covered are death or personal injury, as well as property damage.  However, 
there are differences in the specific heads of losses and liability covered by the respective 
statutes.  For instance, while the Louisiana statute covers liability or loss arising from bodily 
injury or death,1071 the Wyoming and New Mexico statutes also cover injury to property.1072  
Furthermore, even within the heads of losses and liability covered, the statutes also specify and 
exclude losses and liability from certain sources from its scope.  For instance, the Texas statute 
does not prohibit indemnity agreements for personal injury, death, or property injury resulting 
from radioactivity and pollution, reservoir or underground damage.  It also does not apply to 
death or property injury resulting from services to control a wild well either to protect the safety 
of the general public or to prevent depletion of vital natural resources.1073 
 
Given the scope of the exemptions from the application of the statutes, this study notes that 
contract parties retain the ability to provide for indemnification for own negligence in respect of 
the occurrence of adverse events from the most critical aspects of the drilling process.  For 
instance, the adverse events which typically result in the greatest numbers of fatalities and 
casualties during the drilling process are wild well events – that typically lead to fire and 
explosion – and radioactivity.  An example is the Piper Alpha catastrophe that led to the death 
of 167 people – the highest number of fatalities ever recorded during offshore drilling, arising 
from fire and explosion fuelled by gas and radioactive substances.1074  Thus, the curtailment of 
the intention to indemnify for own negligence by the anti-indemnity statutes has not totally 
prevented parties from evincing this intent and providing same in their contracts, especially with 
                                                 
1070 §127.003 of the Texas Act (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE).   
1071 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2780B (West Supp. 1989). 
1072 Subsections III(L)(b), (c), Wyo. STAT. §§ 30-1-131 to -133 (1983). 
1073 §127.004 of the Texas Act (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE).     
1074 The Offshore Installations (Operational Safety, Health and Welfare) Regulations 1976 (SI 1976/1019) make 
the operator of an offshore oil and gas production platform responsible for any death or personal injury that occurs 






respect to the occurrence of adverse events that have potentially devastating impact on life and 
property. 
          
Fourthly, the statutes exclude certain types of agreements from their scope of coverage – for 
example, joint operating agreements1075 and farm-out agreements.1076  Furthermore, the statutes 
also exclude agreements for the purchase and transportation of gas or natural gas liquids by 
pipeline or fixed associated facilities,1077 as well as ‘construction, maintenance, or repair of oil, 
natural gas liquids, or gas pipelines’.1078  A commentator has rationalised these exclusions by 
stating that the activities they cover are further removed from activities at the wellsite, 
notwithstanding that the transaction which is the subject of the agreement is somewhat connected 
to the oil and gas industry.1079  This study posits that another rationale for these exclusions can 
be found in the mischief which the legislature wanted to cure, which was to address the perceived 
injustice that was meted out to significantly weaker parties, particularly contractors, in a 
commercial oil and gas transaction.  The exclusions reflect activities and transactions which 
require parties to be of fairly equal bargaining power.  For instance, joint operating agreements 
regulate co-venturers who have come together to pursue a common objective of exploiting 
hydrocarbons, each of whom freely determines his level of participation in the joint venture.  It 
is unlikely that a party can be coerced or intimidated to participate in this venture, and the 
provisions1080 of the JOA serve as an additional safeguard to ensure participation in accordance 
with the co-venturers intentions.      
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Lastly, statutory exceptions apply where the indemnity obligation is supported by insurance 
coverage provided by the indemnitor, or in respect of mutual indemnities where each party 
provides cover for the other party in equal amounts, subject to statutory limits.1081  Again, this 
study posits that the rationale for these exclusions lies in the fact that a transaction cannot be said 
to be unjust or unfair if both parties bear the same economic burden to provide identical amounts 
of money to fund their respective indemnity obligations. 
 
Where the provisions of the anti-indemnity statutes can be successfully invoked, their effect is 
to shift the risk allocation back to the party who sought to burden the other party with the 
economic consequences of occurrence of a specified event.  Even in circumstances in which the 
anti-indemnity statutes have not been successfully invoked, there are still challenges with the 
enforcement of the indemnities.  Sanchez identifies two such challenges as being applicable law 
as well as whether the indemnity can indeed be enforced under the applicable law.1082  
 
The first issue arises primarily when injuries occur offshore because different legislation1083 have 
an impact upon the consequences of an injury that occurs offshore.  Where a finding is made to 
the effect that a law other than the anti-indemnity statute applies in a given situation, the risk 
allocation of the parties is affected, and previous assumptions may be rebutted.  A party may 
thus be left with risk thought to have been originally allocated under the relevant anti-indemnity 
statute. 
                                                 
1081 Combined effects of §§127.005 and 127.006 of the Texas Act (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE).   
1082 Sanchez, L. (2006) ‘Charting the Chaotic Offshore Waters: The Validity of Contractual Indemnity Provisions 
Pertaining to Injuries Sustained Offshore’, Tul. Mar. LJ, 31, p. 177, at p. 178. 
1083 For instance, Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (‘OCSLA’), 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. Il 1985); 
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (‘LHWCA’), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1982 & Supp. III 
1985); Admiralty Extension Act (‘AEA’) 46 U.S.C. app. § 740 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Death on the High Seas 






In making a finding of applicable law, the courts take into consideration the facts and 
circumstances of each transaction.1084  In Theriot v Bay Drilling Corp,1085 the court held that the 
enquiry would be largely dependent on whether a ‘vessel’1086 is utilised for the operation in 
question.  The nature of the operations performed, as well as the location of the vessel, will also 
affect the applicable law.1087 
 
The second issue as to whether an indemnity can be enforced under the applicable law can then 
be resolved once a finding has been made on which law is actually applicable.  This is by no 
means a straightforward process, and the analyses and outcomes from different courts are 
sometimes confusing.1088  Indeed, Sanchez characterises the current situation of determining the 
enforceability of indemnities under the anti-indemnity statutes as a ‘chaotic mess of statutes, 
legal tests, and facts’.1089  Nevertheless, this study posits that it is a process that is worth 
undergoing each time there is a dispute, as the anti-indemnity statutes are crucial, not only 
because they ultimately allocate risk in a structured manner between parties to a contract, but 
they also serve as the mechanism through which power dynamics between the parties are 
balanced, inequalities in contract drafting are normalised, and the preservation of the core 
objective of public policy attained.  The implication of this confusion on contractual certainty 
and predictability of outcomes is noted, however, the multiplicity of possible applicable 
legislation has created this situation, which can only be addressed and redressed by streamlining 
and clarifying this area of law to infuse greater certainty and confidence.  
 
                                                 
1084 Schilling, E. T. (2001) ‘Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co: The Sinking Ship of Fifth Circuit Precedent Construing 
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and Maritime Law’, Tulane Law Review, 76:1785; Demette v Falcon Drilling 
Co, 280 E3d 492, 503 (5th Cir.), reh ‘g en banc denied, E3d - (5th Cir. 2002). 
1085 783 F.2d 527, 539 (5th Cir. 1986). 
1086 In offshore lingo, ‘vessel’ includes semisubmersible platforms, lift boats, self-elevating work-over platforms, 
and jack-up rigs. 
1087  Smith v Penrod Drilling Corp, 960 F.2d 456, 460, 1993 AMC 81, 185 (5th Cir. 1992). 
1088 Johnson, E. S. and Matherne, C. T. (1999) ‘Statutory and Contractual Indemnification and Forum Selection, 
Including the Oil Patch’, Tul. Mar. LJ, 24, pp. 85–124, at p. 123. 






5.2 Unfair Contracts Terms Act, 1977 
 
Background 
This statute (UCTA 1977) is an example of a very direct legislative intervention to safeguard 
interests of consumers, whether these are individuals or businesses transacting as consumers. 
The Law Commission confirms that this intervention was made to prevent injustice that would 
be occasioned by a consumer’s lack of understanding of the meaning of the contract clauses or 
even when he does, is precluded by his weak bargaining position from preventing its 
inclusion.1090  Beale agrees, and states that a weak bargaining position can erode freedom of 
contract, even where a party has read and understood the purport and effect of an exemption 
clause.1091 Wilson and Bone suggest that this protection is also afforded businesses who deal as 
consumers, whether these are small or large businesses.1092 
 
The question then arises as to whether parties to an offshore drilling contract, who can be stated 
as dealing in the course of business, can be considered as consumers within the contemplation 
of the Act.  Judicial attitude to this question has gone through different phases.  Initially, courts 
were quite clear that the UCTA 1977 applied only to consumer contracts and not to commercial 
contracts generally.1093  The rationale was the assumption that parties to commercial contracts 
were generally of equal bargaining power and so the courts should not interfere in the way they 
have allocated risks inter se.1094  
   
                                                 
1090 Law Com. No 69 (1975) Law Commission’s Second Report on Exemption Clauses. 
1091 Beale, H. (1978) ‘Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977’, Brit. JL & Soc'y, 5, at pp. 114 – 115. 
1092 Wilson, S. and Bone, S. (2002) ‘Businesses, Standard Terms and the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977’, J. 
Obligations & Remedies, 1, at pp. 29– 30. 
1093 White, A. (1997) ‘Caveat Vendor? A Review of the Court of Appeal Decision in St Albans City and District 
Council v International Computers Limited’, The Journal of Information, Law and Technology (JILT), 3. 






This attitude shifted when courts laid down the principle that a party would not be deemed to be 
‘dealing in the course of business’ if it entered into a contract that was not in pursuit of its core 
business or, if it was related to it, did not occur with frequency or regularity that could lead to 
the conclusion that it was ‘dealing in the course of business’.1095  This was in line with the 
provisions of the Act that pertain to when a party deals as a consumer, relative to another who is 
‘dealing in the course of business’.1096  The aim here was to expand the scope of transactions 
within the purview of the Act, enabling the test of reasonableness to be applied thereto. 
 
The current position is that the courts are progressively finding reasons to intervene and apply 
the test of reasonableness, even when it is clear that both parties are dealing in the course of 
business.  This was the case in Salvage Association v CAP Financial Services Ltd1097 which 
centred on defective software, and the court applied the reasonableness test notwithstanding the 
fact that both parties were dealing in the course of business.  Indeed, Lawson1098 has advised 
businesses to recognise this trend and expect more judicial scrutiny even as courts expand the 
reach of the reasonableness test.  In Edmund Murray Ltd v BSP International Foundations Ltd1099, 
the transaction was for the supply of a drilling rig, yet the court held that the exclusion clauses1100 
were unreasonable after subjecting them to the test of reasonableness. 
 
In view of the current state of jurisprudence on this subject, as well as the demonstrated attitude 
of the courts, this study takes the position that offshore drilling contracts could be subject to the 
                                                 
1095 White, A. (1997), Op.Cit., at p.4. 
1096 Section 12, Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. 
1097 (1995) FSR 654 
1098 Lawson, R. G. and Singleton, S. (2011) Commercial Contracts: A Practical Guide to Standard Terms. A&C 
Black.  See also Lawson R, (1995) ‘Business Contracts – the UCTA Test’ The Commercial Lawyer, October 1995 
p. 29, cited in White, A. (1997), supra, at p.4. 
1099 (1992) Con LR 1. 
1100 The clauses excluded liability for loss, injury or damage however caused. They also excluded liability for loss 
of profit or any other category of loss, however caused, as well as for breakdown of the equipment.  See also Lease 
Management Services Ltd v Purnell Secretarial Services Ltd (1994) CCLR 127, in which the exclusion of liability 






test of reasonableness in the UCTA 1977.  This is especially against the backdrop of the fact that 
some drilling companies are more powerful, wealthier and more influential than the operators 
they work for.  This is especially true when small operators of marginal fields1101 are considered.  
In this situation, it is hard to imagine that the parties would be ascribed equal bargaining power, 
and the courts may very well find reasons to intervene and subject exclusion clauses here to the 
test of reasonableness, especially given the fact that transactions in this situation would most 
likely be on the standard terms of the drilling company. 
5.2.1 Discussion 
 
The Act precludes reliance on exemption clauses in some specific circumstances, or limits 
recourse to this by subjecting the relevant clauses to the test of reasonableness.  The focus of the 
Act is on contract terms that exclude or limit liability, and no overarching power is granted to 
the courts to strike down other terms of the contract on the basis of unfairness or because they 
are oppressive.1102 
  
                                                 
1101 An oil field that does not generate sufficient net income or hydrocarbon to make it economical to develop at a 
specific reference point. The field may become more economically viable if economic or technical conditions 
change. It usually has a short lifespan before the field goes into decline. 






Broadly speaking, the Act regulates contract terms that exclude or limit liability for 
negligence,1103 breach of statute-implied terms in contracts for sale and supply of goods,1104 and 
breach of contract in consumer and standard form contracts.1105 
In circumstances in which there is an absolute prohibition of recourse to an exemption clause, 
the application of the law is usually more straightforward, as the enquiry is only as to whether 
or not the events contemplated by the relevant section have occurred.  It becomes more 
challenging when enforcement of clauses is dependent on satisfying the requirement of 
reasonableness. 
   
Section 11(1) of the Act gives guidance on how reasonableness is assessed.  Essentially, the 
courts will seek to determine whether, at the time of contract, and given the prevailing 
circumstances known or imputed to the parties, the term was a fair and reasonable one to include 
in their contract.  It is clear from this provision that the test refers back to the time at which the 
contract was made and not when the liability results.1106  Thus, the gravity and/or extent of the 
liability does not determine the reasonableness or otherwise of the relevant term, unless this was, 
or ought to have been, foreseen by the parties at the time of making the contract.1107 
 
Whenever the courts are called upon to rule on reasonableness, it is a largely subjective process, 
which they try to rationalise by resorting to guidelines. Thus, the Act lays down some guidelines 
                                                 
1103 Section 2(1), Unfair Contracts Terms Act 1977. This section prohibits the limitation or exclusion of liability for 
death or personal injury arising from negligence, while s.2(2) and (3) subject a limitation or exemption clause for 
any other type of loss/damage arising from negligence to the reasonableness test. See generally Johnstone v 
Bloomsbury HA [1992] QB 333. 
1104 Ibid, at ss. 6 and 7. Section 6 prohibits the exclusion or limitation of liability for breach of the implied term as 
to title and subjects the exclusion or limitation of liability for breach of the implied terms as to fitness for purpose, 
merchantable quality and compliance with sample/description (See ss.12 – 15, Sale of Goods Act 1979) by sellers 
of goods to the test of reasonableness.  Similarly, s.7 focuses on the same exclusions/limitations in respect of supply 
of goods covered by the Supply of Goods and Services Act, 1982.  While s.7(2) prohibits the exclusion or limitation 
of liability for breach of the implied terms in circumstances where a party is dealing as a consumer, s.7(3) subjects 
the exemption clauses to the test of reasonableness when the dealing is otherwise than as a consumer. 
1105 Ibid, at s.3 which applies to restrict the exclusion or limitation of business liability when a party deals as a 
consumer, or if the parties are utilising the standard terms of business of one of the parties.  
1106 See, for instance, Stewart Gill v Horatio Myer & Co (1992) QB 600 at pp 607– 608.   






to help the courts in making this assessment, among which is determining the relative bargaining 
positions of the parties, having regard to the alternative supply sources available to the 
customer.1108 
  
The courts can form an opinion as to reasonableness, taking into consideration these guidelines, 
and indeed any relevant fact or circumstance that would assist the court in this regard.  So, where, 
for instance, the court finds that the power structure between the parties is balanced, there is a 
greater likelihood that any clause which is the product of negotiations will be held to be 
reasonable, as courts are less prone to interfere in these circumstances.1109 
  
Contract parties who seek to enforce exemption clauses bear the onus of proving 
reasonableness.1110  In discharging this burden, parties are aware of the discretion that courts 
exercise in matters of this nature, and so it is not uncommon to find different opinions in the face 
of seemingly similar facts.  Indeed, the attitude of higher courts is to uphold findings of lower 
courts in this circumstance, provided that they are not premised on faulty principles.1111 
 
The relevance of the foregoing on risk allocation is to be noted.  Where a party seeks reliance on 
an exemption clause which he thought offered protection on the occurrence of certain events, 
and which, in effect, allocated the risk of the economic consequences of that event occurring to 
another party, he would inevitably retain the obligation to deal with the economic consequences 
of the occurrence of the said event if the clause is either prohibited or struck down as being 
                                                 
1108 Section 11(2), Schedule 2, Unfair Contracts Terms Act 1977.  Other guidelines include: (a) Whether the 
customer was induced to accept the term, or if he could have entered into another contract with less onerous terms; 
(b) Whether the customer knew that the term existed, or it could be imputed to him, from previous dealings and 
industry practice; (c) Whether the application of the exemption clause was conditional, compliance with which 
seemed likely at the time of contract; and (d) Whether the goods in question were customised for the customer. 
1109 Granville Oil and Chemicals Ltd v Davies Turner and Co Ltd (2003) 1 All ER (Comm) 819 at para 31. 
1110 Section 11(5) Unfair Contracts Terms Act 1977. 
1111 See George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd (1983) 2 AC 803, at 810.  In Watford Electronics 
Ltd v Sanderson CFL Ltd (2001) EWCA Civ 317, the Court of Appeal disagreed with a trial judge’s finding of 
reasonableness, holding instead that the Appellant had not taken unfair advantage of the Respondent, as the latter 






unreasonable.  However, such clauses have the effect of preventing a party against whom they 
are successfully invoked from enjoying contractual rights that they expected to have.1112 
 
Perhaps the more important emphasis, for the purposes of this study, should be placed on the 
exclusion or limitation of business liability1113 if the parties are utilising the standard terms of 
business of one of the parties.1114 This enquiry leads to the question as to when a transaction will 
be deemed to be based on the standard terms of business of one of the parties which will trigger 
the application of section 3 of the Act.  Although ‘standard terms of business’ has not been 
defined by any court, different courts have postulated approaches to same.  In St Albans City and 
District Council v International Computers Ltd,1115 it was held that the written terms of the 
contract entered into by the parties will constitute the standard terms of the contract.  However, 
this is not the same formulation as was reached by the court in British Fermentation Products 
Ltd v Compair Reavell Ltd,1116 which requires express adoption or frequency of use.  In Salvage 
Association v CAP Financial Services Ltd1117, the court laid down different matters that should 
be considered in reaching a decision on whether a party is contracting on standard terms.  The 
court stated, inter alia, that the extent to which a party foists his terms of business on the other 
party would be taken into consideration in determining whether they are standard terms.  In 
Yuanda (UK) Co Ltd v WW Gear Construction Ltd,1118, the court reached a decision on whether 
standard terms were used by considering the nature and extent of alterations that emerged in the 
aftermath of negotiations between the parties.  More recently, in African Export-Import Bank v 
                                                 
1112 Palmer, N. and Yates, D. (1981) ‘The Future of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977’, The Cambridge Law 
Journal, 40(01), pp. 108-134, at p. 124. 
1113 ‘Business liability’ is defined in s.1(3) as ‘liability for breach of obligations or duties arising (a) from things 
done or to be done by a person in the course of a business (whether his own business or another's); or (b) from the 
occupation of premises used for business purposes of the occupier; and references to liability are to be read 
accordingly’.  
1114 Section 3 Unfair Contracts Terms Act 1977. 
1115 (1997) FSR 251. 
1116 (1999) BLR 352. 
1117 (1995) FSR 654. 






Shebah Exploration and Production Co Ltd,1119 the court held that the correct approach in 
determining whether a contract that contained portions of the written standard terms of business 
of one party, but not all, was caught by section 3 of the Act was to inquire whether there had 
been substantial variations to the standard terms that the party typically and habitually utilised.  
If there had been substantial variations, it was unlikely that a conclusion would be reached that 
the contract was based on that party's standard terms. 
  
The different approaches postulated by the courts are indicative of the difficulty of defining 
‘standard terms of business’.  Indeed, this difficulty was anticipated when both House of 
Commons and the House of Lords failed to agree on a precise definition, choosing instead to 
leave it to the courts to decide on an individual basis.  Their rationale was that a definition would 
fail to cater to all circumstances in which business is undertaken, and would be unduly 
restrictive.1120  Given the reference to the courts, it is no surprise that different approaches will 
be developed, however, a central theme seems to have emerged in these different approaches.  It 
is not enough that terms are used; those terms must be used in a manner that suggests that the 
purveyors consider them as their standard terms, either expressly or by their actions - such as the 
frequency of use and the preference not to deviate from same even if this is the other party’s 
preference. 
        
When standard terms are amended, perhaps pursuant to negotiations between the parties, the 
question as to whether the resulting terms will be regarded as ‘standard’, relative to the previous 
standard terms, is one of ‘fact and degree’.1121  The resulting terms will replace the previous terms 
and become the new ‘standard’ terms, if regularity and frequency of use can be established.1122 
                                                 
1119 (2018) 1 W.L.R. 487; (2017) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 111. 
1120 Wilson, S. and Bone, S. (2002) ‘Businesses, Standard Terms and the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977’, supra, 
at p. 30. 
1121 Chester Grosvenor Hotel Co Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Management Ltd (1991) 56 BLR 115, at pp. 131– 133.  







 Where parties have utilised the standard terms of a model contract that has been developed by 
a professional association or trade group, these will only be regarded as the ‘standard’ terms of 
the party who proposed the form of contract if it can be established that the party has adopted it 
as such, either expressly or by sustained practice.1123 
 
It follows from the judicial position above that a party utilising any of the model offshore drilling 
contracts that form the basis for this study1124 can escape the reach of the Act (if English law is 
applicable), unless it can be imputed to that party as their standard terms of business.  Even if 
they adopt only some of the terms of the model contracts, or conduct negotiations thereon, it 
becomes a question of fact as to whether the resulting terms materially differ from the original 
terms of the model contract.1125  If no significant difference is established between the two sets 
of terms, the parties will still be held as contracting on the terms of the model contract, and 
whether or not the terms will be regarded as ‘standard’ will depend on proof of regularity and 
frequency of use. 
 
The question then arises as to what will constitute ‘regularity’ and ‘frequency’ of use of a model 
contract which will qualify it to be deemed as the ‘standard’ term of business of a party.  This 
question has not been answered by the courts, and this study posits that it is one that must be 
determined by the facts and circumstances of each transaction. This conclusion is consistent with 
the treatment of similar notions;1126 it is also consistent with the mode of determining whether 
                                                 
1123 Wilson, S. and Bone, S. (2002), Supra, at p.31; British Fermentation Products Ltd v Compair Reavell Ltd (1999) 
BLR 352. 
1124 Mobile Drilling Rigs Contract, Edition 1 developed by Oil & Gas UK, through LOGIC, its not-for-profit wholly-
owned subsidiary; daywork, footage and turnkey contract models developed by the International Association of 
Drilling Contractors (IADC) in the USA; and the CAODC/CAPP Master Daywork Contract developed by the 
Canadian Association of Oilwell Drilling Contractors (CAODC) and the Canadian Association of Petroleum 
Producers (CAPP). 
1125 See, for instance, The Salvage Association v CAP Financial Services Ltd (1995) FSR 654. 
1126 See for instance, the test of ‘sufficiency’ of evidence, as distinguished from ‘adequacy’ of evidence.  The former 
is a question of fact, while the latter is a question of law; Jaffe, L. L. (1955) ‘Judicial Review: Question of Fact’, 






the requirement of reasonableness - which goes to the core of the current discourse - has been 
satisfied, an enquiry that is also a question of fact consigned to the discretion of the court of first 
instance.1127 
 
Flowing from the above, and given that parties can utilise model contracts without necessarily 
‘adopting’ them as their standard terms of business,1128 a contract party who seeks to avoid the 
application of the test of reasonableness can achieve this objective simply by clearly disclaiming 
the intention to adopt the model contract as his standard terms of business.  Indeed, to ensure 
that regularity or frequency of use is not established, there is a perverse incentive to make 
significant ‘modifications’ to the model contract, arising from negotiations in every contract 
transaction.  It is logical to assume that the courts will find that there is no regularity or frequency 
of use if there are several drafts from the same source model contract. 
 
Even when there is proof of regularity and frequency of use of a model contract, which suggests 
its adoption by a party as its standard terms, the courts have been reluctant to make 
pronouncements as to the application of the test of reasonableness thereto. Indeed, the court in 
British Fermentation Products Ltd v Compair Reavell Ltd1129 specifically and consciously 
refrained from answering the question as to the application of the test of reasonableness where a 
model contract has been established to be the standard terms of business of a party upon a finding 
of regularity of use.1130 
 
In conclusion, it is fair to assume that parties who are minded to avoid the application of the test 
of reasonableness to model contracts have the ability to do so.  Until a judicial pronouncement 
                                                 
1127 See George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd (1983) 2 AC 803. 
1128 British Fermentation Products Ltd v Compair Reavell Ltd (1999) BLR 352. 
1129  (1999) BLR 352. 






is made one way or the other, parties to offshore drilling model contracts can escape the reach 
of the Act through creative and deliberate drafting. 
 
5.3 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 
 
The treatment of third parties who had been conferred rights/benefits under a contract by the 
contract parties was unsatisfactory.  Even though contract parties recognised that these 
rights/benefits existed, there was no structured mechanism for the third parties to exercise these 
rights or obtain the benefits.  The dominant position of contract parties was backed by the 
doctrine of privity of contract, which effectively barred third parties from suing or being sued on 
these contracts as they were not parties thereto.   
In view of the dissatisfaction with the stringent privity of contract regime,1131 the Law 
Commission recommended changes in its report1132 which led to the enactment of the Contracts 
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. 
   
The aim of this legislation is not to abolish the privity of contract principle, but to reform it by 
creating a statutory exception, essentially allowing third parties enforceable rights under 
contracts.1133  The primary way in which it does this is to stipulate circumstances in which the 
third-party is legally able to sue the promisor and enforce the promise contained in the contract 
conferring a benefit to him.  However, it still preserves the rule that obligations cannot be 
imposed on third parties.1134 
 
                                                 
1131 MacMillan, C. (2000) ‘A Birthday Present for Lord Denning: The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999’, 
MLR, 63, p. 721. Macmillan documents Lord Denning, M.R.’s frustration with the privity doctrine, stating that he 
‘consistently questioned the existence of the privity rule in English contract law…’. 
1132 Law Commission (1991) Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefits of Third Parties, HM Stationery Office. 
1133 Yeo, T. (2001) ‘When Do Third Party Rights Arise Under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 
(UK)’, Singapore Academy of Law Journal, 13, p. 34, at p. 36. 






The intention of the contracting parties is paramount.  Thus, they determine the nature and extent 
of the benefit conferred upon and enforceable by the third party.  MacMillan sees the nature of 
this benefit as a gift that underpins the overarching aim of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) 
Act 1999, which is to give effect to the intention of the contracting parties.1135  This intention can 
be express or implied.  Thus, according to the Act, the contracting parties can confer a benefit 
expressly stated as being enforceable by the third party,1136 or the term of the contract can purport 
to confer a benefit on the third party,1137 which the third party is able, or presumed to be able, to 
enforce if there is nothing in the contract that rebuts that presumption.1138  Roe suggests that the 
word ‘rebut’ is a misnomer, as the question as to the intention of the contracting parties in this 
circumstance is one that should be resolved by the court, and not by either of the parties, as he 
finds no formal burden of proof in this instance.1139 
   
Roe, however, concedes that there are matters of fact within the knowledge of the parties relating 
to the intention of the contract term that contains the promise or benefit, which may themselves 
be in dispute.  In this circumstance, he agrees that the onus would be on the defendant to prove 
that the parties did not intend the contract term to be enforceable.1140   Bridge adopts a different 
approach, stating that the onus is on the third party to prove that the contract term confers a 
benefit that was meant to be enforced, and then shifts to the promisor to rebut this thereafter.1141  
MacMillan, citing the Law Commission’s report, opines that the burden of proof is usually borne 
by contracting parties – especially the promisor – as they are better placed to explain what they 
intended by that contract term.1142 
                                                 
1135 MacMillan, C. (2000), supra, at pp. 723, 734. 
1136 Section 1(1)(a), Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. 
1137 Ibid, s. 1(1)(b). 
1138 Ibid, s. 1(2). 
1139 Roe, T. (2000) ‘Contractual Intention under Section 1 (1)(b) and 1 (2) of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) 
Act 1999’, The Modern Law Review, 63(6), pp. 887– 894, at p. 889. 
1140 Ibid, at p. 889. 
1141 Bridge, M. (2001), supra, at p. 91. 







As far as risk allocation is concerned, the third party is able to take the benefit of an exemption 
or limitation of liability clause only if he could validly do so if he were a party to the contract.1143  
The Act permits this if the limitation of liability or exemption clause can be brought within the 
purview of defences and set-off,1144 if the contract clause granting the third-party this right is 
express in this intent.   
   
The right of the promisee to seek protection of an exemption or limitation of liability clause, 
even against a third party, is one that is preserved, both by contract and the Act.1145  The promisor 
is further protected from the situation in which the third party could seek to block the 
enforcement of the exemption or limitation of liability clause on grounds of unreasonableness as 
contemplated by the Unfair Contracts Terms Act 1977.1146  The 1999 Act clearly stipulates that 
this recourse is not available against the promisor in circumstances where negligence has been 
alleged, such negligence constituting a breach of the promisor’s obligation arising from the 
promise.1147 
 
The combined effect of section 7(2) of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 and the 
rule that third parties cannot be burdened by contracting parties with obligations arising from 
their (contracting parties) contract means that all risks within the contract are still allocated only 
between the parties. This study finds that the Act1148 has not made a difference as far as 
contractual risk allocation is concerned, as the Act merely confers benefits on third parties 
                                                 
1143 Section 3(6), Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. 
1144 Ibid, at s. 3(3). 
1145 Ibid. at s. 4. 
1146 Section 2(2). 
1147 Section 7(2), Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. This protection is only in respect of loss/damage 
arising other than from death or personal injury.  Furthermore, where the parties agree to exclude and/or limit the 
third-party’s liability, this will not be subjected to the same scrutiny of reasonableness under s. 2(2) of the Unfair 
Contracts Terms Act 1977.  The promisee’s rights against the promisor are preserved and not affected by s. 2(2) of 
the Unfair Contracts Terms Act 1977. 






without the associated risks.  If the Act had conferred upon contracting parties the right to 
allocate risk to third parties who could claim and enforce a promise or benefit under the contract, 
this would have altered the risk allocation landscape and affected the dynamics of the 
relationship between the primary contracting parties and the ‘beneficiary’ third parties.  For 
example, indemnities would have been required to be extended to cover the relevant third parties, 
who, by claiming a benefit under the contract, could also be deemed as giving back-to-back 
indemnities to the primary contracting parties.  If the Act had made this provision, it would have 
expanded the contractual risk allocation regime.  Given the fact that the status quo is maintained, 
and risk allocation is confined only to primary contracting parties, the Act has made no difference 
in this regard. 
Furthermore, it is clear from the scope of this Act that the third parties it targets are those who 
claim entitlement to certain benefits or promises contained in the terms of commercial contracts 
falling within its purview,1149 and not third parties who are negatively impacted by the operations 
of the contracting parties.  This is because nothing in the Act confers any right of action on a 
third party to enforce any other clause in a contract which he is not a party to; the only right of 
action is to enforce a promise or benefit, and even then, this is subject to the intention of the 
parties as detailed in the Act.  The way in which third parties who are negatively impacted by 
the operations of the contracting parties can seek recourse has been neither strengthened nor 
affected in any way by the provisions of the 1999 Act. 
   
This conclusion is slightly different when the position of non-operators is concerned.  Sometimes 
the drilling contract recites that the operator enters into the contract for itself, and as agent of the 
co-venturers.  This makes them disclosed principals in the contract, and this study argues that 
                                                 
1149 Ibid. Subsections 6(2) and (3) exclude contracts for carriage by sea, employment contracts, and contracts 






this equates to a conferment of a ‘benefit’ under the 1999 Act.  Since the determination of 
whether a benefit has been conferred is by discerning the intention of the parties, the express 
recital by the parties becomes indicative of that intention.  Indeed, the court in Prudential 
Assurance Co Ltd v Ayres1150 held that the requirements of section 1(1)(b) were satisfied if a term 
being construed had the effect of conferring a benefit on a specified third party, even if that 
benefit was not the predominant purpose or intent behind the term.1151  Furthermore, the fact that 
there is a ‘benefit conferred on someone other than the third party’ does not negate the 
application of the subsection.  In these circumstances, the presumption of intention by the parties 
to confer a benefit is very strong.1152 
 
However, this presumption is rebutted if there is a term in the contract that expressly negates the 
legal rights of the third party, or is otherwise inconsistent with those rights.1153  This is precisely 
the case where the drilling contract expressly prohibits the non-operator from enforcing the 
contract, conferring on the operator the power in this regard, as previously discussed.1154  Where 
this restriction has been imposed, this study posits that the non-operators are no better than any 
other category of third parties contemplated by the Act.  
 
5.4 Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 
 
Unless excluded by the parties to a contract, the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 will 
apply to contracts for the supply of a service.  The Act defines a contract for the supply of a 
                                                 
1150 (2007) 3 All ER 946 per Lindsay, J. 
1151 But it has to be a purpose of the contract: Dolphin Maritime & Aviation Services Ltd v Sveriges Angfartygs 
Assurans Forening (2009) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 123. 
1152 Burrows, A. (1996) ‘Reforming Privity of Contract: Law Commission Report No. 242’, Lloyds Maritime And 
Commercial Law Quarterly, at pp. 467– 486. 
1153 Ibid, at p.473. 






service as one in which a person agrees to undertake a service for another.1155  Although there is 
no definition of ‘service’ in the Act, it gives some guidance in this regard by stating that the fact 
that goods are transferred or agreed to be transferred pursuant to a contract of service will not 
negative the status of that transaction as being one for services.1156  As with other areas of law,1157 
in which the true status of transactions needs to be deciphered, this study submits that the 
substance-over-form consideration will be required to discern the true nature of the contract. 
Thus, where the real substance of the contract is to carry on services, such as with a drilling 
contract, the fact that goods are transferred in the course of the provision of the service should 
not alter its original nature, thereby bringing it within the purview of the Act. 
 
Section 13 provides that a supplier acting in the course of business is under an implied obligation 
to discharge his duties with reasonable care and skill.  Palmer1158 suggests that this definition 
implies that the supplier is to perform this duty in person, and that the work will actually be 
carried out.1159  He further questions whether the Act will cover circumstances in which the 
supplier delegates his duties to another to perform on his behalf, and opines that it should, 
provided that delegation is not prohibited.1160 
 
This study takes the view that section 13 is wide enough to accommodate work done through 
another person, whether this is a natural or juridical person, since there is neither a definition of 
‘person’ in the Act, nor a limitation on the type of person it intended.1161  Furthermore, if a person 
                                                 
1155 Section 12(1), Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982.  By s. 12(2), contracts of service and apprenticeship 
contracts are exempted. 
1156 Section 12(3), Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982. 
1157 For example, in taxation in which the principle is used to unmask transactions that are structured purely for tax 
evasion or reduction purposes; see Gregory v Helvering 293 U.S. 465 (1935).  See also Chicago, Burlington & 
Quincy Railroad Co v City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) in which the court held, in respect of due process, 
‘regard must be had to substance, not to form’. 
1158 Palmer, N. E. (1983) ‘The Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, [Legislation]’, 46 Mod. L. Rev. 619 1983. 
1159 Ibid, at p. 628. 
1160 Ibid, at p. 629. 







does it through another, he does it himself in line with the principles of agency.1162  He remains 
accountable for the outcome of the work, and by extension, bound by the obligation imposed by 
the implied term. 
The Act also implies terms relating to time of performance,1163 as well as the compensation for 
the services.1164  In both cases, it makes the terms subject to the provisions of the contract, and 
where the contract has no relevant provisions to this effect, the implied terms of reasonableness 
will apply, depending on the factual circumstances of the transaction.1165  Indeed, the entire Part 
II of the Act is made subject to the provisions of the contract by the parties,1166 and so the parties 
can exclude its application.  Part II is also made subject to any enactment which more particularly 
relates to the service which is the subject of the contract.1167 
 
From a service contract risk allocation perspective, this Act does not do more than codify the 
existing position in law,1168 and making its provisions subject to the expressed intent of the parties 
deprives it of any real value that requires serious consideration by contract parties. 
   
Indeed, the subject-matter of Part II is covered by most contracts, and certainly in most offshore 
drilling contracts.  In all circumstances, the risk of discharging the service obligations1169 lies 
with the supplier, and the party who alleges that this standard of reasonableness has not been met 
in any transaction bears the onus of proving same.  The recipient of the service, of course, bears 
the burden of paying for same. 
                                                 
1162 Qui facit per alium facit per se. See also Ireland v Livingstone (1872) LR 5 HL 395. 
1163 Section 14, Supply of Goods & Services Act 1982. 
1164 Ibid, at s.15. 
1165 Ibid, at ss.14(2) and 15(2). 
1166 Ibid, at s.16(1). 
1167 Ibid, at s.16(4). 
1168 For instance, reasonable care is well covered in the law of tort: see Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100; 
and, in respect of reasonable skill, see, for instance the duties of company directors who are under a duty to exercise 
reasonable skill, care and diligence, ss. 171– 177, Companies Act 2006. 








5.5 Other Legislation 
5.5.1  Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism (SARAH) Act 2015 
 
In the bedrock section, this study examined the status of voluntary and gratuitous tasks 
undertaken by Whiteacre for Blackacre.  Notwithstanding that the tasks were voluntary, 
Blackacre could expect that the quality of work undertaken would be consistent with that which 
a professional with similar skill and qualification should produce.  Therefore, even if the task 
was not ‘satisfactorily’ performed, Blackacre was unable to compel re-performance of the task, 
even though damages could be recovered if Blackacre had suffered loss because of the voluntary 
and gratuitous service. 
  
However, the foregoing must be distinguished from circumstances in which the performance of 
the voluntary task falls within the purview of the Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism 
(SARAH) Act 2015,1170 which focuses on first aiders, rescuers, volunteers, and doers of good 
deeds aimed at saving life and property in extenuating circumstances.  Given the fact that the 
activities of this group of people are socially beneficial, the law steps in to encourage this 
behaviour by requiring judges to consider the context within which the voluntary intervention 
was made, with a view to exculpating the volunteer from liability that may have resulted from 
that intervention.1171  These activities are outside the scope of this study, and the underlying 
assumption is that the tasks that are the subject of the study are undertaken in a commercial 
context. 
  
                                                 
1170 Also known as the so-called ‘Good Samaritan’ law, it makes provisions in respect of matters for consideration 
when claims for negligence or breach of statutory duty have been brought against volunteers or doers of good deeds. 
It received Royal Assent on 12 February 2015, and came into force on 13 April 2015 in England and Wales. 






5.5.2  Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 
 
In the bedrock section, the courts’ treatment of contributory negligence was examined, 
highlighting the shift in their attitude towards claimants who had been contributorily negligent.  
Thus, the courts had sought to ameliorate the harshness of their initial stance, which exculpated 
Blackacre from liability once it was established that Whiteacre, the claimant, had contributed to 
the ensuing liability.  The courts new approach was that Whiteacre’s negligence had to be such 
that it directly contributed to the ensuing harm,1172 and in Davies v Mann,1173 it laid down the ‘last 
opportunity’1174 test, which states that when both parties have been negligent, liability should fall 
on the party who had the last opportunity to avoid harm from ensuing.1175 
  
The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 was enacted statutorily to empower courts 
to apportion the percentage of damages payable between the claimant and the defendant when a 
case of contributory negligence has been successfully made out.  The thrust of this legislation is 
to ensure that a claimant is not left without a remedy in deserving cases in which the defendant’s 
actions have caused injury recognised by law, just because the claimant also contributed to the 
ensuing liability.1176  The courts are enjoined to make this apportionment in a manner that was 
‘just and equitable’, taking into consideration the claimant’s own blameworthiness in the 
transaction.1177  The correct procedure for the courts to adopt is to work out how much would 
have been payable in damages if the claimant had not been contributorily negligent, and then 
reduce that sum in accordance with the negligent contribution.1178 
 
                                                 
1172 Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd (1940) A.C. 152 at 165. 
1173 (1842) 152 ER 588 (Exch). 
1174 Also called the ‘last clear chance’ or ‘last clear opportunity’ test. 
1175 The Boy Andrew (1948) A.C. 140 at 148– 149. 
1176 Section 1, Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. 
1177 Ibid. 






However, the manner in which the courts have made this apportionment has not been without 
controversy.  In a recent study, Goudkamp and Nolan found that litigants had contested both the 
finding of contributory negligence as well as the apportionment by the courts.1179  In this regard, 
44% of appeals were on the finding of contributory negligence, while 56% were on the discount.  
Of this number, claimants were responsible for 41% of the appeals, while the unsatisfied 
defendants amounted to 59% of the distribution.1180  They also found that the chances of 
succeeding on appeals relating to apportionment were similar for both claimants and defendants, 
but claimants were almost twice as likely to succeed in appeals relating to the finding of 
contributory negligence. 
 
Importantly, they also found that the Court of Appeal rarely altered the quantum of 
apportionment upwards or downwards by small amounts, but the records show that they go as 
high as 50% on an average, and this is more so when they are further reducing the amount 
payable to the claimant as damages,1181 thereby increasing the quantum of apportionment. 
   
The immediate implication of this is that defendants have an incentive to appeal the quantum of 
apportionment, while claimants have an incentive to appeal the very finding of contributory 
negligence, seeking to obtain the full complement of damages arising from the defendant’s 
negligence.  This also means that contract parties would progressively seek to infuse greater 
certainty in their contracts as to the consequences of a situation in which either party has been 
contributorily negligent in circumstances falling outside the indemnity structure which 
exculpates parties even when they have been negligent. 
    
 
                                                 
1179 Goudkamp, J. and Nolan, D. (2017) ‘Contributory negligence in the Court of Appeal: An Empirical Study’, 
Legal Studies. 
1180 Ibid, at p. 19. 







The study has examined the regulatory framework underpinning contractual risk allocation, with 
the aim of understanding the current state of the risk allocation regime.  To lay the proper 
foundation, the study undertook an examination of the bedrock of this regime, from the time in 
which neither contractual parties nor the legislation had made provisions for risk allocation upon 
the occurrence of certain risk events in the relevant areas that concern this study, and it was down 
to the courts to determine whether or not any liability should be imposed for loss or damage 
arising from the occurrence of these events.  The focus was on the basis upon which they made 
this determination and, where appropriate, the manner in which they allocated liability for the 
relevant loss or damage, as well as the consequences, if any, flowing from such allocation of 
liability. 
   
This study has examined the decisions that form the bedrock of the risk regulatory regime, as 
well as the rationale enunciated by the courts in reaching those decisions.  It further discussed 
the underlying legal theories of liability for loss or damage that formed the basis of these 
decisions to provide clarity and greater understanding.   
 
Thereafter, the ways in which contractual parties have responded to the manner in which the 
courts allocated liability through the use of contractual provisions (indemnities, limitation of 
liability, exclusion/exception provisions) were examined.  These selected provisions are the 
primary instruments under which contractual risk is allocated in a deliberate manner. 
 
The courts’ response to risk allocation approach by contractual parties was then considered, after 
which the intervention of the legislature, in response to the manner in which both the courts and 
contractual parties have dealt with this issue, was also discussed. 






As detailed above, contract parties will attempt to address the aspects of the legislative 
intervention that they find unfavourable in their contract provisions – for instance, in the way in 
which the courts have apportioned the discounts payable upon a finding of contributory 
negligence.  There is no doubt that this is an iterative process in which all the stakeholders – 
contract parties, the courts, and the legislature – will constantly respond to their actions and 
interpretations inter se, as they seek to regulate the manner in which risk is allocated in contracts. 
 
The question that now falls to be answered is whether the measures that the contract parties have 
taken to allocate risks themselves are effective in achieving their contract objectives –  especially 
when juxtaposed with the bedrock positions relating to the different risk events – or whether 
allocating them in a different manner would produce a better result.  In the context of this study, 
‘effectiveness’ would be assessed by the success of the parties in allocating risk inter se, in a 
manner that stands up to judicial scrutiny, while taking into consideration the party best able to 
bear a given risk, which refers to the efficiency of risk allocation. 
 
Chapter 3 discussed the position in which contract parties had not allocated specific risks, 
thereby giving rise to the default risk allocation mechanism by the courts.  The response by the 
parties to re-order the default risk allocation mechanism was examined in Chapter 4, and the 
various methods adopted for this purpose were fully discussed.  In Chapter 5, the intervention 
by the legislature highlighted the societal perspective on how risks should be allocated, so that 
commercial transactions cohere with norms, mores and public expectation.  The risks and 
responsibilities that were allocated pursuant to the contractual response by the parties have also 
been discussed, with emphasis on the way in which they have been allocated inter se.  Some 
rationales have been proposed to explain the way in which parties have allocated the risks, 







There is evidence of judicial acceptance that contract parties can utilise the risk allocation 
mechanisms that have already been examined – indemnities, insurance, exclusions and limitation 
of liability – to allocate risk contractually.  Indeed, indemnities were specifically approved by 
the court in EE Caledonia Ltd v Orbit Valve Co Europe Plc1182 in which it was stated that it was 
an industry practice that had arisen to cater for the peculiarities of the oil and gas sector, 
especially in respect of offshore operations.  This contractual ability is founded on the principle 
of freedom of contract, which is recognised in common law and arose from equating free market 
economy with contract law principles, providing a platform upon which individuals could trade 
among themselves based on their preferred terms and conditions.1183  The courts acknowledge 
that the freedom of contract principle allows contract parties to utilise indemnity and exclusion 
clauses to release each other from liability, even for their own negligence.  Based on this 
principle, the courts are unwilling to interfere in the way in which contract parties have allocated 
risks inter se especially when they are generally of equal bargaining power.1184  
 
There seems to be a constant interplay, however, between the principles of freedom of contract 
and public policy.  Even though the freedom of contract principle allows parties to allocate risk 
as they deem fit, public policy considerations will disallow the extension of this freedom in 
certain circumstances – for instance, relating to indemnity for own negligence,1185 or, in the USA, 
to indemnify a party who is liable to pay punitive damages, as this will defeat the intention of 
the applicable statute that was breached.1186  In the UK, it is now settled law that the risk allocation 
mechanisms will be respected and enforced so long as the parties express that intent. If the 
                                                 
1182 (1995) 1 All ER 174. 
1183 Atiyah, P. S. (1979) The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract. Oxford University Press, at p. 402. 
1184 Photo Productions Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd (1980) AC 827. 
1185 Section 2(1), Unfair Contracts Terms Act 1977. 
1186 Clean Water Act (‘CWA’), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7).  The court cited the case of Daughdrill v Ocean Drilling & 






contractual provisions are clear, the courts will enforce that as being the agreed risk allocation 
method of the parties, and will not seek to curtail their freedom in this regard.1187 
 
The manner of risk and responsibility allocation by contract parties has also been the subject of 
judicial pronouncements.  The most recent validation of the ability of parties to a drilling contract 
to allocate risk in any manner they deem fit was given in Transocean Drilling UK Ltd v 
Providence Resources Plc.1188  In construing the way in which the parties chose to exclude 
consequential losses, the court noted that the parties had materially altered the clause to allow 
them to accept responsibility for losses that could have been recovered as damages for breach of 
contract.  The court had no difficulty in giving effect to their agreement, holding that the 
language of the clause was clear in excluding liability for consequential losses arising from 
‘spread costs’, and that the contract had been concluded between parties of equal bargaining 
power.1189   
 
The court further upheld the clause as written, citing the principle of freedom of contract, and 
gave the interpretation that was consistent with the intention of the parties and that was evident 
in the language of the contract, to the effect that neither party should be liable to the other for 
consequential losses.1190 
 
A central theme that seems to have emerged in the decisions of the courts relating to the principle 
of freedom of contract is their reluctance to alter the will of the parties when they are perceived 
                                                 
1187 See, for instance, Persimmon Homes Ltd v Ove Arup and Partners Ltd (2017) EWCA Civ 373. 
1188 (2016) EWCA Civ 372, paras 20–24. 
1189 Ibid, at paras 14 and 20.   






to be of ‘equal bargaining power’.1191  This has been the stance of the courts when deciding on 
commercial contracts relating to penalties,1192 damages1193 and risk allocation.1194   
 
The question arises as to how the courts will approach a transaction in which the parties are 
clearly of unequal bargaining positions, and risk has been allocated in a way that disfavours the 
weaker party.  
 
There is evidence that the courts are willing to invoke the contra proferentem rule, which states 
that ambiguities in contracts are to be construed against the maker, and in the other party’s favour 
in this circumstance.1195 Indeed, going by the pronouncements of the court as to their 
unwillingness to invoke this principle where parties are of equal bargaining power, it can be 
deduced that the principle would be invoked to protect the weaker party in appropriate 
circumstances.1196   
 
However, there would be circumstances in which the application of the contra proferentem rule 
may not quite address the imbalance in the power equation between the parties, leaving the 
manner of risk allocation unusually skewed against the weaker party.  In these circumstances, 
this study posits that the determination of cases coming within that purview should depend on 
what the courts deem unconscionable, and the subjective nature of this enquiry should widen the 
                                                 
1191 Parties are said to have equal bargaining power if there are certain features of the transaction that leads the court 
to make this assessment, and these include (a) having the benefit of legal advice (b) having the opportunity to 
negotiate contract terms and conditions (c) dealing otherwise than on the standard terms of one entity (d) absence 
of coercion or duress in making the agreement.  See, generally, First Tower Trustees Ltd and another v CDS 
(Superstores International) Ltd (2017) EWHC 891(Ch).  See also Barnhizer, D. D. (2005) ‘Inequality of Bargaining 
Power’, U. Colo. L. Rev., 76, pp. 139–242, at pp. 194–197, where the author examines the US jurisprudence on the 
subject, and makes the connection between weak bargaining positions, unreasonableness as well as one-sided 
clauses. 
1192 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi (2015) UKSC 67. 
1193 The Transocean/BP litigation, Case 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS Document 5446 Filed 01/26/12 at United States 
District Court Eastern District of Louisiana. 
1194 Transocean Drilling UK Ltd v Providence Resources Plc (2016) EWCA Civ 372. 
1195 John Lee & Son (Grantham) Ltd v Railway Executive (1949) 2 All ER 581. 







scope of discretion of the courts in reaching this determination.  To do justice, the courts may 
choose to widen the scope of application of the rule on unconscionability and, before long, it 
may assume the status of a doctrine, such that contracts, in general, may be required to satisfy 








RISK ALLOCATION IN OFFSHORE DRILLING MODEL CONTRACTS 
 
International drilling operations are mostly carried on based on contracts largely developed from 
models authored by regional drilling associations and aim to guide contract parties in their 
negotiations.1197  The model contracts are not prescriptive, and contract parties are at liberty to 
adapt or adopt them to conform to their contracting realities and objectives.   
 
In the United Kingdom, Oil & Gas UK1198 has, through LOGIC, developed model contracts,1199 
including the Mobile Drilling Rigs Contract, Edition 1, which target drilling operations in the 
United Kingdom Continental Shelf.  However, the model can also be utilised outside the United 
Kingdom, subject to amendments that conform to the laws of the governing jurisdiction of the 
contract. 
 
In the United States of America, the International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) 
has developed the international model contracts for offshore drilling campaigns, and further 
distinguishes between model contracts for domestic use within the USA and international use.1200   
 
In Canada, the Canadian Association of Oilwell Drilling Contractors (CAODC) and the 
Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) have developed the CAODC/CAPP 
Master Daywork Contract,1201 which applies to offshore drilling, and came into existence in May 
2001, with a further update in 2004. 
 
                                                 
1197 See, generally, Martin, A. T. (2004) ‘Model Contracts: A Survey of the Global Petroleum Industry’, Journal of 
Energy & Natural Resources Law, 22(3), at pp. 281– 340. 
1198 http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/about-us.cfm   
1199 https://www.logic-oil.com/content/standard-contracts-0 Standardisation of contracts is an objective initially 
introduced in the 1990s by the CRINE (Cost Reduction in New Era) initiative with the aim of reducing costs by 
30% and helping to simplify the industry’s procedures. 







Some operators and drilling contractors have also designed their own offshore drilling model 
contracts, and the extent to which these are utilised or accepted by the other contract party will 
depend on the balance of power between them, as well as the prevailing market/economic 
conditions at the time at which the work is sought to be executed. 
 
The offshore drilling model contracts developed by these regional associations are mainly for 
daywork transactions,1202 even though model contracts for footage1203 and turnkey1204 transactions 
also exist.  In this section, this study will focus on the key differences between the model 
contracts developed by the regional associations, specifically to see how they allocate different 
risks therein between the operator and the contractor.  Given the fact that the contract parties in 
these model contracts are typically ‘Company’ and ‘Contractor’, reference to ‘Company’ would 
be deemed to include reference to the ‘operator’ in this context, and both terms would also be 
used interchangeably.       
 
6.1 Daywork Contracts 
The primary characteristic of daywork contracts is that the operator is in control of drilling 
operations, and the contractor gets a daily rate for their services.  The operator directs the way 
in which operations are carried on, and the contractor is duty bound to comply with its 
instructions.  The compensation structure and command-and-control approach of daywork 
                                                 
1202 A ‘day-rate’ or ‘daywork’ contract provides that the drilling contractor be paid a stipulated price (rate) for work 
performed at the direction of the operator over a 24-hour period with the contractor assuming only specified risks: 
Calkins, ‘The Drilling Contract- Legal and Practical Considerations’, 21 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 285, 288 (1975), 
cited by Anderson, O. L. (1989) ‘The Anatomy of an Oil and Gas Drilling Contract’, Tulsa LJ, 25, pp. 359–533, at 
p.374. 
1203 A ‘footage’ contract provides that the drilling contractor be paid a stipulated price per foot of hole drilled from 
the surface through the total; ibid, at p. 18. 
1204 A ‘turnkey’ contract provides for the drilling contractor to be paid a stipulated price for drilling a well to a 






contracts make it inevitable that the operator bears a significant amount of risk relating to the 
contract.   
 
Although the underlying philosophy of daywork contracts is the same across the different model 
contracts, there are some differences in the way in which some specific risks are allocated.  These 
differences are discussed below, but where the risks have been allocated in the way already 
highlighted in the preceding chapter, this fact will be mentioned but no further analysis would 
be required. 
 
6.1.1 Mobile Drilling Rigs Contract, Edition 11205 
 
This model contract has been acknowledged by the courts as serving the oil and gas industry 
since 1997, and the experience garnered from utilising it has also been judicially noticed.1206  This 
model contract has not been officially modified by its authors since it was developed, and it 
specifically enjoins users to seek legal advice before utilising it, as it may not be suitable for 
every circumstance, especially since there may have been subsequent changes in the law in force 
since the model contract was issued.1207  It is fair to assume that users have adhered to this advice, 
especially since there have indeed been changes in the legislation that impact contracts in 
general, and including drilling contracts.  For instance, the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) 
Act 1999, which was discussed previously,1208, has been specifically mentioned in most drilling 
contracts, with contract parties delineating the extent of its application therein, which, ipso facto 
defines the ability of third parties to enforce any provision in the contract, or claim a benefit 
therefrom. 
                                                 
1205 See Appendix A. 











Nevertheless, the model contract still represents the starting point for users, especially the North 
Sea operators and contractors, even though there is evidence that it is also used further afield in 
other jurisdictions.1209  The key risk allocation methods are examined below. 
 
6.1.1.1 Loss or Damage Caused by Subcontractors   
  
This model contract defines Contractor Group as including, inter alia, the contractor’s 
subcontractors.1210  However, in defining Company Group, it omitted to list the company’s other 
contractors or their subcontractors.1211  The practical effect of this is seen in the section on 
indemnities1212 in which the contract parties have provided for mutual indemnities against all 
losses, claims and liabilities arising from death, loss of, or damage to property of members of 
their respective Groups.1213  While the contractor indemnifies the company for the foregoing 
liability in respect of members of Company Group, which excludes the company’s other 
contractors or their subcontractors, the company gets the full benefit of their indemnity as 
Contractor Group includes subcontractors. This means that the contractor is exposed to the 
operator’s contractors and subcontractors, but not vice versa. 
 
Article 18(2)(b) attempts to remedy this imbalance by stating that the company indemnifies the 
contractor for death, personal injury or disease ‘to any person employed by the Company Group’.  
The assumption is that the term ‘employ’ used in this provision refers to the usual employer – 
employee context, rather than the context in which a resource is merely utilised, otherwise that 
provision would have used the term ‘hire’.  In this regard, the reference to ‘employment’ raises 
                                                 
1209 See, for instance, Zahari, W. Z. (2017) ‘A Comparative Analysis on the Enforceability of Knock-for-Knock 
Indemnities in Thailand and the United Kingdom’, at p. 33, where the author asserts that the LOGIC model is widely 
used in south-east Asia, including Thailand. 
1210 Article 1.4, Mobile Drilling Rigs Contract, Edition 1. 
1211 Ibid, Art. 1.2. 
1212 Ibid, Art. 18.   






an issue as to whether a contractor hired by the operator is an ‘employee’ or an independent 
contractor.  This issue has been discussed previously,1214 and can be resolved only upon 
undertaking further analysis of the transaction.  Such lack of clarity can jeopardise the interest 
of the contractor, as it would be left exposed to the operator’s contractor if the latter is held to be 
an independent contractor rather than an employee.  In this circumstance, the independent 
contractor is not within the indemnity structure contemplated by Article 18, leaving the 
contractor with responsibility for bearing the economic consequences of any infraction that any 
member of Contractor Group commits against the independent contractor. 
 
Furthermore, the definition of ‘third party’ for the purposes of the indemnities in the model 
contract as any person who belongs to neither Contractor Group or Company Group,1215 puts it 
beyond contention that the operator’s contractors, where they are found to be independent 
contractors, would qualify as third parties.  This would mean that the contractor would be left 
exposed to the operator’s contractors where the contractor, or any member of Contractor Group, 
has been negligent, leading to the occurrence of an adverse event that causes death, injury, loss 
or damage to the operator’s contractors.  It would have been beneficial if the operator’s 
contractors fell within the indemnity structure as the contractor would avoid responsibility for 
bearing the economic consequences of the same adverse event that creates the liability under 
Article 18(1)(c).  
 
6.1.1.2  Loss of Income Arising from Inadequate Personnel    
 
Article 8.1 requires the contractor to provide and maintain the full complement of the personnel 
required to undertake the drilling operations in line with the contract.  Where the contractor fails 
                                                 
1214 Under the heading ‘Whiteacre Undertakes Task X for Blackacre – Through an Employee or Third Party’. 






to do this, a grace period of 48 hours is allowed, after which the operator is entitled to deduct the 
applicable rates to reflect the inadequate personnel level.  Furthermore, the operator also has the 
right to request the removal and replacement of any member of personnel who has been found 
to be incompetent, negligent or not safety conscious or whose presence at the worksite is inimical 
to the interests of the operator.1216  The contractor is expected to replace any personnel removed 
pursuant to this section within 24 hours or longer if the operator agrees to this.1217  Although this 
section is silent on the consequences of failure by the contractor to replace the personnel within 
the agreed period, this study posits that the operator’s powers under Article 8(1) would extend 
to cover this situation, and the operator is able to reduce the applicable rates to reflect the reduced 
personnel level.   
 
In both scenarios highlighted above, the contractor is responsible for bearing the economic 
consequences of the reduction in personnel.  Furthermore, this is an example of how the 
compensation mechanism is used as a tool for risk allocation, and it further raises the question 
as to who bears the responsibility for the consequences of any adverse event that occurs because 
of the inadequate manning level.  If the adverse event occurs due to the contractor’s negligence, 
the indemnity structure in Article 18 would be triggered, and the contractor might escape 
culpability thereby.  By the combined effects of Articles 18.2 and 18.8, if the adverse event 
causes any of the consequences detailed in those sections,1218 the indemnity structure protects the 
contractor from liability that would have ordinarily attached. 
 
However, given the fact that the adverse event occurred because of inadequate manning levels, 
this study posits that this would be a breach of the contractor’s general obligations under Article 
                                                 
1216 Ibid, Art. 8.8. 
1217 Ibid. 






4, and, specifically, the breach of the obligation to exercise due care and diligence.1219  This is 
because the contractor has the obligation to ensure the adequacy and stability of the drilling 
operations,1220 a key component of which is to maintain adequate personnel members, with the 
right skills set, knowledge and competence.  In Seadrill Management Services Ltd v OAO 
Gazprom,1221 the court held that when the contractor specifically assumes an obligation in a 
contract, under English law, that obligation had to be discharged with reasonable care and skill, 
failing which the contractor might be liable in damages.   
 
The provision of adequate and competent personnel goes to the heart of the contractor’s 
obligations under the drilling contract, as this has a direct impact on whether the contract 
objectives would be achieved.  Indeed, if the contractor could breach this fundamental obligation, 
and then escape liability vide the indemnity structure, this creates a perverse incentive for the 
contractor to breach a fundamental obligation, including not performing the contract at all, for 
which no remedy would be available to the operator.  This position recognises that exclusion 
clauses in the drilling contract can exculpate the contractor from liability even in these 
circumstances if that intent is clearly expressed.1222   
 
But that is clearly not the case here as this model contract equates the provision of adequate and 
competent personnel with the provision of the drilling unit1223 as far as materiality of the 
obligation is concerned, and the non-provision of the drilling unit has been judicially recognised 
as being a ground for treating the contract as terminated, entitling the operator to damages.1224  
Indeed, this is also the position of the model contract relating to the contractor’s failure to deliver 
                                                 
1219 Article 4.2, Mobile Drilling Rigs Contract, Edition 1. 
1220 Ibid, Art. 4.3. 
1221 (2011) 1 All E.R. (Comm) 1077.    
1222 Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd (1980) A.C. 827. 
1223 Article 4.1, Mobile Drilling Rigs Contract, Edition 1. 






the drilling unit to the well location stipulated in the contract.1225  This model contract also 
stipulates that if the contractor fails to remedy the breach of any material contractual obligation 
for a continuing period of 10 days after notice is served, this is a basis for termination of the 
contract,1226 a provision that justifies this study’s position on the consequences of the occurrence 
of an adverse event due to the inadequacy of the rig personnel.           
 
      
 
6.1.1.3  Risk Allocation for Various Events    
 
The model contract allocates risk inter se upon the happening of certain adverse events in the 
manner already discussed,1227 barring the need for further discussion.  These events are: 
(a) Death of, or personal injury to, contractor group personnel.1228 
(b) Death of, or personal injury to, company group personnel.1229 
(c) Loss of, or damage to, contractor group’s property.1230 
(d) Loss of, or damage to, company group’s property.1231 
(e) Third-party death, injury or property damage.1232 
(f) Consequential losses.1233 
(g) All pollution arising from surface activities and contractor equipment.1234 
(h) All pollution except that arising from surface activities and contractor equipment.1235 
(i) Wild well control.1236 
                                                 
1225 Article 22.1(f), Mobile Drilling Rigs Contract, Edition 1. 
1226 Ibid, Art. 22.1(e). 
1227 In Chapter 3, under the heading ‘Risk Allocation between Parties to a Drilling Contract’. 
1228 Article 18.1(b), Mobile Drilling Rigs Contract, Edition 1. 
1229 Ibid, Art. 18.2(b). 
1230 Ibid, Art. 18.1(a). 
1231 Ibid, Art. 18.2(a). 
1232 Ibid, Arts 18.1(c) and 18.2(c). 
1233 Ibid, Art. 20. 
1234 Ibid, Art. 18.4. 
1235 Ibid, Art. 18.3. 






(j) Loss of, or damage to, well reservoir or sub-surface formation.1237 
(k) Intellectual property and patent infringement.1238 
(l) Insurance cover in respect of liabilities assumed under the contract by the contractor.1239 
(m) Wreck or debris removal.1240 
(n) Liability for unsound location.1241 
 
For the avoidance of doubt, the model contract restates that all indemnities – except those 
exempted1242 – shall apply irrespective of negligence or breach of any legal duty, and gives 
priority to the contract over all other legal routes that could be the basis of any liability.1243  In so 
doing, the model contract makes it clear that it intends to indemnify even for own negligence, 
thereby satisfying the judicial requirement for unequivocal expression of intent in this regard.  
 
6.1.2 International Offshore Daywork Drilling Contract1244 
 
This model contract was developed in February 1989,1245 and revised in November 2007, by the 
International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) in the USA, specifically for offshore 
drilling operations outside USA.1246  The courts have made pronouncements on contracts that 
have been developed from this model, both in the USA1247 and in the UK,1248 especially in respect 
of indemnities and the ability of contract parties to use them as tools for risk allocation.  
                                                 
1237 Ibid, Art. 18.6(c). 
1238 Ibid, Arts 16.5 and 16.6. 
1239 Ibid, Art. 19.  The model contract is silent in respect of insurance by the company. 
1240 Ibid, Art. 18.7.   
1241 Ibid, Art. 10, which only provides that operator is responsible for providing access to the well location, as well 
as the requisite survey reports.    
1242 Ibid, Arts 18.1(c), 18.2(c), 18.5, 18.6(a) and 20. 
1243 Ibid, Art. 18.8. 
1244 See Appendix B. 
1245 Moomjian, C. A.  ‘Drilling Contract Historical Development and Future Trends Post-Macondo: Reflections on 
a 35-year Industry History’, supra, at p. 4. 
1246 Information is contained on the IADC website: 
https://iadc.ebiz.uapps.net/personifyebusiness/OnlineStore/ProductDetail/tabid/55/Default.aspx?ProductId=11102
6; accessed 27 January 2018. 
1247 Darty v Transocean Offshore USA, Inc, 875 So. 2d 106, 111-12 (La. App. (4th Cir.) 2004); Rodrigue v Legros, 
563 So. 2d 248, 255 (La. 1990). 






However, the model contract has not been as widely accepted and utilised internationally as its 
proponents had hoped, and a commentator has rationalised this as stemming from the fact that 
IADC developed this model contract, and others within its portfolio, without the participation of 
operators, and worked only with member organisations of its association.  It is therefore not 
perceived as being reflective of the common interest or position of the industry.1249  In some 
cases, it was firmly rejected as being one sided, in favour of the contractors, and potentially 
prejudicing operators.1250  Recognising the shortcoming of this model contract, it has been 
suggested that its usefulness lies in serving both as a starting point for negotiations and as a 
benchmark for comparing the legal and commercial risk exposure in other model contracts 
sought to be utilised.1251      
 
That notwithstanding, the model contract has served as the basis for developing drilling contracts 
used in various transactions, and continues to serve this purpose.1252  The key risk allocation 
methods are examined below. 
 
6.1.2.1  Loss or Damage Caused by Subcontractors    
 
Unlike the Mobile Drilling Rigs Contract, Edition 1, this model contract defines both 
‘Contractor’s Personnel’1253 and ‘Operator’s Personnel’1254 to include their respective 
subcontractors regardless of tier.  This prevents the situation already discussed,1255 in which the 
                                                 
1249 Martin, A. T. and Park, J. J. (2010) ‘Global Petroleum Industry Model Contracts Revisited: Higher, Faster, 
Stronger’, Journal of World Energy Law & Business, 3(1), pp. 4– 43, at p. 28. 
1250 Pugh, W. W. (1998) ‘The IADC Offshore Drilling Contract’, Oil and Gas Development on the Outer Continental 
Shelf, Paper, (Rocky Mtn Min L Fdn, 1998) §8. 
1251 Moomjian, C. A.  ‘Drilling Contract Historical Development and Future Trends Post-Macondo: Reflections on 
a 35-year Industry History’, supra, at p. 4. 
1252 Jones, P. M. (2003) ‘The Drilling Contract: A Perspective from the Hard Knocks of Litigation No. 12'’, Ann. 
Inst. on Min. L., 50, pp. 294–303, at p. 301. 
1253 Paragraph 101(d), International Offshore Daywork Drilling Contract. 
1254 Ibid, para.101(e). 






contractor is exposed from a mutual indemnity perspective because the subcontractors of the 
operator are not included in the indemnity structure. 
 
However, the concern here lies not only in the definition of the respective contractor and operator 
groups but with the whole indemnity section, and the impact of the anti-indemnity statutes1256 
that four states in the USA1257 have enacted, as previously discussed.1258  There is a clear and 
present possibility that the indemnity provisions relating to indemnification for own negligence 
may not be enforced for being in contravention of the statutes.  This is subject, of course, to the 
exceptions and/or conditions to their enforcement: inter alia, the fair notice requirement,1259 and 
its application to only certain heads of liability or losses,1260 and exclusion of certain types of 
agreements from its scope of coverage (for example joint operating agreements,1261) and where 
each party provides insurance cover for the other party in equal amounts, subject to statutory 
limits.1262  
 
To circumvent the harshness of these statutes, contract parties have resorted especially to the fair 
notice requirement, which seeks to put the indemnitor on actual notice of the responsibility for 
bearing the economic consequences of the occurrence of certain adverse events within the 
exceptions permitted by the statutes.  Importantly, contract parties engage in ‘forum shopping’ 
                                                 
1256 The Wyoming Act (Wyo. STAT. §§ 30-1-131 to -133 (1983); the New Mexico Act (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-
7-2 (1986); the Louisiana Act (LA. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2780 (West Supp. 1989); the Texas Act (TEX. CIV. 
PRAC. & REM. CODE §§127.001–127.007). 
1257 Texas, Louisiana, Wyoming and New Mexico. 
1258 Under the heading ‘Methods of Risk Allocation’.   
1259 The fair notice principle was laid down in Spence & Howe Constr Co v Gulf Oil Corp, 365 S.W.2d 631, 634 
(Tex. 1963), to the effect that it is only right that a party who is exposed to assuming significant risk on behalf of 
the other party, even in circumstances of that other party’s negligence, should be put on notice.      
1260 §127.003 of the Texas Act (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE).   
1261 Ibid. §127.002 rationalises this exclusion, inter alia, by holding that they are not contrary to public policy.  The 
Texas statute does not prohibit indemnity agreements for personal injury, death, or property injury resulting from 
radioactivity, property injury resulting from pollution, reservoir or underground damage.  It also does not apply to 
death or property injury resulting from services to control a wild well either to protect the safety of the general 
public or to prevent depletion of vital natural resources (§127.004 of the Texas Act (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE). 






for jurisdictions with more favourable treatment of indemnification for own negligence, which 
may sometimes lead them to choosing the laws of foreign countries, especially England and 
Wales,1263 or, within the USA, the increasing preference for the general maritime law of the 
United States.1264  Resort to the laws of foreign jurisdictions has its own challenges, especially in 
respect of interpretation of the indemnity provisions.  This is examined in the following section. 
 
6.1.2.2  Loss of, or Damage to, Own Equipment    
 
The indemnity structure in the model contract provides for mutual indemnities between the 
contractor1265 and operator1266 for property loss or damage, with exceptions set out in the same 
section.1267  There are other specific provisions relating to liability for damage to equipment –  
for instance, damage to the drilling unit arising from an unsound location, which will result in 
the operator’s liability for the damage as well as the payment of the standby rate during the repair 
period.1268  The model contract also confirms that drilling operations would be undertaken on a 
daywork basis, stating that the operator will be solely liable for all the outcomes of the operations, 
including the results of the drilling operations, notwithstanding the negligence of the contractor 
(emphasis added).1269 
 
In Seadrill Management Services Ltd v OAO Gazprom,1270 the drilling contract, which was based 
on the model contract, came before the English Court of Appeal, which had to interpret the 
indemnity obligation vis-à-vis the contractor’s standard of performance detailed in paragraph 
                                                 
1263 As happened, for instance, in Seadrill Management Services Ltd v OAO Gazprom (2011) 1 All E.R. (Comm) 
1077. 
1264 Moomjian, C. A. Jnr. (1999) ‘Contractual Insurance and Risk Allocation in the Offshore Drilling Industry’, 
Drilling Contractor, May/June, at p. 26. 
1265 Paragraph 901(a), International Offshore Daywork Drilling Contract. 
1266 Ibid, para. 901(c). 
1267 Ibid, para. 901(a)(1– 3), (b). 
1268 Ibid, para. 605. 
1269 Ibid, para. 501. 






501.  In this case, the drilling unit suffered a punch-through during ‘pre-loading’,1271 in 
consequence of which it was damaged, necessitating its removal for repairs.  In resolving the 
dispute that arose over liability for the damage, the court, in dismissing the contractor’s appeal, 
found that the damage occurred due to the negligence of the master of the rig, as the seabed 
conditions were known before-hand, and the rig owners accepted bringing the rig in that 
condition.  The contractor denied liability citing the indemnity provisions, and the court had to 
decide whether paragraph 5011272 implied an obligation that the contractor had to perform its 
duties under the contract with reasonable care and skill (emphasis added), which would call into 
question whether that standard had been met in the specific pre-loading circumstances.   
 
The court held that since the parties had chosen English law as their governing jurisdiction, the 
contract was subject to English rules of contract interpretation and, as such, there was indeed an 
implied obligation of performing the contract with reasonable care and skill.  The court’s 
rationale was that clear words were required to exclude the implied terms,1273 and that since 
nothing in the contract excluded the implied terms, the contractor was in breach of contract for 
performing its obligations under paragraph 501 negligently, entitling the operator to damages.1274   
 
                                                 
1271 The procedure in which the drilling unit’s legs are lowered onto the seabed to establish a firm foundation 
preparatory to the commencement of drilling operations.   
1272 Contractor’s Standard of Performance 
Contractor shall carry out all operations hereunder on a daywork basis. For purposes hereof the term "daywork 
basis" means Contractor shall furnish equipment, labor, and perform services as herein provided, for a specified 
sum per day under the direction and supervision of Operator inclusive of any employee, agent, consultant or 
subcontractor engaged by Operator to direct drilling operations). When operating on a daywork basis, Contractor 
shall be fully paid at the applicable rates of payment and assumes only the obligations and liabilities stated herein. 
Except for such obligations and liabilities specifically assumed by Contractor, Operator shall be solely responsible 
and assumes liability for all consequences of operations by both parties while on a daywork basis, including results 
and alt other risks or liabilities incurred in or incident to such operations, notwithstanding any breach of 
representation or warranty, either expressed or implied, or the negligence or fault of any degree or character of 
Contractor, Contractor's Personnel, its subcontractors, consultants, agents or servants, including sole, concurrent 
or gross negligence, either active or passive, latent defects or unseaworthiness of any vessel or vessels, including 
the Drilling Unit (whether or not pre-existing), and any liability based on any theory of tort, breach of contract, 
breach of duty (whether statutory, contractual or otherwise), regulatory or statutory liability, or strict liability, 
including defect or ruin of premises, either latent or patent. 
1273 Gilbert-Ash (Northern) Ltd v Modern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd (1974) AC 689. 






This case serves as the authority in English law that the IADC model contract has an implied 
obligation that the drilling unit must be operated with reasonable care and skill, failing which 
the operator would be entitled to damages, notwithstanding the indemnity structure in the 
contract.  It is also the authority on the fact that damages accruing to the operator in these 
circumstances are not inconsistent with the provisions of paragraph 701 that mandate payment 
of the applicable rate notwithstanding the negligence of the contractor.  The court interpreted 
this paragraph as a ‘pay now, dispute later’ clause, meaning that the operator could recover 
damages where it had already paid the applicable rate but the service had not been rendered, 
meaning that the rate paid was ‘wasted’.1275  
 
The Seadrill decision highlights the fact that some of the provisions of the model contracts are 
potentially conflicting, and could jeopardise the manner of risk allocation intended by the 
contract parties.  This is especially so when the conflict is with a provision in the liability section 
of the contract.  There could be conflicts between the contractor’s general obligations and the 
liability section, as was seen in this case.  The interpretation of the English Court of Appeal 
implied a duty of reasonable care into the obligation section, which defeated the intended risk 
undertaking evidenced in the liability section.  For instance, while the contractor has the 
obligation to take all steps necessary, and to act reasonably, to prevent a wild well situation from 
ensuing, all the model contracts allocate the risk of a wild well to the operator.  This inevitably 
leads to a situation in which, as in Seadrill, the contractor needs to demonstrate reasonableness, 
as no definition has been given to this term by the contract parties.  This process can potentially 
become acrimonious, and lead to a Seadrill outcome in which the obligation section takes 
precedence over the liability section. 
 
                                                 
1275 Ibid, at para. 30.  See also Ogilvie, J. and Doe, J. (2009) The IAD Drilling Contract: SeaDrill v OAO Gazprom. 
London: Herbert Smith LLP. Available at: https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=181f42c1-4755-465d-






This study recommends that contract parties should insert a clear provision to the effect that 
either one of the sections will prevail in case of an ambiguity or conflict.  This would certainly 
have changed the outcome in Seadrill, and puts beyond contention what the parties intended as 
far as that specific situation is concerned.  
 
6.1.2.3  Loss of, or Damage to, Contractor Equipment (Including Drilling Unit)    
 
The model contract allocates the responsibility of bearing the economic consequences of damage 
to all subsea equipment to the operator.1276  Typically, other model contracts provide that the 
operator would be responsible for subsea equipment if it gets damaged during in-hole operations, 
provided that the contractor was not negligent.1277  This model contract contains a similar 
provision,1278 but it does not curtail the operator’s responsibility to bear the economic 
consequences of any damage that occurs through the negligence of the contractor.  However, it 
makes the operator’s responsibility to bear the economic consequences of any in-hole equipment 
damaged during in-hole operations subject to the extent of insurance available to the contractor 
from their insurers.1279  Thus, the operator’s responsibility to bear the economic consequences 
will be triggered only by a shortfall in the contractor’s insurance. 
 
Perhaps of more importance to this study are the provisions of the model contract that allocate 
to the operator the responsibility for bearing the economic consequences of loss of, or damage 
to ‘Contractor’s Items’ arising from vessels, tugs or helicopters provided by the operator.1280  
Under the definition of ‘Contractor’s Items’, the drilling unit is listed among other equipment.1281  
The implication of this provision is that the operator also has a residual liability to pay for the 
                                                 
1276 Paragraph 901(a)(2), International Offshore Daywork Drilling Contract. 
1277 See, for instance, Art. 18.5, Mobile Drilling Rigs Contract, Edition 1. 
1278 Paragraph 901(a)(1), International Offshore Daywork Drilling Contract. 
1279 Ibid, para. 901(a). 
1280 Ibid, para. 901(a)(4). 






cost of replacing the drilling unit if it is damaged or destroyed by the actions of a subcontractor 
that is ordinarily covered under the indemnity structure.1282  This is a significant exposure for the 
operator, especially in the event of the total loss of the drilling unit. Drawing from the Deepwater 
Horizon experience, in which a lot of money was paid in compensation for the lost rig, the 
operator needs to insure specifically against that eventuality which BP did not have to do, as it 
was not under the same burden of risk allocation.1283  
 
Furthermore, the same provision of the model contract makes it clear that the operator would be 
responsible for bearing the economic consequences of any damage to the drilling unit caused by 
a supply vessel hired by the operator.  Although the vessel owner is a subcontractor and, thus, 
part of the indemnity structure in the model contract, the operator has no protection here like that 
previously set out in the Mobile Drilling Rigs Contract, Edition 1.1284  
 
6.1.2.4  Third-Party Death, Injury or Property Damage    
 
In this section, ‘third party’ refers to the class of people who are negatively impacted by the 
operations of contracting parties, which cause death, injury or other damage to them, their 
property or their relatives (in case of death). The model contract does not make provision for 
third-party death, injury or property damage.  Accordingly, it leaves it to contract parties to 
determine the risk allocation mechanism that they wish to adopt in specific instances.  In this 
regard, different options are open to contract parties.   
 
                                                 
1282 Ibid, para. 101(e) lists the operator’s subcontractors of any tier as being members of Operator Personnel. 
1283 Green, M. (2010) Transocean: Insurers Have Already Paid $401 Million for Deepwater Horizon Loss. USA: 
InsuranceNewsNet. Available at: https://insurancenewsnet.com/oarticle/Transocean-Insurers-Have-Already-Paid-
401-Million-for-Deepwater-Horizon-Loss-a-188498#.Wfp6CGaDPIU; accessed: 2 November 2017. 






For instance, the contract can provide that the contractor shall indemnify the operator for third-
party claims arising either from its own negligence, and vice versa1285 or, more generally, during 
the performance of the contract.  Contract parties can also agree that the designated applicable 
law shall determine their respective third-party liabilities.1286  The implication of tying liability 
in this context to negligence is the requirement for an investigation into the conduct of both 
parties before a finding can be made.  This process can be adversarial, time consuming and 
resource draining for both parties.  In this regard, contract parties have been advised to mitigate 
the potential claims arising from third parties by ensuring that subcontractors are captured within 
the indemnity structure of the contract, leaving only a small class of people who would come 
under the ‘true third-party’ purview.1287       
 
6.1.2.5  Risk Allocation for Various Events    
 
The IADC model contract allocates risk to the parties inter se upon the happening of certain 
adverse events in the manner already discussed,1288 barring the need for further discussion.  These 
events are: 
(a) Death of, or personal injury to Contractor’s Personnel.1289 
(b) Death of, or personal injury to Operator’s Personnel.1290 
(c) Loss of, or damage to, operator’s property.1291 
(d) Loss of, or damage to, contractor’s surface equipment.1292 
                                                 
1285 See, for instance, Arts 18.1(c) and 18.2(c), Mobile Drilling Rigs Contract, Edition 1. 
1286 Foster, S. J., Gibbie, K. W., Mason, D. C. and Baron, S. L. ‘Risks Assumed in Drilling Contracts: Global 
Comparison and Case Histories’. SPE/IADC Drilling Conference: Society of Petroleum Engineers, at p. 5.  
1287 Moomjian, C. A. (1999) ‘Contractual Insurance and Risk Allocation in the Offshore Drilling Industry’, Drilling 
Contractor, March/April at p. 16. 
1288 In Chapter 3, under the heading ‘Risk Allocation between Parties to a Drilling Contract’. 
1289 Paragraph 903, International Offshore Daywork Drilling Contract. 
1290 Ibid, para. 904. 
1291 Ibid, para. 901(c). 






(e) Loss of, or damage to, contractor’s downhole equipment.1293 
(f) Consequential losses.1294 
(g) All pollution arising from surface activities and contractor equipment.1295 
(h) All pollution except that arising from surface activities and contractor equipment.1296 
(i) Wild well control.1297 
(j) Loss of, or damage to, well reservoir or sub-surface formation.1298 
(k) Intellectual property and patent infringement.1299 
(l) Insurance cover in respect of liabilities assumed under the contract by the contractor and 
operator.1300  
(m) Wreck or debris removal.1301 
(n) Liability for unsound location.1302 
 
The model contract restates that all indemnities shall apply irrespective of negligence or breach 
of any legal duty, and gives priority to the contract over all other legal routes that could be the 
basis of any liability.1303  Although the model contract makes it clear that it intends to indemnify 
even for own negligence, the enforcement and extent thereof remain subject to the application 
of the anti-indemnity statutes discussed earlier in this section.1304 
 
                                                 
1293 Ibid, para. 901(a)(1). 
1294 Ibid, para. 909. 
1295 Ibid, para. 905(a). 
1296 Ibid, para. 905(b). 
1297 Ibid, para. 906. 
1298 Ibid, paras 902 and 907. 
1299 Ibid, para. 908. 
1300 Ibid, para. 1001. The provision also confirms that the operator shall waive the right of subrogation against the 
contractor only to the extent of liabilities that the operator assumes.  The operator is mandated to maintain insurance 
in the same way that the contractor does, unlike the Mobile Drilling Rigs Contract, Edition 1 which mandates only 
contractor insurance.  
1301 Ibid, para 906. 
1302 Ibid, para 605. 
1303 Ibid, paras 911 and 912. 






6.1.3 CAODC/CAPP Master Daywork Contract1305 
 
This model contract is cited as another example of the product of collaboration between operators 
and contractors, like the Mobile Drilling Rigs Contract, Edition 1, which was collaboratively 
developed by operators and contractors in the UK under the aegis of CRINE.1306  The 
CAODC/CAPP Master Daywork Contract was developed in 2001 by the Canadian Association 
of Oilwell Drilling Contractors (CAODC) and the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers 
(CAPP), and has been accepted by both the oil and gas industry in Canada and the judiciary.  In 
a recent decision, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench in Precision Drilling Canada Limited 
Partnership v Yangarra Resources Ltd1307 upheld the indemnity structure in the contract, which 
was based on this model contract, affirming the contract parties’ right to allocate risk in the way 
that they did, given their freedom of contract.  In upholding the knock-for-knock provisions, the 
court, recognising that the model contract was accepted industry wide, further stated that 
enforcing these provisions was neither contrary to public policy nor unconscionable, as both 
parties were sophisticated and had equal bargaining power.1308    
 
Although the knock-for-knock provisions, as incorporated in the model contract, have been 
acknowledged as representing a change in the attitude of the Canadian oil and gas industry to 
the regime, it has been stated that their use is still not as pervasive as it is in the UK.1309  
Nevertheless, the model contract represents the most acceptable starting point in drilling 
negotiations in Canada, and the key risk allocation methods are examined below. 
 
                                                 
1305 See Appendix C. 
1306 Martin, A. T. (2004) ‘Model Contracts: A Survey of the Global Petroleum Industry’, Journal of Energy & 
Natural Resources Law, 22(3), pp. 281– 340, at p. 295. 
1307 (2016) ABQB 365. 
1308 Ibid, at para. 56. 
1309 Mercier, T., Kane, J. and Nammour, S. (2014) ‘Drafting Canadian Oilfield Master Service Agreements: An 






6.1.3.1  Loss or Damage Caused by Subcontractors    
 
Just like the Mobile Drilling Rigs Contract, Edition 1, this model contract defines Contractor’s 
Group as including, inter alia, the contractor’s subcontractors,1310 and omits to do the same in 
defining Operator’s Group.1311  The practical effect of this has been discussed previously1312 as it 
impacts on the section on allocation of risk and liability,1313 especially relating to the mutual 
indemnities against all losses, claims and liabilities arising from death, loss of, or damage to 
property of members of their respective groups.1314  While the operator gets the full benefit of 
their indemnity: as the Contractor’s Group includes subcontractors, the contractor is exposed to 
the operator’s contractors and subcontractors, as they are not part of the indemnity structure.  
Although Article 10.7 attempts to remedy this imbalance by stating that the company indemnifies 
the contractor for death, personal injury or disease to the employees of Operator’s Group, this 
brings its own challenges, which have been discussed previously.1315   
 
6.1.3.2  Risk Allocation for Various Events    
 
The model contract allocates risk to the parties inter se upon the happening of certain adverse 
events in the manner already discussed,1316 barring the need for further discussion.  These events 
are: 
(a) Death of, or personal injury to, employees of Contractor’s Group.1317 
(b) Death of, or personal injury to, employees of Operator’s Group. 1318 
                                                 
1310 Article 1.1, CAODC/CAPP Master Daywork Contract. 
1311 Ibid, Art. 1.1. 
1312 Under the heading ‘Mobile Drilling Rigs Contract, Edition 1’. 
1313Article 10, CAODC/CAPP Master Daywork Contract.   
1314 Ibid, Arts 10.6 and 10.7.  
1315 Under the heading ‘Mobile Drilling Rigs Contract, Edition 1’. 
1316 In Chapter 3, under the heading ‘Risk Allocation Between Parties to a Drilling Contract’. 
1317 Article 10.6, CAODC/CAPP Master Daywork Contract.   






(c) Loss of, or damage to, Contractor’s Surface Equipment.1319 
(d) Loss of, or damage to, Contractor’s Downhole Equipment.1320 
(e) Loss of, or damage to, Operator Equipment.1321 
(f) Third-party death, injury or property damage.1322 
(g) Consequential losses.1323 
(h) All pollution arising from surface activities and contractor equipment.1324 
(i) All pollution except that arising from surface activities and contractor equipment.1325 
(j) Environmental loss or damage to Contractor’s Items.1326 
(k) Wild well control.1327 
(l) Loss of, or damage to well reservoir or sub-surface formation.1328 
(m) Intellectual property and patent infringement.1329 
(n) Insurance cover in respect of liabilities assumed under the contract by the contractor and 
operator.1330  
(o) Liability for unsound location.1331   
 
For the avoidance of doubt, the model contract restates that all indemnities shall apply 
irrespective of negligence or breach of any legal duty, and gives priority to the contract over all 
other legal routes that could be the basis of any liability.1332  By this provision, the model contract 
                                                 
1319 Ibid, Art. 10.1. 
1320 Ibid, Art. 10.3(a)(i). 
1321 Ibid, Art. 10.3(a)(ii). 
1322 Ibid, Arts 10.10 and 10.11. 
1323 Ibid, Art. 10.14. 
1324 Ibid, Art. 10.8. 
1325 Ibid, Art. 10.9. 
1326 Ibid, Art. 10.2(b). 
1327 Ibid, Art. 10.3(c). 
1328 Ibid, Art. 10.3(a)(iii). 
1329 Ibid, Art. 15.1. 
1330 Ibid, Art. 11. The operator is mandated to maintain insurance in the same way that the contractor does, and both 
parties are required to specify the other party as additional insureds in their respective insurance policies.  The 
provision also confirms that the operator shall waive the right of subrogation against the contractor only to the extent 
of liabilities that the operator assumes.   
1331 Ibid, Art. 10.5. 






expresses the intent to indemnify even for own negligence, thereby satisfying the judicial 
requirement for unequivocal expression of intent in this regard. 
 
6.1.4 Contract Model of a Major Operator1333 
 
In this section, the model contract of an international oil and gas exploration and production 
company that had extensive interests in West Africa – for reasons of confidentiality, referred to 
as ‘ExplorCo’ – is discussed.  The drilling contractor is a major global player in the drilling 
services sector, and will be referred to here as ‘DrillCo’.  Given the private nature of negotiations 
between contract parties, it is difficult to speculate as to which factors determined the risk 
allocation methods adopted.  However, suffice it to say that in 2013, when the contract was made, 
significant discoveries had been made in East Africa, which increased the demand for rigs in 
Africa as a whole.1334  In this regard, the market conditions would typically have been in favour 
of the drilling contractors, and they would ordinarily have been able to influence which 
provisions were ultimately utilised in the drilling contract.  However, ExplorCo’s leverage over 
DrillCo cannot be underestimated, as this operator had multiple wells planned in the drilling 
programme, so the potential for continuous future work would have been a factor to consider in 
the overall balance of power dynamics between the parties. 
 
This contract was successfully utilised to prosecute the drilling campaign, without any need to 
recourse to the courts for the settlement of any dispute.  This can be interpreted as meaning that 
the risk allocation methods were acceptable in this instance to both parties.  The key risk 
allocation methods are examined below. 
 
                                                 
1333 See Appendix D. 
1334 Liou, J. (2012) Positive Rig Demand Steers 2013 Outlook. Drilling Contractor. Houston: International 
Association of Drilling Contractors. Available at: http://www.drillingcontractor.org/2012/novemberdecember-






6.1.4.1  Liability for Punitive and Exemplary Damages    
 
This model contract allows contract parties to indemnify each other for liabilities or damages of 
any kind, including punitive and exemplary damages.1335  It also allows indemnification for fines, 
charges and penalties of any kind imposed by a competent authority.1336  These indemnities apply 
irrespective of cause, fault or negligence, and would be effective even if there has been failure 
to comply with any applicable law or breach of statutory duty.1337  This risk allocation method is 
novel in that it specifically provides for indemnification for punitive and exemplary damages in 
the same circumstances that the US courts have stated that this would not be allowed, on the 
ground of public policy. 
   
The governing law of this model contract is English law, which, as previously discussed,1338 will 
permit indemnification for punitive damages provided that this intent is clearly expressed by the 
parties.  This is, perhaps, why the contract parties stipulated for indemnification in these 
circumstances, regard having been had to the judicial attitude of the courts of England. 
 
6.1.4.2  Priority of Insurance for Indemnification    
 
Unlike the IADC model contract, which provides for the operator’s residual liability in respect 
of damage or loss of Contractor’s Items, including the drilling unit, if they are damaged or 
destroyed by the actions of a subcontractor,1339 the ExplorCo model contract indemnifies the 
operator, ExplorCo, from liability in this regard.1340  Furthermore, both parties agree that 
DrillCo’s insurance shall have priority over any insurance maintained by ExplorCo, even if there 
                                                 
1335 Clause 13.1(a)(i), ExplorCo Model Contract.   
1336 Ibid, Cl. 13.1(a)(ii). 
1337 Ibid, Cl. 13.1(b). 
1338 Under the heading ‘Requirement to “indemnify, defend, release and hold harmless”’.  See also Persimmon 
Homes Ltd v Ove Arup and Partners Ltd (2017) EWCA Civ 373. 
1339 Paragraph 901(a)(2), International Offshore Daywork Drilling Contract. 






is an overlap in terms of the subject-matter covered.1341  However, this is only in respect of 
DrillCo’s liabilities, indemnities and obligations under the contract.1342  
 
These provisions reinforce the intent of the parties that the contractor be solely responsible for 
bearing the economic consequences of the occurrence of any of the events for which they have 
accepted liability.  Aside from holding ExplorCo harmless in respect of all excesses and 
deductibles incorporated in the insurance policies, DrillCo is also required to name ExplorCo as 
an additional assured to the extent of the liabilities and indemnities assumed by DrillCo under 
Clauses 131343 and 141344 of the model contract, except for employer’s liability insurance.1345      
 
6.1.4.3  Indemnification for Gross Negligence    
 
The model contract indemnifies contract parties even for gross negligence.1346  Given that this 
contract is governed by English law and, as previously discussed,1347 the current state of the law 
is that the distinction between negligence and gross negligence is ‘sterile and semantic’,1348 it is 
doubtful that this clause will be enforced before an English court.     
 
This is certainly an area of UK jurisprudence that is evolving and, if the attitude of the court in 
Camarata Property v Credit Suisse Securities1349 is to be followed, the time may come when the 
UK courts recognise the distinction and enforce the indemnity accordingly.  Thus, clarity is 
required in this area of English jurisprudence.  Contract parties must understand the implication 
of terms for which they provide in their contracts, and certainty and consistency of approach, 
                                                 
1341 Ibid, Cl. 15.6. 
1342 Ibid, Cll 13 and 14. 
1343 Provisions on liabilities and indemnities. 
1344 Provides for consequential losses. 
1345 Clause 15.1, ExplorCo Model Contract.   
1346 Ibid, Cl. 13.1(b)(i). 
1347 Under the heading ‘Negligence/Wilful Misconduct in Risk Allocation’. 
1348 Per Lord Justice Aikens in Springwell v JP Morgan [2010] EWCA Civ 1221 at para 193. 






which are a hallmark of the English judicial doctrines of precedents and stare decisis, must apply 
to this area of the law.  Essentially, contract parties must understand whether inclusion of the 
indemnification for gross negligence would ordinarily be enforced by an English court, or the 
courts would treat it as a cosmetic addition that means nothing within English jurisprudence. 
     
6.1.4.4  Risk Allocation for Various Events    
 
The model contract allocates risk to the parties inter se upon the happening of certain adverse 
events in the manner already discussed,1350 barring the need for further discussion.  These events 
are: 
(a) Death of, or personal injury to, Contractor Group Personnel.1351 
(b) Death of, or personal injury to, Operator Group Personnel.1352 
(c) Loss of, or damage to, Contractor’s Surface Equipment.1353 
(d) Loss of, or damage to, Contractor’s Downhole Equipment.1354 
(e) Loss of, or damage to, Company Group’s Equipment.1355  
(f) Loss of, or damage to, Contractor’s Items and Property.1356 
(g) Third-party death, injury or property damage.1357 
(h) Loss or damage caused by subcontractors.1358 
(i) Consequential losses.1359 
(j) All pollution arising from surface activities and contractor equipment.1360 
                                                 
1350 In Chapter 3, under the heading ‘Risk Allocation between Parties to a Drilling Contract’. 
1351 Clause 13.2(b), ExplorCo Model Contract.     
1352 Ibid, Cl. 13.2(a). 
1353 Ibid, Cl. 13.3(b). 
1354 Ibid, Cl. 13.4. 
1355 Ibid, Cl. 13.3(a). 
1356 Ibid, Cl. 13.3(b). 
1357 Ibid, Cl. 13.8. 
1358 Ibid, Cl. 1.1 includes subcontractors in the definition of Company Group. 
1359 Ibid, Cl. 14. 






(k) All pollution except that arising from surface activities and contractor equipment.1361 
(l) Environmental loss or damage to Contractor’s Items.1362 
(m) Wild well control.1363 
(n) Loss of, or damage to, well reservoir or sub-surface formation.1364 
(o) Intellectual property and patent infringement.1365 
(p) Insurance cover in respect of liabilities assumed under the contract by the contractor and 
operator.1366  
(q) Liability for non-workmanlike performance.1367    
(r) Wreck or debris removal.1368 
(s) Liability for Unsound Location.1369 
 
For the avoidance of doubt, the model contract restates that all indemnities shall apply 
irrespective of negligence or breach of any legal duty, and gives priority to the contract over all 
other legal routes that could be the basis of any liability.1370  By this provision, the model contract 
confirms the intent to indemnify even for own negligence and, in this regard, satisfies the judicial 
requirement for clear expression of this intent. 
6.2 Turnkey Contracts 
The most pre-dominant type of model contract utilised for offshore drilling is the daywork 
contract.1371 However, turnkey contracts are sometimes used if both contract parties agree a 
specified depth or reservoir formation that the contractor is required to drill, and for which a 
                                                 
1361 Ibid, Cl. 13.6. 
1362 Ibid, Cl. 13.6(v). 
1363 Ibid, Cl. 13.6(iii). 
1364 Ibid, Cl. 13.6(i). 
1365 Ibid, Cll 18.5 and 18.6. 
1366 Ibid, Cl. 15. The model contract is silent in respect of insurance by the operator. 
1367 Ibid, Cl. 8.1. 
1368 Ibid, Cl. 8.9. 
1369 Ibid, Cl. 9.3. 
1370 Ibid, Cl. 13.1(a) and (b). 






specified amount would be paid.  Among the organisations that have authored the model 
contracts that are the focus of this study, only the IADC has developed a turnkey model 
contract,1372 which is designed for offshore work within the USA.  There is no evidence that this 
model contract has been used outside the USA, or been the subject of litigation in any other 
country.  Indeed, a commentator has stated that turnkey contracts are used only in the Gulf of 
Mexico, and for not more than 15% of the total contracts in that sector, and mostly for 
exploratory drilling.1373  He attributes this low utilisation to the fact that turnkey contracts focus 
on only one performance indicator – metres drilled per day – at the expense of other important 
indicators, which can lead to a perverse incentive to distort information.1374  It may also be due 
to the manner in which petroleum authorisations work outside the USA, in which state 
involvement is more intrusive.  The state may want to have more control and involvement in the 
drilling process, and the turnkey structure prevents this. 
 
Unlike in daywork contracts, in which the operator is in control of drilling operations, the 
contractor in a turnkey contract typically assumes control of drilling operations and, ipso facto, 
takes on greater responsibility of bearing the economic consequences of the occurrence of 
adverse events while performing the contract.  In Totah Drilling Co v Abraham,1375 the court 
stated that the drilling contractor, having accepted the specifically agreed lump-sum 
consideration for the project, would be responsible for any cost escalation, whether arising from 
weather or a wild well. However, there are risks that are allocated to the operator, who retains 
                                                 
1372 In February 1988. 
1373 Osmundsen, P., Sorenes, T. and Toft, A. (2009) ‘Oil Service Contracts: New Incentive Schemes to Promote 
Drilling Efficiency’, supra, at p. 223, citing Corks, K. (2000) ‘Turnkey Contracts as a Response to Incentive 
Problems: Evidence from the Offshore Drilling Industry’, Unpublished Working Paper, Harvard University. 
1374 Ibid, at p. 223. 






the obligation to pay the contractor1376 even if the drilling operations result in a dry hole.1377  The 
key risk allocation methods are discussed below. 
 
The underlying meaning and implication of the respective obligations on the contract parties are 
typically the same in turnkey contracts as they are in daywork contracts; the difference is that 
there is a swap of who bears the responsibility for the economic consequences of the occurrence 
of the adverse events in turnkey contracts.  However, there are some differences in the way in 
which some specific risks are allocated.  These differences are discussed below, but where the 
risks have been allocated in the way already highlighted in the preceding chapter and sections, 
this fact will be mentioned but no further analysis would be required. 
 
6.2.1 Offshore Turnkey Drilling Contract – US 
 
This model contract has not been officially modified by its authors since it was developed in 
1988, and specifically enjoins users to seek the advice of counsel before utilising it, as it may 
not be suitable for every circumstance.  This admonition is well placed as this model contract 
has been used only in limited circumstances – for instance, for well interventions, and by 
contractors that are both willing and able to bear the responsibility of the economic consequences 
of the occurrence of adverse events that an operator would ordinarily be sufficiently experienced 
to bear.1378 
   
It is important to highlight that the model contract anticipates that there may be circumstances 
in which drilling operations would be conducted on a daywork basis – for instance, if the operator 
elects to take over operations to control a wild well.  In these circumstances, the model contract 
                                                 
1376 Tilley v Allied Materials Corp, 208 Okla. 433, 256 P.2d 1110 (1953). 
1377 A well that contains hydrocarbons that cannot be produced in economic quantities, making it unprofitable to 
progress to the production stage.  The consequence of encountering a dry hole is to abandon the well. 
1378 Osmundsen, P., Sorenes, T. and Toft, A. (2009) ‘Oil Service Contracts: New Incentive Schemes to Promote 






makes separate provisions for risk allocation that reflect previous discussions on the subject-
matter covered. 
 
Despite the limitations of the model contract, it is useful in circumstances in which the operator 
is a small player in the industry with no prior experience, and so is willing to delegate control to 
the contractor.  The key risk allocation methods are examined below.   
 
6.2.1.1  Liability for Non-Workmanlike Performance    
 
As previously discussed,1379 the contractor is ordinarily supposed to conduct the drilling 
operations in ‘a good, diligent, safe and workmanlike manner’.  However, the model contract 
specifically excludes the application of this standard in undertaking drilling operations by either 
party.1380  Ordinarily, this objective standard holds contractors accountable for professional 
wrongdoing if they demonstrate capacity that falls below that ordinarily expected of a 
practitioner within their trade.  Excluding its application means that the contractor cannot be held 
liable for any wrong that ensues from the failure to undertake the given task to the expected 
standard.   
 
Given that this model contract also anticipates circumstances in which the operator takes over 
control of the drilling operations, the exclusion also applies to the operator. This raises the 
question as to how an English court would interpret this clause if it came before it for 
consideration.  This is against the backdrop of the decision in Seadrill Management Services Ltd 
v OAO Gazprom,1381 in which the court held that the duty to take reasonable care was implied in 
the performance of the obligations under the drilling contract.  However, the court’s rationale 
                                                 
1379 Under the heading ‘Conduct of Drilling Operations’.  
1380 Paragraph 501, Offshore Turnkey Drilling Contract – US. 






was that there was nothing in the contract that showed a contrary intention.1382  It follows that if 
the contract parties specifically exclude this, just as in the model contract, the courts will respect 
this risk allocation, and enforce it accordingly. 
 
When the implied term has been expressly excluded, as is the case here, this creates a perverse 
incentive for the contractor to undertake their obligation without reasonable care, especially in 
respect of tasks whose liability is borne by the operator. 
 
In the light of this possibility, this study recommends that the contract parties make a specific 
provision for the duty of good faith to apply in the performance of the obligations in respect of 
which the implied term of reasonableness has been excluded.  In English jurisprudence, there is 
no overarching doctrine of good faith as the courts have always been wary that it could open the 
floodgates for defeating agreements freely entered upon by contract parties.1383  However, 
English law recognises the ability of contract parties to provide for this expressly, and the courts 
will enforce it if the scope and extent of the obligation to act in good faith are clear.1384  In this 
regard, it is up to the parties to make this provision, taking care to ensure that it is clear in both 
its intent and the extent of its application. 
 
6.2.1.2  Risk Allocation for Various Events – Irrespective of Turnkey or Daywork Basis    
 
There are risk allocation methods in the model contract that remain the same irrespective of 
whether drilling operations are being conducted on a turnkey or daywork basis. This allocation 
of risk to the parties inter se upon the happening of certain adverse events has already been 
discussed,1385 barring the need for further discussion.  These events are: 
                                                 
1382 Ibid, at paras. 27–28. 
1383 MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co S.A. v Cottonex Anstalt (2016) EWCA Civ 789. 
1384 Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust v Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd  (2013) EWCA Civ 200. 
1385 In Chapter 3, under the heading ‘Risk Allocation between Parties to a Drilling Contract’, and in the preceding 






(a) Death of, or personal injury to, Contractor’s Personnel.1386 
(b) Death of, or personal injury to, Operator’s Personnel. 1387 
(c) Loss of, or damage to, Contractor’s Surface Equipment.1388 
(d) Loss of, or damage to, Operator’s Items and Property.1389 
(e) Third-party death, injury or property damage.1390 
(f) Consequential losses.1391 
(g) Loss or damage caused by subcontractors.1392 
(h) Loss of, or damage to, well reservoir or sub-surface formation.1393 
(i) All pollution arising from surface activities and contractor equipment.1394 
(j) Intellectual property and patent infringement.1395 
(k) Insurance cover in respect of liabilities assumed under the contract by the contractor and 
operator.1396  
 
6.2.1.3  Risk Allocation for Various Events – Turnkey Basis    
 
The model contract allocates risk to the parties inter se upon the happening of certain adverse 
events in the manner already discussed,1397 barring the need for further discussion.  The only 
                                                 
1386 Paragraph 1007, Offshore Turnkey Drilling Contract – US.  This provision does not change whether the drilling 
is being conducted on a daywork or turnkey basis. 
1387 Ibid, para. 1008. 
1388 Ibid, para. 1001. 
1389 Ibid, para. 1006. 
1390 This has not been provided for in the model contract, just as in the International Offshore Daywork Drilling 
Contract.  Parties are therefor at liberty to provide for this in their specific contracts. 
1391 Paragraph 1017, Offshore Turnkey Drilling Contract – US. 
1392 Ibid, para. 1019.  The definition of ‘Operator’s Personnel’ in para. 101(e) already includes the operator’s 
subcontractor, thus para. 1019 is only emphasising the extent of indemnities already discussed.   
1393 Ibid, para. 1014. 
1394 Ibid, para 1011(a).  Paragraph 1012(a) allocates the same risk on a daywork basis.   
1395 Ibid, para. 1015. 
1396 Ibid, paras 1101–1104.  Although the operator is not expressly mandated to maintain insurance in the same way 
that the contractor does, both parties are required to specify the other party as additional insureds in their respective 
insurance policies.  The provision also confirms that the operator shall waive the right of subrogation against the 
contractor only to the extent of liabilities that the operator assumes.    
1397 In Chapter 3, under the heading ‘Risk Allocation between Parties to a Drilling Contract’, and in the preceding 






difference is that the responsibility for bearing the economic consequences of these events is 
allocated to the contractor.  For each of the provisions in which risk is allocated on a turnkey 
basis, there are corresponding provisions that allocate risk on a daywork basis.  These events are: 
(a) Loss of, or damage to Contractor’s Downhole Equipment. 1398 
(b) All pollution except that arising from surface activities and contractor equipment.1399 
(c) Wild well control.1400 
(d) Environmental loss of, or damage to, Contractor’s Items1401. 
 
For the avoidance of doubt, the model contract restates that all indemnities shall apply 
irrespective of negligence or breach of any legal duty, and gives priority to the contract over all 
other legal routes that could be the basis of any liability.1402  By this provision, the model contract 
confirms the intent to indemnify even for own negligence, and in this regard, satisfies the judicial 
requirement for clear expression of this intent. 
 
6.3 Footage Contracts 
Aside from the fact that there is no record of footage contracts being used as a basis for offshore 
drilling operations,1403 none of the organisations that are the focus of this study has developed a 
model footage contract for offshore drilling operations.  In this regard, this study finds that it is 
both needless and irrelevant to discuss such contracts. 
6.4 Risks Allocation Matrix in Model Drilling Contracts 
                                                 
1398 Paragraph 1002, Offshore Turnkey Drilling Contract – US.  Paragraph 1003 allocates the same risk on a daywork 
basis. 
1399 Ibid, para 1011(b).  Paragraph 1012(b) allocates the same risk on a daywork basis.   
1400 Ibid, para 1009.  Paragraph 1010 allocates the same risk on a daywork basis. 
1401 Ibid, para 1004.  Paragraph 1005 allocates the same risk on a daywork basis. 
1402 Ibid, paras 1018 and 1020. 
1403 See, for instance, Moomjian, C. A. (1999) ‘Contractual Insurance and Risk Allocation in the Offshore Drilling 
Industry’, Drilling Contractor, March/April at p. 17.  See also Anderson, O. L. (1989) ‘The Anatomy of an Oil and 







The allocation of risks for daywork contracts, discussed in the foregoing sections of this chapter, 
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In this chapter, this study undertakes a comparison of the way in which risk has been allocated in the 
model contracts examined in the preceding section, which culminated with the development of the 
risk matrix.  This will entail an investigation into the correlation, similarities and differences that 
exist among the model contracts in the way that they utilise the different contractual tools to allocate 
risk, such as indemnities, insurance, exclusions and limitation of liability. 
 
The judicial attitude of the English courts to the risk allocation provisions will be discussed 
simultaneously.  Essentially, the discussion will ask and answer the question of how the risk 
allocation methods will be viewed if they come before a court in England.  This discussion will 
necessarily highlight the perspectives of risk allocation from the standpoints of the contract parties, 
evidenced in the way in which they have done this in the model contracts.   
7.1 Indemnification for Own Negligence and Gross Negligence 
All the model contracts have provisions allowing indemnification for own negligence,1404 and each 
of these provisions is unequivocal as to its intent and effect.  For the avoidance of doubt, two of the 
model contracts – Mobile Drilling Rigs Contract, Edition 1 and International Offshore Daywork 
Drilling Contract – list the sections that are not subject to indemnification for own negligence, 
making it even clearer that they intended to allocate risk in this manner.  Indemnification for own 
negligence is allowed in the knock-for-knock provisions, including consequential losses; loss of, or 
damage to Operator’s Items and Property; intellectual property and patent infringement; and death 
of, or personal injury to the respective personnel and subcontractors of the contract parties.  
                                                 
1404 Article 18.8, Mobile Drilling Rigs Contract, Edition 1; para. 911(a), International Offshore Daywork Drilling 






However, as it relates to subcontractors, the contractor in all the model contracts indemnifies the 
operator for death or injury to the subcontractors, although the Mobile Drilling Rigs Contract, 
Edition 1 and CAODC/CAPP Master Daywork Contract do not have specific provisions to this 
effect.  In these circumstances, the contractor is exposed to the operator’s other contractors in the 
event of the occurrence of any adverse event. 
 
The attitude of the English courts to risk allocation in this manner has already been noted.  If the 
parties clearly express that intent, and the construction of the whole contract does not contradict that 
intent, the courts will enforce the provisions as written.  Unlike the courts of the USA, which have 
to enquire as to whether the provisions comply with any applicable anti-indemnity statutes, the courts 
in England are not under the same burden.  There is no equivalent anti-indemnity statute in 
Canada.1405  
 
Indemnification for gross negligence is considered differently.  Only the International Offshore 
Daywork Drilling Contract allows for indemnification in this way, and the attitude of the English 
courts to this has been to deny the existence of gross negligence as part of English jurisprudence.  
Recently, however, this attitude seems to be shifting towards a recognition of the fact that parties 
must have intended gross negligence to mean something other than negligence by inserting it into 
their contract.  Although there is still no firm recognition of the concept, the current willingness to 
understand whether the parties did intend it to mean something different from ordinary negligence 
may engender a change in the future in this area of English law.1406 
7.2 Exclusion of Liability   
                                                 
1405 Mercier, T., Kane, J. and Nammour, S. (2014) ‘Drafting Canadian Oilfield Master Service Agreements: An Overview 
of Key Clauses and Market Trends’, supra., at p. 253. 






All the model contracts exclude the liability of the contractor for wild well incidents, environmental 
loss or damage to Contractor’s Items, all pollution except that arising from surface activities and 
contractor equipment, and loss of or damage to well reservoir or sub-surface formation as well as 
for unsound locations.  In the same vein, the model contracts exclude the operator’s liability for all 
pollution arising from surface activities and contractor equipment.  These provisions also function 
as releases, and the attitude of the English courts is that a release must be unequivocal and 
unconditional in order to be effective.  Where there is a condition attached to the release – for 
instance, the operator’s liability for loss of, or damage to Contractor’s Downhole Equipment in the 
Mobile Drilling Rigs Contract, Edition 1 has been made subject to the absence of negligence of the 
contractor – the courts will be unwilling to find that a release exists unless the condition has been 
performed.1407  The rationale for this is found in the courts’ stance that it is implausible that a contract 
party will exculpate the other from liability, even when this is attributed to the latter’s negligence, 
unless this is expressed in very clear and unconditional terms.  
 
The exclusion of liability in the model contracts is clear and unequivocal in the provisions 
highlighted.  In this regard, the English courts should have no difficultly in upholding and enforcing 
them as provided.  This is more so when the provisions in the model contracts for third-party death, 
injury or property damage are considered.  Apart from the International Offshore Daywork Drilling 
Contract, which has no specific provision that addresses these adverse events, all the other model 
contracts have provisions that exclude the liability of the innocent party in respect of harm done to 
a third party arising from the negligence of the wrongful party.  Again, this exclusion is clear and 
unequivocal, and should ordinarily be upheld by the English courts.  However, this is one of the 
inevitable circumstances in which an enquiry is required into the negligence of the party who is 
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alleged to have caused the ensuing harm.  Unless the fault of the wrongful party is apparent and 
acknowledged, the adverse event could be the start of an acrimonious process to determine 
culpability – a situation that was sought to be avoided by instituting the knock-for-knock scheme.   
7.3 Limitation of Liability   
The model contracts are replete with circumstances in which contracting parties have limited their 
liability in respect of certain adverse events.  For instance, the International Offshore Daywork 
Drilling Contract limits the liability of the contractor for in-hole and subsea equipment to the extent 
of their insurance.1408  Thereafter, the operator’s liability is triggered.  Again, in respect of wreck or 
debris removal, the Mobile Drilling Rigs Contract, Edition 1 limits the operator’s liability to harm 
occasioned by blowouts or other well control incidents, while the International Offshore Daywork 
Drilling Contract limits the liability of the contractor for the same events to the extent of the 
contractor’s insurance.   
 
English courts recognise the right of contract parties to limit their liability in this way, and so apply 
the contra proferentem rule less rigorously, as they generally prefer parties to limit their liability 
rather than exclude it entirely.1409  The relaxed attitude of the English courts to limitation of liability 
leads the study to posit that more rigour should be applied when considering limitation of liability 
clauses, the consequences of which are dire.  At the very minimum, the same level of clarity and 
intent as is expected of an exclusion clause should be required.  The courts should be guided by such 
factors as the balance of power between the parties, the clarity of the meaning intended by the 
relevant clause, and the rationale of the stated mechanism for arriving at the relevant limit.   
 
                                                 
1408 Para. 901(a), International Offshore Daywork Drilling Contract. 
1409 Ailsa Craig Fishing Co v Malvern Fishing Co Ltd and Securicor (Scotland) Ltd (1983) 1 W.L.R. 964; George 






As evidence of equal bargaining strength, the contract could recite that the party that accepts the 
limitation of liability is deemed to understand that it bears the residual risk of the remaining 
economic consequences of the occurrence of the relevant risk event.  That party then has the choice 
of taking appropriate steps to manage, mitigate and/or prevent the risk event from occurring, which 
steps may include taking out insurance to cover that eventuality.  
7.4 Insurance   
All the model contracts mandate the contractor to take out insurance in respect of the liabilities it 
has assumed under the contract.  These provisions recognise that the contractor’s burden of bearing 
the economic consequences of the occurrence of the adverse events may be too much for it to carry 
without the benefit of insurance.  Risk allocation would be pointless if the responsible party were 
unable to bear the economic consequences of the adverse events occurring, which is why the model 
contracts not only mandate the contractor to carry insurance, but also specify the types of insurance 
as well as the applicable thresholds and limits.  Furthermore, the contractor is obliged to show 
evidence of compliance with the contractual requirement, and the Mobile Drilling Rigs Contract, 
Edition 11410, International Offshore Daywork Drilling Contract1411 and the Major Operator model 
contract1412 require the contractor to notify the operator if there are changes to the insurance policies, 
or in the event of their cancellation. 
 
In respect of the operator, only the International Offshore Daywork Drilling Contract and the 
CAODC/CAPP Master Daywork Contract mandate the operator to carry insurance to cover their 
assumed liabilities under the contracts.  Although these model contracts allow the operator to self-
insure, the contractor is not permitted to do so, except that the CAODC/CAPP Master Daywork 
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Contract allows contractor self-insurance with the operator’s consent.1413  Otherwise, the contractors 
are required to insure with reputable insurers in the open market. 
 
English courts have always enforced the obligation to insure, and especially recognise the waiver of 
subrogation as an exclusion clause that extinguishes the right to subrograte that an insurer possesses 
to proceed against a third party whose actions caused an insurance loss to the indemnitor, with a 
view to recovering the amount paid by the insurer to the insured for the loss.1414  Where the waiver 
provision is not contained in the contract, the courts’ attitude is that a contractual indemnity is the 
primary indemnity that a contract party has, enabling insurers to exercise the right of subrogation to 
recover against the wrongful party.  The courts have held that the indemnitee’s initiative to insure 
himself against the same risk to which the insurer seeks to be subrogated will not impact on the 
obligation of the indemnitor to indemnify the indemnitee, and neither will it diminish the amount 
payable thereto.1415  
 
7.5 Optimality of Risk Allocation   
The model contracts examined allocate risk in a similar manner:  first, on a knock-for-knock basis 
in respect of death; personal injury; loss of, or damage to Operator’s and Contractor’s Items and 
Property; and consequential losses; then, on a fault basis in respect of third-party death, personal 
injury, property loss or damage; intellectual property and patent infringement; and insurance to cover 
assumed liabilities. The rest of the risks are allocated based on what this study calls ‘optimality’, as 
the risks are allocated by the models to the parties deemed best able to manage the risk and, in the 
study’s construct, best able to bear the economic consequences of the occurrence of the adverse 
                                                 
1413 Article 11.3. 
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event.  For instance, all the model contracts allocate the risk of all pollution arising from surface 
activities and contractor’s equipment to the contractor, while any other pollution from other sources 
is the operator’s liability.  Furthermore, all the model contracts allocate the risk of wild well control 
to the operator, as well as the loss of the hole and the underground formation/reservoir.   
 
This pattern of risk allocation is not a coincidence.  A situation in which the model contracts from 
different regions of the world allocate risk in the same way is not only indicative of an entrenched 
industry practice, but underpinned by a common understanding and acceptance that risk has been 
allocated in a way that is equitable, practical and optimal.  Indeed, in all the case law examined and 
discussed, the contention was not whether risk was optimally allocated but whether, in the specific 
circumstances, the adverse event fell within the ambit of the risk-bearer’s responsibility.  The 
decisions then turned on the specific facts and circumstances of the case, without impugning the 
allocation method of the contract parties.  The consistency of this industry practice even after 
countless number of drilling contracts have been developed from the different models, and even 
when the contract parties have the power to alter the practice, is a clear indication of the fact that 
industry accepts this pattern as optimal – the very reason that it has endured till this day.  Indeed, 
even when, post-Macondo, it was thought that this risk allocation would be altered, it has endured, 








The core objective of this study was to examine how English courts interpret risk allocation 
provisions in oil and gas contracts, using the model contracts as the context for this analysis.  In this 
quest, the study sought to detect any correlation and identify similarities and differences between 
model contracts, with a view to understanding how risks are allocated between the operator and the 
contractor..  Among other desirable outcomes, the study aims to assist decision makers in their choice 
of a suitable template from among the model contracts, taking into consideration the specificities of 
the operating environment in which it would be utilised.  The international nature of the offshore 
drilling business makes it imperative that the right choice is made, as the drilling contract plays a 
major role in the outcome of the drilling campaign. 
 
The foregoing discussions in the previous chapters lead to certain conclusions and positions adopted 
by the study.  These positions reflect the contributions that the study makes to the existing body of 
knowledge and are set out hereunder. 
 
Judicial Attitude of the English Courts to the Model Contracts 
The preference of English law as governing jurisdiction for most drilling contracts between parties 
engaged in cross-border transactions, necessitates enquiry into the judicial attitude of English courts 
to the manner in which risk is allocated in the model drilling contracts.  To aid this enquiry, the study 
focused on different contractual tools utilised in various model contracts to allocate risk, such as 
indemnities, insurance, exclusions  and limitations of liability.  Although these risk allocation 
mechanisms are not exhaustive of the tools available to contract parties, they are the most frequently 
used, and represent a fair method of understanding the attitude of English courts to the manner in 







This analysis has shown that model contracts share more similarities than differences in the way they 
allocate risk between contract parties using the contractual tools detailed above.  In this regard, it is 
no surprise that there is no major difference in the judicial approach of English courts to the manner 
in which contract parties allocate risk inter se within the model contracts.  This study highlights the 
differences in the way that risk is allocated in the model contracts, and the approach of English courts 
thereto. However, these differences do not considerably tilt the scale in terms of the overarching 
conclusion that there is no major difference in the manner in which risk is allocated between the 
contract parties inter se in model contracts, and the judicial attitude of English courts thereto.  The 
study has shown how that attitude has evolved, right from the time in which the English courts 
enforced the fault-based risk allocation regime, and contract parties were left bearing the full brunt 
of the economic consequences of the occurrence of adverse events they had caused.   English courts 
have made a transition from the bedrock fault-based risk allocation regime, and will now enforce 
contractual parties’ risk allocation provisions if that intent is expressed unequivocally, and 
construction of the whole contract supports this.  The contextual and more objective approach to the 
interpretation of contract terms necessarily extends to the interpretation of the risk allocation 
provisions, and the meaning that the courts will ascribe to the provisions is that which a reasonable 
person, who has the same background knowledge of the contract that the contract parties are 
reasonably expected to have, would give to it.  The English court’s judicial attitude has also been 
demonstrated as being different from their counterparts in the USA as far as indemnification for 
punitive damages, breach of statutory duty and gross negligence are concerned.        
 
Application of Unfair Contracts Terms Act 1977 
The study has also contributed to the debate on the application of the Unfair Contracts Terms Act 
1977 (UCTA) to drilling contracts, and takes the position that they – drilling contracts – could be 






from negligence.  Likewise, the study also concludes that provisions in drilling contracts could be 
subject to the requirement relating to the test of reasonableness for other heads of liability.  This 
conclusion is reached after analysis of the case law on the subject which shows the shifting attitude 
of the courts with respect to the scope of coverage of the UCTA.  It was previously thought that 
commercial contracts could not come under the ambit of the UCTA, as it was focused on consumer 
contracts, but evidence to the contrary has been adduced.  English courts have subjected commercial 
contracts to the test of reasonableness under the UCTA, and have evinced the intent to keep 
expanding the scope of coverage as the case law on the subject suggests.  
  
Furthermore, the decision of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in the case of Farstad Supply AS 
v Enviroco Ltd which stated that the expression ‘defend, indemnify and hold harmless’ could be 
regarded as an ‘indemnity’ simpliciter when it operated to determine responsibility for ‘third party 
exposure’, and as an ‘exclusion’ clause when it operated in circumstances of ‘direct exposure to the 
other contracting party’, lends credence to the position taken by the study.  That position is that the 
pronouncement of the Supreme Court could potentially trigger the application of the UCTA to 
drilling contracts, which contain indemnities and exclusion clauses that allocate risk, inter alia, for 
death, personal injury or property damage.  This means that the entities impacted by these events 
can sometimes be human entities – especially with respect to death and personal injury – and not 
corporate entities, even though the protection is given at the corporate level to the contracting entity.  
It is trite that a company carries out its business through human agents, even though it has corporate 
personality, and is separate and distinct from its shareholders, directors, officers, and employees. 
Indeed, it is always the death or injury of the employee or officer of the company that forms the basis 
of the action to establish liability and determine risk allocation, just as it is the same acts of the 
employee that give rise to vicarious liability.  This study, thus, takes the position that the 






the contracting party, and not the corporate entity.  It is therefore possible that the potential 
application and impact of the UCTA will be triggered, resulting in the exclusion of liability for 
negligence in the indemnity structures of most offshore oil and gas contracts, including offshore 
drilling contracts.  
 
Again, the above notwithstanding, the study opines that a contract party utilising any of the model 
offshore drilling contracts examined in this study can avoid the application of the UCTA, unless it 
can be imputed to that party as his standard terms of business.  Even if they utilise some of the terms 
of the model contracts, or conduct negotiations thereon, it becomes a question of fact as to whether 
the resulting terms materially differ from the original terms of the model contract.  If no significant 
difference is established between the two sets of terms, the parties will still be held as contracting on 
the terms of the model contract, and whether or not the terms will be regarded as ‘standard’ will 
depend on proof of regularity and frequency of use, and this study posits that it is a question that 
must be determined by the facts and circumstances of each transaction.  Since contract parties can 
utilise model contracts without necessarily ‘adopting’ them as their standard terms of business, 
contract parties can avoid the application of the test of reasonableness by clearly disclaiming the 
intention to adopt the model contract as their standard terms of business.  Indeed, to ensure that 
regularity or frequency of use is not established, contract parties have a perverse incentive to make 
significant ‘modifications’ to the model contract, arising from negotiations in every contract 
transaction.  It is unlikely that the courts will find that there is regularity or frequency of use if there 
are several drafts from the same source model contract. 
 
Effectiveness of Risk Allocation Methods 
In this study, ‘effectiveness’ enquires into whether the risk allocation methods adopted by contract 
parties will stand up to judicial scrutiny from an English court’s perspective.  This enquiry is against 






allocation in which the courts allocated risk based on certain principles and theories of liability.  The 
dissatisfaction with the manner in which the courts undertook this allocation led to the development 
and utilisation of the risk allocation mechanisms which have been examined in this study.  Contract 
parties went further to codify these mechanisms into model contracts, all with a view to 
circumventing the fault-based regime of risk allocation, and instituting a regime which was more in 
line with their expectations, contract objectives and bargaining outcomes.  
 
 However, there was a concern as to whether the manner and mechanisms of risk allocation utilised 
by contract parties would be enforced by the English courts, given the departure from the default 
risk allocation regime.  The study has shown that English courts will enforce the risk allocation 
manner and mechanisms if the intent of the contract parties is expressed clearly and unequivocally, 
and construction of whole contract supports this.  Thus, the English courts will enforce the provisions 
of the model contracts which have all utilised the mechanisms examined in this study to allocate 
risk.  The study has found evidence of judicial acceptance that contract parties can utilise the risk 
allocation mechanisms that have already been examined – indemnities, insurance, exclusions and 
limitation of liability – to allocate risk contractually.  For instance, in EE Caledonia Ltd v Orbit 
Valve Co Europe Plc, indemnities were specifically approved by the court which stated that it was 
an industry practice that had arisen to cater for the peculiarities of the oil and gas sector, especially 
in respect of offshore operations.  The ability of contractual parties to allocate risk in this manner, 
and using the mechanisms examined, is founded on the principle of freedom of contract, which is 
recognised in common law and arose from equating free market economy with contract law 
principles, providing a platform upon which individuals could trade among themselves based on 
their preferred terms and conditions.  The freedom of contract principle is acknowledged by the 
English courts as enabling contract parties to utilise indemnity and exclusion clauses to release each 






willingness to uphold and enforce the manner and mechanisms of risk allocation proposed by 
contract parties. 
 
This approach by the English courts is however subject to certain exceptions, chief of which is public 
policy.  Even though the freedom of contract principle enables parties to allocate risk as they deem 
fit, public policy considerations will disallow the exercise of this freedom in certain circumstances 
– for instance, relating to indemnification or exclusion of liability for fraud.  The public policy 
argument in the UK, which does not bar indemnification for own negligence, is however different 
from that in the USA, as the courts in the latter jurisdiction make a distinction between 
indemnification for negligence resulting in compensatory damages and punitive damages.  While the 
USA courts enforce provisions that indemnify for compensatory damages, the public policy 
argument prevents the enforcement of indemnification for punitive damages on the grounds that the 
latter punishes egregious behaviour.   
 
Thus, the risk allocation mechanisms adopted by contractual parties will be respected and enforced 
so long as that intent is clearly and unequivocally expressed.  If the contractual provisions are clear, 
the courts will enforce that as being the agreed risk allocation method of the parties, and will not 
seek to curtail their freedom in this regard.      
   
Development of the Conscionability Principle 
Another exception to the exercise of the freedom of contract that seems to have emerged from case 
law arises where the bargaining power of contractual parties is unequal.  This can be gleaned from 
the decisions of the English courts demonstrating their reluctance to alter the will of the parties when 
they are perceived to be of ‘equal bargaining power’, and by extension, their readiness to intervene 
when they are not.  This is evident from some decisions on commercial contracts relating to penalties, 






by enquiring, inter alia, whether the parties had access to legal advice, or if they were coerced or 
induced to enter into the contract.   
 
When the courts find that the bargaining power of the contractual parties is unequal, and risk has 
been allocated in a way that disfavours the weaker party, evidence abounds of the willingness of the 
courts to invoke the contra proferentem rule, which states that ambiguities in contracts are to be 
construed against the maker, and in the other party’s favour in this circumstance.  From the 
pronouncements of the court as to their unwillingness to invoke this principle where parties are of 
equal bargaining power, the conclusion can be reached that the courts will invoke the principle to 
protect the weaker party in appropriate circumstances.   
 
However, the imbalance in the power equation between the parties, and the skewed manner of risk 
allocation against the weaker party, may not always be addressed by the application of the contra 
proferentem rule.  This study posits that cases that fall into this category should be determined based 
on what the courts deem unconscionable, and the subjective nature of this enquiry should widen the 
scope of discretion of the courts in reaching this determination.  This study further posits that the 
demands of justice will, in time, cause the courts to widen the scope of application of the rule on 
unconscionability and, before long, it may assume the status of a doctrine, such that contracts, in 
general, may be required to satisfy the conscionability test before they can be enforced.   
 
This position is based on the seeming focus of the courts in protecting perceived weaker parties from 
unfair bargains, a situation which is limited by the fact that English courts have no overarching 
jurisdiction to strike down one-sided and unreasonable bargains by commercial parties.  Although 
the Unfair Contracts Terms Act 1977 attempts to do this, yet, its scope is limited only to transactions 
in which liability has been excluded or limited in circumstances where negligence has caused the 






down unconscionable bargains may interfere with contractual parties’ freedom of contract if 
improperly exercised, but the study recommends that the courts can modulate this doctrine by 
guidelines which ensure that the exercise of this jurisdiction is neither arbitrary nor whimsical, but 
serves to preserve societal mores and expectations that parties should deal fairly with one another.  
Besides, the courts have stated that a contractual party who has submitted to an unconscionable 
bargain due to a weaker bargaining position cannot be said to have exercised the freedom of contract, 
which further lends credence to the study’s position on the need for the overarching doctrine of 
conscionability. 
 
Optimality of Risk Allocation Methods  
While effectiveness of risk allocation methods in this study enquires into whether the manner in 
which the contractual parties have allocated risks inter se stands up to judicial scrutiny, optimality 
enquires into the efficiency of that allocation.  The enquiry into the efficiency of risk allocation 
investigates whether risk has been allocated to the party who is best able to bear it.  The study has 
found that there are different formulations for determining the contractual party best able to bear a 
given risk, among which are the ownership of, or access to, resources with which to prevent a certain 
risk from eventuating, as well as the ability to bear the economic consequences if it does.  The study 
further examined rationales underpinning the manner in which the contractual parties allocate risk 
inter se, ranging from those based on industry practice, as well as those based on legal/economic 
considerations.   
 
In this regard, the study found that all model contracts allocate responsibility for specified adverse 
events firstly on a knock-for-knock basis.  These events include death of, and personal injury to, 
members of both Company and Contractor Groups.  Thereafter, risk is allocated based on the 
contract parties’ formulation of the party best suited to bear the risk based on different rationales.  






to the drilling unit.  The rationale for this is premised on the assumption that contractors have the 
capacity to mitigate risk volatility, given the breadth of their assets or investment relative to the risk 
of damage of the drilling unit and so should be allocated that contractual risk.  This position is based 
on the thinking that contractors own multiple rigs in respect of which they can source good insurance 
deals with discounts which can be internalised in day rates.  Furthermore, since contractors work for 
different clients simultaneously, they can leverage their entire contracts portfolio, deploying men, 
materials and technology across the fleet to optimise individual contracts. 
 
Similarly, the economic benefit principle justifies the stance of contractors who posit that the 
operators should be allocated majority of the risks arising from the drilling contract as they stand to 
benefit economically from production in the oilfield – assuming that commercial discovery and 
development have occurred – in which they have proprietary interest long after the drilling contractor 
has exited the scene.   
 
The above notwithstanding, the study found that the quest for optimality of risk allocation is one that 
is pursued only by the contractual parties whose interest it is to ensure that they allocate risk as 
efficiently as possible otherwise their contract objectives may not be achieved.  English courts will 
rarely interfere with, nor seek justification of the allocation methods or rationale, where the 
bargaining power of the contractual parties is equal.  Provided the parties have allocated risk in an 
effective manner, the English courts will enforce the contract, and the manner in which risk has been 
allocated inter se. 
 
Focus of Risk Allocation in Oil and Gas Contracts  
The study was guided by three economic theories – risk and reward, incentives and transactional 
efficiency – which conceptualise risk from cost and utility perspectives, and view risk as just another 






allocation’ is a misnomer, as far as contractual risk allocation is concerned, as, from the literature, it 
assumes that a risk event is being allocated, when, in actual fact, it is the economic consequences of 
the occurrence of an event that are being allocated.  Several consequences – legal, factual, 
reputational – can occur upon the happening of a given event, which could have implications 
different from the economic consequences of that same event.  The study demonstrates that it is 
actually the economic consequences of the occurrence of an event that are being allocated, and that 
the entire notion of risk allocation is a determination of how the economic cost of the occurrence of 
the particular consequence will be borne by the parties to the contract.  
 
The focus on economic consequences makes it possible to utilise economic theories to understand 
when risk has been optimally allocated.  This is because the theories collectively seek to ensure that 
transactional costs do not escalate as this would lead to allocative inefficiency which is antithetical 
to optimality.  As detailed above, when contractual parties allocate a specific risk to the party who 
is best able to bear it, risk is then allocated efficiently, and this ensures that transactional costs are 
optimised.  
 
Status of Non-operators in Oil and Gas Contracts 
Although the contract is primarily between the operator and contractor, the role of the non-operator 
is crucial as a financial and administrative stakeholder for the overall success of the contract 
objectives.  Depending on the way that the parties’ clause in the oil and gas contract is structured, 
the non-operator may either be disclosed or non-disclosed principals arising from whether the 
operator contracts for itself and as agents to the non-operators.  The issue then arises as to whether 
non-operators can sue or be sued by the contractor on matters arising from the contract.  This is 
especially against the backdrop of the fact that the contract may itself bar an action against any other 
party aside from the operator and contractor, with specific verbiage that the contractor shall look 






proceedings against any non-operator or principal other than the operator.  In effect, the real question 
is whether the restriction placed by the contract will apply to defeat any attempt by either the non-
operator or contractor to initiate and sustain an action between and against each other.     
 
This study finds that this question can be approached in two ways.  The first assumes that the 
principle of concurrent liability in contract and tort makes it possible circumvent the restriction 
placed by contract, as the other legal routes available are sui generis, and can be invoked 
independently of the contract route.  From this perspective, if the duty of care can be established 
between the non-operator and the contractor, and that duty has been breached, this triggers the tort 
regime accordingly.  This position also enables the contractor sue the non-operator in agency, as the 
operator is the agent of the non-operator, and is thus answerable for the tort committed by the former. 
 
The second approach sees the restriction placed by the contract as sacrosanct and unassailable, 
disentitling the contractor and non-operator from pursuing one another otherwise than as prescribed 
therein.  The contract would typically exclude liability notwithstanding the sole, contributory, gross, 
active or passive negligence of any party, or members of their group, or any breach of contract, tort, 
duty (statutory or otherwise, whether or not involving fault), or any under any other legal theory 
(including strict or product liability) that may be applicable.  The courts are minded to enforce these 
provisions as they are deemed to embody the intention of the contractual parties, and therefore the 
product of negotiations between parties of equal bargaining power.   
 
The two approaches notwithstanding, this study further posits that the possibility of direct action 
between the non-operator and the contractor presents the potential problem of circularity and circuity 
due to the indemnity structure of the contract.  For instance, if the non-operator successfully sues the 
contractor for negligence and recovers damages thereby, the contractor is entitled to claim indemnity 






meet the indemnity obligation, it may either call on the insurers to settle the claim or issue a cash 
call on the non-operators under the JOA.  In both scenarios, the co-venturers are ultimately 
responsible for bearing the economic consequences of the indemnity, including the non-operator 
who recovered the damages from the contractor.   
 
To avoid this circularity, most JOAs provide that only the operator can commence proceedings.  
Thus, even in circumstances in which the non-operator has a cause of action against the contractor, 
the non-operator is unable to proceed, and it is doubtful that the operator would proceed against the 
contractor in circumstances which would create this circularity because of the indemnity structure 
of the contract.   
 
The discourse in this section details the contributions that the study makes to the existing body of 
knowledge on the subject matter that it covers.  As far as the model contracts that form the case study 
and context of this enquiry, the overarching conclusion is that there is no significant difference in 
the way in which they all allocate risk, or in the judicial approach of the English courts thereto.  This 
conclusion then begs the question of why a decision maker would struggle with the choice of which 
model contract to utilise to develop a drilling contract.  The answer to this question can be found in 
model contracts themselves; each model contract admonishes the user to adapt it to suit their 
particular circumstance and operating environment.  This study theorises that this process of 
adaptation – usually birthed during negotiations by contract parties – causes confusion and anxiety 
over the choice of a suitable model contract, as each party seeks to maximise its advantage by 
skewing the risk allocation in its favour.  Success, in this context, is determined by factors such as 
the balance of power between the contract parties, and the market conditions prevalent at the time 







Thus, this study concludes that, while the manner in which risk is allocated in the model contracts is 
not significantly different, the manner in which contract parties have utilised the model contracts in 
their resulting contracts, in line with their right to freedom of contract, has created diversity in intent 
of contract parties and interpretation of contract terms, with each case turning on its own facts.  The 
confusion and anxiety created by this situation is wrongly ascribed to the model contracts, due to the 
fact that, in most cases, they are the starting point of the negotiation process. 
 
In conclusion, one can assert that this study has undoubtedly achieved its objectives and answered 
the research question.  In making this assertion, it is recognised that risk allocation is an iterative 
process in which all stakeholders including contract parties, the courts, and legislature, will 
constantly respond to their actions and interpretations inter se, making future research in this area 
























































































































































































































































NOTE: This form contract is a suggested guide only and use of this form or any variation thereof shall be at the sole discretion and risk of the user parties. Users of the form contract 
or any portion or variation thereof are encouraged to seek the advice of counsel to ensure that their contract reflects the complete agreement of the parties and applicable law. The 
International Association of Drilling Contractors disclaims any liability whatsoever for loss or damages which may result from use of the form contract or portions or variations 
thereof. 
 
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DRILLING CONTRACTORS 
 
INTERNATIONAL OFFSHORE DAYWORK DRILLING CONTRACT 
THIS CONTRACT CONTAINS PROVISIONS RELATIVE TO INDEMNITY, 
RELEASE OF LIABILITY AND ALLOCATION OF RISK - 
SEE PARAGRAPHS 1 0 9 , 5 0 1 , 6 0 5 , 6 0 6 , 6 0 7 , 8 0 5 , 1 3 0 5 AND ARTICLE IX 
THIS AGREEMENT (the "Contract"), dated the day of . 20 , is made between 
,a organized under the laws of 
located at 
 
(hereinafter called "Operator"), and ,a 
organized under the laws of , located at 
 
(hereinafter called "Contractor"). 
WHEREAS, Operator desires to have offshore wells drilled, completed or worked over in the Operating Area and to have performed or 
carried out all auxiliary operations and services as detailed in the Appendices hereto or as Operator may require; and 
WHEREAS, Contractor is willing to furnish the drilling vessel together with drilling and other equipment (hereinafter called the "Drilling 
Unit"), insurance and personnel, ail as detailed in the Appendices hereto, for the purpose of drilling said wells and performing said 
auxiliary operations and services for Operator. 
NOW THEREFORE THIS CONTRACT WITNESSETH that in consideration of the covenants herein it is agreed as follows: 
ARTICLE I - INTERPRETATION 
101. Definitions 
In this Contract, unless the context otherwise requires: 
(a) "Commencement Date" means the point in time that the Drilling Unit either commences jacking operations or commences 
pulling anchors (whichever is applicable) preparatory to moving the Drilling Unit to Operator's first drilling location under this 
Contract; 
(b) "Operator's Items" means the equipment, material, services and other facilities owned, rented or leased or otherwise 
provided by Operator (or Operator's Affiliated Company) or by Operator's Personnel or which are listed in Appendix D that are 
to be provided by or at the expense of Operator; 
(c) "Contractor's Items" means the Drilling Unit, equipment, material and services owned by Contractor or by Contractor's 
Personnel or which are listed in Appendices B or D that are to be provided by and at the expense of Contractor; 
(d) "Contractor's Personnel" means the personnel of Contractor and Contractor's subcontractors of any tier, including but not 
limited to their employees, consultants and other persons to be provided by Contractor from time to time in connection with 
operations hereunder; 
(e) "Operator's Personnel" means the personnel of Operator and Operator's other contractors and subcontractors of any tier, 
including but not limited to their employees, consultants and other persons to be provided by Operator from time to time in 
connection with operations hereunder or present in the Operating Area; 
(f) "Operating Area" means the area specified in Appendix A in which Operator is entitled to conduct drilling operations; 
(g) "Operating Base" means the place onshore designated by Operator and specified in Appendix A; 
(h) "Affiliated Company" means a company or other legal entity which controls or is controlled by Operator or Contractor, or 
which is controlled by an entity which controls Operator or Contractor. For purposes hereof, control means the ownership, 
directly or indirectly, of fifty percent (50%) or more of the shares, voting rights or other controlling rights in a company or legal 
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(i) "Joint Venture Company" means any company in which Contractor or an Affiliated Company of Contractor owns less than 
fifty percent (50%) of its shares, voting rights or other controlling rights, and such company provides labor, services, material or 
equipment to Contractor or in support of Contractor's obligations under this Contract. 
102. Currency 
In this Contract, all amounts expressed in dollars are United States Dollar amounts. 
103. Conflicts 
Appendices A, B, C, D, E, and F attached hereto are incorporated herein by reference. If any provision of the Appendices conflicts with 
a provision in the body hereof, the latter shall prevail. 
104. Headings 
The paragraph headings shall not be considered in interpreting the text of this Contract. 
105. Further Assurances 
Each party shall perform the acts, execute and deliver the documents and give the assurances necessary to give effect to the 
provisions of this Contract. 
106. Contractor's Status 
Contractor shall be an independent contractor in performing its obligations hereunder. 
107. Operator's Status 
Operator enters into this Contract on behalf of itself and its co-venturers, co-lessees and joint owners, if any, and agrees that Operator 
and only Operator may enforce any obligation or rights herein contained expressed or implied to be for the benefit of Operator and/or 
the co-venturers, co-lessees and joint owners, and Operator and only Operator may commence any action, claim or proceedings 
against Contractor resulting from, arising out of or in connection with this Contract. 
1 08. Governing Law 
This Contract shall be construed, interpreted, enforced and litigated, and the relations between the parties determined in accordance 
with the General Maritime Law of the United States of America, not including, however, any of its conflicts of law rules which would 
direct or refer to the laws of another jurisdiction. 
The Parties agree that this Contract is not governed by the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods. 
109. Governing Language 
This Contract may be signed in multiple originals in the English language. All documents produced by a party in the performance of this 
Contract as well as all written communications of the parties are to be written communications in the English language, which is hereby 
designated the governing language of the Contract. Contractor and Operator may use any language within their own organizations, 
except that all subcontracts and all written communications pertaining to such subcontracts shall be in English. In the event of any 
dispute concerning  the construction or meaning of this Contract, reference shall be made only to this Contract as written in 
English and not to any translation into any other language, and Operator agrees that Contractor shall have no liability or 
responsibility  for any errors in any translation of this Contract into any other language. 
110. Jurisdiction and Venue 
Each of the parties irrevocably agrees that the courts of the jurisdiction specified in Appendix A shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear 
and decide any suit, action or proceeding, and/or to settle any dispute which may arise out of or in connection with this Contract 
(collectively, "Disputes") and, solely for these purposes each party irrevocably submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the 
jurisdiction specified in Appendix A. 
Each party irrevocably waives any and all objections it might at any time have to the courts of the jurisdiction specified in Appendix A 
being nominated as the forum to hear and decide any Disputes and agrees not to claim that the courts of the jurisdiction specified in 
Appendix A are not a convenient or appropriate forum or venue for any such Dispute and further irrevocably agrees that a judgment in 
any Dispute brought in any court referred to in this paragraph shall be conclusive and binding upon the parties and may be enforced in 
the courts of any other jurisdiction. 
ARTICLE II-TERM 
201. Effective Date 
The parties shall be bound by this Contract when each of them has executed it (hereinafter referred to as "Effective Date"). 
202. Duration 
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This Contract shall terminate: 
(a) immediately if the Drilling Unit becomes an actual loss or the date Contractor's marine surveyor determines a 
constructive or arranged total loss to have occurred; 
(b) after the number of wells or on the date specified in Appendix A or, if operations are then being conducted on a well, 
as soon thereafter as such operations are completed, and the Drilling Unit has been safely jacked up or moored, 
whichever is applicable, at the demobilization location specified in Appendix A (unless some other location or port is 
mutually agreed) and all of Operator's Items have been offloaded, whichever is latest; or 
(c) in accordance with Paragraphs 707 or 802. 
204. Option to Extend 
Operator may extend the duration of this Contract for an additional period by giving notice thereof to Contractor as may be specified in 
Appendix A. Such extension shall be subject to mutual agreement of the associated rates, terms and conditions by the deadline for 
notice specified in Appendix A. 
205. Continuing Obligations 
Notwithstanding the termination of this Contract, the parties shall continue to be bound by the provisions of this Contract that 
reasonably require some action or forbearance after such termination. 
206. Return of Operator's Items 
Upon termination of operations, Contractor shall return to Operator on board the Drilling Unit, or as directed by Operator at Operator's 
sole cost, any of Operator's Items which are at the time in Contractor's possession. 
ARTICLE III - CONTRACTOR'S PERSONNEL 
301. Obligation to Supply Personnel 
Contractor shall provide Contractor's Personnel in accordance with Appendix C. 
302. Number, Selection. Hours of Labor and Remuneration 
Except where herein otherwise provided, the number, selection, replacement, hours of labor and remuneration of Contractor's 
Personnel shall be determined by Contractor.  Such employees or subcontractors' employees shall be the employees solely of 
Contractor or its subcontractors. 
303. Contractor's Representative 
Contractor shall nominate one of its personnel as Contractor's representative who shall be in charge of the remainder of Contractor's 
Personnel and who shall have full authority to resolve all day-to-day matters which arise between Operator and Contractor. 
304. Increase in Contractor's Personnel 
Operator may, at any time, with Contractor's approval require Contractor to increase the number of Contractor's Personnel and the 
rates provided herein shall be adjusted accordingly. 
305. Replacement of Contractor's Personnel 
Contractor will remove and replace in a reasonable time any of Contractor's Personnel if Operator so requests in writing and if Operator 
can show reasonable grounds for its request. 
ARTICLE IV - CONTRACTOR'S ITEMS 
401. Obligation to Supply 
Contractor shall provide Contractor's Items and perform the services to be performed by it in accordance with Appendices B and D. 
402. Maintain Stocks 
Contractor shall be responsible, at its cost, for maintaining adequate stock levels of Contractor's Items as determined by Contractor. 
403. Maintain and Repair Eguipment 
Contractor shall, subject to Paragraph 901 and Appendix D, be responsible for the maintenance and repair of all Contractor's Items and 
shall provide all spare parts and materials required therefor. Contractor shall, if requested by Operator, also maintain or repair any of 
Operator's Items on board the Drilling Unit which Contractor is qualified to and can maintain or repair with Contractor's normal 
complement of personnel and equipment on board the Drilling Unit; provided, however, that Operator shall at its cost provide all spare 
parts and materials required to maintain or repair Operator's Items, and the basic responsibility and liability for furnishing and 
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ARTICLE V - CONTRACTOR'S GENERAL OBLIGATION 
501. Contractor's Standard of Performance 
Contractor shall carry out all operations hereunder on a daywork basis. For purposes hereof the term "daywork basis" means Contractor 
shall furnish equipment, labor, and perform services as herein provided, for a specified sum per day under the direction and supervision 
of Operator (inclusive of any employee, agent, consultant or subcontractor engaged by Operator to direct drilling operations). When 
operating on a daywork basis, Contractor shall be fully paid at the applicable rates of payment and assumes only the 
obligations and liabilities  stated herein. Except for such obligations and liabilities  specifically assumed by Contractor, 
Operator shall be solely responsible and assumes liability for all consequences  of operations by both parties while on a 
daywork basis, including results and alt other risks or liabilities incurred in or incident to such operations, notwithstanding 
any breach of representation or warranty, either expressed or implied, or the negligence or fault of any degree or character of 
Contractor, Contractor's Personnel, its subcontractors, consultants,  agents or servants, including sole, concurrent or gross 
negligence, either active or passive, latent defects or unseaworthiness of any vessel or vessels, including the Drilling Unit 
(whether or not preexisting),  and any liability based on any theory of tort, breach of contract, breach of duty (whether 
statutory, contractual or otherwise), regulatory or statutory liability, or strict liability, including defect or ruin of premises, 
either latent or patent 
502. Operation of Drilling Unit 
Subject to Paragraph 605, Contractor shall be responsible for the operation of the Drilling Unit, including supervising moving operations 
and positioning on drilling locations as required by Operator. Operations under this Contract will be performed on a twenty-four (24) 
hour per day basis. 
503. Compliance with Operator's Instructions 
Contractor shall comply with all instructions of Operator consistent with the provisions of this Contract, including, without limitation, 
drilling, well control and safety instructions. Such instructions shall, if Contractor so requires, be confirmed in writing by the authorized 
representative of Operator. However, Operator shall not issue any instructions which would be inconsistent with Contractor's rules, 
policies or procedures pertaining to the safety of Contractor's Personnel and/or Contractor's Items, or require Contractor to exceed the 
rated capacities of Contractor's Items or the minimum or maximum water depths or maximum well depth set forth in Appendix A. 
504. Adverse Weather 
Contractor, in consultation with Operator, shall decide when, in the face of impending adverse weather conditions, to institute 
precautionary measures in order to safeguard the well, the well equipment, the Drilling Unit and personnel to the fullest possible extent. 
Contractor and Operator shall each ensure that each senior representative on board will not act unreasonably in the exercise of their 
discretion under this Paragraph. 
505. Drilling Fluids and Casing Program 
Contractor shall take reasonable care to follow Operator's instructions with respect to the drilling fluid and casing program as specified 
by Operator. Operator shall provide Contractor with these programs reasonably in advance of the spud date of each well to be drilled 
hereunder. 
506. Cutting/Coring Program 
Contractor shall save and identify cuttings and cores according to Operator's instructions and place them in containers furnished by 
Operator. 
507. Records to be Kept by Contractor 
Contractor shall keep and furnish to Operator an accurate record of the work performed and formations drilled on the IADC Daily Drilling 
Report Form or other form acceptable to Operator. A legible copy of said form signed by Contractor's representative shall be furnished 
by Contractor to Operator. 
508. Difficulties During Drilling 
In the event of any difficulty arising which precludes either drilling ahead under reasonably normal procedures or the performance of 
any other operations planned for a well, Contractor may suspend the work in progress and shall immediately notify the representative of 
Operator, in the meantime exerting reasonable effort to overcome the difficulty. In the event Contractor is required to drill a relief well(s) 
or to undertake well control activities, such operations may be subject to the consent of, and additional conditions imposed by, 
Contractor's underwriters. Any additional premiums and all deductibles shall be for Operator's account during such operations. 
509. Well Control Eguipment 
Subject to Paragraph 706 and Article IX, Contractor shall maintain its well control equipment listed in Appendices B and D in good 
condition at all times and shall use all reasonable means to prevent and control fires and blowouts and to protect the hole. 
510. Inspection  of Materials Furnished by Operator 
Contractor agrees to visually inspect all materials furnished by Operator before using same and to notify Operator of any apparent 
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ARTICLE VI - OPERATOR'S OBLIGATIONS 
601. Equipment and Personnel 
Operator shall at its cost provide Operator's Items and Operator's Personnel and perform the sen/ices to be provided or performed by it 
according to Appendix D. In addition to providing the initial supply of Operator's Items, Operator shall be responsible, at its cost, for 
maintaining adequate stock levels and replenishing as necessary. When, at Operator's request and with Contractor's agreement, 
Contractor furnishes or subcontracts for certain items or services which Operator is required herein to provide, for purposes of this 
Contract said items or services shall be deemed to be Operator furnished items or services. Any subcontractors so hired shall be 
deemed to be Operator's contractor, and Operator shall not be relieved of any of its liabilities in connection therewith. For furnishing 
said items and services, Operator shall reimburse Contractor its entire cost plus a handling charge as specified in Appendix A. 
602. Maintenance and Repair 
Operator shall be responsible, at its cost, for the maintenance and repair of all Operator's Items on board the Drilling Unit which 
Contractor is not qualified to or cannot maintain or repair with Contractor's normal complement of personnel and the equipment on 
board. 
603. Operator's Representatives 
Operator may from time to time designate representatives for the purpose of this Contract who shall at all times have access to the 
Drilling Unit and may, among other things, observe tests, examine cuttings and cores, inspect the work performed by Contractor, or 
examine the records kept on the Drilling Unit by Contractor. Operator shall designate a senior representative to resolve day-to-day 
matters requiring decision by Operator who will be present on board the Drilling Unit.  Contractor may treat Operator's senior 
representative on board the Drilling Unit as being in charge of all Operator's Personnel on board. Operator agrees that Operator's 
Personnel shall be subject to Contractor's policies regarding prohibition of alcoholic beverages, controlled substances, and contraband, 
including random searches and tests. Operator further agrees that Operator's Personnel who have duties which directly affect the 
safety of operations under this Contract shall be subject to and in compliance with applicable laws, rules and regulations with respect to 
drug and alcohol testing. 
604. Replacement of Operator's Personnel 
Contractor shall have the right to request in writing Operator to remove and replace any Operator's Personnel on board the Drilling Unit 
if Contractor can show reasonable grounds for such request. 
605. Drilling Site and Access 
Operator will be responsible for providing all necessary rights of ingress and egress to drilling locations, as well as selecting, marking, 
and clearing access routes and drilling locations, for providing proper and sufficient certificates, including, without limitation, all 
consents, licenses, approvals, permits or permission necessary pursuant to applicable laws, rules and regulations to enter upon and 
operate on the drilling locations, and for notifying Contractor of any obstructions, impediments, faulty bottom conditions or hazards to 
operations in the area of each drilling location or within the anchor pattern, including but not limited to wellheads, platforms, pipelines, 
cables, boulders, and mud filled depressions. Should Contractor be denied free access to a location, any time lost by Contractor as a 
result of such denial shall be paid for at the Standby Rate. Operator will also provide Contractor with soil and sea bottom condition 
surveys at each drilling location hereunder adequate to satisfy Contractor's marine surveyor. In the event the Drilling Unit is used over 
a platform, all surveys to determine the structural integrity of the platform will be the responsibility of Operator. 
Should seabed conditions be unsatisfactory to properly support or moor the Drilling Unit upon arrival at a drilling location or during 
operations hereunder, Operator shall continue to pay Contractor the Standby Rate until seabed conditions are ultimately remedied. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Contract, should  there be any obstructions, impediments, faulty bottom 
conditions  or hazards to operations in the access route to a drilling location or at or within the area of a drilling location, 
including the anchor pattern, and these obstructions, impediments, faulty bottom conditions or hazards to operations damage 
Contractor's Items, or Contractor's Items damage these obstructions or impediments, or if seabed conditions  prove 
unsatisfactory  to properly support or moor the Drilling Unit during operations hereunder, Operator will be responsible for and 
hold harmless and indemnify Contractor for all resulting damage, including payment of the Standby Rate during required 
repairs, but Operator will receive credit for any physical damage insurance proceeds received by Contractor as a result of any 
damage to the Drilling Unit All expenses associated with improvements to the seabed and repositioning of the Drilling Unit at 
the drilling location under this Paragraph 605 shall be for Operator's account 
606. Custom or Excise Duties. Taxes and Fees 
Operator shall pay all import and export charges, customs and excise duties, levies, assessments, taxes and fees including, without 
limitation, clearing agent's fees, or other similar taxes or fees that are levied on Contractor's and/or Operator's Items (collectively, 
"Customs Fees"), ff Contractor is assessed and/or pays any such Customs Fees, Operator agrees to be responsible for and 
hold harmless and indemnify Contractor from any and all cost, liability, expense, loss or claims with respect to such Customs 
Fees, including but not limited to liability or loss arising out of Operator's non-payment of such Customs Fees, including 
interest, penalties, fines and attorney's fees. In addition, Operator will reimburse  Contractor any sums so paid, including 
gross-up if applicable. 
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Except as otherwise provided in Appendix A, Operator shall be responsible for all taxes, levies, and assessments imposed on 
Contractor,  Contractor's Items or expatriate members of Contractor's Personnel arising  out of or in connection  with 
Contractor's performance under this Contract, including,  without limitation  corporate and personal income taxes, gross 
receipts taxes, safes taxes, use or compensating taxes, ad valorem property taxes, value added taxes, stamp duties and any 
other taxes imposed by the government of the country of operations or any political subdivision thereof, and shall at all times 
be responsible for and hold harmless and indemnify Contractor from any and all claims and liabilities with respect thereto. 
When required by the tax laws governing the Operating Area, Operator shall pay directly all such taxes to the proper 
governmental authority, including gross-up if applicable, and shall furnish Contractor with copies of appropriate tax receipts 
or other documentation satisfactory to the taxing authorities evidencing payment of the taxes within ninety (90) days of such 
payment by Operator. Operator shall at all times be responsible for and hold harmless and indemnify Contractor from all 
liability or loss arising out of non-payment of such taxes or from the failure to provide tax receipts or other suitable 
documentation, including interest and penalties thereon and for attorney's fees incurred in connection therewith. In the event 
that Contractor, as a result of operations under this Contract, determines that a tax payment is due to a taxing authority or 
receives an assessment of tax directly by a taxing authority, Contractor will, prior to making any payment, notify Operator of 
such determination or assessment If Contractor is required to pay the tax, Contractor shall invoice Operator for such amount 
including  any additional taxes, interest and penalties levied thereon and Operator agrees to pay such invoice and be 
responsible for and hold harmless and indemnify Contractor  from any and all claims with respect thereto. In addition, 
Operator will reimburse Contractor any sums so paid, including gross-up if applicable. 
608. ISPS Code Compliance (applicable to self-propelled Drilling Units only) 
Operator acknowledges that all personnel aboard the Drilling Unit are subject to applicable law, rules and regulations, including without 
limitation the International Ship & Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, and Contractor's implementation and enforcement thereof, 
including the Drilling Unit's Ship Security Plan. In particular, all personnel shall be: (a) prepared to present a valid photographic 
identification prior to embarking for the Drilling Unit, (b) required to undergo security awareness training aboard the Drilling Unit, (c) 
subject to tests and verification of identification while aboard the Drilling Unit, and (d) subject to search of their person and personal 
effects upon embarking and disembarking the Drilling Unit,  in addition, at least seven (7) days prior to the commencement of 
operations under this Contract, Operator will provide Contractor with the contact information in respect of any Operator-provided 
helicopter and vessel support services in order that Contractor may prepare required declaration of security documentation. In order to 
minimize the risk of transportation delays, Operator, as soon as practical, and in any event prior to presenting Operator-supplied 
personnel for travel to the Drilling Unit, will provide the Drilling Unit's master/security officer with the names and employers of such 
personnel. 
609. Drilling Conditions 
Operator shall keep Contractor advised as to any potentially hazardous geologic formation or condition that may be encountered in the 
Operating Area based on Operator's best available information and prior experience. 
ARTICLE VII - RATES OF PAYMENT 
701. Payment 
Operator shall pay to Contractor the amounts from time to time due, calculated to the nearest hour, according to the rates of payment 
herein set forth and in accordance with the other provisions hereof, notwithstanding any breach of representation or warranty, either 
expressed or implied, or the negligence or fault of any degree or character of Contractor, Contractor's Personnel, its subcontractors, 
consultants, agents or servants, including sole, concurrent or gross negligence, either active or passive, latent defects or 
unseaworthiness of any vessel or vessels, including the Drilling Unit (whether or not preexisting), and any liability based on any theory 
of tort, breach of contract, breach of duty (whether statutory, contractual or otherwise), regulatory or statutory liability, or strict liability, 
including defect or ruin of premises, either latent or patent. 
702. Mobilization Fee 
In addition to Operator's obligation to pay the Standby Rate in accordance with Paragraph 705 and to supply Operator's Items, Operator 
shall pay Contractor a Mobilization Fee as specified in Appendix A which shall be earned on the date the Drilling Unit departs for the 
Operating Area. 
703. Demobilization Fee 
In addition to Operator's obligation to pay the Standby Rate in accordance with Paragraph 705 and to supply Operator's Items, Operator 
shall pay Contractor a Demobilization Fee as specified in Appendix A which shall be earned on the date of termination of this Contract. 
704. Operating Rate 
The Operating Rate specified in Appendix A will first become payable from the moment when the Drilling Unit arrives at the first drilling 
location and commences either jacking operations or running anchors (whichever is applicable). The Operating Rate shall continue to 
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705. Standby Rate 
The Standby Rate specified in Appendix A will be payable as follows: 
(a) during any period of delay when Contractor is unable to proceed because of adverse sea or weather conditions, 
including loop, eddy or other adverse currents (including periods required to repair damage caused by such seas, 
conditions and currents), or as a direct result of an act, instruction or omission of Operator including, without 
limitation, the failure of any of Operator's Items, or the failure of Operator to issue instructions, provide Operator's 
Items or furnish services; 
(b) from the Commencement Date until the moment when the Operating Rate first becomes payable; 
(c) during any period after the Commencement Date that the Drilling Unit is under tow, or under way, between drilling 
locations or in transit to the demobilization location specified in Appendix A after the last well; provided that if, at the 
termination of this Contract, the Drilling Unit does not go to the demobilization location specified in Appendix A, the 
period shall be the reasonably estimated time required to go to that location specified in Appendix A; 
(d) during any period after the Commencement Date that the Drilling Unit is undergoing periodic inspections required by 
Operator or by applicable laws, rules and regulations or for the maintenance of the certification and classification 
certificates; 
(e) during any period when operations are suspended to repair the Drilling Unit or other Contractor's Items as provided in 
Paragraph 605 or due to blowout, fire, cratering, shifting or punch through at a drilling location; 
(f) during any period when operations are being conducted hereunder to redrill or repair the hole drilled hereunder which 
is lost or damaged as a result of Contractor's sole negligence or wilful misconduct; 
(g) as provided in Paragraphs 605 and 901; or 
(h) as may otherwise be specified in the Contract. 
706. Rate During Repair 
The Repair Rate specified in Appendix A will be payable for any period in excess of the repair time specified in Appendix A per 
occurrence during which operations are suspended to permit necessary replacement or repair of Contractor's Items, except as provided 
in Paragraphs 605, 705 and 707. Suspensions for routine maintenance and inspections, such as lubrication, packing of swivels, 
changing of pump parts, slipping and cutting the drilling line, servicing the top-drive, testing BOP equipment, drill string inspections and 
any certification inspections, shall not be considered repair time for purposes of this Paragraph. 
707. Force Majeure Rate 
The Force Majeure Rate specified in Appendix A will be payable during any period in which operations are not being carried on because 
of Force Majeure as defined in Paragraph 1303, including periods required to repair damage caused by a Force Majeure event. 
However, after thirty (30) consecutive days, of the continuous existence of the Force Majeure condition the Contract may be terminated 
at the option of either party, subject to demobilization as provided herein. 
708. Additional Payments 
Operator shall, in addition, pay to Contractor: 
(a) the cost of any overtime paid by Contractor to Contractor's Personnel in respect of the maintenance or repair on 
board the Drilling Unit of Operator's Items or other overtime required by Operator; 
(b) Contractor's costs associated with waiting on Operator furnished transportation or for time in excess of two hours in 
transit to or from the Drilling Unit, or as a direct result of an act, instruction or omission of Operator; 
(c) in the event the Drilling Unit is taken into sheltered waters or harbor for inspection, repair, maintenance, or structural 
defects, the related rig move costs and harbor expenses will be for Operator's account; 
(d) Contractor's costs associated with evacuations and accommodations of personnel caused by adverse sea or weather 
or other hazardous conditions; 
(e) Contractor's costs associated with moving Contractor's Items and Personnel, and their persona! effects, if Contractor 
is required to change its Operating Base; and 
(f) Contractor's costs associated with demobilizing and remobilizing Contractor's Personnel as requested by Operator. 
709. Variation of Rates 
The rates and payment herein set forth shall be revised by the actual amount of the change in Contractor's cost if an event as described 
below occurs or if the cost of any of the items hereinafter listed shall increase by more than the amount which may be indicated below 
from Contractor's cost thereof on the Effective Date or by the same amount after the date of any revision pursuant to this Paragraph: 
(a) labor costs, including all payroll burden and benefits paid by Contractor for its employees; 
(b) if Operator requires Contractor to increase the number of Contractor's Personnel; 
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(c) if it becomes necessary for Contractor to change the work schedule of its personnel or change the location of its 
Operating Base or Operating Area; 
(d) in the event described in Paragraph 1102; 
(e) if the cost of insurance premiums increases by five percent (5%) or more; 
(f) if the cost of catering increases by five percent (5%) or more; and 
(g) the rates listed herein shall be increased for costs other than those fisted above on the Commencement Date and at 
three (3) month intervals thereafter based on changes in the Bureau of Labor Statistics Oil Field and Gas Field Drilling 
Machinery Producer Price Index (Series ID WPU119102) as published by the U.S. Department of Labor from that 
reported for the month of the Effective Date. Said rates shall be increased proportionately by the percentage specified 
in Appendix A for each change of five percent (5%) in said Index. 
710. Change in Law 
In the event that the laws, ordinances, rules, regulations, by-laws, orders and the like, including, but not limited to the fiscal, tax laws, 
tax regulations, and interpretations, whether of governmental, national, federal, state or local authority or other agencies or other 
authority having jurisdiction over the Operating Area and/or the parties to the Contract and which are or may become applicable or 
classification society rules change, including changes in the interpretation and enforcement thereof, or practices applicable to the 
Operating Area following the date specified in Appendix A of this Contract, including any extension thereof, which cause an increase in 
operating costs or any taxes, duties, fees, expenses and charges assessed or levied against Contractor's Personnel or Contractor's 
Items or otherwise relating to the Contract, Operator will fully reimburse Contractor for any such increase. 
711. Change in Locale of Operating Area 
Upon one hundred twenty (120) days written notice to Contractor and subject to Contractor's approval, Operator may change the 
Operating Area or Operating Base specified in Appendix A. Any new designations will then become the Operating Area or Operating 
Base in substitution for the preceding designation. In such event, Contractor will proceed to mobilize and move Contractor's Items to the 
new Operating Area and continue to work under the Contract, provided such change does not result in a breach of Contractor's trading 
warranties or violate the laws, rules and regulations applicable to Contractor or its Affiliated Companies; provided further that Contractor 
is able to obtain all insurance required by the Contract, and any other insurance typically carried by Contractor, for operations in the 
new Operating Area. Operator shall reimburse Contractor all costs associated with changing the Operating Area or Operating Base, 
including but not limited to the cost to return the Drilling Unit to the original Operating Area or such other point as the Contractor may 
nominate no further distant than the original Operating Area, and shall pay all set up costs incurred by Contractor on a cost 
reimbursable basis. In addition, the parties shall adjust the day rates to account for all other increases in the costs of operation between 
the new and preceding designations. 
ARTICLE VIII - INVOICES. PAYMENTS AND LIENS 
801. Monthly Invoices 
Contractor may invoice Operator at the end of each month, or at the end of each well, if sooner, for all daily charges earned by 
Contractor. Other charges may be invoiced as earned. Invoices for daily charges will reflect details of the time spent (calculated to the 
nearest hour) and the rate charged for that time. Invoices for other charges will be accompanied by documentation supporting costs 
incurred for Operator or other substantiation as reasonably required. Contractor's invoices shall be delivered as specified in Appendix 
A. 
802. Payment 
Operator shall pay all invoices within thirty (30) days after the receipt thereof except that if Operator disputes an item invoiced, Operator 
shall within twenty (20) days after receipt of the invoice notify Contractor of the amount disputed, specifying the reason therefor, and 
payment of the disputed amount may be withheld until settlement of the dispute, but payment shall be made of any undisputed portion. 
Any sums (including amounts ultimately paid with respect to a disputed invoice) not paid within thirty (30) days after receipt of invoice 
shall bear interest at the rate specified in Appendix A or the maximum allowed by law, whichever is less, from said due date until paid. 
Contractor shall have the right, upon ten (10) days prior written notice, to terminate this Contract if Operator fails or refuses to timely pay 
Contractor amounts due and owing to Contractor. Unless otherwise specified herein, all payments shall be made in US Dollars. 
803. Manner of Payment 
All payments due by Operator to Contractor hereunder shall be made by wire transfer or as otherwise agreed in writing to Contractor's 
bank account which is specified in Appendix A. 
804. Financial Guarantee 
If required by Contractor, Operator shall, prior to commencing operations under this Contract, provide Contractor with a letter of credit or 
other financial security in an amount and form acceptable to Contractor. The security shall be worded to make the proceeds payable to 
Contractor upon presentation of a sight draft by Contractor. 
805. Liens and Encumbrances 
Operator shall have no right, power or authority to create, incur, or permit to be imposed upon the Drilling Unit any liens or 
encumbrances whatsoever. Operator shall at all times be responsible for and hold harmless and indemnify Contractor and the 
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owners of the Drilling Unit from and against any and all claims, demands, causes of action, damages, judgments, costs and 
expenses (including attorney's fees, costs of litigation, and the costs of bonds or other security) which may be incurred or 
suffered by Contractor or the owners of the Drilling Unit resulting from or arising out of any lien or encumbrance filed, 
asserted or claimed against the Drilling Unit created, incurred or permitted to be imposed by, through or under Operator. 
806. Local Currency Expenditures 
Upon Contractor's request, Operator shall pay Contractor in the currency of the country where the Drilling Unit is operating in amounts 
equal to Contractor's local currency expenditures (including those expenditures incurred locally by Contractor for the account of 
Operator) and as needed by Contractor. All amounts of currency so paid by Operator to Contractor during the month shall be credited 
against Contractor's US Dollar monthly invoice for that month at the rate of exchange of US Dollars for the local currency, as published 
in the Wall Street Journal, in effect on the date Contractor makes the local currency payment. 
 
ARTICLE IX - LIABILITY 
900. General 
For the purposes of this Article IX, the terms "Affiliated Company", "Contractor's  Items", "Operator's Items", "Contractor's 
Personnel" and "Operator's Personnel" shall have the meanings as defined in Article I. 
901. Equipment or Property 
(a) Except as specifically provided herein to the contrary, Contractor shall at all times be responsible for and 
hold harmless and indemnify Operator from and against damage to or loss of Contractor's  property, 
Contractor's Items, and the property, equipment, material and services of Contractor's Affiliated Companies, 
partnerships, and limited liability companies, and its and all of their co-owners, partners, co-venturers, joint 
owners, and its contractors and subcontractors of any tier and the officers, directors, employees, agents, 
assigns, representatives, managers, consultants, insurers and subrogees of each of the foregoing. To the 
extent that the proceeds from Contractor's insurance as made available to Contractor do not compensate 
Contractor therefor, 
(1) Operator shall be responsible for and hold harmless and indemnify Contractor for loss or destruction 
of or damage to Contractor's drill pipe, drill collars, subs, reamers, bumper subs, stabilizers and 
other in-hole equipment when such equipment is being used in the hole below the rotary table, 
normal wear excepted. Abnormal wear and/or damage for which Operator shall be responsible 
hereunder shall include, but not be limited to, wear and/or damage resulting from the presence of H2S 
or other corrosive elements in the hole including those introduced into the drilling fluid, excessive 
wear caused by sandcutting, damage resulting from excessive or uncontrolled pressures such as 
those encountered during testing, blowout, or in a well out of control, excessive deviation of the hole 
from vertical, dog-leg severity, fishing, cementing or testing operations, and from any unusual 
drilling practices employed at Operator's request. Operator's responsibility  for such abnormal wear 
and/or damage as referred to herein shall include abnormal wear and/or damage to Contractor's 
choke hoses and manifolds, BOP and other appurtenant equipment Operator shall pay the cost of 
repairing damaged equipment if repairable. In the case of equipment lost, destroyed or damaged 
beyond repair, Operator shall reimburse Contractor an amount equal to the then current replacement 
cost of such equipment delivered to the Drilling Unit. 
(2) Operator shall be responsible for and hold harmless and indemnify Contractor for damage to or loss 
of Contractor's subsea and mooring equipment, including without limitation, chains, anchors, the 
riser, slip joint, choke and kill lines, flexible hoses, hydraulic hoses and guidelines,  subsea BOP, 
shackles, pendant lines and buoys, and shall reimburse Contractor an amount equal to the then 
current replacement cost of such equipment delivered to the Drilling Unit, or the repair cost, 
whichever is applicable. 
(3) Operator shall be responsible for and hold harmless and indemnify Contractor for loss or destruction 
of or damage, including corrosion and contamination, to Contractor's surface equipment resulting 
from the presence of H2S, C02 or other corrosive elements introduced into the drilling fluid (including 
elements introduced from the hole), or the presence of naturally occurring radioactive  materials 
(NORM). Operator shall pay the cost of repairing and/or decontaminating damaged equipment if 
repairable. In the case of equipment lost, destroyed, damaged or contaminated  beyond repair, 
Operator shall reimburse Contractor an amount equal to the then current replacement cost of such 
equipment delivered to the Drilling Unit. In addition, notwithstanding the provisions  of Paragraph 
706 of this Contract, the Standby Rate shall apply with respect to any downtime that may occur or 
result from such loss or damage, including decontamination operations. 
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(4) Operator shall be responsible for and hold harmless and indemnify Contractor for damage to or loss 
of the Contractor's Items caused by Operator furnished helicopters, tugs, supply or service vessels. 
In addition, notwithstanding  the provisions of Paragraph 706 of this Contract, the Standby Rate shall 
apply with respect to any period of time required to repair Contractor's  Items downtime that may 
occur or result from such loss or damage 
(b) Contractor's operating practices require the BOP stack to be operated at one (1) degree or less from vertical 
to avoid abnormal wear and damage.  In the event the stack angle exceeds one (1) degree from vertical', 
Operator shall be responsible  for and hold harmless and indemnify Contractor for loss or damage to 
Contractor's  subsea and in-hole equipment which may result Operator shall pay the cost of repairing 
damaged equipment if repairable. In the case of equipment lost, destroyed or damaged beyond repair, 
Operator shall reimburse Contractor an amount equal to the then current replacement cost of such 
equipment delivered to the Drilling Unit In addition, notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 706 of this 
Contract, the Standby Rate shall apply with respect to the period of time required to repair or replace 
Contractor's subsea and in-hole equipment that may occur or result from such loss or damage. 
(c) Operator shall at all times be responsible for and hold harmless and indemnify Contractor from and against 
damage to or loss of Operator's property, Operator's Items, and the property,  equipment, material and 
services of Operator's Affiliated Companies, partnerships,  and limited liability companies, and its and all of 
their co-owners, co-lessees, farmors, farmees, partners, co-venturers, joint owners, and its contractors and 
subcontractors of any tier (with the exception  of Contractor and its subcontractors of any tier) and the 
officers, directors, employees, agents, assigns,  representatives, managers,  consultants, insurers  and 
subrogees of each of the foregoing. 
902. The Hole 
In the event the hole should be lost or damaged at any time, Operator shall be responsible for and hold harmless and 
indemnify Contractor and its suppliers, contractors and subcontractors of any tier from such damage to or loss of the hole, 
including all downhole property therein. 
903. Contractor's Personnel 
Contractor shall at all times be responsible for and hold harmless and indemnify Operator from and against all claims, 
demands and causes of action of every kind and character on account of bodily injury, illness or death of Contractor's 
Personnel or Contractor's invitees or damage to their property. 
904. Operator's Personnel 
Operator shall at all times be responsible for and hold harmless and indemnify Contractor from and against all claims, 
demands, and causes of action of every kind and character on account of bodily injury, illness or death of Operator's 
Personnel or Operator's invitees or damage to their property. 
905. Pollution and Contamination 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, the responsibility  for pollution or contamination shall at all times 
be as follows: 
(a) Contractor shall be responsible for and hold harmless and indemnify Operator for control and removal of 
pollution  or contamination which originates above the surface of the water from spills of fuels, lubricants, 
motor oils, normal water base drilling fluid and attendant cuttings, pipe dope, paints, solvents, ballast, bilge 
and garbage wholly in Contractor's  possession and control and directly associated with Contractor's 
equipment and facilities. For purposes hereof the term "normal water base drilling fluid" means drilling fluid 
which does not exceed toxicity limits specified for offshore discharges by the environmental protection entity 
having jurisdiction over the Operating Area. 
(b) Operator shall be responsible for and hold harmless and indemnify Contractor and its suppliers, contractors 
and subcontractors of any tier against all claims, demands, and causes of action of every kind and character 
(including control and removal of the pollutant involved) arising directly or indirectly from all pollution or 
contamination (including radioactive contamination), other than that described in Paragraph 905(a) above, 
which may occur including, but not limited to, that which may result from fire, blowout, cratering, seepage or 
any other uncontrolled flow of oil, gas, water or other substance, as well as the use of or disposition  of 
radioactive sources, lost circulation  and fish recovery materials and fluids, oil emulsion, oil base or 
chemically treated drilling fluids and attendant cuttings, and drilling fluids other than "normal  water base 
drilling fluid" defined in Paragraph 905(a) above. 
(c) In the event a third party commits an act or omission which results in pollution or contamination for which 
either Contractor or Operator for whom such party is performing  work is held to be legally liable, the 
responsibility therefor shall be considered, as between Contractor and Operator, to be the same as if the 
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party for whom the work was performed had performed the same and all of the obligations and limitations set 
forth in Paragraphs 905(a) and (b) above, shall be specifically applied. 
906. Debris Removal and Cost of Control 
Operator shall at all times be responsible  for and hold harmless and indemnify Contractor for the cost of removal of debris 
(including Contractor's Items) to the extent that proceeds from Contractor's insurance as made available to Contractor do not 
compensate Contractor therefor.  Operator shall at all times be responsible for and hold harmless and indemnify Contractor 
for the cost of regaining control of any wild well. 
907. Underground Damage 
Operator shall at all times be responsible for and hold harmless and indemnify Contractor and its suppliers, contractors and 
subcontractors  of any tier from and against any and all claims on account of injury to, destruction of, or loss or impairment of 
any property right in or to oil, gas or other mineral substance or water, if at the time of the act or omission causing such 
injury, destruction, loss, or impairment, said substance had not been reduced to physical possession above the seabed, and 
for any loss or damage to any formation, strata, or reservoir beneath the seabed. 
90S. Patent Liability 
Contractor shall at all times be responsible for and hold harmless and indemnify Operator from and against any and all loss or 
liability arising from infringement of patents of the United States covering equipment furnished by Contractor. Operator shall 
at all times be responsible for and hold harmless and indemnify Contractor from and against any and all loss or liability 
arising from infringement  or alleged infringements of patents covering the property,  equipment, methods or processes 
furnished or directed by Operator. 
909. Conseouential Damages 
Subject to and without affecting the provisions of this Contract regarding the payment rights and obligations  of the parties or 
the risk of loss, release and indemnity rights and obligations of the parties, each party shall at all times be responsible for and 
hold harmless and indemnify the other party from and against its own special, indirect or consequential  damages, and the 
parties agree that special, indirect or consequential damages shall, notwithstanding  any interpretation  under applicable law to 
the contrary, be deemed to include, whether direct or indirect, without limitation, the following: loss of profit or revenue; costs 
and expenses resulting from business interruptions; loss of or delay in production; loss of or damage to the leasehold, 
concession, production sharing contract or other similar rights; loss of or delay in drilling or operating rights; cost of or loss 
of use of property, equipment, materials and services, including  without limitation those provided  by contractors  or 
subcontractors of every tier or by third parties. 
Operator shall at all times be responsible  for and hold harmless and indemnify Contractor from and against all claims, 
demands and causes of action of every kind and character in connection  with such special, indirect or consequential 
damages suffered by Operator's co-owners, co-venturers, co-lessees, farmors, farmees, partners and joint owners. 
910. Termination of Location Liability 
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Contract, once the Drilling Unit is under way from the drilling location, Operator 
shall be responsible for and hold harmless and indemnify Contractor for loss or damage to property, personal injury or death 
of any person which occurs thereafter as a result of the condition of the well or the location and Contractor shall be relieved of 
such liability. 
911. Indemnity Obligation 
(a) The parties intend and agree that the phrase "be responsible  for and hold harmless and indemnify" in 
Paragraphs 605, 606, 805 and 901 through 910 hereof means that the indemnifying  party shall release, 
indemnify, hold harmless and defend (including payment of reasonable attorney's fees and costs of litigation) 
the indemnified party from and against any and all claims, demands, causes of action, damages, judgments 
and awards of any kind or character, without limit and without regard to the cause or causes thereof, 
including claims, liabilities, demands, and causes of action arising out of operation of, or in connection with, 
any vessel or vessels (including the Drilling Unit), including ingress and egress to the drilling location, and 
loading and unloading of personnel and cargo, and also including preexisting  conditions,  defect or ruin of 
premises or equipment (whether such conditions, defect or ruin be patent or latent), the unseaworthiness  of 
any vessel or vessels (including the Drilling Unit), breach of representation  or warranty (express or implied), 
breach of duty (whether statutory, contractual or otherwise), strict liability, any theory of tort, breach of 
contract, fault, regulatory or statutory liability, products liability, the negligence of any degree or character 
(including without limitation sole, joint or concurrent, active, passive or gross negligence) of any person or 
persons, including such negligence of the party seeking the benefit of a release, indemnity or assumption of 
liability, or any other theory of legal liability. 
(b) An indemnifying party's obligations contained in this Contract shall extend to the indemnified party and shall 
inure to the benefit of such party, its Affiliated Companies, and their co-owners, co-venturers, co-lessees, 
farmors,  farmees,  and joint owners,  and the officers, directors, stockholders, partners, managers, 
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representatives, employees, consultants, agents, servants and insurers of each, and to actions against the 
Drilling Unit, its legal and beneficial owners, whether in rem or in personam. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided herein, the terms and provisions of Paragraphs 605, 606, 805 and 901 through 
910 shall have no application to claims or causes of action asserted against Operator or Contractor which 
arise solely by reason of any agreement of indemnity with a person or entity not a party hereto. Except as 
otherwise provided herein, nothing contained herein shall confer any rights upon any third party beneficiary. 
912. General Intent 
The parties recognize that the performance of well drilling, workover and associated activities such as those to be performed 
under this Contract have resulted in bodily injury, death, damage or loss of property, well loss or damage, pollution, loss of 
well control, reservoir damage, consequential damage and other losses and liabilities.  It is the intention of the parties hereto 
that the provisions  of this Article IX and Paragraphs 605, 606 and 605 shall exclusively govern the allocation of risks and 
liabilities of said parties without regard to cause (as more particularly specified in Paragraph 911), it being acknowledged that 
the compensation payable to Contractor as specified herein has been based upon the express understanding  that risks and 
liabilities shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of this Contract 
ARTICLE X - INSURANCE 
1001. Insurance 
Contractor shall carry and maintain, or cause to be carried and maintained, insurance coverages of the type and in the 
amounts set forth in Appendix E, covering only those liabilities specifically assumed by Contractor under this Contract. 
All references in this Contract to "insurance" of Contractor shall mean such insurance as set forth in Appendix E. Contractor 
shall have the right to self-insure any or all of that portion of insurance relating to loss or damage to Contractor's Items. 
Operator shall carry and maintain, or cause to be carried and maintained, the insurance coverages of the types and amounts 
set forth in Appendix F, covering only those liabilities specifically assumed by Operator under this Contract 
All references in this Contract to "insurance" of Operator shall mean such insurance as set forth in Appendix F. Operator 
shall have the right to self-insure any or all of that portion of insurance relating to loss or damage to Operator's Items. 
1002. Certificates 
Each party will furnish the other, on request, certificates indicating that the required insurance is in full force and effect and 
that the same shall not be canceled or materially and adversely changed without ten (10) days prior written notice to the other 
party. 
1003. Subrogation 
For liabilities assumed hereunder by Contractor, its insurance shall be endorsed to provide that the underwriters waive their 
right of subrogation against Operator, its Affiliated  Companies and their co-owners, co-venturers,  co-lessees, farmors, 
farmees, and joint  owners and the officers, directors,  stockholders, partners, managers, representatives, employees, 
consultants, agents, servants and insurers of each. Operator will, as well, cause its insurer to waive subrogation  against 
Contractor and Contractor's  Affiliated Companies and their co-owners, and the officers, directors, stockholders, partners, 
managers, representatives, employees, consultants, agents, servants and insurers of each for liabilities it assumes. 
1004. Additional Insured 
Contractor shall name Operator as additional insured, where permitted, under its policies of insurance, but only with respect 
to and to the extent of the liabilities specifically assumed by Contractor under this Contract Operator shall name Contractor 
as additional insured, where permitted, under its policies of insurance, but only with respect to and to the extent of the 
liabilities specifically assumed by Operator under this Contract 
ARTICLE XI - SUBLETTING AND ASSIGNMENT 
1101. Subcontracts 
Either party may employ other contractors to perform any of the operations or services to be provided or performed by it 
1102. Assignment 
Neither party may assign this Contract other than to an Affiliated Company without the prior written consent of the other, and 
prompt notice of any such intent to assign shall be given to the other party. In the event of such assignment, the assigning 
party shall remain liable to the other party as a guarantor of the performance by the assignee of the terms of this Contract If 
any assignment is made that increases Contractor's financial burden, Contractor's compensation shall be adjusted to give 
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ARTICLE XII - NOTICES 
1201. Notices 
Notices, reports and other communications required or permitted by this Contract to be given or sent by one party to the other 
shall be delivered by hand, mailed, digitally transmitted or telecopied to the address as specified in Appendix A. Either party 
may by notice to the other party change its address. Notices shall be effective upon receipt 
ARTICLE XIII - GENERAL 
1301. Confidential Information 
Upon written request of Operator, all information relating to the well obtained by Contractor in the conduct of operations 
hereunder shall be held confidential by Contractor who will use the same degree of care it uses in safeguarding its own 
confidential information. 
 
1302. Attorney's Fees 
If this Contract is placed in the hands of an attorney for collection of any sums due hereunder, or suit is brought on same, or 
sums due hereunder are collected through bankruptcy or arbitration proceedings, then the prevailing party shall be entitled to 
recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs of litigation. 
1303. Force Majeure 
Except as otherwise provided in this Paragraph 1303 and without prejudice to the risk of loss, release and indemnity 
obligations under this Contract, each party to this Contract shall be excused from complying with the terms of this Contract, 
except for the payment of monies when due, if and for so long as such compliance is hindered or prevented by riots, strikes, 
wars (declared or undeclared), insurrection, rebellions, piracy, terrorist acts, civil disturbances, dispositions or order of 
governmental authority, whether such authority be actual or assumed, epidemics, pandemic, acts of God (except, however, 
adverse sea or weather conditions including loop, eddy and other adverse currents), inability to obtain equipment, supplies, 
fuel or necessary labor, or by any act or cause (other than financial distress or inability to pay debts when due) which is 
reasonably beyond the control of such party, such cause being herein sometimes called "Force Majeure."  Neither Operator 
nor Contractor shall be required against its will to adjust any labor or similar disputes except in accordance with applicable 
law.  In the event that either party hereto is rendered unable, wholly or in part, by any of these causes to carry out its 
obligation under this Contract, such party shall give notice and details of Force Majeure in writing to the other party as 
promptly as possible after its occurrence. In such cases, the obligations of the party giving the notice shall be suspended 
during the continuance of any inability so caused except that Operator shall be obliged to pay to Contractor the Force Majeure 
Rate provided for in Paragraph 707. 
1304. Right to Audit 
For a period of two years from termination of the Contract, Contractor shall keep proper books, records and accounts of 
operations hereunder and shall permit Operator at all reasonable times to inspect the portions thereof related to any variation 
of the rates under Paragraph 709 or charges for reimbursable items. 
1305. Compliance with Laws 
Each party hereto agrees to comply with all laws, rules and regulations of any national, federal, state, provincial  or local 
government authority  which are now or may become applicable to that party's operations covered by or arising out of the 
performance of this Contract In the event any provision of this Contract is inconsistent with or contrary to any applicable 
national, federal, state, provincial or local law, rule or regulation, said provision shall be deemed to be modified to the extent 
required to comply with said law, rule or regulation, and as so modified said provision and this Contract shall continue in full 
force and effect. Without prejudice to Article IX, if any act or omission by Contractor in response to an instruction  of 
Operator's Personnel violates any such law, Operator shall be responsible for and hold harmless and indemnify Contractor for 
any consequences thereof. 
Notwithstanding any provision  in this Contract to the contrary, the parties agree that the failure by one party, solely on 
account of conflict of laws, to comply with applicable laws directly affecting the work or performance of such party's 
obligations under this Contract shall not constitute a breach of this Contract Notwithstanding  any provision  in this Contract 
to the contrary, Operator agrees that Contractor, in undertaking the work or performing  Contractor's  obligations  under this 
Contract, shall not be obligated to engage in any act or omission to act, which is prohibited by or penalized under any laws, 
rules or regulations applicable to Contractor or its Affiliated Companies. 
1306. Expropriation 
In the event that any of Contractor's Items are actually or constructively  taken over or taken from Contractor by a government 
or any other entity, including any governmental seizure, detainment, confiscation,  nationalization or expropriation, or if the 
exportation of Contractor's Items is effectively prohibited at any time (collectively, "Expropriation"), on any basis under which 
Contractor is not compensated for the fair market value thereof in U.S. Dollars, Operator will reimburse  Contractor in an 
amount equal to the fair market value  of such equipment in U.S. Dollars, less amounts recovered by Contractor under 
applicable insurance policies, if any, and less the U.S. Dollar equivalent of the amounts, if any, received by Contractor from 
such government body and convertible to U.S. Dollars or from any other source as compensation for such Expropriation. In 
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addition Operator will reimburse Contractor for all other direct costs and expenses reasonably incurred as a result of such 
Expropriation. 
In the event that a partial or full Expropriation renders Contractor unable to proceed with operations under this Contract, 
Operator will have the option of declaring that an Expropriation has occurred', in which event the date of Expropriation  will be 
the date of Operator's delivery to Contractor of a written notice of Expropriation at which time the day rates payable under this 
Contract will cease. 
Operator will pay Contractor the above computed amount within thirty (30) days of the date of such Expropriation. Contractor 
will pay to Operator any moneys received with respect to such Expropriation which Contractor receives and for which 
Operator has not already received credit after payments made by Operator to Contractor under this Paragraph 1306. 
1307. Compliance with Export Controls and Trade Embargoes 
In connection with the work to be performed under this Contract, each party shall comply at all times with all applicable trade 
embargo and export control laws, rules and regulations applicable to such party and its Affiliated Companies and shall not 
export or re-export any goods, software or technology (including, without limitation, technical data), directly or indirectly, 
without first obtaining all written consents, permits, or authorizations  and completing such formalities as may be required by 
any such laws, rules or regulations.  Each party shall assist the other party in applying for such consents, permits or 
authorizations  and in completing such formalities if so requested. Each party shall provide to the other party upon request 
copies or other written evidence of such consents, permits or authorizations and such other information  regarding export 
control classifications as may reasonably be requested. Each party represents that it has in place appropriate screening 
procedures to ensure compliance with such laws, rules and regulations and shall apply those procedures in connection with 
the work to be performed under this Contract Each party agrees to keep records of its export and re-export related activities 
for a minimum of five years or such period as is required from time to time by all relevant laws, whichever is the greater. Each 
party shall make such records available to a duly authorized representative of the other party upon reasonable request for 
inspection and copying. 
1308. Waivers 
It is fully understood and agreed that none of the requirements of this Contract shall be considered as waived by either party 
unless the same is done in writing, and then only by the persons executing this Contract, or other duly authorized agent or 
representative of the party. 
1309. Entire Agreement 
This Contract constitutes the full understanding of the parties, and a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of their 
agreement, and shall exclusively control and govern all work performed hereunder. All representations, offers, and 
undertakings of the parties made prior to the effective date hereof, whether oral or in writing, are merged herein, and no other 
contracts, agreements or work orders, executed prior to the execution of this Contract, shall in any way modify, amend, alter 
or change any of the terms or conditions set out herein. 
1310. Enurement 
This Contract shall enure to the benefit of and be binding upon the successors and assigns of the parties. 
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Attached to and incorporated as a part of that certain Contract dated. 
Paragraph 
Number: 
101 (f)  Operating Area: 




203 (b) Termination: 
203 (b) & 
705 (c) Demobilization Location: 
204 Option Term: 
Option Notice: 
Deadline for Mutual 
Agreement: 
503 Maximum Water Depth: 
Minimum Water Depth: 
Maximum Well Depth: 
601 Handling Charge: 
607 Contractor Taxes: 
702 Mobilization Fee: 
703 Demobilization Fee: 
704 Operating Rate: 
705 Standby Rate: 
706 Repair Rate: 




707 Force Majeure Rate: 
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802 Interest Rate on Late Payments: per annum 



























































DRILLING UNIT AND EQUIPMENT TO BE PROVIDED BY CONTRACTOR 
































































PERSONNEL TO BE PROVIDED BY CONTRACTOR 
 
 







































































Furnished by Operator, paid by Operator 4 
 
1. Contractor's Items as set forth in Appendix B. 1 
2. Except as otherwise specified, maintenance and repair, including repair parts, of Contractor's Items. 1 
3. Maintenance and repair, including repair parts, of Operator's Items except as provided in Paragraph 403. 4 
4. All charges relative to acquisition, shipping and transportation (except charges as provided in Items 61, 62, 64, 
65, 66, 70 and 73) of all Contractor's Items required as replacements or spare parts. 1 
5. Contractor's Personnel including replacement, subsistence, insurance, wages, benefits, and all other costs 
related thereto, except for local taxes pursuant to Paragraph 607 and for increases pursuant to Paragraph 709. 1 
6. Extra personnel in excess of the complement of personnel set forth in Appendix C when requested in writing 
by Operator. 3 
7. Overtime beyond normal work schedule for Contractor's Personnel when requested in writing by Operator. 3 
8. Required licenses, permits, certificates of financial responsibility  and clearances to enter upon and depart from 
drilling location, pursuant to Paragraph 605. 4 
9. Surveying service and marker buoys to mark drilling location. 4 
10. Sea floor surveys required by Contractor's Marine Surveyor. 4 
11. Sea bottom coring services at the drilling location if required by Contractor. 4 
12. Fuel, oil, greases, lubricants and hydraulic fluid for Contractor's Items and Operator's Items. 
a. Fuel; 4 
b. Oil, greases, lubricants and hydraulic fluid. 3 
13. Water for drilling, washdown and cementing and excess potable water, if required. 4 
14. Drilling fluid and additives including lost circulation material. 4 
15. Mud logging services. 4 
16. Normal welding services required on Operator's Items to the extent available from Contractor's Personnel. 1 
17. Welding materials used on Operator's Items. 2 
18. Pneumatic hoses between supply vessels and Drilling Unit for unloading fuel, water, bulk cement and mud 
materials including repair and replacement of same: 
a. Initial hoses; 1 
b. All replacements. 2 
19. Mooring system between supply vessels and Drilling Unit including repair and replacement: 
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a. Initial; 1 
b. All replacements. 2 
20. Pre-slung cargo and pre-slung cargo baskets for use in transporting Contractor's Items to and from supply vessels. 1 
21. Pre-slung cargo and pre-slung cargo baskets for use in transporting Operator's Items to and from supply vessels. 4 
22. Towing service for all Drilling Unit moves, as approved by Contractor's insurance underwriters. 4 
23. Tow lines and bollards. 4 
24. Anchor setting and retrieving with marine vessels including anchor handling crews, if required. 4 
25. Additional anchors and buoy lines, if required, including all repairs and replacement 3 
26. Inspection of Contractor's drill pipe, drill collars and other in-hole equipment according to API standards before 
operations commence under this Contract, if required. 1 
27. Inspection of Contractor's drill pipe, drill collars and other in-hole equipment according to API standards after 
operations commence under this Contract at reasonable intervals requested by Operator. 4 
28. Drill pipe casing protectors (one per joint inside conductor or surface casing) on Contractor's drill pipe. 1 
a. All additional rubbers or replacements for rubbers installed. 2 
29. Drill pipe casing protectors on other drill pipe furnished by Operator, if required by Operator. 4 
30. Kelly saver sub rubbers, and replacements, for kellys furnished by Contractor. 1 
31. Drill pipe wipers. 1 
32. Fishing tools other than provided by Contractor as set forth in Appendix B. 4 
33. Repair and/or replacement parts for Contractor furnished fishing tools. 3 
34. Drilling bits, stabilizers, hole openers, reamers, under-reamers, well scrapers, drilling bumper subs, drilling safety 
joints, hydraulic drilling jars, and other special in-hole equipment, including replacement parts and repairs for same. 4 
35. Directional surveying equipment and service. 4 
36. Deflection drilling tools and service. 4 
37. Drill pipe, drill collars and handling tools other than those specified in Appendix B. 4 
38. Blowout prevention equipment other than as listed in Appendix B. 4 
39. Wellhead equipment and supplies. 4 
40. Tubular goods, hangers, packers and accessories. 4 
41. Casing shoes, float collars, baskets, centralizers, scratchers, scrapers, baffles and other casing accessories. 4 
42. Casing tools as provided in Appendix B. 1 
a. All repairs and replacements, if used. 3 
43. Tubing tools, including slips, elevators, power tongs (or jaws for Contractor's power tongs), wrenches, and 
tubing pipe wiper. 4 
44. Swabbing equipment, including lubricator, swab valve, swabs, oil savers, sinker bars, rope sockets and jars, 
if required (except sand line). 4 
 
 
(International Offshore Daywork Drilling Contract - Appendix D - Page 2) 











45. Swab rubbers and oil saver rubbers. 4 
46. Core barrels and handling tools. 4 
47. Core heads and core catchers. 4 
48. Wireline logging unit, maintenance of unit and logging services. 4 
49. Wireline formation testing and sidewall sampling equipment and services. 4 
50. Drill stem test equipment and services. 4 
51. Gun and perforating services. 4 
52. Cement and cementing services. 4 
53. Cementing unit, if specified in Appendix B. 1 
NOTE: If Operator uses the services of a cementing service company other than the owner of the cementing unit, 
any charges imposed upon Contractor by the owner of the cementing unit as consequence thereof shall be for 
Operator's account 
54. Repair and maintenance of Contractor furnished cementing unit. 3 
55. Labor to install servicing equipment by Operator aboard the Drilling Unit and for later removal, if required, including, 
but not limited to, cementing unit, wireline logging unit, mud logging unit, diving equipment and well testing system. 4 
56. Supplies and materials to install Operator's Items. 4 
57. Well testing system complete with separators, heaters, gas vents, metering, piping and valves, oil and/or gas 
burner, necessary booms, piping igniters, fabrication and installation. 4 
58. Test tanks for well fluid. 4 
59. Administrative  center including offices, office furniture, equipment and supplies for Contractor's Personnel, 
warehousing and storage yard at Operating Base for Contractor's Items, if required. 1 
60. Administrative  center including offices, office furniture, equipment and supplies for Operator's Personnel, 
warehousing and storage yard facilities for Operator's Items. 4 
61. Port facilities and dockside area in vicinity of Operating Base for loading and unloading Contractor's and 
Operator's Items on and off supply vessels. 4 
62. Transportation for Contractor's Items and Personnel: 
a. Routine transportation from point of origin to Operating Base; 1 
b. Routine transportation from Operating Base to and return from dockside and/or heliport; 4 
c. Routine transportation from one Operating Base to another; 4 
d. Temporary lodging, if required, and transportation from Operating Base to and return from dockside and/or 
heliport and between Operating Bases during evacuation due to weather or other safety reasons; 3 
e. Emergency transportation for both Operator and Contractor, as required. 4 
63. Transportation for Operator's Items and Personnel to dockside at Operating Base or point of departure and return. 4 
64. Dockside labor and equipment at Operating Base to load and unload Contractor's and Operator's Items from 
or to land transportation and from or to supply vessels. 4 
65. Marine transportation for Contractor's and Operator's Items and Personnel from dockside to Drilling Unit and 
return with supply vessels supplied by Operator: 4 
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a. Crew boats to transport personnel of Operator and Contractor; if required; 
b. Standby boat, if required. 
66. Storage space at dock site for Contractor's Items. 
67. Storage space at dock site and Operating Base for Operator's Items. 
68. Onshore transportation  for Contractor's shorebased personnel. 
69. Onshore transportation for Operator's shorebased personnel. 
70. DutieSs fees, licenses, pilotage fees, wharfage fees, harbor fees and costs or similar charges including any sales 
taxes or clearing agent or brokerage fees relating to Contractor's Items and replacements or spare parts. 
71. Duties, fees, licenses, pilotage fees, wharfage fees, harbor fees and costs or similar charges including any sales 
taxes or clearing agent or brokerage fees relating to Operator's Items and replacements or spare parts. 
72. Communication system from Drilling Unit to supply vessel and supply vessel to Operator's Operating Base office 
or direct to Operating Base, including permits and licenses: 
a. Communication system from Drilling Unit to Contractor's office or shore base, including permits and licenses; 
b. Communication system operators. 
73. All helicopter transportation as required including medical evacuation. 
a. Non-directional beacon for helicopter operations. 
74. Helicopter refueling system aboard Drilling Unit including helicopter fuel tanks, fuel tank stand, fuel pump filters, 
hoses and grounding systems. 
75. Helicopter fuel and lubricants. 
76. Special or additional helicopter safety equipment aboard Drilling Unit. 
77. Diver services as required. 
78. Meals and quarters for all of Contractor's Personnel and up to and including Operator's Personnel. 
79. Meals and quarters for Operator's Personnel in excess of per day to be charged at 
$ per meal and $ per bed. 
80. Waste storage, removal and disposal, including any required registration and permits. 
81. Insurance as provided in Appendix E. 
82. Insurance as provided in Appendix F. 
83. Maintenance and repair including repair parts: 
a. Of Contractor's surface equipment except as provided in Paragraphs 605 and 901; 
b. Rubber goods in Contractor's BOP's; 
c. Of Contractor's subsurface equipment as provided in Paragraphs 605 and 901; 
d. Of Contractor's mooring equipment including pendant lines. 
84. Extra labor (in excess of supply vessel's personnel) required aboard supply vessels when alongside Drilling Unit 
to unload or load Contractor's and/or Operator's Items. 
85. Anchor piles, if required, and placement of same. 
 
 
(International Offshore Daywork Drilling Contract - Appendix D - Page A) 











86. Subsea equipment: 
a. Wellhead equipment; 4 
b. Wellhead connector from BOP stack to wellhead as specified in Appendix B; 1 
c. Subsea running tools for wellheads, if required; 4 
d. Contractor's surface or subsea blowout preventer system as described in Appendix B; 1 
e. Wellhead temporary guidebase, if required; 4 
f. Wellhead guide post structure, if required; 4 
g. Jetting tools for jetting in conductor casing, if required; 4 
h. Guide arms and bushings for drilling conductor hole and running conductor casing, if required; 4 
i. Repair and/or replacement for items (a), (c), (e), (f), (g) and (h). 4 
87. Screens for shale shakers up to and including mesh. 1 
a. Screens for shale shakers above mesh. 3 
88. All screens for mud cleaners. 3 
89. Weather forecast services, if required. 4 
90. Conductor drive hammer and accessories, if applicable, including repairs and/or replacement. 4 
91. Personal protective equipment for Contractor's Personnel when using or handling corrosive or hazardous materials. 3 
92. Any PVT equipment or other monitoring devices other than specified in Appendix B. 4 








































I. Workers' Compensation and Employer's Liability 
A. Workers' Compensation insurance (or the equivalent for the Operating Area) to comply fully with the provisions 
and applicable laws of the country or state in which the Contractor qualifies as an employer and in which 
operations hereunder are performed, including  U.S. Longshore & Harbor Workers Act and Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands Act coverage, if applicable. 
B. Employer's Liability (or the equivalent for the Operating Area) with limits of: 
Bodily Injury by Accident  - $1,000,000 each accident 
Bodily Injury by Disease - $1,000,000 policy limit . 
Bodily Injury by Disease - $1,000,000 each employee 
C. Maritime Employer's Liability (or the equivalent for the Operating Area) including Jones Act and Death on the 
High Seas Act coverage and transportation, wages, maintenance and cure with limits of $1,000,000 each 
person/$1,000,000 each accident 
D. "In rem" endorsement 
E. Borrowed Servant/Alternate Employer endorsement. 
II. Comprehensive General Liability Insurance 
A. Commercial General Liability, including coverage for premises/operations, independent contractor's protective 
liability, contractual liability  and products/completed operations coverage  and subject to a $1,000,000 
combined single limit of liability each occurrence for Bodily Injury and Property Damage. 
B. Charterer's Legal Liability. 
C. Deletion of watercraft exclusion as respects operations and contractual  liability for watercraft exposure not 
covered by Protection and Indemnity policy. 
D. "In rem" endorsement 
III. Automobile Liability Insurance 
Standard comprehensive  form including all owned, hired and non-owned vehicles with a $1,000,000 combined single 
limit of liability each accident for bodily injury and/or property damage. 
IV. Aircraft Liability 
Aircraft liability including contractual liability covering all owned (if any), hired and non-owned aircraft (fixed wing and 
rotary) including passenger liability with a $5,000,000 combined single limit of liability each accident for bodily injury 
and/or property damage. 
V. Excess/Umbrella Liability Insurance 
A. Providing following form coverage for Employer's Liability, Maritime Employer's Liability, Commercial General 
Liability, Automobile Liability, Aircraft Liability, and Vessel Liabilities. 
B. Limit of Liability: $ combined single limit of liability each occurrence for bodily injury and/or 
property damage. 
VI. Marine Insurance 
A. Hull and Machinery Insurance (including collision liability) shall be provided  for the Drilling Unit owned or 
chartered by Contractor and utilized in the performance  of this Contract in an amount equal to the declared 
value of the Drilling Unit, subject to a deductible determined by Contractor. 
B. Protection and Indemnity Insurance or equivalent comprehensive general liability insurance, with watercraft 
exclusion deleted, shall be provided with a combined single limit of U.S. $ per 
occurrence or the value of the Drilling Unit, whichever is greater. 
VII. No Recourse of Premium 
All policies of insurance shall be endorsed to delete any recourse of premium, club calls, assessments or advances 
against Operator; Operator's Affiliated Companies, partnerships, and limited liability companies, and its and all of 
their co-owners, partners, co-venturers, and joint owners. 
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I. Workers' Compensation and Employer's Liability 
A. Workers' Compensation insurance (or the equivalent for the Operating Area) to comply fully with the provisions 
and applicable laws of the country or state in which the Operator qualifies as an employer and in which 
operations hereunder are performed, including  U.S. Longshore & Harbor Workers Act and Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands Act coverage, if applicable. 
B. Employer's Liability (or the equivalent for the Operating Area) with limits of: 
Bodily Injury by Accident  - $1,000,000 each accident 
Bodily Injury by Disease - $1,000,000 policy limit 
Bodily Injury by Disease - $1,000,000 each employee 
C. Maritime Employer's Liability (or the equivalent for the Operating Area) including Jones Act and Death on the 
High Seas Act coverage and transportation, wages, maintenance and cure with limits of $1,000,000 each 
person/$1,000,000 each accident 
D. "In rem" endorsement 
E. Borrowed Servant/Alternate Employer endorsement 
II. Commercial General Liability Insurance 
A. Commercial General Liability, including coverage for premises/operations, independent contractor's protective 
liability; contractual liability  and products/completed operations coverage  and subject to a $1,000,000 
combined single limit of liability each occurrence for Bodily Injury and Property Damage. 
B. Underground Resource/Equipment  Coverage. 
C. Charterer's Legal Liability. 
D. Deletion of watercraft exclusion as respects operations and contractual liability for watercraft exposure not 
covered by Protection and Indemnity policy. 
E. "In rem" endorsement. 
III. Automobile Liability Insurance 
Standard comprehensive form including all owned, hired and non-owned vehicles with a $1,000,000 combined single 
limit of liability each accident for bodily injury and/or property damage. 
IV. Aircraft Liability 
Aircraft liability including contractual liability covering all owned (if any), hired and non-owned aircraft (fixed wing and 
rotary) including passenger liability with a $5,000,000 combined single limit of liability each accident for bodily injury 
and/or property damage. 
V. Excess/Umbrella Liability Insurance 
1. Providing following form coverage for Employer's Liability, Maritime Employer's Liability, Commercial General 
Liability, Automobile Liability, Aircraft Liability, and Vessel Liabilities. 
2. Limit of Liability: $ combined single limit of liability each occurrence for bodily injury and/or 
property damage. 
VI. "All Risk" Insurance 
"All Risk" Insurance, subject to a nominal deductible, covering physical loss or damage (including  wreck/debris 
removal) to all Operator's Items and other property of Operator. 
VII. Operator's Extra Expense Insurance 
Operator's Extra Expense Insurance in the amount of not less than U.S. $ combined single 
limit per occurrence to cover any and all sums which Operator and/or Contractor may be obligated to incur as 
expenses and/or liabilities which may be incurred on account of bringing under control an oil or gas well which is out 
of control or extinguishing an oil or gas well fire, redrilling or repair of loss or damage to an oil or gas well, seepage 
and pollution, cleanup and contamination arising from operations under this Contract 
VIII. No Recourse of Premium 
All policies of insurance shall be endorsed to delete any recourse of premium, club calls, assessments or advances 
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against Contractor and its Affiliated Companies. 
IX. Deductibles 
Except as otherwise provided deductibles shall be for the account of Operator. 
X. Financial Responsibility 
In the event applicable law requires Operator to meet or exceed certain financial requirements, Operator shall provide 
Contractor with all related certificates or approvals issued by the government. 
XI. Scope 
The above specified amounts and types of insurance coverage shall not be deemed to constitute, or be construed as, 
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The Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) represents 130 
companies that explore for, develop and produce natural gas, natural gas liquids, 
crude oil, oil sands, and elemental sulphur throughout Canada. CAPP member 
companies produce more than 95 per cent of Canada’s natural gas and crude oil. 
CAPP also has 150 associate members that provide a wide range of services that 
support the upstream crude oil and natural gas industry. Together, these members 
and associate members are an important part of a $120-billion-a-year national 

























This publication was prepared for the Canadian Association of Petroleum 
Producers (CAPP) by Canadian Association of Oilwell Drilling Contractors 
(CAODC). While it is believed that the information contained herein is reliable 
under the conditions and subject to the limitations set out, CAPP and CAODC 
do not guarantee its accuracy. The use of this report or any information 
contained will be at the user’s sole risk, regardless of any fault or negligence of 









2100, 350 – 7 Avenue S.W. 
Calgary, Alberta 
Canada T2P 3N9 
Tel (403) 267-1100 
Fax (403) 261-4622 
403, 235 Water Street 
St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador 
Canada A1C 1B6 
Tel (709) 724-4200 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PROVISION OF JACK-UP DRILLING UNIT 
















































1. Definitions and Interpretation 
2. Commencement, Duration and Term 
3. Mobilisation and Demobilisation 
4. Appointment of Contractor and Company Representative 
5. Drilling Operations 
6. Equipment, Supplies and Services 
7. Personnel 
8. General Responsibilities of the Contractor 
9. General Responsibilities of the Company 
10. Compensation 
11. Invoicing and Payment 
12. Customs, Duties and Taxes 
13. Liabilities and Indemnities 
14. Consequential Loss 
15. Insurance 
16. Force Majeure 
17. Confidentiality 
18. Intellectual Property Rights and Patent Infringement 
19. Assignment and Subcontracting 
20. Records and Audit 
21. Termination and Amendment of Contract 




26. Other Conditions 
27. Compliance with Law 
28. Permits and Licences 
29. Independent Contractor 
30. Waiver 
31. Business Standards 
32. Local Content 
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35. Drilling Unit Security 





1. Drilling Unit Specification and Equipment List 
 
a) Drilling Unit Description and Inventory 
 
b) Rig Commissioning 
 
c) Equipment and Operating Standards 
 
2. Additional services and equipment to be provided by Contractor 
 
3. Personnel, Equipment, Materials, Supplies and Services to be supplied by Company 
and/or Contractor 
 
4. Contractor Personnel 
 




7. Health, Safety and Environment Policy 
 
8. Medical and Catering Requirements 
 
9. Procedure for offshore Helicopter Refuelling Systems and the Management of Offshore 
Helideck Operations 
 







































(1) EXPLORCo a company incorporated and existing under the laws of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria with its registered office and operational address at --- 
(“hereinafter referred to as Company, together with any permitted successors and 
assigns”); and 
 
(2) DRILLCO., a Company organised and existing under the laws of Cayman Islands and 
having its registered office at --------- (hereinafter collectively referred to as 




Company wishes to engage Contractor to provide a Drilling Unit and personnel to drill offshore 
Nigeria (“Work”) for a term drilling programme and Contractor is willing to accept such 
engagement on the following terms and conditions. 
 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS AGREED as follows: 
 
1. DEFINITIONS AND INTERPRETATION 
 
1.1. For purposes of this Contract, the following words shall have the meanings hereinafter 




“Affiliate” means in relation to either Party a company or corporation: 
 
(i) that is, directly or indirectly, controlled by such 
Party; or 
 
(ii) that, directly or indirectly, controls such Party; or 
 
(iii) that is, directly or indirectly, controlled by a 
company or corporation that also, directly or 
indirectly, controls such Party. 
 
For the purposes of this definition, “control” means having 
the right to exercise or cause the exercise of the vote of 
more than 50% of all of the voting shares of such company 
or corporation. 
 
“API” means the American Petroleum Institute. 
 
“Applicable Law” means all laws, statutes, judgements, statutory 
instruments, decrees, ordinances, regulations, directives 
(including but not limited to Employers' Liability, 
Workman's Compensation or similar statutory national 
insurance), decrees and rules of Nigeria or the government 
having or claiming jurisdiction thereof, of whatever form or 
title whether of the nation, state, province, district, 
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prefecture, territory, governorate, municipality or other 
political subdivision which apply with respect to the 
Contractor in fulfilling its obligations under this Contract 
and/or the Drilling Operations and/or the Work, including 
any amendment, modification and/or re-enactment thereof, 
for the relevant time period. 
 
“Air Base” means the Company’s air base at Port Harcourt and/or 
elsewhere as designated by Company. 
 
"Area of Operations" means offshore Nigeria or such other area as requested by 
Company and agreed to by Contractor within which the 
Drilling Operations are to be conducted. 
 
“Claims” means claims, liens, judgments, penalties, proceedings, 
awards, remedies, debts, liabilities, damages, demands, 
costs, losses, expenses (including without limitation legal 
costs and expenses) or causes of action, of whatever 
nature including, without limitation, those made or enjoyed 
by dependants, heirs, claimants, executors, administrators, 
successors, survivors or assigns. 
 
“Commencement Date” means the date and time when the following events have 
occurred: (i) Contractor has given Company written 
notification that the Drilling Unit is ready; (ii) Company has 
accepted the Drilling Unit in accordance with Section 6.2; 
and, (iii) the Drilling Unit is under tight tow one (1) nautical 
mile from the designated first well location. 
 
“Company Group” means the Company, its Co-Venturers, Company's other 
contractors and their respective subcontractors (of any 
tier), its and their respective Affiliates and its and their 
respective officers, directors, employees (including agency 
personnel and consultants) and invitees, but does not 
include any member of the Contractor Group." 
 
 
“Company Group Equipment” means all equipment, materials, tools, spare parts and 
other items owned, hired or otherwise in the possession or 
control of any member of the Company Group, but 
excludes those items provided by the Contractor and 
reimbursed by the Company as detailed in Schedule 3. 
 
“Company Group Personnel” means the directors, officers, employees, agents, 
consultants and invitees of the Company Group. 
 
“Company’s Representative” means the representative(s) of the Company appointed 
pursuant to Section 4. 
 
“Completion Date” “Completion Date” means the date and time when Drilling 
Operations shall be deemed to have been completed 
under the Contract, being the date and time on which all of 
the Company Group Equipment has been off-loaded from 
the Drilling Unit (except as the Parties may otherwise 
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agree) and: (i) in the event that another operator has 
contracted the Drilling Unit in direct continuation of 
Company’s Contract, the Drilling Unit is under tight tow 
one (1) nautical mile away from Company’s final Well 
Location; or, ii) in the event that Contractor has not 
contracted the Drilling Unit with another operator in direct 
continuation of Company’s Contract, or (iii)at Contractor’s 
sole discretion, Contractor wishes to undertake scheduled 
or non-scheduled repairs/maintenance, Special Periodic 
Survey or other Classification Survey prior to the 
commencement of a contract with another operator, the 
Drilling Unit is safely jacked-up in a sheltered water 
location off Port Gentil, Gabon or an equivalent distant 
location nominated by Contractor. The Moving Rate shall 
apply during Demobilization with any required tow, anchor 
handling or supply vessels to be supplied by and at the 
cost of Company, together with the costs of fuel for such 




“Contractor Group” means the Contractor, its Subcontractors, its and their 
Affiliates, its and their respective, directors, officers, 
employees (including agency personnel and consultants) 
and invitees, and the Drilling Unit and the legal and 
beneficial owners thereof, but does not include any 
member of the Company Group. 
 
“Contractor Group Equipment” means the Drilling Unit and all equipment, materials, tools, 
spare parts and other items (including those specified in 
Schedules 1, 2, and 3) owned, hired or leased by 
Contractor for use in connection with the Contract. 
 
“Contractor Group Personnel” means the directors, officers, employees, agents, 
consultants and invitees of the Contractor Group. The 
Contractor Group Personnel shall include (but not be 
limited to) the personnel listed in Schedule 4. 
 
“Contractor’s Representative” means the representative of the Contractor appointed 
pursuant to Section 4. 
 
“Co-Venturers” means any other entity, including but not limited to XXX , 
with whom the Company is or may be from time to time a 
party to a joint operating agreement, production sharing 
agreement, unitisation agreement, technical services 
agreement or similar agreement relating to the Area of 
Operations for which the work is being performed and the 
successors in interest of such Co-Venturer or the assignees 
of any interest of such Co-Venturer. 
 
“Daily Drilling Report” means the daily drilling report on the IADC standard form or 
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“Demobilization Point” means either (i) one (1) nautical mile from Company’s final 
Well Location in the event that another operator has 
contracted the Drilling Unit in direct continuation of this 
Contract provided there is no requirement for the Drilling 
Unit to be exported outside Nigeria for any reason 
whatsoever or (ii) if Contractor has not contracted the 
Drilling Unit with another operator in direct continuation of 
this Contract or, at Contractor’s sole discretion, Contractor 
wishes to undertake scheduled or non-scheduled 
repairs/maintenance, Special Periodic Survey or other 
Classification Survey prior to the commencement of a 
contract with another operator, the Drilling Unit is safely 
jacked-up in a sheltered water location off Port Gentil, 
Gabon or an equivalent distant location nominated by 
Contractor. 
 
“Dollars” means dollars of the United States of America. 
 
“Drilling Operations” means all drilling and ancillary operations which the 
Contractor is required to carry out to drill (and, as the case 
may be, complete, sidetrack, suspend and/or abandon) in 
strict conformity with the Drilling Programme and this 
Contract. 
 
“Drilling Programme” means the drilling programme(s) to be delivered by the 
Company to the Contractor pursuant to Section 5.2. 
 
“Drilling Unit” means the XXX drilling unit complete with all spare parts, 
ancillary equipment, tools, materials and services and as 
further specified in Schedule 1a (Equipment List) but 
excluding Company Group Equipment. 
 
“Dry Tow Offload Location” means dry tow vessel discharge point in Malabo, 
Equatorial Guinea, or as mutually agreed. 
 
“Firm Term” means the Operational Period between the 
Commencement Date and the Completion Date pursuant 
to the provisions of Section 2.2 and Section 2.3. 
 
“Government” means the government and governmental authorities 
having jurisdiction over the Area of Operations. 
 
“HSE Policy” means the health, safety and environmental policy 
comprising Schedule 7. 
 
“IADC” means the International Association of Drilling Contractors. 
 
“Intellectual Property” means any patent, copyright, proprietary right, trademark, 
know-how, process, invention, and any other form of 
discovery (whether or not patentable or in any other way 
registrable) made by any person or entity. 
 
“Mobilisation Point” means the shipyard in Singapore where the Drilling Unit is 
being reactivated and/or prepared for this Contract. 
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“Operational Period” means the period from the Commencement Date to the 
Completion Date or, if earlier, the date on which this 
Contract is terminated for any reason. 
 
“Party” or “Parties” means the Company and/or the Contractor as the context 
so requires. 
 
“Subcontractors” means those parties and their contractors of any tier to 
whom the Contractor has subcontracted any part of its 
obligations under this Contract. 
 
“Supply Base” means the Company’s supply base in Port Harcourt and/or 
elsewhere as mutually agreed by the Parties. 
 
“Third Party” means any person or entity which is not a member of the 
Contractor Group, Contractor Group Personnel, Company 
Group and/or the Company Group Personnel. 
 
“Scheduled Earliest 
Mobilisation Date” means March 1st, 2014 which shall be the earliest date on 
which the Contractor is required to initiate mobilisation of 
the Drilling Unit from the Mobilization Point. 
 
“Scheduled Latest 
Mobilization Date” means June 15th 2014 which shall be the latest date on 
which the Contractor is required to initiate mobilisation of 
the Drilling Unit from the Mobilization Point. 
 
“Variation” means the addition to, the deduction from, or any other 
way of varying the Contract in accordance with Section 25. 
 
“VAT” means any taxes in the nature of value added tax, goods 
and services tax or sales tax. 
 
"Well" means a Well to be drilled, completed, side-tracked, 
tested, suspended, re-entered and/or abandoned in 
accordance with the Drilling Programme and/or directives 
of Company. A Well drilled hereunder which is re-spudded 
or sidetracked for any reason shall be deemed to be one 
well. 
 
“Well Location” means the location(s) of the Well. 
 
“Working Day” means a day on which the clearing banks are open for 
business in both London and Nigeria. 
 
1.2. The Schedules referred to in this Contract form an integral part of this Contract. In the 
event of any conflict between a Schedule and the main body of this Contract, the latter 
shall prevail. In the event of any conflict between the Schedules, the order of 
precedence shall be: 1st- Schedule 7, 2nd- Schedule 6, 3rd – Schedule 1, 4th - Schedule 2, 
5th- Schedule 3, 6th- Schedule 5, 7th- Schedule 4, 8th- Schedule 8 and 9th – Schedule 9. 
 
1.3. The index and any headings used in this Contract are inserted for convenient reference 
only and shall be ignored in construing the meaning of any of the provisions of this 
Contract. 
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1.4. Where the sense requires, words denoting the singular only shall also include the plural 
and vice versa. References to persons shall include any company, firm, partnership, 
joint venture, association, body corporate or individual. Reference to any gender shall 
include a reference to all other genders. 
 
1.5. References to statutory provisions shall be construed as references to those provisions 
in effect at the date of this Contract, as respectively amended or re-enacted or as their 
application is modified by other provisions (whether before or after the date hereof) from 
time to time and shall include references to any provisions to which there are re- 
enactments (whether with or without modification). 
 
 
2. COMMENCEMENT, DURATION AND TERM 
 
2.1 This Contract will be effective on and from the date hereof and will, unless earlier 
terminated pursuant to Section 21, continue in force until the Completion Date. 
 
2.2 The Firm Term of the Contract shall begin on the Commencement Date and except as 
set forth hereafter continue consecutively for a nine hundred and twelve (912) day firm 
period in accordance with the terms of the Contract to include the period required to 
demobilise the Drilling Unit and to off-load Company Group Equipment from the Drilling 
Unit. 
 
2.3 Company shall have the right to extend the Firm Term in direct continuation by an 
additional two (2) terms of three hundred and sixty five (365) days each subject to the 
Parties agreement on applicable terms and conditions. 
 
Company shall notify Contractor of its intent to extend the Firm Term by giving 
Contractor written notice on or before one hundred and twenty (120) days before the 
end of the Firm Term or each extension period. 
 
Notwithstanding the Firm Term, the Parties agree that such Firm Term shall be 
extended, and any additional term as described above shall be extended to allow 
completion of the Work on the last Well commenced during the Firm Term or any 
additional term, if applicable, provided that Company may not, without Contractor's 
consent, which shall not be unreasonably denied, commence a new Well during the final 
thirty (30) days of the Firm Term, or additional term (if applicable) if such new Well is not 
expected (based on a reasonable P50 estimate) to be completed within sixty (60) days 
after the end of the Firm Term, or additional term (if applicable). Should Contractor 
withhold its consent to commencement of a new Well during the last thirty (30) days of 
the Firm Term, or additional term (if applicable), then the Contract will expire upon 
completion of the last Well completed prior to such proposed Well, but in no event more 
than thirty (30) days prior to the expiration of the Firm Term. 
 
3. MOBILISATION AND DEMOBILISATION 
 
3.1 Initial Mobilisation 
 
(a) Contractor shall be responsible for mobilisation of the Drilling Unit from the 
Mobilisation Point to the Dry Tow Offload Location, together with other Contractor 
Group Equipment and the Contractor Group Personnel. Company shall be 
responsible for providing tow vessels from the Dry Tow Offload Location to the 
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(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this Section 3.1, the Company shall 
have no obligation: 
 
(i) to accept the Drilling Unit prior to or on the Commencement Date in the 
event there is any outstanding deficiency which has been outlined in the 
Schedule 10 and is still not closed out unless otherwise mutually agreed; 
or 
 
(ii) unless otherwise specified herein, to make any payments with respect to 
the Contractor’s mobilisation of the Drilling Unit pursuant to the provisions 
of this Section 3.1 until the Commencement Date 
 
(c) Time required to obtain/renew temporary importation permit, and obtain any 
resulting importation, exportation and/or customs clearance (“TIP process”) shall 
be payable as follows: 
 
(i) If the TIP process occurs prior to the Commencement Date, it shall be 
payable at fifty percent (50%) of the Operating Rate up to a maximum of 
five (5) days from commencement of the TIP process. Thereafter, rate 
shall be zero. Company shall facilitate towing of the Drilling Unit as 
provided in Schedule 6. 
 
(ii) If at anytime during the Firm Term of the Contract or any extensions 
thereof, the Drilling Unit is required by Applicable Law or orders of the 
corresponding Nigerian Government Authorities to leave the country, the 
TIP process shall be payable at fifty percent (50%) of the Operating Rate 
up to a maximum of twenty-one (21) days from commencement of the TIP 
process. 
 
For purposes of this Section, Nigerian Government Authorities shall be defined 
as any ministry, body, department, agency or instrumentality, such as state- 
owned or state controlled company or statutory corporation thereof of the 
government of Nigeria. 
 
 
In the event the TIP process lasts longer than sixty (60) days, the Company shall 
have the right to terminate the Contract without incurring any liability whatsoever 
or additional costs up to the date of termination for demobilization of the Drilling 
Unit. 
 
(d) Following the effective date of this Contract, the Contractor shall at regular 
intervals give notice to the Company of the estimated date of availability of the 
Drilling Unit. 
 
(e) The Party responsible for the supply of anchor handling and/or towing vessels 
and crews for the mobilisation of the Drilling Unit, other Contractor Group 
Equipment and the Contractor Group Personnel to the first Well Location and any 
subsequent Well Locations is specified in Schedule 3. 
 
(f) During the tow of the Drilling Unit from the Mobilisation Point, the Contractor shall 
keep the Company full informed of its location and estimated date of arrival at the 
first Well Location. 
 
3.2 Demobilisation From Well Location 
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The Company shall be responsible for demobilisation of the Drilling Unit from Company’s 
final Well Location in accordance with the Contract. Upon demobilisation of the Drilling 
Unit to the Demobilisation Point then the responsibility of the Company ceases and the 
Contractor responsibilities are as specified in Schedule 3 (Services 2). 
 
4. APPOINTMENT OF CONTRACTOR AND COMPANY REPRESENTATIVES 
 
4.1 Contractor’s Representatives 
 
(a) The Contractor shall: 
 
(i) no later than the Commencement Date, designate an individual as its 
Representative onboard the Drilling Unit at all times during the Contract; 
 
(ii) authorise such Representative to direct and control the Contractor’s 
performance of the Drilling Operations and to discuss and agree with the 
Company all matters which relate thereto; and 
 
(iii) not remove or replace such Representative without the prior written 
consent of the Company which shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
 
For the avoidance of doubt, it is expressly acknowledged that the Contractor’s 
Representative on board the Drilling Unit shall not have authority to agree to any 
amendment or variation of any of the terms or provisions of this Contract or to 
waive any of the rights, duties or liabilities of the Parties and no action of the 
Contractor’s Representative shall have any such effect. 
 
(b) The Contractor shall in addition: 
 
(i) designate a Representative onshore who shall be in overall charge of the 
Contractor’s performance of its obligations under this Contract 
(ii) authorise such Representative to act for and bind the Contractor in all 
matters relating to the Contractor’s performance of its obligations 
hereunder; 
 
(iii) notify the name of such Representative to the Company at least five (5) 
days prior to the Commencement Date; and 
 
(iv) not remove or replace such Representative without the prior written 
consent of the Company which shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
 
For the avoidance of doubt, it is expressly acknowledged that the Contractor’s 
Representative shall not have authority to agree to any amendment or variation 
of any of the terms or provisions of this Contract or to waive any of the rights, 
duties or liabilities of the Parties and no action of the Contractor’s Representative 
shall have any such effect. 
 
4.2 Company’s Representative 
 
(a) The Company shall maintain a Representative onboard the Drilling Unit to 
represent the Company and to liaise with the Contractor on all day to day matters 
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(b) For the avoidance of doubt, it is expressly acknowledged that the Company’s 
Representative on board the Drilling Unit shall not have the authority to agree to 
any amendment or variation of any of the terms or provisions of this Contract or 
to waive any of the rights, duties or liabilities of the Parties and no action of the 
Company’s Representative shall have any such effect. 
 
(c) The presence of the Company’s Representative onboard the Drilling Unit shall 
not relieve the Contractor from any of its obligations and liabilities under this 
Contract. 
 
(d) The Company shall notify the name of such Representative to the Contractor not 
later than the Commencement Date. Any subsequent changes shall be notified 
by the Company to the Contractor as soon as reasonably practicable. 
 
5. DRILLING OPERATIONS 
 
5.1. Provision of Drilling Unit, other Contractor Group Equipment and Contractor 
Group Personnel 
 
(a) The Contractor shall furnish the Drilling Unit together with other equipment, 
materials, supplies and services detailed in Schedules 1 to 3 and the personnel 
detailed in Schedule 4 in order to be able to carry out the Drilling Operations in 
accordance with the Drilling Programme and this Contract. 
 
(b) The Contractor shall provide rig move procedures and subject to Company’s 
provision of a seabed survey in accordance with Sections 5.2 and 9.3, such 
procedures will be submitted to the Company for approval at least five (5) days 
prior to the Drilling Unit’s arrival to the Dry Tow Offload Location. 
 
5.2. Provision of Drilling Programme 
 
The Company shall deliver the Drilling Programme for the first Well to the Contractor for 
the Well Location in good time and Company shall endeavour to provide same no less 
than fourteen (14) days prior to the Commencement Date. Drilling Programmes for 
subsequent Wells shall be delivered to the Contractor as soon as reasonably practical. 
 
The Company shall have the right to make changes to the Drilling Programme at any 
time hereunder on written notice given to the Contractor to that effect. 
 
5.3. Commencement of Drilling Operations 
 
The Contractor shall commence the Drilling Operations promptly after the 
Commencement Date. 
 
5.4. Conduct of Drilling Operations 
 
The Contractor shall carry out the Drilling Operations on a twenty-four (24) hour per day, 
seven (7) day per week basis and, except as otherwise directed by the Company, in 
strict conformity with the Drilling Programme and this Contract. 
 
5.5. Compliance with Drilling Programme 
 
Without prejudice to the generality of Section 5.4, the Contractor shall or shall assist 
Company’s other contractors who shall: 
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(a) Mud Programme 
 
(i) follow the mud programme specified by the Company and shall account to 
the Company for all mud fluids as directed by the Company; and 
 
(ii) ensure that all drilling fluid used by the Contractor shall comply with the 
specifications therefor which are contained in the Drilling Programme. 
 
(b) Casing and Drilling Programmes 
 
(i) drill the Well to the depth and set casing of the size and at the depths as 
specified in the Drilling Programme; and 
 
(ii) test all strings of casing by such methods and in such manner as the 
Company may require. 
 
(c) Coring (if applicable) 
 
(i) core between such depths as may be required by the Company and shall 
deliver samples of all cores to such address or other location as the 
Company’s Representative shall designate for such purpose; and 
 
(ii) take all necessary precautions to ensure that only the Company and/or 
any authorised representatives of the Company shall be allowed access 
to any such cores or core data. 
 
(d) Measurement of Well Depth 
 
(i) keep accurate measurements and records of all formations encountered 
during the conduct of the Drilling Operations and shall prepare reports 
and records relating thereto as requested by the Company or its 
authorised representatives from time to time; and 
 
(ii) notify the Company immediately if it shall encounter a formation which 
reasonably appears to be oil or gas bearing and the Contractor shall 
thereupon: 
 
(a) suspend Drilling Operations for such period as the Company may 
require to permit the Company to examine such formation; and 
 
(b) save and prepare clean samples of the formations drilled. 
 
(e) Production Testing (if applicable) 
 
(i) perform open hole, cased hole, drill stem or production tests or services 
as required by the Company from time to time; and 
 
(ii) ensure that all such tests are carried out in accordance with generally 
accepted international petroleum industry methods and practices. 
 
(f) Course of Well 
 
(i) use all reasonable endeavours to drill the Well without deviating from the 
limits specified by the Company; 
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(ii) measure any deviations from the vertical during the course of such drilling 
and provide the Company with all such measurements and other data 
derived therefrom or relating thereto; and 
 
(iii) when the measurements carried out by the Contractor pursuant to Section 
5.5(f) (ii) show a deviation from the vertical which is greater than that 
which is acceptable to the Company, upon receipt of the Company’s 
instructions to that effect, promptly redrill the hole to a deviation that is 




(i) ensure that all threads on downhole equipment utilised by the Contractor 
are protected by steel thread protectors; and 
 
(ii) keep thread protectors on all casing until it is run and grease the threads 
as it is made up with a pipe lubricant acceptable to the Company; and 
 
(iii) in order to reduce the risk of deterioration of casing the Contractor shall, if 
required by the Company, use casing wear protectors on the drill pipes. 
 
(h) Fishing Tools 
 
(i) provide all necessary fishing tools, accessories and spare parts as listed 
in schedule 1a which are required to effect the recovery of its downhole 
equipment; and 
 
(ii) unless otherwise directed by the Company, not permit the running of any 
downhole tool in the Well unless suitable downhole fishing tools, as 
determined by the Company, are used. 
 
(i) Completion, Suspension or Abandonment of Well 
 
(i) if the Company elects to complete the Well as a future producing well, 
complete the Well as directed by the Company, including running casing 
and liner and installing permanent or temporary wellheads; 
 
(ii) if the Company elects to suspend the Well, suspend the Well as directed 
by the Company including running a corrosion cap on top of the Well on 
the seabed; and 
 
(iii) if the Company elects to abandon the Well, upon the request of the 
Company promptly remove from the Well and return to the Company 
forthwith all recoverable casing and tubing, and plug and abandon such 
Well in compliance with the Company’s directions and Applicable Law. 
 
5.6 Daily Drilling Report 
 
The Contractor shall prepare and furnish to the Company the Daily Drilling Report. Each 
Daily Drilling Report shall contain a complete and accurate report of the day's 
operations, showing a breakdown of the rates applied to the nearest half (½) hour, shall 
be signed by the Contractor’s Representative on board the Drilling Unit, and shall be 
delivered to the Company’s Representative as soon as possible after midnight of the day 
to which it relates (but in any event no later than 6 a.m. on the following day) for 
approval and countersignature on behalf of the Company. Any differences of opinion 
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between the Contractor's and the Company's Representatives regarding matters 
contained in any Daily Drilling Report shall be noted thereon. The Daily Drilling Report 
(including notes if any) shall be emailed or faxed to the Company's UK offices/ Lagos 
Offices before 7 a.m. (Lagos, Nigeria, time) on the following day by the Contractor. 
 




(a) The Contractor represents that: 
 
(i) the Drilling Unit is capable of being moved to and from the Well Locations 
specified by the Company and of drilling to a maximum depth of 25,000ft 
in a water depth range of 30 – 350ft and is in every respect capable and 
suitable for the conduct of the Contract; 
 
(ii) the Drilling Unit is constructed pursuant to the classification stated in 
Schedule 1a and, together with its ancillary equipment and appurtenances 
shall be maintained in such class throughout the term of this Contract; 
 
(iii) The Drilling Unit is undergoing a reactivation, and Contractor does not 
have any knowledge of any damage or defects which will or might 
reasonably be expected to necessitate repairs to the Drilling Unit which 
would interrupt or delay Drilling Operations within the term of this 
Contract; 
 
(iv) the Drilling Unit and all other Contractor Group Equipment shall be in 
good working order and, subject to the design limitations of the Drilling 
Unit, Contractor’s operating procedures, and normal wear and tear, the 
equipment shall perform within manufacturers’ specifications. 
 
6.2. Inspection of Drilling Unit and other Contractor Group Equipment 
 
(a) Inspection requirements for drill pipe, drill collars, and other down hole tools 
 
(i) The Contractor shall carry out a complete inspection of all drill pipe, 
HWDP and drill collars that are due for inspection prior to the 
Commencement Date, and thereafter per the required/agreed inspection 
program, to the standard of DS1 Cat 3. Any required repairs shall be at 
Contractor’s sole cost. 
 
(ii) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 6.2(a)(i), the Contractor shall 
carry out further such inspections of all drill collars, downhole equipment 
regularly in use, and drill pipe at the request of the Company should 
repeated failures (repeated meaning “more than once”) with such 
equipment arise in the course of the Contract. Costs of such inspection 
will be at the sole cost of the Contractor. 
 
(iii) Except as otherwise directed by the Company, all inspections shall 
include but not be limited to the following tests: 
 
(aa) Magnetic particle inspection; 
 
(bb) Ultrasonic inspection; 
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(cc) Inside and outside optical inspection; 
 
(dd) Gauging of the outside diameter; 
 
(ee) Drill pipe tool joint threads and general inspection; and 
 
(ff) Drill collars tool joint general inspection and full length magnetic 
particle inspection. 
 
(iv) The result of all inspections shall be made available to the Company and 
the DS1 Cat 3 inspection standard followed to accept or reject pipe within 
the criteria that only new or premium class pipe shall be used. 
 
(b) Hard Banded Drill Pipe 
 
5” drill pipe or other size as mutually agreed will be supplied with EZ700 or 
Armacor M hardbanding or equivalent. 
 
(c) Inspection by Company 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 6.2(a)(i), the Company shall have the 
right, at its cost, to inspect the Drilling Unit and/or the Contractor Group 
Equipment at any time, whether prior to the Commencement Date or after, to 
ensure that same conform to the requirements of this Contract. Inspections 
conducted prior to the Commencement Date shall be subject, if applicable, to 
prior approval and consent of the current operator to whom the Drilling Unit is 
contracted to, provided Contractor shall exercise endeavours to procure such 
approval/consent. If applicable, this will include the acceptance tests detailed in 
Schedule 1b. Inspection conducted after the Commencement Date shall be 
conducted at the Standby Rate and at the sole cost and expense of Company 
 
Contractor shall correct at its sole cost and expense all deficiencies outlined in 
Schedule 10 prior to the Commencement Date to Company’s reasonable 
satisfaction. 
 
In addition to the repairs outlined in Schedule 10, Company and Contractor shall 
mutually agree on a work scope and forward plan to rectify any non-conformity 
under the Contract before or after the Commencement Date if further deficiencies 
are identified. If any further deficiencies identified by the Parties and not included 
in Schedule 10, prevent or substantially delay or interrupt Drilling Operations, the 
Contractor will rectify them at its sole cost. 
 
Any inspections carried on by Company per this Section 6.2 shall not relieve the 
Contractor of any of its representations or obligations set forth elsewhere in this 
Contract. 
 
6.3. Maintenance of Drilling Unit and Contractor Group Equipment 
 
(a) The Contractor shall ensure that the Drilling Unit and all other items of the 
Contractor Group Equipment are properly maintained and repaired as necessary 
prior to the Commencement Date and throughout the term of the Contract, in 
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Upon the Commencement Date, the Drilling Unit and all equipment shall be in 
good working order per applicable industry standards and shall comply with the 
design parameter and manufacturer’s specifications of the Drilling Unit and 
equipment, operating procedures, Company’s quality requirements and as 





(b) The status of the Contractor’s maintenance programme shall be made available 
on a regular basis to the Company’s Representative upon request. Such status 
shall highlight, inter-alia, all maintenance performed during the term of the 
Contract and any outstanding maintenance that was planned but which was not 
completed for any reason together with the Contractor’s plan for completing the 
same. 
 
(c) The Contractor shall carry out and commence to remedy any necessary repairs 
or replacements to the Drilling Unit and other Contractor Group Equipment 
promptly and in such a manner as to prevent or minimise any delays or 
interruptions to the Drilling Operations. 
 
(d) Without prejudice to the foregoing provisions of this Section 6.3, the Contractor 
shall provide, store and maintain at all times sufficient levels of spare parts and 
operating supplies sufficient to ensure the continuous and efficient operation of 
the Drilling Unit and of other Contractor Group Equipment. 
 
(e) The Contractor shall be responsible for arranging delivery of all spare parts and 
operating supplies from their point of origin to the Supply Base. 
 
(f) Contractor shall maintain the Drilling Unit clean per applicable prevailing 
international oil and gas industry standards during the term of the Contract to 
prevent any safety or environmental incidents from occurring or any delays to 
Company’s Drilling Operations. 
 
6.4. Company Group Equipment 
 
(a) The Contractor shall afford the Company all assistance as reasonably practicable 
at the shipyard in Singapore during rig reactivation and / or at the Dry Tow 
Offload Location the Company Group Equipment onboard the Drilling Unit. Such 
loading operations at the Dry Tow Offload Location shall be compensated and 
paid for by Company to Contractor at Zero Rate for up to two (2) days, and 
thereafter at the Standby Rate in accordance with Schedule 6 – Compensation 
Section A. Any loading during the TIP process shall be payable as follows: (i) at 
50% of Standby Rate if done within the 21 days allotted for the TIP process to be 
completed; or (ii) thereafter from day 22 up to day 60, at zero rate. 
 
(b) The Contractor shall examine the Company Group Equipment before using the 
same and shall promptly report to the Company any apparent or visible defects 
therein to allow the Company to replace the same. 
 
(c) The Contractor shall during the Drilling Operations and thereafter until such time 
as the Company Group Equipment shall have been fully off-loaded pursuant to 
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(i) properly store and protect the Company Group Equipment onboard the 
Drilling Unit; 
 
(ii) maintain the Company Group Equipment in good condition and repair, 
provided however that Contractor has the technical expertise to do so and 
the cost of any third party personnel, replacement or spare parts or 
materials reasonably and necessarily required so to maintain the same 
shall be for the Company’s account; and 
 
(iii) provide the Company with all necessary assistance for off-loading the 
Company Group Equipment from the Drilling Unit in accordance with 
Section 6.4(d). 
 
(d) Unless otherwise agreed between the Parties, on completion of the Drilling 
Operations the Contractor shall redeliver to the Company on the Drilling Unit all 
items of the Company Group Equipment in Contractor’s possession prior to the 
Completion Date. The Company Group Equipment shall be so redelivered by the 
Contractor in as good condition as when received by the Contractor, fair wear 





(a) As soon as reasonably practicable following the Commencement Date, the 
Contractor shall measure the quantity of diesel fuel then onboard the Drilling Unit 
in the presence of the Company Representative. The Contractor shall thereafter 
send to the Company its written invoice for an amount equal to the price actually 
paid by the Contractor for such fuel, as evidenced in writing by the Contractor. 
 
(b) With effect on and from the Commencement Date until the Completion Date, the 
Company shall be responsible for supplying all of the Drilling Unit’s requirements 
for diesel fuel at Company’s cost. 
 
(c) The Contractor shall purchase the inventory of diesel fuel on board the Drilling 
Unit at the Completion Date at the documented price actually paid by the 
Company for such fuel, as evidenced in writing by Company. The Contractor 
shall issue to the Company the appropriate credit note covering said purchase of 




The Contractor shall be responsible for purchasing all lubricants and greases required 
by the Drilling Unit and by the Contractor Group Equipment. 
 
6.7. Catering Services 
 
The Contractor shall provide on board the Drilling Unit full catering, laundry and 
recreational facilities in accordance with the requirements set out in Schedule 8. 
 
6.8. Medical Facilities 
 
The Contractor shall provide on board the Drilling Unit full medical facilities in 















The Contractor represents that the Contractor Group Personnel, provided in accordance 
with Schedule 4, are suitably and properly qualified, trained, competent and experienced 
in all respects to properly perform the duties which will be assigned to them by the 
Contractor to undertake Contractor’s obligations under the Contract, including, but not 
limited, to any required certification, work or safety permits. If required by the Company, 
the Contractor shall verify relevant qualifications of the Contractor Group Personnel. 
 
7.2. Key Personnel 
 
Persons designated as Key Personnel in Schedule 4 shall be fluent in the English 
language, both oral and written, and shall be capable of communicating effectively with 
all other Contractor Group Personnel and with the Company’s representatives. The CV’s 
of all proposed Key Personnel shall be submitted to Company at least seven (7) days 
prior to the Commencement Date. The Company shall have the right to object to, in 
writing, and require the Contractor to replace forthwith at Contractor’s cost and expense 
any such proposed Key Personnel who, in Company’s reasonable opinion, are not 
suitable. Key Personnel shall not be replaced without the prior written consent of the 
Company which shall not be unreasonably withheld or delayed. Personnel approval or 
request for removal by the Company shall not relieve the Contractor from its obligations 
herein. 
 
7.3. Good Order and Discipline 
 
(a) In the performance of the Contract the Contractor shall maintain strict discipline 
and good order among the Contractor Group Personnel. 
 
(b) The Contractor shall ensure that no alcohol, drugs or other prohibited substances 
shall be taken to or consumed on the Drilling Unit or on the flight to/from the 
Drilling Unit. 
 
7.4. Replacement of Contractor Group Personnel 
 
The Company shall have the right at any time to object to, in writing, and to require the 
Contractor to remove forthwith at its own cost and expense any Contractor Group 
Personnel who, in the reasonable opinion of the Company, is: 
 
(a) proven to be incompetent or negligent in the performance of their duties; or 
 
(b) proven not to be suitable to safely and efficiently carry out the duties to which 
that person may be assigned; or 
 
(c) engaged in activities which are contrary or detrimental to the interests of the 
Company; or 
 
(d) not conforming with the relevant safety procedures described in Schedule 7. 
 
7.5. Medical Fitness 
 
(a) The Contractor shall ensure that all of the Contractor Group Personnel shall have 
had a regular medical examination to recognized oilfield standards, prior to 
commencement of the Drilling Operations and that they are physically and 
mentally fit to provide the Work herein. 
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(b) A registered medical practitioner shall conduct all such medical examinations in 
accordance with accepted international medical standards and the minimum 
requirements set out in Schedule 8. Should the Contractor fail to have complied 
with Schedule 8 and any Contractor Group Personnel require emergency, 
unscheduled evacuation from the offshore facility for medical treatment as a 
result of this failure, the Contractor shall, in addition to any other obligation or 
liability it may have to the Company at law or hereunder (and without limitation to 
the generality of the provisions of Section 13), reimburse the Company any 
direct, documented costs incurred by the Company arising out of or in connection 
with such evacuation. 
 
(c) On request from the Company, the Contractor shall promptly provide the 
Company with a copy of all medical certificates relating to such personnel, where 




7.6. Survival and Training Courses 
 
(a) Pursuant to Schedule 7, the Contractor shall ensure that all of the Contractor 
Group Personnel performing services hereunder shall have attended all survival, 
safety and operational (including without limitation with respect to well control) 
training courses required by Applicable Law in the Area of Operations and as is 
generally consistent with international petroleum industry practice. Any such 
training of Contractor Group Personnel required by Company which exceeds the 
above criteria shall be at the cost of Company. 
 
(b) The Contractor shall, if requested, forthwith produce certificates of completion or 
attendance of any training courses for the Company's inspection. 
 
7.7 Transportation of Contractor Group Personnel 
 
The Contractor shall provide or procure transportation for the Contractor Group 
Personnel between their home base and the Air Base. 
 
7.8 Medivac of Contractor Group Personnel 
 
The Company shall be responsible for the medical evacuation of Contractor Group 
Personnel from the Drilling Unit to the Air Base or other suitable onshore location. The 
Contractor shall be responsible for the medical evacuation of same therefrom to any 
other location for medical treatment as required. Contractor shall have in place during 
the term of this Contract suitable arrangements/coverage to carry out such medical 
emergency evacuation. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Company may, subject to 
the agreement of the Contractor’s Representative onshore, make its own arrangements 
to evacuate any Contractor Group Personnel from the Air Base (or other suitable 
onshore) to another location for medical treatment. The cost of such medical evacuation 
arranged by the Company shall be reimbursed by the Contractor at documented cost. 
Upon request from the Company, the Contractor shall provide evidence of Medivac 
coverage. 
 
8. GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CONTRACTOR 
 
8.1. Standard of Performance 
 
The Contractor represents that it shall perform the Contract: 
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(i) in a good, diligent, safe and workmanlike manner and with due regard to 
the protection of the environment; 
 
(ii) in accordance with good international oilfield drilling and safety practices 
including, without limitation, the standards from time to time of the API and 
IADC; and 
 
(iii) with that degree of skill, care and diligence ordinarily exercised by skilled 
and experienced drilling contractors engaged in similar operations in the 






8.2. Compliance with Instructions 
 
Subject to the Contractor’s rights and responsibilities as an independent contractor 
pursuant to Section 29, the Contractor shall comply with all instructions and directions 
issued by or on behalf of the Company on matters relating to the Drilling Operations, 
provided such instructions are not in conflict with Applicable Law and/or the Contractor's 
health, safety and environmental policy. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, if Contractor’s health, safety and environmental policy is less 
stringent than Company’s instructions and directions, then Contractor shall comply with 
such instructions and directions. 
 
8.3. Health, Safety and the Environment 
 
(a) The Contractor represents that: 
 
(i) as at the date of this Contract it has, and shall at all times during the term 
of this Contract maintain, a clear and comprehensive health (including 
substance abuse), safety and environmental policy acceptable to the 
Company; 
 
(ii) it shall provide the Company with a copy of its health, safety and 
environmental policy promptly after the effective date of this Contract and 
further, that it shall forthwith make and implement any changes thereto 
which are mutually agreed between the Parties; and 
 
(b) it shall at all times observe and comply with and shall ensure that the Contractor 
Group Personnel shall be made aware of, observe and comply with the terms of 
the HSE Policy. The Company shall have the right to carry out ad hoc audits of 
the Contractor’s compliance with the provisions of this Section 8.3. The 
Contractor shall forthwith rectify at its sole cost any deficiencies which are notified 
to the Contractor by the Company following any such audit within the time frame 
agreed to by the Parties. 
 
8.4. Reporting of Accidents 
 
(a) The Contractor shall notify the Company forthwith of any accidents or incidents 
resulting in personal injury to or the death of any person or damage to any 
property arising out of or as a consequence of the Drilling Operations. 
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(b) The Contractor shall promptly thereafter take all necessary remedial action in 
respect of any such accident or incident and shall prepare such reports thereon 
as may be required by Applicable Law or as may be required by the Company 
from time to time. 
 
8.5. Inspections, Measurements and Reports 
 
(a) The Contractor shall at all times permit the Company and its authorised 
employees and representatives to inspect the performance or results of any Well 
and of all measurements and tests made in connection with such part of the 
Contract. 
 
(b) The Contractor shall keep accurate measurements and records relating to the 
Drilling Operations including, but not limited to penetration rate, rotary torque, 
rotary RPM, pump pressure and strokes for each mud pump and hook load and 
shall prepare and furnish copies thereof to the Company on a daily basis. 
 
(c) The Contractor shall furnish the Company's designated representatives with the 
Daily Drilling Report and any other relevant information requested by the 
Company in accordance with Section 5.6. 
 
8.6. Import – Export 
 
(a) Not used 
 
(b) The Contractor shall use every option available including the temporary import 
regime to import and maintain the Drilling Unit with full exemption from import 
duties and/or taxes and in doing so may require assistance from the Company. 
Through no fault of its own, should the Contractor be assessed and required to 
pay import duties and/or taxes on the import of the Drilling Unit, the Company 
shall reimburse the Contractor in full for any such duties and/or taxes incurred. 
Company will accept no costs, other than documented Temporary Importation 
charges, for any delays associated with importation of the Drilling Unit into 
Nigeria and exportation of the Drilling Unit from Nigeria. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, if the Drilling Unit is delayed or operations are interrupted whilst on hire 
to Company due to Temporary Import problems which are beyond Contractor's 
control Company shall compensate Contractor at the Standby Rate in 
accordance with Schedule 6 – Compensation Section A for any such delay or 
interruption, provided Contractor has demonstrated that all reasonable steps 
within its control have been taken. 
 
(c) The Company will provide all such assistance as the Contractor may reasonably 
require in connection with the performance of the Contractor’s obligations under 
Section 8.6(a) and Section 8.6(b). 
 
(d) The Contractor shall promptly provide the Company with a complete set of all 
relevant documentation which the Contractor shall obtain pursuant to Sections 
8.6(a) and 8.6(b), together with all such other related information or 
documentation as the Company shall require. 
 
8.7. Blow-out and Fire Hazard 
 
(a) The Contractor shall exercise all possible due diligence and care to prevent fire, 
explosion and blowouts. The Contractor shall have and maintain well control and 
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blow-out prevention equipment in accordance to Applicable Law, Original 
Equipment Manufacturer Certificate of Compliance and Contractor’s procedures 
(“Agreed Maintenance”). If requested, the Contractor shall provide the Company 
with copies of such procedures. 
 
(b) The Contractor shall use blow-out prevention equipment which complies with the 
Agreed Maintenance. Said blow-out prevention equipment shall be configured as 
mutually agreed between Company and Contractor. Contractor shall only utilize 
original equipment manufacturers spare parts for blow-out prevention equipment. 
 
(c) The Contractor shall at all times maintain well control and blow-out prevention 
equipment in good condition per the Agreed Maintenance. 
 
(d) The Contractor shall examine and test all blow-out prevention equipment per the 
Agreed Maintenance. Test results shall be noted on the Daily Drilling Report. 
 
(e) Subject to Section 8.7(f) below, in the event of blow-out or loss of control, the 
Contractor shall take all measures necessary to protect the Well and to bring the 
Well under control. 
 
(f) Subject always to Contractor’s underwriters approval and to the offshore 
installation manager’s overall responsibility for the safety of the Drilling Unit and 
all personnel onboard, the Company shall have the right exercisable at any time 
to direct the conduct of blow-out or loss of control operations and to use the 
Contractor Group Equipment and Contractor Group Personnel during such times 
to bring the Well under control. The person designated as offshore installation 




The Contractor undertakes that except for fluids and cuttings originating from any Well 
which have been authorised by the Company and are allowable under Applicable Law 
for discharge to the sea, nothing shall be dumped, jettisoned, discharged, spilled or 
intentionally dropped from the Drilling Unit. 
 
8.9. Removal of Wreck 
 
(a) If the Drilling Unit or any other item of the Contractor Group Equipment becomes 
stranded, capsizes, sinks or becomes a wreck or obstruction to navigation, the 
Contractor shall at its own cost promptly raise and remove the same if required 
by Applicable Law or if the wreckage/debris interferes with Company or its Co- 
Venturer’s operations. 
 
(b) The fact that the Drilling Unit or any other item of the Contractor Group 
Equipment is insured or shall have been declared an actual, constructive, 
compromised or arranged total loss shall not relieve the Contractor from any of its 
obligations and responsibilities under this Contract. 
 
8.10 Transportation of Contractor’s Equipment 
 
(a) The Contractor shall comply with all the Company’s requirements regarding 
delivery of the Contractor Group Equipment to the Supply Base. The Company’s 










Contract Number: C-2770 
 
 
(i) the Contractor shall ensure that the Contractor Group Equipment 
delivered to the Supply Base is correctly packaged, labelled and 
documented in accordance with all Applicable Law and the requirements 
of the Company; and 
 
(ii) the Contractor shall ensure that the Contractor Group Equipment is 
suitably packed and protected for onward shipment in suitable classified 
and certified containers complete with fully certified lifting equipment in 
accordance with all Applicable Law. 
 
(iii) Contractor and Company shall respectively ensure that Contractor’s 
equipment and Company’s equipment is pre-slung in accordance with 
relevant procedures and standards of Contractor’s management system 
and Company’s requirements. 
 
(b) If any of the Contractor Group Equipment does not comply with Section 8.10(a), 
the Company shall not accept delivery of such Contractor Group Equipment, and 
shall be considered as not delivered for purposes of this Contract. 
 
(c) The Contractor shall unload and load the Contractor Group Equipment and the 
Company Group Equipment at the Drilling Unit from and to any transport 
provided by the Company. The Contractor shall ensure all such Contractor Group 
Equipment and the Company Group Equipment is handled in a proper and safe 
manner with particular reference to dangerous or hazardous material. 
 
8.11 Blow Out Prevention Equipment 
 
The Contractor represents that, when the Well is being drilled, deepened, serviced, 
worked-over, completed and/or re-conditioned: 
 
(a) blow-out preventer(s) of standard make will, when in accordance with the Agreed 
Maintenance requirements and as per best oilfield practices, be set on surface 
casing, or the well-head and installed and tested in accordance with usual 
practice; and 
 
(b) it will comply with all American Petroleum Institute (“API”) regulations and 
requirements in respect of fitting storm chokes and other equipment to minimise 
damage or pollution. 
 
8.12 Predrill Planning and Preparatory Work 
 
Prior to the Commencement Date, the Contractor shall assist the Company in the 
following predrill planning and preparatory work: 
 
(a) assistance in preparation of any permit applications to the regulatory authorities; 
 
(b) assistance in preparation of any notifications required to regulatory authorities; 
 
(c) assistance in preparation of the bridging documents to cover operations and 
emergency procedures; 
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(e) assistance in training of key operations personnel for any abnormal or 
specialised activities; 
 
(f) implementation of Drilling Unit modifications as mutually agreed and 
pressure/function testing of well control equipment; 
 
(g) any work required to address deficiencies of the Drilling Unit in accordance with 
the Contract identified in inspections performed by the Company and/or any 
independent survey teams; 
 
(h) assistance in completing any Company or independent environmental audit of 
the Drilling Unit; 
 
(i) assistance in preparation of an environmental awareness training package in 
accordance with the Company’s Environmental Management System (EMS). An 
environmental awareness training package may have to be completed by all 
offshore based personnel and key operations personnel. 
 
9. GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMPANY 
 
9.1 Company Group Personnel and Company Group Equipment 
 
The Company shall provide the personnel, equipment, materials, supplies and services 
detailed in Schedule 3. 
 
9.2 Company to Obtain Licences and Approvals 
 
(a) The Company shall at its own cost obtain all necessary licences and 
authorisations required to be obtained by the Company to permit the 
performance by the Contractor of the Drilling Operations at the Well Location. 
 
(b) The Company shall advise the Contractor of any restrictions, conditions or 
limitations contained in any such licences or authorisations which will affect the 
free right of entry to and/or exit from the Well Location and/or the conduct of the 
Drilling Operations. 
 
Any delays caused by Company’s failure to obtain such licences or authorisations which 
will affect the free right of entry to and/or exit from the Well Location and/or the conduct 
of the Drilling Operations shall be compensated and paid for by Company to Contractor 
at the Standby Rate in accordance with Schedule 6 – Compensation Section A. 
 
9.3 Seabed Survey 
 
Company has the obligation to provide Well Locations that are level, free of obstacles or 
obstructions, and capable of supporting the Drilling Unit. Without prejudice to the 
provisions of Section 9.2, the Company shall obtain seabed survey report and soil data 
report in respect of the Well Locations prior to the commencement of Drilling Operations 
at such locations and shall make the results of such survey available to the Contractor 
pursuant to Clause 5.2 no later than 2 (two) weeks prior to the commencement of the 
Drilling Operations. In the event that additional surveys are required by Contractor's 
underwriters, the same shall be provided by Company at the cost of Company. All 
expenses associated with clearing, preparing or improvements to the seabed, including, 
without limitation, gravel or rock dumping and sandbagging, and repositioning the Drilling 
Unit at any location shall be for Company's account and Standby Rate shall apply during 
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such times. Standby Rate shall also apply in the event the Well Location is not ready for 
the Drilling Unit to safely position and jack and Contractor has to wait while the location 
is being prepared or an alternative location is being selected. In the event that the 
Drilling Unit suffers a punch-through, Company shall pay and provide tow vessels to tow 
the Drilling Unit to a suitable shipyard to carry out the necessary repairs as applicable. 
Moving Rate shall apply for towing the Drilling Unit to / from the Well Location to a 
sheltered location or suitable shipyard to carry out the necessary repairs. Standby Rate 
shall apply while the required repairs are being conducted up to a maximum of thirty (30) 
days, thereafter the rate shall be zero until completion of repairs. 
 
9.4 Transportation of Contractor Group Personnel and Contractor Group Equipment 
 
The Company shall provide or procure the provision of: 
 
(a) air/marine transportation of the Contractor Group Personnel, together with such 
other personnel as may be agreed in writing by the Company, between the 
Drilling Unit and Air Base/Supply Base; and 
 
(b) marine transportation of the Contractor Group Equipment (other than the Drilling 
Unit) between the Drilling Unit and the Supply Base. 
 
9.5 Delays in Transporting Contractor Group Personnel 
 
If the transportation of the Contractor’s relief crew between the Air Base and the Drilling 
Unit is delayed due to adverse weather conditions or by other circumstances which are 
outside the reasonable control of the Contractor, the Company shall reimburse the 
Contractor for any accommodation and subsistence costs which are reasonably incurred 
by such relief crew during the period of such delay up to a maximum continuous period 
of seven (7) days only, provided that such costs shall be properly substantiated to the 




9.6 Unscheduled Transportation 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 9.4 and subject to Section 13.4 the costs of 
any unscheduled air or marine transportation which is provided by the Company in 
respect of the Contractor Group Equipment which has failed or which has broken down 
due to the fault or negligence of Contractor, and/or replacement of the Contractor Group 





10.1 Subject to the following provisions in this Section 10, the Company shall pay the 
Contractor, as full compensation for the Drilling Operations and all other obligations 
under this Contract, the rates, lump sums, prices and fees set forth in Schedule 6 - 
Compensation. 
 
Except as otherwise provided in this Contract all such rates, lump sums, prices and fees 
shall be fixed and firm for the term of this Contract. The currency of all such rates, lump 
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All such day rates shall be based on a twenty-four (24) hour day and any part thereof 
shall be pro-rated to the nearest half (1/2) hour. 
 
The Contractor is deemed to have satisfied itself as to the circumstances (including risks 
and contingencies) affecting the price for the Drilling Operations and/or the cost to the 
Contractor of carrying out the Contract and to the correctness and the sufficiency of the 
rates, lump sum prices and charges specified in this Contract which shall, except insofar 
as it is otherwise provided in this Contract, cover all its obligations under this Contract 
and all matters and things necessary for the proper execution and maintenance of the 
Contract (including mobilisation and demobilisation operations). 
 
10.2 Operating Rate 
 
Subject to the other provisions of this Section 10, the Company shall pay the Contractor 
the Operating Rate during the Operational Period. 
 
10.3 Standby Rate 
 
Except as otherwise provided in the Contract, the Company shall pay the Contractor the 
Standby Rate during the Operational Period when: 
 
(a) the Drilling Unit is otherwise ready in all respects to carry out the Drilling 
Operations at the Well Location, but such Drilling Operations are suspended on 
the instructions of the Company, waiting on delivery of the Company Group 
Equipment, failure/loss/damage of the Company Group Equipment and/or whilst 
waiting on weather; or 
 
(b) Drilling Operations are being performed that do not require the use of power to 
the draw works, the rotary table, the top drive or mud pumps or any rotating 
equipment including, without limitation and if applicable, well testing (all DST 
operations after setting the Packer until releasing Packer), electric wire-line works 
including rigging time and Gyro or cased hole surveys, including rigging time; or 
 
(c) the Drilling Unit is moving between Well Locations, from the moment that the 
Drilling Unit commences jacking down at its current location until the Drilling Unit 
is jacked up at Company’s next Well Location; or 
 
(d) the Drilling Unit is otherwise ready in all material respects but Contractor is 
delayed by the relevant Nigerian authority in issuing all necessary import or 
export permits provided that the delay is not due to any fault of Contractor; or 
 
(e) Company Group equipment is loaded onto the Drilling Unit at the Mobilisation 
Point pursuant to Section 6.4a); or 
 
(f) the Drilling Unit is inspected by Company prior to the Commencement Date 
pursuant to Section 6.2c). 
 
(g) Repairs are being performed to the Drilling Unit and/or Contractor Group 
Equipment due to damage caused by the Company Group or caused by 
Company Group Equipment through no fault of Contractor, including any move of 
the Drilling Unit to dry dock or safe harbour location for performing the repairs per 
the provisions of this Section 10.3(g). 
 
10.4 Repair Rate 
 
 










Except as provided in Section 10.3(g), if at any time during the Operational Period the 
Contractor is not able to conduct Drilling Operations because of failure, loss, breakdown 
and/or damage to the Drilling Unit and/or to other Contractor Group Equipment then, 
from the cessation of such Drilling Operations until the Drilling Unit is fully repaired and 
ready to recommence Drilling Operations at the same point (including any trip time, e.g. 
“drill to drill”) as when the failure occurred the Contractor shall be paid the Repair Rate, 
or if the Contractor is in material breach of any provision of this Contract which causes a 
suspension of Drilling Operations the Company shall be entitled, without prejudice to 
Section 21.3(a) or to any of its other rights under this Contract or at law, to treat such 
material breach as a failure of the Drilling Unit under this Section 10.4 and the terms of 
this Section 10.4 shall apply mutatis mutandis from the cessation of such Drilling 
Operations until Contractor has rectified such breach and has fully recommenced Drilling 
Operations at the same point (including any trip time, e.g. “drill to drill”) as when the 
material breach giving rise to such suspension occurred, provided that payment of the 
Repair Rate shall be: 
 
(a) conditional upon the giving of written notice by the Contractor to the Company as 
soon as practicable following the occurrence of the incident in question, detailing 
the nature, extent and cause of such failure/loss/breakdown/damage together with 
the Contractor’s best estimate of the duration of the resulting repairs or 
replacement; 
 
(b) limited to a maximum cumulative total of twenty-four (24) hours per calendar 
month, pro-rated for partial months. Thereafter, no day rate shall be payable. 
 
The Repair Rate shall not apply during routine maintenance such as replacing the 
swivel, replacing pump liners, slipping the drill line or lubricating the Drilling Unit which in 
no event shall take longer than two (2) hours per day 
 
Neither the Repair Rate nor any other day rate shall be paid to the Contractor at any 
time during the Operational Period when: 
 
Contractor moves the Drilling Unit away from the Well Location for any UWILD survey in 
dry dock, port, repair facility, or elsewhere, except in the event such activity is carried out 
during the TIP process and does not impact the critical path of the process. Company 
shall provide fuel and vessels at its expense to move the Drilling Unit from the Well 
Location to an open water location. Such open water location will be discussed and 
mutually agreed between both Parties. 
 
10.5 Force Majeure Rate 
 
The Company shall pay the Contractor the Force Majeure Rate during the Operational 
Period when Drilling Operations are suspended due to Force Majeure. 
 
10.6 Mobilisation and Demobilisation 
 
The Lump sum Mobilisation Rate, as detailed in Schedule 6 – Compensation, shall be 
paid by Company to Contractor for the period from Commencement Date until the time 
and date the Drilling Unit is one (1) nautical mile from Company’s first Well Location at 
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During demobilisation the Moving Rate will be payable in accordance with Section 
10.9b). For the avoidance of doubt any delays or interruptions of the demobilisation 






10.7 Early Termination 
 
If, pursuant to Section 21.6(b), the Contract is terminated in accordance with either 
Section 21.3(i) or 21.8 then Company shall immediately pay Contractor the following 
amounts as liquidated damages, a debt due and payable, and not as a penalty: 
 
(i) the Operating Rate for the total number of days remaining under the Firm Term 
and any additional term (if applicable) of the Contract payable as provided in 
Section 11; and 
 
(ii) rates and fees earned and reimbursable costs and expenses incurred or due and 
payable under the Contract prior to the effective date of termination payable as 
provided in Section 11. 
 
provided always that any compensation payable under (i) above shall be subsequently 
reduced by repayments (or discounts to the sums due) equal to the daily operating rate 
and other applicable rates of any substitute contract that may be secured by Contractor 
for either all or any portion of the remaining number of days of the Contract . 
 
10.8 Redrill Rate 
 
The Company shall pay the Contractor the Redrill Rate for Drilling Operations specified 
in Section 13.10 and/or Section 13.6 due to the sole negligence or wilful misconduct of 
Contractor. 
 
10.9 Moving Rate 
 
a) The Moving Rate shall apply from a point of one (1) nautical mile from Company’s first 
Well Location and will continue during the Drilling Unit move until the point in time the 
Drilling Unit is jacked up at Company’s first Well Location. The Moving Rate shall apply 
during inter wells move from the point in time the Drilling Unit starts jacking down for the 
move to the Company’s second Well Location or any subsequent Well Location 
thereafter until that the point in time the Drilling Unit is jacked up at the second Well 
Location or any other subsequent Well Location thereafter respectively. 
 
b) The Moving Rate shall apply from the date and time the Drilling Unit is one (1) 
nautical mile away from Company’s last Well Location and shall continue to apply until 
the Completion Date. 
 
10.10 Rate Conflict 
 
The Parties recognise that in given situations more than one day rate may apply. In any 
case where two or more day rates could apply to a given situation, the Parties agree that 
the Contractor shall be paid at the highest applicable day rate. 
 
10.11 Reimbursable Items 
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The services and equipment to be provided by the Contractor and reimbursed by the 
Company at documented cost with or without a handling charge are specified in 
Schedule 3. 
 
11. INVOICING AND PAYMENT 
 




11.1(a) Contractor shall submit to Company an invoice each month relating to the 
period commencing on the 26th calendar day of each month and 
termination on the 25th calendar day of the current month. 
 
Upon completion or termination of this Contract whichever is earlier, 
Contractor shall no later than thirty (30) calendar days provide final 
reconciliation and either refund Company to Company’s nominated bank 
account, moneys overpaid by Company or invoice Company any sums 
due in accordance with Sections 11.1(a) (i) and (ii) above. 
 
11.1(b) Invoices shall be sent to the address specified in Schedule 6. All invoices shall 
include the following minimum information: 
 
- Contract Number 
- Location where Work is being performed 
Rig and well name 
- Description of the Work (indicate quantity and unit of measurement) including, 
but not limited to, monthly Drilling Unit time breakdown, including applicable 
charge rates pursuant to this Contract. 
- Time period in which Work was provided, accompanied by delivery tickets for 
equipment (including materials and other items), with details of the type and 
number of each item delivered, the location and date of delivery 
- Time sheets for Contractor’s personnel, indicating the dates and locations that 
such personnel worked or were on standby. 
- Unit rate or day rate 
- Total amount due (both in figures and words) 
- Catering records. 
- Originals of all invoices for reimbursable costs. 
- Banking information for payment purposes to include: bank name and 
location, routing code, swift code and account number, including any 
intermediary bank information if applicable. 
 
11.2 Payment By Company 
 
11.2(a) (i) The Company shall pay all sums invoiced by Contractor within forty five 
(45) calendar days after receipt by the Company. 
 
11.2(b) the making of any payment by Company pursuant to this Section 11.2 shall 
be without prejudice to the Company’s rights under this Contract, nor shall it 
be deemed to constitute acceptance by the Company of defective work. 
 
11.2(c) Interest shall be payable for late payment of (i) correctly prepared and 
supported invoices and (ii) undisputed amounts payable on disputed 
invoices and (iii) disputed amounts that become payable to Contractor. The 
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amount of interest payable shall be the published LIBOR “Base Rate” on 
the initial due date of payment, accrued from the due date for payment until 
actual payment. 
 
11.3 Disputed Invoices 
 
In the event of Company disputing any item of an invoice, Company shall, within seven 
(7) working days following receipt of such invoice, notify Contractor of the item in dispute 
and specify its reasons for dispute. Both Company and Contractor shall confer in good 
faith to resolve the disputed amount. Payment in respect of such item in dispute shall be 
withheld until settlement of the dispute. 
 
The Company will pay the undisputed amount as set out in Section 11.2, provided that 
the Contractor resubmits a revised invoice for such undisputed amount. A revised VAT 
invoice tying to such revised invoice must be submitted at the same time. Requiring the 
re-submission of the invoice is to allow Company to make a payment within tax 
guidelines for the undisputed portion and is not intended to compromise the Contractor’s 
right to claim for the disputed portion. 
 
12. CUSTOMS, DUTIES AND TAXES 
 
12.1 a) Unless otherwise specified herein, Contractor shall be responsible for the physical 
import and export of Contractor’s Drilling Unit and its equipment and spares. Company 
shall be recharged at documented costs by Contractor for all import or export charges or 
customs or excise duties, taxes and fees including without limitation, local sales taxes, 
VAT, clearing agents’ for the physical import and export of the Drilling Unit and such 
equipment and spares at the point of entry to Nigerian waters from the Mobilisation Point 
 
b) Subject to 12.1 a) the Contractor shall be responsible for and shall indemnify, defend 
and hold harmless the Company Group, against all import or export charges or customs 
or excise duties, taxes and fees including, without limitation, local sales taxes, VAT, 
clearing agents' fees or other similar taxes or fees which are levied on the Contractor 
Group Equipment during Drilling Operations. 
 
12.2 Unless otherwise specified herein, Contractor shall be responsible for and shall 
indemnify, defend and hold harmless the Company Group against all import or export 
charges or customs or excise duties, taxes and fees including, without limitation, local 
sales taxes, VAT, clearing agents' fees or other similar taxes or fees which are levied on 
the personal property of the Contractor Group Personnel. 
 
12.3 The Company shall be responsible for and shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless 
the Contractor Group, against all import or export charges or customs or excise duties, 
taxes and fees including, without limitation, local sales taxes, VAT, clearing agents' fees 
or other similar taxes or fees which are levied on the Company Group Equipment or on 
the personal property of the Company Group Personnel. 
 
12.4 The Contractor shall, and shall procure that the Subcontractors shall, report, file and pay 
any and all income, corporation, revenue or similar taxes, howsoever described, and all 
fines, penalties and interest thereon duly assessed on the income, profits and gains 
accruing to the Contractor or any Subcontractor in performance of the Contract. The 
Contractor shall defend, indemnify and hold harmless the Company Group from and 
against any and all Claims relating to taxation howsoever arising in connection with said 
income, profits and gains of the Contractor or any Subcontractor. 
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12.5 The Contractor shall defend, indemnify and hold harmless the Company Group from and 
against all taxes assessed or levied against or on account of wages, salaries or other 
emoluments, income or deemed benefits paid to any member of the Contractor Group 
Personnel, or any social security payments payable in respect of the Contractor or any 
member of the Contractor Group Personnel. 
 
12.6 Notwithstanding any other provision in the Contract, Company shall fully compensate 
Contractor for any and all costs, taxes, duties, imposts, dues, charges, fees, penalties, 
fines and any other form of assessment arising from or related to applicable rules, 
regulations, procedures, and/or enforcement practices of relevant authorities in relation 
to the Coastal and Inland Shipping (Cabotage Act) 2003 and the corresponding 
Guidelines for the implementation of the Cabotage Act. Notwithstanding the foregoing, 
Company’s obligation to reimburse Contractor is limited to a maximum amount equal to 
two percent (2%) of the Drilling Unit Operating Rate over the Operational Period. 
 
12.7 Withholding Tax 
 
The Company may withhold sums from payments to be made by the Company to the 
Contractor or to any Subcontractor to the extent that such withholding may be required 
by Applicable Law, orders, rules or directions of any competent taxing authority. Unless 
otherwise specified, the rates and prices set forth in Schedule 6 are inclusive of any 
withholding taxes. 
 
Notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary, if any withholding tax applies, 
Company shall furnish Contractor within ninety (90) days of such withholding, the official 
tax receipts or other reliable documentation (in a form acceptable to the appropriate 
authority in Nigeria) evidencing payment by Company of the amounts so withheld to the 
Nigerian Authorities. 
 
If the Company fails to provide the Contractor within ninety (90) days of such withholding 
with all official withholding tax receipts or other credible evidence of such taxes withheld 
which is acceptable to the taxing authorities, and as a result the Contractor is unable to 
properly claim such withholding as a credit against it corporate income tax liability, the 
Contractor retains the right to separately invoice the Company for amounts so withheld, 
and the Company must pay such invoice within sixty (60) days of receipt or produce 
such original withholding tax receipt or other credible evidence of tax payment 
acceptable to the taxing authorities. 
 
Where the requirement for any withholding is avoided by the Contractor or any 
Subcontractor holding an appropriate exception certificate it is the duty of the Contractor 
to inform the Company that such a certificate is held, prior to any payment being made, 
and to inform the Company of any change to or cancellation of the certificate and to 
provide copies of the certificate or any further information that may be required by the 
Company to satisfy it that it can avoid any withholding. The Contractor shall defend, 
indemnify and hold the Company Group harmless from and against any and all Claims 
arising in connection with such withholding or failure to withhold as may arise due to the 
Contractor’s failure to inform the Company of any relevant matter in a timely fashion. 




Unless otherwise specified, the rates, lump sums, prices and fees set forth in Schedule 6 
are exclusive of VAT. To the extent that VAT is applicable to the amounts invoiced by 
Contractor, Contractor shall provide a separate standard VAT invoice with all additional 
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forms and documentation currently required by the laws and regulations pertaining to 
said VAT. Upon receipt of such a correct and proper VAT invoice, Company shall pay 
the VAT in accordance with the Applicable Laws and regulations and provide the 




In relation to any costs to be compensated by the Company on a reimbursable basis in 
accordance with this Contract, the Company shall have no liability to reimburse the 
Contractor for any portion of such costs which are eligible for tax relief, reduction, 
exemption or recovery by the actions of the Contractor or any Subcontractor. 
 
12.10 If the fiscal system, customs/importation laws, tax laws, tax regulations, interpretation 
and enforcement of the foregoing or interpretations or practices of any government 
agency applicable in the Area of Operations change during the Firm Term of this 
Contract, plus any additional term(s), which cause a variation in any taxes, import duties, 
fees and charges assessed or levied against the Contractor, its personnel or equipment 
or otherwise relating to the Contract, the Company shall fully reimburse the Contractor 
for any increase in such taxes, duties, fees or other charges. 
 
13. LIABILITIES AND INDEMNITIES 
 
13.1 Interpretation 
Notwithstanding anything expressed or implied in this Contract to the contrary: 
 
(a) Where in this Contract a Party gives an indemnity, such indemnity shall extend to 
any and all liabilities, damages, charges, fines, penalties, costs and expenses 
incurred or payable in connection with or in consequence of the Claim including, 
but without limitation: 
 
i) liabilities or damages, not excluding punitive or exemplary damages, 
admitted, determined or awarded or agreed in any settlement or 
compromise; 
 
ii) charges, fines and penalties levied or imposed by any person or body 
having jurisdiction and power so to do; and 
 
iii) reasonable and proper costs and expenses, including but without 
limitation legal costs and expenses on a full indemnity basis and the cost 
of the time spent on the Claim by the personnel of the indemnified Party, 
whether or not the Claim is successfully resisted or defended. 
 
(b) Where in this Contract a Party gives an indemnity, such indemnity shall extend, 
apply and be enforceable regardless of the cause or causes of the event giving 
rise to the Claim and in particular but without limitation, shall extend, apply and 
be enforceable notwithstanding that a cause or the cause may be: 
 
i) the negligence of any degree (whether sole, contributory or gross), fault 
or default of; 
 
ii) claim in tort, breach of contract (whether breach of condition or warranty), 
repudiation of contract or misrepresentation (whether innocent or 
negligent, but not fraudulent) by; 
 
 










iii) any breach of duty (statutory or other and whether or not involving fault) 
or failure to comply with any Applicable Law on the part of 
 
the person or body so indemnified. 
 
(c) The indemnities given by the Company to the Contractor Group in this Contract 
may be enforced by the Contractor against the Company for the benefit of the 
Contractor Group and/or Contractor Group Personnel. 
 
(d) The indemnities given by the Contractor to the Company Group in this Contract 
may be enforced by the Company against the Contractor for the benefit of the 
Company Group and/or Company Group Personnel. 
 
(e) Where in this Contract a Party gives an indemnity, such indemnity shall extend, 
apply and be enforceable as a fundamental obligation of that Party without 
prejudice to any right whatsoever of any insurer or any right of any person who is 
not a Party. 
 
13.2 Sickness, Disease, Injury or Death of Personnel 
 
(a) The Company shall save, indemnify, hold harmless and defend the Contractor 
Group and the Contractor Group Personnel against any and all Claims arising in 
respect of injury to or sickness, disease or death of any Company Group 
Personnel in relation to or in connection with this Contract. 
 
(b) The Contractor shall save, indemnify, hold harmless and defend the Company 
Group and the Company Group Personnel against any and all Claims arising in 
respect of injury to or sickness, disease or death of any Contractor Group 
Personnel in relation to or in connection with this Contract. 
 
13.3 Physical Property 
 
(a) The Company shall save, indemnify, hold harmless and defend the Contractor 
Group and Contractor Group Personnel against any and all Claims in respect of: 
 
(i) loss of or damage to physical property of the Company Group whether 
owned, hired, leased or otherwise provided by the Company Group; and 
 
(ii) physical property of Company Group Personnel arising out of or in 
connection with this Contract. 
 
(b) The Contractor shall save, indemnify, hold harmless and defend the Company 
Group and the Company Group Personnel against any and all Claims in respect 
of: 
 
(i) loss of or damage to physical property of the Contractor Group whether 
owned, hired, leased or otherwise provided by the Contractor Group; and 
 
(ii) physical property of Contractor Group Personnel 
 
arising out of or in connection with this Contract. 
 
13.4 Contractor’s Down-hole Equipment Below the Rotary Table 
 
 










(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 13.1(b) and 13.3(b) and except to the 
extent of fair wear and tear, the Company shall be liable to the extent set out 
below in respect of loss of or damage to the Contractor Group’s down-hole 
equipment (excluding blow-out preventors and associated equipment), arising out 
of or in connection with this Contract, when said down-hole equipment is in-hole 
below the rotary table except where any such loss or damage is caused by the 
negligence (statutory, contractual or otherwise) of the Contractor Group or 
Contractor Group Personnel. 
 
(b) Not Applicable 
 
(c) In the event that the Contractor makes a claim under this Section 13.4, the 
Contractor shall submit to the Company a fully documented request for 
reimbursement in accordance with any applicable provisions of this Contract 
together with independent third party supporting evidence for the amount of such 
claim. 
 
(d) The Company’s liability under this Section 13.4 shall be limited to the lower of the 
following amounts: 
 
(i) reasonable repair costs; 
 
(ii) replacement purchase price depreciated at the rate of two percent (2%) per 
month from the date of original purchase to a maximum depreciation of fifty 
percent (50%); or 
 
(iii) for any lost in hole charges specified in this Contract- depreciated at the rate 
of two percent (2%) per month from the date of this Contract to a maximum 
depreciation of fifty percent (50%). 
 
13.5 Emergency Operations 
 
(a) Without prejudice to the provisions of this Section 13 and Section 14, at all times 
of emergency (including but not limited to a Well out of control) arising out of or in 
connection with this Contract, the Company may by notice request and in such 
event the Contractor shall permit the Company to assume control of any and all 
work necessary to contain and end such emergency pursuant to Section 8.7(f). 
 
(b) Throughout any such emergency, the Contractor shall make its personnel and 
physical property available as required by the Company, provided that the 
Contractor shall retain control of the marine functions of its vessels, including for 
this purpose and without limitation the Drilling Unit. 
 
13.6 Well Damage, Blow-out, Crater and Associated Pollution 
 
Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in the Contract to the contrary, but 
subject to Sections 13.2, 13.3 and 13.4, the Company shall save, indemnify, hold 
harmless and defend the Contractor Group and Contractor Group Personnel against any 
and all Claims in respect of: 
 
(i) loss of or damage to the Well, subterranean geological formation, strata 
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(ii) loss of products from (i) above or resulting from a blow-out, crater, catching 
fire or the Well in any manner getting beyond control; 
 
(iii) killing or bringing under control of the Well; 
 
(iv) pollution, containment and clean-up resulting from Sections 13.6 (i), (ii) and 
(iii) above; 
 
(v) pollution, containment and clean-up if pollution emanating from the 
Company Group Equipment and any pollution wherever and howsoever 
arising or caused pursuant to Section 13.7 below; 
 
(vi) injury to or sickness, disease or death of any Third-Party person or loss of 
or damage to any property of a Third Party resulting from a blow-out, crater, 
catching fire or the Well in any manner getting beyond control 
 
arising out of, relating to, or in connection with this Contract, save that notwithstanding 
Section 13.1(b): 
 
- in the event that such loss or damage as set out in Section 13.6(i) is 
caused by the sole or substantially the sole negligence or wilful 
misconduct of Contractor Group or Contractor Group Personnel, the 
Contractor shall, at the request of the Company provided the Drilling Unit 
is still on the Well Location, either drill the same or an equivalent hole to 
the same depth as such hole had been previously drilled or repair such 
damaged hole or well to its original state at the Redrill Rate. 
 
13.7 Pollution From Contractor Group Equipment 
 
Subject to Section 13.6, the Contractor shall assume all responsibility for, including 
control and removal of, and shall indemnify, hold harmless and defend the Company 
Group against any and all Claims in respect of any pollution, contamination or waste 
matter emanating and originating from the Contractor Group Equipment. 
 
13.8 Third Party 
 
Subject to Sections 13.6(iv), 13.6(v) and 13.6(vi) all Claims in respect of injury to or 
sickness, disease or death of any Third Party person or loss of or damage to any 
property of a Third Party arising out of, relating to or in connection with this Contract 
shall, as between the Company and the Contractor, be borne in proportion to what their 
respective liabilities (if any) in the law of negligence are or would be in respect of the 




(a) The Contractor shall not claim, and shall procure that no member of the 
Contractor Group shall claim, any lien, charge or the like on or over the Drilling 
Operations or on any property of the Company Group, including, but not limited, 
to any property of the Company Group which is within the control or possession 
of the Contractor Group or on or within the Area of Operations. 
 
(b) Upon receipt of a notice from the Company, the Contractor shall discharge or 
cause to be discharged all liens, charges or other encumbrances attaching to or 
upon any of the: 
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(i) Contractor Group Equipment; or 
(ii) (where such liens, charges or encumbrances have arisen as a result of 
the actions of any member of the Contractor Group) equipment provided 
by the Company Group for use for or in connection with the performance 
of the Drilling Operations 
 
which, in either case, adversely affects the performance of the Contractor’s 
obligations under this Contract. 
 
(c) The Contractor shall indemnify, hold harmless and defend the Company Group 
against any and all Claims, in respect of liens, charges or other encumbrances in 
connection with or arising out of the Contract. 
 
(d) If at any time there is evidence of any lien, attachment, charge or claim to which, 
if established, any member of the Company Group or its property might be 
subjected, whether made by any persons against the Contractor or made by any 
Subcontractor against the Company, then the Company shall have the right to 
withhold and/or set off or otherwise recover from the Contractor such sum of 
money as will fully indemnify the Company Group against any such lien, 
attachment, charge or claim. 
 
(e) Before withholding any payment due to the Contractor in accordance with 
Section 13.9(d), the Company shall give to the Contractor a reasonable 
opportunity to demonstrate that the purported lien, attachment, charge or claim is 
either fully discharged, unenforceable or is covered by a bond, an enforceable 
policy of insurance, or any other valid means of security. 
 
13.10 Well Abandonment 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 13.1(b) and 13.6, if the Well has to be 
plugged and abandoned due to any member of the Contractor Group’s or any member 
of the Contractor Group’s Personnel’s sole negligence or wilful misconduct whilst the 
Contractor is working on such Well, the Company may require the Contractor to drill a 
new Well in replacement at the same location or adjacent thereto at Redrill Rate, until 






If either Party becomes aware of any incident likely to give rise to a Claim, it shall notify 
the other Party as soon as practicable and both Parties shall co-operate fully in 
investigating the incident. 
 
13.12 Salvage and General Average 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 13.8, the Contractor shall indemnify, hold 
harmless and defend the Company Group and Company Group Personnel against any 
and all Claims in respect of injury to or sickness, disease or death of any Third Party 
person or loss of or damage to any property of a Third Party arising out of any salvage 
and rescue operations in respect of the Drilling Unit. 
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13.13.1 Subject to Section 13.13.3, the Parties intend that no provision of this Contract 
shall, by virtue of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 (“the Act”) 
confer any benefit on, nor be enforceable by any person who is not a party to 
this Contract. 
 
13.13.2 For the limited purpose of this Section 13.13 and notwithstanding the definition 
of Third Party under Section 1.1, "Third Party" shall mean any member of the 
Contractor Group (other than Contractor) or Company Group (other than 
Company). 
 
13.13.3 Subject to the remaining provisions of this Contract, Sections 13, 14, 15, 18, 
and 27 are intended to be enforceable by a Third Party and by virtue of the 
Act. 
 
13.13.4 Notwithstanding Section 13.13.3, this Contract may be rescinded, amended or 
varied by the Parties to this Agreement without notice to or the consent of any 
Third Party even if, as a result, that Third Party’s right to enforce a term of this 
Contract may be varied or extinguished. 
 
13.13.5 The rights of any Third Party under Section 13.13.3 shall be subject to the 
following: 
(i) any claim, or reliance on any term of this Contract by a Third Party 
against a Party to this Contract shall be notified in writing in 
accordance with the requirements of Section 23 by such Third 
Party to each Party to this Contract as soon as such Third Party 
becomes aware that an event is likely to give rise to such a claim 
and such notification shall contain the following information as a 
minimum: 
 
(a) details of the occurrence giving rise to the claim; and 
(b) the right relied upon by the Third Party under this Contract, 
(c) the Third Party’s written agreement to submit irrevocably to 
the jurisdiction of the English Courts in respect of all 
matters relating to such rights. 
 
13.13.6 In enforcing any right to which it is entitled by virtue of the Act and the provisions of this 




14. CONSEQUENTIAL LOSS 
 
14.1 For the purposes of this Section 14 the expression "Consequential Loss" shall mean: 
 
(i) consequential or indirect loss under English law; and 
 
(ii) Spread Costs, loss and/or deferral of production, loss of 
product, cost of or loss of use, loss of revenue, loss of or 
damage to the leasehold, loss of or delay in drilling or operating 
rights, profit or anticipated profit (if any), delay, business 
interruption and any other similar losses in each case 
whether direct or indirect to the extent that these are not 
included in (i), and whether or not foreseeable at the 
effective date of this Contract. For the purposes of this 
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Section the term “Spread Costs” shall mean cost of or loss 
of use of property of Company Group and/or cost or loss of 
use of services provided by Company Group and/or cost of 
or loss of use of Company Group. 
 
14.2 Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary elsewhere in the Contract and except 
to the extent of any agreed liquidated damages (including without limitation any 
predetermined termination fees) and payment rights and obligations of Company 
provided for in the Contract, the Company shall save, indemnify, defend and hold 
harmless the Contractor Group from the Company Group’s own Consequential Loss 
and the Contractor shall save, indemnify, defend and hold harmless the Company 
Group from the Contractor Group's own Consequential Loss, arising from, relating 




15.1 Minimum Insurances 
 
Without prejudice to the liabilities, indemnities and obligations of Contractor under 
Sections 13 and 14, the Contractor shall effect and maintain, and shall ensure that the 
Subcontractors shall effect and maintain, throughout the term of this Contract, insurance 
policies which shall include but shall not be limited to the minimum types and amounts 
set out in this Section 15. The Contractor shall indemnify, hold harmless and defend the 
Company Group against any and all excesses, deductibles or franchises incorporated 
therein. All insurance policies effected by the Contractor and the Subcontractors, except 
for Employer’s Liability Insurance, shall name the Company and/or the Company Group 
as an additional assured to the extent of the liabilities and indemnities assumed by 
Contractor under Sections 13 and 14 respectively with cross liabilities provisions, where 
appropriate. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Contractor may elect to self insure any and 
all of the liabilities and indemnities assumed under Sections 13 and 14 respectively or 
procure such insurances with an affiliate insurance provider, provided that Company has 
consented and such consent has not been unreasonably withheld or delayed. 
 
15.2 Certificates of Insurance 
 
(a) The Contractor shall provide the Company with certificates of insurance, 
endorsed by the Contractor’s insurers or brokers, within seven (7) days of the 
effective date of this Contract, unless a current certificate has already been 
provided. Updated certificates will be provided on the renewal anniversary of all 
policies required hereunder. 
 
(b) Failure by the Contractor to provide such a certificate may be taken by the 
Company to indicate that the Contractor has failed to meet its obligations to 




15.3 Material Changes 
 
The Contractor shall notify the Company promptly in the event of cancellation or material 
change affecting any insured party’s interest in respect of the insurances set out in this 
Section 15. 
 
15.4 Cancellation or Failure to Maintain 
 
 










Except for an event of Contractor electing to self insure under Section 15.1 above, if any 
insurance policy is cancelled or if the Contractor and/or the Contractor Group shall fail to 
effect or maintain any insurance policy which it is required to effect or maintain, such 
default shall be deemed a material breach under the terms of Section 21.3(a). 
 
15.5 Waivers of Subrogation 
 
To the extent of the indemnities and liabilities assumed by Contractor hereunder, all 
legal liability policies required under this Section 15 shall contain an agreement from the 
insurers to waive their rights of subrogation against the Company Group and Company 
Group Personnel. 
 
15.6 Priority of Insurance 
 
Contractor Group insurance policies required under this Section 15 shall be primary to 
any other insurance effected by Company Group and which may overlap in quantum 
and/or terms and conditions. 
 
15.7 The Contractor’s and Subcontractor’s Minimum Insurance 
 
The following are the minimum insurances which are required of the Contractor under 
Section 15.1: 
 
(a) Insurance in accordance with Workman’s Compensation and Occupational 
Disease Laws to the full extent required by any laws in any jurisdiction in which 
the Drilling Operations are to be provided and/or contracts of employment for 
Contractor Group Personnel involved in the provision of the Drilling Operations 
are entered into; 
 
(b) Employer’s Liability insurance for an amount required by Applicable Law but in no 
instance less than one and one half million Dollars ($1,500,000.00) per person 
per occurrence or series of occurrences arising from the one event. Such 
insurance shall cover all Contractor Group Personnel; 
 
(c) General Third-Party insurance with a combined bodily injury and property 
damage limit of not less than ten million Dollars ($10,000,000.00) per occurrence 
or series of occurrences arising from the one event; 
 
(d) Hull and Machinery insurance covering loss of or damage to vessels and/or jack- 
up barges, including but not limited to loss or damage arising from helicopter 
operations, War Risks (except if cancelled by Contractor’s insurance underwriter 
in case of a War Risk situation), Riots, Strikes and Civil commotion, in amounts of 
not less than the insured value and Increased Value insurance of (combined 
total) for each vessel and/or jack-up barge owned, hired, chartered or borrowed 
under this or other agreements by the Contractor Group and used in connection 
with this Contract; 
 
(e) Protection and Indemnity (P&I) insurance or marine liability insurance equivalent 
to United Kingdom Mutual Steamship Association (Bermuda) Ltd rules, including 
Collision Liability and Sistership clauses, removal of wrecks and debris, pollution 
liability and Tower’s Liability, with limits of not less than the insured value of each 
vessel and/or jack-up barge owned, hired, chartered or borrowed under this or 
any other agreements, by the Contractor Group and used in connection with this 
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Contract. Also, excess P&I to give a combined limit of not less than fifty million 
Dollars ($50,000,000.00) per occurrence or series of occurrence arising from the 
one event; 
 
(f) Aviation Liability insurance which shall cover aircraft (including helicopters) 
owned, hired, chartered or borrowed under this or other agreements, supplied by 
the Contractor Group and used in connection with this Contract, with a combined 
bodily injury and property damage limit, including passenger liability, of not less 
than fifty million Dollars ($50,000,000.00) per occurrence or series of occurrence 
arising from the one event; and 
 
(g) Motor Vehicle Liability insurance, which shall comply with Applicable Law with 
respect to vehicles used in connection with this Contract. 
 
The Contractor shall procure that the Subcontractors shall effect and maintain 
appropriate and applicable insurances. 
 
 
16. FORCE MAJEURE 
 
16.1 Except for the Company’s obligation to pay money in accordance with this Contract, 
neither the Company nor the Contractor shall be responsible for any failure to fulfil any 
term or condition of the Contract if and to the extent that fulfilment has been 
delayed or temporarily prevented by a force majeure occurrence, as hereunder 
defined, which has been notified in accordance with this Section 16 and which is 
beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the Party affected and which, 
by the exercise of reasonable diligence, the said Party is unable to provide against. 
 
16.2 For the purposes of this Contract only the following occurrences shall be force 
majeure: 
 
(a) Riot, war, invasion, act of foreign enemies, hostilities (whether war be 
declared or not), acts of terrorism, piracy, civil war, rebellion, revolution, 
insurrection of military or usurped power; 
 
(b) Ionising radiations or contamination by radio-activity from any nuclear fuel or 
from any nuclear waste from the combustion of nuclear fuel or radio-active, toxic, 
explosive or other hazardous properties of any explosive nuclear assembly or 
nuclear component thereof; 
 
(c) Pressure waves caused by aircraft or other aerial devices travelling at sonic or 
supersonic speeds; 
 
(d) Earthquake, flood, fire, explosion and/or other natural physical disaster, but 
excluding weather conditions as such, regardless of severity; 
 
(e) Strikes at a national or regional level or industrial disputes at a national or 
regional level, or strikes or industrial disputes by labour not employed by the 
affected party its subcontractors or its suppliers and which affect a substantial or 
essential portion of the Drilling Operation; or 
 
(f) Maritime or aviation disasters. 
 
(g) Dispositions or order of governmental authority, whether such authority be actual 
 











16.3 In the event of a force majeure occurrence, the Party that is or may be delayed in 
performing the Contract shall notify the other Party without delay giving the full 
particulars thereof and shall use all reasonable endeavours to remedy the situation 
without delay. 
 
In the event of a force majeure occurrence the Force Majeure Rate shall be payable in 
accordance with the provisions of Schedule 6 – Compensation and the Firm Term shall 
be extended at Company’s discretion, provided that such election to extend shall be 
exercised, and notice thereof given, within thirty (30) days after the Force Majeure event 
has abated. 
 
16.4 Following notification of a force majeure occurrence in accordance with Section 16.3, the 
Company and Contractor shall meet without delay with a view to agreeing a mutually 




17.1 The Contractor shall, and shall ensure that each member of the Contractor Group and 
Contractor Group Personnel shall, treat as strictly confidential and shall not, without the 
Company's prior written consent, sell, trade, use, reproduce, copy, divulge or disclose to, 
place at the disposal of or use on behalf of any third party or, except to the extent 
necessary for performance hereunder, make use of any of the Company's proprietary 
technical information or of any other information about the Drilling Operations or the 
operations to which the Drilling Operations pertain. 
 
17.2 The Contractor shall at no time without the prior written consent of the Company make 
any public releases or announcements concerning the subject matter of this Contract. 
 
17.3 The provisions of this Section 17 shall not apply to any information which: 
 
(a) is lawfully in the Contractor’s possession prior to the award of this Contract and 
which is not subject to any obligation of confidentiality owed to the Company; or 
 
(b) is in the public domain through no breach of the obligations set out in this Section 
17; or 
 
(c) is received from a third party whose possession and right to disseminate such 
information is lawful and who is under no obligation not to disclose; or 
 
(d) is required to be disclosed in order to comply with the requirements of any law, 
rule or regulation of any government, regulatory body having jurisdiction over the 
Area of Operations, or the Contractor or of any stock exchange on which the 
shares of a Contractor Group member are listed, provided the Contractor shall 
notify the Company of the requirement to make such disclosure prior to doing so. 
 
17.4 The Contractor hereby acknowledges that any data, papers, documents, drawings, other 
printed or written matter, samples, computer software or equipment supplied to it by or 
on behalf of the Company Group to assist it in the performance of the Drilling Operations 
or any such items prepared by or on behalf of the Contractor in connection with the 
performance of the Drilling Operations are the sole and exclusive property of the 
Company and/or of any other member of the Company Group. The Contractor shall 
return to the Company all such items and all copies thereof within thirty (30) days after 
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termination of this Contract upon written request. Contractor may retain one (1) set of 
copies of the IADC Daily Drilling Reports for its records. 
 
17.5 The Contractor shall ensure that similar confidentiality provisions to this Section 17 are 
incorporated in any subcontract it enters into with any Subcontractor and that all 
Contractor Group Personnel shall comply with the same. 
 
17.6 The Contractor acknowledges that any breach of the obligation of confidence contained 
in this Section 17 will result in unquantifiable loss to the Company and therefore, in the 
event of any such breach, will submit to an interlocutory injunction or give undertakings 
to the Court to prevent further breaches, without prejudice to the Company's rights to 
pursue other forms of relief. Any breach of this Section 17 will in any event be deemed 
to be a material breach of this Contract. 
 
18. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PATENT INFRINGEMENTS 
 
18.1 Neither the Company nor the Contractor shall have the right of use, other than for 
the purposes of the Contract, whether directly or indirectly, of any patent, copyright, 
proprietary right or confidential know how, trademark or process provided by the 
other party and the intellectual property rights in such shall remain with the party 
providing such patent, copyright, proprietary right or confidential know how, 
trademark or process. 
 
18.2 Where any potential patent or registrable right in any country in the world results from 
developments by the Contractor which are based wholly on data, equipment, 
processes, substances and the like in the possession of the Contractor at the effective 
date of this Contract such rights shall vest in the Contractor. 
 
18.3 Except as provided in Section 18.2, the Parties shall jointly seek patents or registrable 
rights in any country in the world on any item or idea arising out of or invented during the 
term of the Contract as a direct result of the Drilling Operation. The Parties agree to 
notify each other promptly of any potentially patentable or other registrable ideas 
conceived during the term of and as a direct result of working under the Contract. The 
Parties agree to co-operate in all efforts to obtain such patents or other registrable rights, 
and shall mutually agree, by means of a variation a reasonable allocation of the extra 
time and expense required to the Parties. The Parties agree to grant each other a 
royalty free licence either to use any patents or other registrable rights developed out of 
the Contract or to permit a subcontractor to manufacture or otherwise use the patents or 
other registrable rights for the ultimate use only of the respective Party. 
 
18.4 Intentionally left blank. 
 
18.5 The Contractor shall save, indemnify, defend and hold harmless the Company 
Group from all claims, losses, damages, costs (including legal costs), expenses and 
liabilities of every kind and nature for, or arising out of, any alleged infringement of 
any patent or proprietary or protected right arising out of or in connection with the 
performance of the obligations of the Contractor under the Contract except where 
such infringement necessarily arises from the Company’s technical information and 
/or the Company's instructions. 
 
18.6 The Company shall save, indemnify, defend and hold harmless the Contractor 
Group from all claims, losses, damages, costs (including legal costs), expenses 
and liabilities of every kind and nature for, or arising out of, any alleged 
infringement of any patent or proprietary or protected right arising out of or in 
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connection with the performance of the obligations of the Company under the 
Contract or the use by the Contractor of technical information or materials or 
equipment supplied by the Company. 
 
19. ASSIGNMENT AND SUBCONTRACTING 
 
19.1 Subject to Section 19.3, neither Party may assign all or any part of this Contract, without 
the prior written consent of the other Party which will not be unreasonably withheld or 
delayed. 
 
19.2 Except for an assignment to the Company no assignment by the Contractor shall relieve 
the Contractor or any member of the Contractor Group or any surety of any of the 
obligations or liabilities under this Contract prior to the date of the assignment 
 
19.3 The Company is entitled to assign all or some of its rights or obligations under this 
Contract at any time and from time to time to any of its Affiliates, to any of the Co- 
Venturers and/or to any successor operator in the Area of Operations subject to the 
Contractor's consent which shall not unreasonably be withheld. The Company may 
assign the Contract or any part of it or any benefit or interest in or under it to any third 
party but only with the prior agreement of the Contractor. 
 
19.4 The Contractor undertakes that, in the event of any assignment described in Section 
19.3, it will execute without delay a formal assignment of interest in the Contract to the 
assignee, to be effective upon the written assumption by the assignee of all obligations 
of the Company under this Contract. 
 
19.5 The Contractor shall not subcontract the whole of the Contractor subcontract any part of 
the Contract without the prior written consent of the Company. 
 
19.6 Before entering into any subcontract under the Contract, the Company shall be given an 
adequate opportunity to review the form of the subcontract, the choice of the 
Subcontractor, the part of the Contract included in the subcontract and any other 
relevant details requested by the Company. 
 
19.7 No subcontract shall bind or purport to bind any member of the Company Group. 
Nevertheless the Contractor shall ensure that any Subcontractor shall be bound by and 
observe the provisions of this Contract in so far as they apply to the subcontract. 
 
19.8 Each subcontract shall expressly provide for the Contractor’s unconditional right of 
assignment of the subcontract to the Company in the event that the Company terminates 
this Contract. 
 
19.9 The Contractor shall be responsible for all work, acts, omissions and defaults of any 
Subcontractor as fully as if they were work, acts, omissions or defaults of the Contractor. 
 
20. RECORDS AND AUDITS 
 
20.1 The Contractor shall, and shall procure that the Subcontractors shall, maintain a true 
and correct set of records pertaining to all activities relating to their performance of this 
Contract and all transactions related thereto. The Contractor shall provide a copy of all 
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20.2 The Contractor shall, and shall procure that the Subcontractors shall, retain all such 
records for a period of not less than three (3) years after Completion Date or termination 
pursuant to Section 21, whichever is earlier. 
 
20.3 During the term of this Contract and for a period ending three (3) years after Completion 
Date, the Company or its duly authorised representative shall have the right to audit at 
all reasonable times and, upon request, take copies of all of the Contractor’s non 
confidential or non-privileged records (including data stored on computers), books, 
personnel records, accounts, correspondence, memoranda, receipts, vouchers and 
other papers of every kind relating to: 
 
(a) all invoiced charges made by the Contractor on the Company; and 
 
(b) any provision of this Contract under which the Contractor has obligations the 
performance of which is capable of being verified by audit 
 
provided however that Company is not entitled in any event to investigate the make-up 
of rates and/or lump sum amounts expressed in the Contract. 
 
21. TERMINATION AND AMENDMENT OF CONTRACT 
 
21.1 Intentionally left blank. 
 
21.2 If the Drilling Unit fails to initiate mobilization by the Scheduled Latest Mobilization Date, 
then the following provisions shall apply: 
 
(a) if the Drilling Unit initiates mobilization between June 16, 2014 and July 31, 2014, 
Company shall pay the Standby Rate during the Operational Period for the 
number of days the Drilling Unit’s mobilization is delayed beyond 16 June 2014. 
 
(b) if the Drilling Unit initiates mobilization between August 1, 2014 and September 
15, 2014, Company shall pay the Standby Rate for the first 45 days of 
Operational Period and then 50% of the Operating Rate from day 46 of the 
Operational Period for the number of days the Drilling Unit’s mobilization is 
delayed beyond August 1, 2014. 
 
(c) if the Drilling Unit initiates mobilization on or after September 16, 2014, Company 
shall have the right to terminate the Contract. 
 
At any time the Contractor believes the Drilling Unit may not be able to initiate 
mobilization by 15 September 2014, then Contractor shall immediately notify Company 
of such anticipated delay and a revised estimated mobilization date, in writing. The 
Company would be required to notify its intent to terminate or continue the Contract, no 
later than: (i) thirty (30) days after receipt of Contractor’s notice between June 15th and 
August 31th, 2014; or (ii) fifteen (15) days after receipt of Contractor’s notice between 
September 1st and September 15th, 2014. 
 
 
In the event of termination under 21.2 (a), (b) and (c), Contractor shall reimburse 
Company upon request, any Mobilization Rate paid to Contractor, if applicable. 
 
21.3 The Company may by giving notice to the Contractor terminate all or any part of this 
Contract at such times as the Company may consider necessary for any and all of the 
following reasons: 
 










(a) if the Contractor is at any time in breach of any material obligations hereunder, 
including, but not limited to compliance with Schedule 10, and following receipt of 
a notice from Company that Contractor has failed to perform its obligations under 
the Contract in a diligent, skilful and workmanlike manner for reasons within 
Contractor’s control, Contractor then: 
 
(i) refuses to remedy; or within five (5) days either: 
 
(ii) fails to commence to remedy; or 
 
(iii) having commenced to remedy the matter(s) complained of, fails to proceed 
diligently to remedy the matter(s) complained of. 
 
(b) if the Contractor becomes insolvent; 
 
(c) if the Contractor becomes bankrupt or makes or attempts to make any 
composition or scheme of arrangement with its creditors or any of them, or, being 
a company or corporation, passes a resolution for winding up, or an order is 
made by the Court that the Contractor shall be wound up (other than a voluntary 
winding up for the purposes of amalgamation or reconstruction), or the Court 
shall make an administration order in respect of the Contractor, or a receiver or 
manager is appointed by the Court or the Contractor’s creditors or any of them or 
the Contractor shall become subject to any of the circumstances which entitle the 
Court or any creditor to appoint a receiver or manager or which entitle the Court 
to make a winding up order or administration order in respect of the Contractor; 
 
(d) intentionally left blank 
 
(e) if a Force Majeure event prevails for a continuous uninterrupted period of thirty 
(30) days, Company has a right but not an obligation to terminate, subject to 
continued payment of the Force Majeure Rate in case of non-termination; 
 
(f) if a breakdown of the Contractor Group Equipment, unless caused by the actions 
of the Company, results in the Contractor being unable to perform its obligations 
hereunder for a period of ten (10) days consecutive or more; 
 
(g) if the Drilling Unit becomes an actual, constructive, arranged or compromised 
total loss, or is damaged to an extent to which, in the Company's sole opinion, it 
is unsafe for the Drilling Unit to continue to be used to perform the Drilling 
Operations; 
 
(h) at any time by giving the Contractor at least ten (10) days prior written notice. 
The Company may terminate this contract prior to the expiry of the nine hundred 
and twelve (912) day firm period from the Commencement Date and any 
extension of any such Firm Term, if applicable. In such an event by way of 
liquidated damages, but not as a penalty, the balance will be paid of the 
remaining of nine hundred and twelve (912) firm day period and any extension of 
any such Firm Term, if applicable as provided for in Section 10.7. Should 
termination occur prior to the Commencement Date it will be paid at the Standby 
Rate. In the event the Drilling Unit works for another customer during the 
remainder of the Firm Term or any agreed extension of such Firm Term, the 
liquidated damages will be adjusted accordingly as provided for in Section 10.7. 
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(i) if the Drilling Unit is lost to the Contractor through confiscation, nationalisation or 
seizure by the Government or any other authority claiming or having jurisdiction 
and the Drilling Operations is interrupted for more than ten (10) days. 
 
21.4 In the event of the Company giving the Contractor notice of termination in accordance 
with Section 21.3 of all or any part of this Contract, the effective date of termination shall 
be the date specified in the notice, subject to such date complying with the above 
provisions regarding notice period. If the date specified does not comply with the above 
notice periods, or no date is specified, then the effective date of the termination shall be 
the earliest date that the notice can be effective in accordance with the above 
provisions. When a termination notice becomes effective, the Contractor shall 
immediately cease performance of the Drilling Operations or such part thereof as may 
be specified in the notice, and take such actions as the Company may require to protect 
the Well. 
 
21.5 (a) In the event of termination of the Contract in accordance with Section 21.3 (a), 
(b), (c), (e) or (f) Contractor shall be entitled to payment as set out in Schedule 6 
- Compensation for Work performed up to the date of termination, together with 
other sums due under this Contract and the Company shall pay the Contractor at 
zero rate plus the tow boats and fuel for the Drilling Unit and tow boats during the 
demobilisation of the Drilling Unit to the Demobilisation Point or equal distant 
location. 
 
(b) In the event of termination of the Contract in accordance with Section 21.3 (g) 
and (i) Contractor shall be entitled to payment as set out in Schedule 6 - 
Compensation for Work performed up to the date of termination, together with 
other sums due under this Contract. 
 
21.6 a) Intentionally left blank 
 
b) In the event of termination under Section 21.3(h) or 21.8, the Contractor shall be 
entitled to payment as set out in Section 10.7. 
 
21.7 In the event of termination under this Section 21 the Contractor shall not be relieved of 
any continuing obligations or liabilities under this Contract or at law. 
 
21.8 In the event of Company’s material breach of its financial obligations under the Contract 
which shall be deemed to include but not be limited to Company’s failure or refusal to pay 
any undisputed invoice due in accordance with Sections 11.1(a) and 11.2(a) then 
Contractor shall have the right to terminate this Contract upon the expiry of ten (10) days 
prior written notice to Company of such material breach and Company’s failure to remedy 
such breach within said ten (10) day period. 
 




23.1 All notices and other communications provided for in this Contract hereunder shall be in 
writing. Wherever practicable, all such notices will be given by facsimile. Where this is 
not practicable, notices may be delivered by hand to an authorised representative of the 
Party to whom directed or shall be sent by registered airmail or (postage and charges 
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In case of technical/operational notices or issues, notices should be given to the 











23.4 Unless otherwise provided herein, notices and other communications shall be deemed 
received as follows: 
 
(a) when given by hand, on the day of delivery provided such day is a Working Day 
and delivery is made at least one hour prior to close of business in recipient's 
office; 
 
(b) when given by registered airmail, on the seventh day following date of posting; 
and 
 
(c) when given by facsimile, on the day of transmission provided such day is a 
Working Day and transmission is made at least one hour prior to close of 




The Company enters into this Contract on behalf of itself and the Co-Venturers, the 
Company will carry out its operations on behalf of its Co-Venturers’ and the Co-Venturer 
as the Operator of the Block and/or marginal field has full legal and regulatory approval 
and responsibility for the operations on the field, the Co-Venturer has the right and 
responsibility with all authorities in relation to the provisions and performance of this 
contract including but not limited the DPR NNPC NAPIMS and the Ministry of Petroleum 
but notwithstanding this: 
 
(a) the Contractor shall look only to the Company for the due performance of this 
Contract and nothing herein shall entitle the Contractor to commence any 
proceedings against any Co-Venturer other than the Company; and 
 
(b) the Company may enforce the Contract for and on behalf of all Co-Venturers as 
well as for itself. For that purpose the Company may assert any claim or 
commence any proceedings against the Contractor in its own name to enforce all 
obligations and liabilities of the Contractor and to make any claim which the 




25.1 The Company may at any time by written notice require the Contractor to perform a 
Variation. Subject always to Contractor’s agreement, the Contractor shall carry out such 
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Variation as directed subject to the following provisions, and provided such Variation is 
within the Contractor’s capability and any additional cost arising therefrom is to the 
Company’s account. 
 
25.2 The Company may instruct the Contractor to: 
 
(a) supply personnel or equipment not specified in Schedules 1a, 2, 3 and 4; and 
(b) make structural alterations to the Drilling Unit subject to the prior approval of the 
Contractor and the Contractor’s insurance underwriters. 
 
25.3 Where, in the opinion of the Contractor, a Variation given by the Company is likely to 
incur additional cost or prevent the Contractor from fulfilling any of its obligations under 
this Contract or may affect the Drilling Programme, it shall forthwith advise the Company 
and request it to notify the Contractor within forty-eight (48) hours, whether or not the 
Variation should be implemented. 
 
25.4 In the event that the Parties agree that a Variation shall be compensated at 
reimbursable documented cost, then the handling charges specified in Schedule 6 shall 
apply. 
 
26. OTHER CONDITIONS 
 
General or special conditions in any of the Contractor’s price lists, invoices, tickets, 
receipts or other documents presented to the Company or made a part of this Contract 
by reference are null and void. 
 
27. COMPLIANCE WITH LAW 
 
27.1 Contractor shall observe and abide by, and shall require all members of the Contractor 
Group and of the Contractor Group Personnel to observe and abide by, all Applicable 
Law anywhere and any local customs as may apply to the Area of Operations or in 
relation to the Contract including, without limitation those Applicable Laws, Regulations 
and local customs with reference to the certification of Contractor Group Equipment; and 
any regulations and decrees enacted thereunder; the manner of conducting operations 
(including but not limited to Employers' Liability, Workman's Compensation or similar 
statutory national insurance); and the provisions applicable to Contractor in any 
collective labour agreement or equivalent signed by Contractor. 
 
The Contractor shall comply with all applicable laws, rules and regulations of any 
governmental or regulatory body having jurisdiction over the Contract and/or the 
Worksite and unless otherwise provided for in this Contract shall save, indemnify and 
hold harmless the Company Group from and against all fines and penalties assessed by 
a governmental authority against the Company resulting from the Contractor’s failure to 
so comply. 
 
27.2 Contractor recognises that any breach by any member of Contractor Group of any of the 
material provisions of this Section 27 will be considered a breach of a material obligation 
under Section 21.3 (a). 
 
27.3 Contractor shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless Company Group against any 
penalty or other sanction or other Claims which may be imposed on any member of 
Company Group by the Government or any governmental authority, agency or body by 
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Group Personnel of any restriction or any failure to comply with any of the foregoing 
provisions of this Section 27. 
 
27.4 Should the Contractor experience an increase or decrease in its costs due to changes in 
Applicable Laws and regulations (including HSE Safety Notices, Guidelines, Guidance 
Notes, Classification Society Rules and other like documents under which the Contractor 
is subject to compliance) including a change in the manner of enforcement or 
interpretation thereof, or any changes to the Drilling Unit’s VSSC pursuant to the 
Company’s instructions or required for the Company’s locations, any of which became 
effective after the effective date of the Contract then the rates and fees shall be 
increased or decreased as applicable to fully account for such change in costs. 
 
27.5 The Contractor shall obtain all licenses, permits, temporary permits and authorizations 
required by the Applicable Laws, rule and regulations for the performance of the 
Contract, save to the extent that the same can only be legally obtained by the Company. 
 
28. PERMITS AND LICENCES 
Subject to Section 9.2 and unless otherwise specified herein, Contractor shall obtain at 
its own cost from the appropriate authorities all necessary permits and licences required 
by Applicable Law for the performance of the Contract. Company shall provide all 
necessary assistance but Company shall in no circumstances be responsible for any 
failure of Contractor to obtain any such permit or licence and unless otherwise provided 
for in this Contract for any consequence of such failure. 
 
Contractor shall obtain and provide at its own expense all visas, passport, working 
permits, exit and re-entry permits and all other governmental authorisations or 
documentation required in connection with the entry, presence, employment and/or exit 
of Contractor Group Personnel. This documentation must be valid during the term of the 
Contract. 
 
29. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR 
 
The Contractor shall act as an independent contractor with respect to the Contract. All 
personnel assigned to the Contract shall be the Contractor’s employees or 
Subcontractors or employees of Subcontractors and shall not be or deemed to be 




None of the provisions of this Contract shall be considered waived by the Parties unless 
such waiver is given in writing by a Party. No such waiver shall be a waiver of any past 
or future default, breach or modification of any of the terms, provisions, conditions or 
covenants of this Contract unless expressly set forth in such waiver. Nor shall any delay 
or omission on the part of a Party in exercising or availing itself of its rights hereunder 
constitute a waiver of such right. 
 
31. BUSINESS STANDARDS 
 
31.1 The Contractor, in performing its obligations under this Contract, shall comply with all 
Anti-Corruption Laws, to the extent applicable to the Contractor or the Company Group 
and shall establish and maintain appropriate business standards, procedures and 
controls including those necessary to avoid any real or apparent impropriety or adverse 
impact on the interests of the Company Group and the Company Group Personnel. The 
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Company reserves the right to review such standards and procedures prior to 
commencement of, and during the Drilling Operations. 
 
For purposes of this Section 31, Anti-Corruption Laws means any Law or other rule or 
regulation of any governmental authority that has jurisdiction over the issue in question, 
or any other legislative executive or administrative action of a governmental authority , or 
a final agreement judgment award, or court order that relates to the performance of this 
Contract, or to the interpretation or application of this Contract, and includes all Laws to 
the extent applicable, or (i) Nigeria or the country where services are being provided 
hereunder; (ii) the United States of America, including the United States Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977 (“FCPA”); (iii) the UK Bribery Act of 2010 (“UK Bribery Act”); and 
(iv) the country of formation and principal place of business of the Contractor; as any of 
the foregoing may be amended from time to time. 
 
31.2 The Contractor shall review with the Company, on a regular and frequent basis during 
the term of this Contract, the Contractor’s business practices, standards, procedures and 
controls, including, without limitation, those related to the: 
 
(a) activities of the Contractor Group and Contractor Group Personnel; 
 
(b) avoidance of any conflict of interest; and 
 
(c) giving of gifts, entertainment, bribes or favours of any kind in contravention of the 
FCPA and UK Bribery Act (collectively the “Anti-bribery Acts”). 
 
31.3 The Contractor represents to the Company that all financial statements, reports and 
billings rendered to the Company under this Contract shall properly reflect the facts of all 
activities and transactions handled for the Company’s account and Contractor 
acknowledges that same may be relied upon by Company as being complete and 
accurate in any further recording or reporting made by the Company for any purpose. 
 
31.4 The Contractor shall notify the Company in writing promptly upon discovery of any failure 
to comply with this Section 31. 
 
31.5 The Contractor shall conduct its business in accordance with all Applicable Laws 
prevailing in the Area of Operations and the Anti-bribery Acts to reflect a high standard of 
ethics in all its business transactions and to avoid any unlawful or unethical intervention in 
the political or other affairs of any country. In this regard Contractor shall not, nor permit: 
 
(a) to make any contributions, gifts or other incentive directly or indirectly, to any 
political party or candidate in connection with any election campaign for any 
government office unless such contribution is lawful; 
 
(b) to make any contributions, gifts or other incentive to any foreign political party, 
committee or candidate for public office unless such contribution is lawful in the 
country where it was made and does not contravene the Anti-bribery Acts; 
 
(c) to make any payment, gift, commission, fee, rebate or other incentive shall be 
made to or for the benefit of any supplier, customer, government or public official 
or other business associate of the Company which could reasonably be 
interpreted as being for the purpose of improperly influencing, inducing or 
facilitating a business or administrative decision of such supplier, customer, 
government or public official or other business associate and which contravenes 
relevant provisions of the Acts; and 
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(d) the Contractor shall not pay any commissions, fees, nor grant any rebates or 
incentives to any employee or officer of the Company or of any Contractor’s 
Subcontractor, nor favour said persons with gifts, bribes or entertainment of 
significant or substantial value, nor enter into any business arrangements with 
employees or officers of the Company other than with authorized representatives 
of the Company who are acting on behalf of the Company in compliance with the 
Anti-bribery Acts. The Contractor shall report in writing to the Company any 
solicitation of commissions, fees or rebates received in connection with this 
Contract. 
 
31.6 Without limiting the generality of this Section 31, each Party understands the purposes 
of the Anti-bribery. UK Anti-Corruption Legislation means the Public Bodies Corrupt 
Practices Act 1889, the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906, the Prevention of Corruption 
Act 1916 and the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, Part 12 and UK Bribery 
Act 2010 any other similar legislation in force at the date of this Contract. Each Party 
agrees that in carrying out the intent of this Contract, it shall strictly comply with the 
substance of the FCPA, the UK Anti-Corruption Legislation and any other similar laws 
and shall not take any action or permit any of its Affiliates or agents to take any action 
that would violate the substance of the FCPA, the UK Anti-Corruption Legislation or such 
other similar laws. 
 
31.7 Contractor, on behalf of Contractor and Contractor’s Group, warrants, on behalf of 
Contractor Group, that the members of Contractor Group: 
 
(a) are not government officials nor are they affiliated with any government official 
 
(b) understand the FCPA and the UK Anti-Corruption Legislations (collectively the 
“Acts”) Anti-bribery Acts, including any additional amendments thereof 
 
(c) have not and will not engage in conduct that would violate the Anti-bribery Acts if they 
had been subject to either of them. 
 
(d) will not cause the Company to violate either of the Anti-bribery Acts. 
 
32. LOCAL CONTENT 
 
In order to support the Government’s policy, Contractor shall in performing the Contract 
give preference to goods and services sourced from Nigeria provided these are 
competitive in quality, price and time of delivery. 
 
Subject to the provisions of Section 27, the Contractor shall comply at its sole cost and 
expense with any and all Applicable Laws. 
 
33. GOVERNING LAW 
 
This Contract shall be governed by, interpreted and construed in accordance with the 
laws of England. The courts of England shall have exclusive jurisdiction to settle any 




The provision in this Section 34 and Sections 1, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21.7, 22, 23, 
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35. DRILLING UNIT SECURITY 
 
A security assessment of the Drilling Unit taking into consideration all aspects of the 
locations of the wells will be undertaken by Control Risks Limited acting as an 
independent security advisor to both Parties. The measures recommended by Control 
Risks Limited shall be reviewed by both Parties and any recommendations agreed by 
both Parties shall be implemented at the cost and expense of Company. Company shall 
not unreasonably withhold its consent to the implementation of any recommendation 
considered beneficial to the security of the Drilling Unit and requested by Contractor. 
 
36. ENTIRE AGREEMENT 
 
This Contract contains the entire agreement between the Parties in relation to the 
subject matter hereof and, in the absence of fraud, supersedes any previous 
understandings, commitments, agreement or representations whatsoever, oral or written 
(including, for the avoidance of doubt, Contractor's standard terms of sale, service or 
supply, its price lists, estimates, quotations and work tickets). This Contract shall not be 
varied except by any instrument in writing executed by the duly authorised 
representatives of both Parties. 
 
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Parties hereto have caused this Contract to be executed in two (2) 
original texts on the date first above mentioned. 
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